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This dissertation is a rhetorical biography of Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864-1937), the 
foremost British proponent of pragmatism at the turn of the previous century.  Beyond 
reconstructing the development and receptions of Schiller’s thoughts, this dissertation brings the 
resources of rhetorical criticism to bear and focuses, in particular, on his style and its 
significance both in his own lifetime and afterward.  While spending most of his career in 
England, Schiller came in his time to be one of the most widely discussed figures in what is often 
considered a distinctly American philosophical movement.  This rhetorical biography analyzes, 
in chronological order, the most substantial and often contested arguments that Schiller engaged 
in so as to promote, first, Jamesian pragmatism and, secondly, his own pragmatic humanism.  
These arguments were meant to defend the principles of pragmatism and pragmatic humanism 
against the dominant strains of Idealism then current in both British and American philosophy.  
But they were also supported by reference to a wide range of topics: psychical research, formal 
logic, science, religion, and eugenics.  This dissertation examines how Schiller’s arguments 
exemplify the positive and negative aspects of the rhetorical category of style.  More specifically, 
this rhetorical biography posits that Schiller’s use of the stylistic figure repetition—the 
reiteration of key claims so as to emphasize their importance and to engage the pathos of the 
audience—helps to explain why Schiller is now a largely forgotten instigator of pragmatism, 
conceived herein as both a philosophical concept and a historical movement.  This dissertation 
also demonstrates how traditional methods of rhetorical criticism, often focusing on the set text 
or oration, can be profitably extended by way of archival materials, public documents, and a 
focus on the range of arguments offered over the expanse of a subject’s career. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION: THE DISSAPEARANCE OF A PRAGMATIST 
The philosopher’s voice is hushed in death but the meaning of his life 
cannot be entombed in glib words of appraisal—time alone will reveal his true stature.1 
 
The pragmatic family is a rather large and diverse one.  Once can assuredly point to philosophers 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey as the recognized forefathers.  That 
lineage leads up to well known contemporary philosophers such as Richard Rorty and Hillary 
Putnam.  Pragmatism also embraces distinguished scholars from a variety of other fields: John 
Patrick Diggins and Robert B. Westbrook in History, Morris Dickstein and Giles Gunn in 
English, Nancy Fraser and Alan Wolf in Political Science, Hans Joas in Sociology, and Michel 
Rosenfeld in Law.  And it has a well-heeled historical ancestry that goes beyond the 
aforementioned forefathers.  Various scholars point with confidence to the works of John Stuart 
Mill, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and W. E. B. DuBois and note pragmatic themes.  But pragmatists, 
like any other family, have their fair share of black sheep.  Whether by deliberate omission, 
supposed transgression, or institutional forgetting, the pragmatic family album contains a number 
of worn pages missing particular pictures.  This project hopes to reinsert one of those historical 
snapshots. 
                                               
1
 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, “F. C. S. Schiller: An Appreciation,” Personalist 19, no. 1 (January 1938): 11. 
 
  2 
1.1 FORGOTTEN ORIGINS: SCHILLER AND THE NARRATIVE OF 
PRAGMATISM 
In a letter dated three weeks prior to his death in 1910, William James wrote to the British 
pragmatist Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864-1937): “I leave the cause in your hands. . . . 
Good-bye, and God bless you. . . . Keep your health, your splendid health.  It is better than all the 
truths under the firmament.  Ever thy W. J.”  The cause was pragmatism and this is the Schiller 
who James once also referred to “as ‘the only clear writer’ on the pragmatic side.”2    This is the 
same Schiller whose influence on pragmatism was assessed by none other than Bertrand Russell, 
himself no fan of pragmatism: “The three founders of pragmatism differ greatly inter se; we may 
distinguish James, Schiller, and Dewey as respectively its religious, literary, and scientific 
protagonists.”3   This is the Schiller who said that “the origins of great truths, as of great men, are 
usually obscure, and by the time that the world has become cognizant of them and interested in 
their pedigree, they have usually grown old.” 4  It is doubtful Schiller knew how prescient his 
observation would be.  His involvement in the development of pragmatism—a philosophy that 
stressed contingency over absolutism, fallibility over certainty, and the future over the past—in 
the first decades of the previous century has been obscured.  And it is his involvement in 
bringing that philosophical movement to fruition that is the focus of this dissertation.  
                                               
2
 Qtd. in Kenneth Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1967), 20-1.  As a stylistic note: the terms pragmatism and humanism will remain lower case for 
the remainder of this dissertation, save in instances of direct quotations from other authors.  Given current usage and 
historical justification—that pragmatism and humanism were essentially methods and not metaphysics—this 
standardization seems warranted. 
 
3
 Qtd. in Reuben Abel, The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller (New York: King’s Crown Press, 
1955), 3. 
 
4
 F. C. S. Schiller, preface to Humanism: Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan and Company, 1912), 
xi-xxix. 
 
  3 
In an age given to hyperbole, with this or that calamity placing the last great conceptual 
juggernaut in the dustbin of history, one need be cautious in making assessments of scholars, 
philosophical or otherwise.  That being said, it is no exaggeration to suggest that Schiller, as 
Steven Mailloux argues, “is Pragmatism’s most forgotten major figure.”5   Today a search for his 
works often results in frustration.  Many are out of print.  Others are tucked away in antiquarian 
bookstores in the United Kingdom, often at a high cost and in less than stellar condition.  Some, 
given their status as public domain, are now available only as cheap trade facsimiles. While the 
works of William James and John Dewey go through new rounds of publication at prestigious 
publishing houses, Schiller’s works are given no such treatment.   
This dissertation is a rhetorical biography.  It argues that Schiller’s substantial body of 
work demonstrates his historical and contemporary relevance to pragmatism.  It divides 
Schiller’s life into periods—1882-1897, 1898-1905, 1906-1910, 1911-1919, 1920-1926, 1927-
1939—and moves chronologically through the works he created during these phases in his 
career.  It undertakes not only a study of his discourse, but of other discourses produced in 
response to or in reflection on Schiller’s works during these periods.  This dissertation 
contributes to the fields of intellectual history, rhetorical history and criticism, and reception 
studies, by providing a case study that complements and expands upon those areas of inquiry.  In 
addition, it contributes to the interdisciplinary study of pragmatism undertaken in recent years in 
communication, history, philosophy, and cultural studies. 
                                               
5
 Steven Mailloux, ed., “Introduction: Sophistry and Rhetorical Pragmatism,” Rhetoric, Sophistry, 
Pragmatism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 8, n. 16. 
 
  4 
 The primary voice and promoter of pragmatism in Europe around the turn of the previous 
century,6 Schiller’s pedigree is impressive.  Born on 16 August 1864 in Othmarschen, Holstein, 
Denmark (near what is now Hamburg, Germany) to a father who made his money via 
commercial interests in colonial India, it can be suggested that his was a life of comfort if not 
privilege.  The family had a house in Switzerland, one that they retained through most of 
Schiller’s life and one he regularly visited in the summer with friends in tow.  His early 
education in the 1870s was at Belsize Manor, Hampstead, and the School at University College, 
London.7  He transferred in the late 1870s or early 1880s to the Rugby Boarding School, Rugby, 
and then matriculated to Balliol College, Oxford, in 1882.  After receiving his 1st Lit. Hum. and 
B.A. in 1886 and a Taylorian Scholarship in German in 1887 at Oxford, he spent a brief period 
of time as a tutor of German at Eaton.  From the proceeds of his tutoring job, Schiller returned to 
Oxford, receiving his M.A. in October 1891.  From 1893-1897, Schiller served as an Instructor 
in Philosophy and attended courses at Cornell University where, for conflicting reasons, he failed 
the oral component of his doctorate.  Upon his return from Cornell, he became an instructor at 
Corpus Christi (receiving his D.Sc in 1906), a position that he held with promotions—Assistant 
Tutor and Fellow (1897), Assistant Tutor with Fellowship (1900), Tutor (1903), Senior Tutor 
and Extraordinary Fellow (1926)—for most of his career.8  In 1926, Schiller retired from active 
                                               
6
 C. E. M. Joad,  Introduction to Modern Philosophy  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 67; Alban Widgery,  
“Pragmatist Humanism,”  Contemporary Thought of Great Britain (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), 125. 
 
7
 Belsize Manor [Hampstead], “Lower School Report of Conduct and Progress for Easter Term 1872,” Box 
Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research 
Library, University of California, Los Angeles; “University College, London, School Reports,” June 1874-July 
1877, Scholastic Papers, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, 
Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. 
 
8
 College Minutes, Corpus Christi College, 1897; 1900; 1926; B/4/1/10, Corpus Christi College, Oxford.  
Schiller was comfortable mixing his vacations in Switzerland and elsewhere with his extracurricular activities at 
Oxford, even after his retirement (though he still kept an honorary position and room there).  The 20 May 1933 
minutes from his department note, Sect. V., sub. c, “Dr. Schiller was re-elected Garden-Master” (College Minutes, 
  5 
teaching at Corpus Christi and began dividing his time between Oxford and the University of 
Southern California (USC), where he was awarded a visiting lecturer position (1927), a 
Professorship and an honorary LL.D (1930).  He took up residence in Los Angeles full-time in 
1935 and married his only wife, Louise Strang (Griswold).  There he remained until his death, 
from a long-term heart condition, on 6 August 1937.9  
 Schiller was named an honorary member of the Circolo di Filosofia [Rome] in 1909, the 
president of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) in 1914, president of the Aristotelian 
Society in 1921, elected fellow of the British Academy in 1926, held honorary Treasurership and 
Membership in the Mind Association, and was a member of the British Eugenics Society in the 
pre- and inter-war years, frequently contributing to the journals and conferences of the latter 
two.10  During the span of his prolific career Schiller is estimated to have written, in the lone 
comprehensive review of Schiller (by New School of Social Research philosopher Reuben 
Abel), fourteen books and hundreds of articles and book reviews in journals such as Mind, 
                                                                                                                                                       
B/4/1/13, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 1933).  This is to be coupled with the observations of Ralph Tyler 
Flewelling: “Had a little greenhouse on campus of Corpus Christi where he germinated seeds he picked up in his 
travels” (in Allan Shields, "Some Impressions of F. C. S. Schiller," Personalist 55 [1974]: 291). 
 
9
 Unless noted, the information in the above paragraph is culled from: The Balliol College Register, ed. 
Edward Hilliard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914); Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Los Angeles, to F. C. S. Schiller, 
11 July 1930, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special 
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; The Balliol College 
Register, 2d ed., ed. Sir Ivo Elliot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934); R. R. Marett, “Ferdinand Canning Scott 
Schiller, 1864-1937,” Proceedings of the British Academy 23 (1937): 3-15; J. I McKie, “Dr. F. C. S. Schiller (1864-
1937),” Mind 47, no. 185 (January 1938): 135-9; Louise Strang Schiller, foreword to Our Human Truths, by F. C. S. 
Schiller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), vii-viii; Reuben Abel, The Pragmatic, 7; Winetrout, F. C. S. 
Schiller, 7. 
 
10
  The above information is culled from: Bianca Paulusci, Rome, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 April 1909, 
Correspondence, Box Three, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles 
E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; McKie, “Dr.,” 136; Finding Aid for the F. C. S. 
Schiller Papers (Collection 191), 1968, Department of Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young 
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles, x. 
 
  6 
Eugenics Review, the Journal of Philosophy, and others.11  His reputation was so great that the 
likes of Henri Bergson, John Dewey, and Bertrand Russell—persons not always in accord with 
Schiller’s philosophical views—wrote him letters of recommendation in his pursuit of the 
Waynflete Professorship of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy in 1910, the Wykeham Chair of 
Logic in 1919, and the Deputy Professorship of Moral Philosophy in 1922.12   
 During Schiller’s lifetime, there were numerous reviews of his books and lively, often 
tense, exchanges with his critics and consorts.  These materials suggest that Schiller’s active life 
as a philosopher extended up through his last years.  From 1922 through 1929, in the American 
Journal of Philosophy, he engaged in debates with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Dickinson 
S. Miller (1868-1963) regarding the analysis of mind and the merits of William James’s concept 
of the “Will to Believe.”  As late as 1936, in the British journal Mind, he mounted exchanges 
with C. A. Mace (1894-1971) regarding formalism in 1932 and took issue with W. T. Feldman’s 
(1909- ?) book on Dewey, The Philosophy of John Dewey.13  Before, and in between, in these 
journals and others, Schiller sparred with persons ranging from Max Eastman (1883-1969) to 
Lizzie Susan Stebbing (1885-1943) to Ralph Barton Perry (1876-1957).14   
                                               
11
 Abel, The Pragmatic, 179. 
 
12
 Finding Aid, 11-2. 
 
13
 The issue of formalism should be emphasized, as it seems to be a component of current histories of 
pragmatism that is underdeveloped, and under-developed as it regards pragmatist’s interest in history (especially in 
Diggins).  For a lucid reminder of formalism’s relation to philosophical history, see Morton G. White, Social 
Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (New York: The Viking Press, 1949), 11-15. 
 
14
 All three of these scholars took exception to Schiller’s promotion of pragmatism, albeit in different ways 
that will be discussed later.  For a useful gloss on Eastman’s approach to philosophy and social causes (he became 
editor of the left wing magazine The Masses in 1921 but turned to anti-communist writings later in life), one is 
directed to “Max Eastman,” Spartacus,  available from www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Jeastman.htm, Internet.  
Both Stebbing and Perry share the distinction of being on the formalist side of the philosophical camp and, as such, 
as being in the sights of Schiller; for information on their philosophical positions, see Ralph Barton Perry, The 
Approach to Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1905); and Lizzie Susan Stebbing,  A Modern 
Introduction to Logic, 1930 (London: Methuen, 1950). 
  7 
Though there was a respectful smattering of acknowledgements at the time of his death,15 
the drop off in coverage in the years after his demise is dramatic.  Schiller, a philosopher who 
was praised by James, recognized by Russell and in discussion with some of the leading minds 
of his era, suffered a plummeting fall from the pages of philosophy.  Abel notes that, given his 
importance to pragmatism, Schiller “deserves to be known better.”16  But, only thirty years after 
his death, Schiller was deemed “virtually forgotten,” “scarcely read or mentioned” and “put out 
of mind.”17    The printed details bear these comments out.  There is scant publication of his 
correspondence after his death.18  There exist only a handful of significant published treatments 
of his work.19  Only a few additional studies—ranging from biographic overviews to 
                                               
15
 Some of which include: Marett, “Ferdinand,” 1-15; McKie, “Dr. F. C. S.,” 135-139; Flewelling, “F. C. 
S.,” 5-11; Louis J. Hopkins, “Dr. Schiller as A Man and Friend,” Personalist 19, no. 1 (January 1938): 12-5; “Dr. F. 
C. S. Schiller,” Journal of the Society for Psychical Research  30 (April 1938): 204-5. 
 
16
 Abel, The Pragmatic, 7. 
 
17
 Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller, 6. 
 
18
 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, “James, Schiller, and Personalism,” Personalist 23, no. 2 (April 1942): 172-181; 
“A Group of F. C. S. Schiller Letters,” Personalist 30, no. 4 (October 1949): 385-392; “A Schiller Holograph,” 
Personalist 50, no. 4 (October 1959): 388-390; Frederick J. D. Scott, "Peirce and Schiller and Their 
Correspondence," Journal of the History of Philosophy 11 (1973): 363-386.  This is not to suggest that Schiller is 
not mentioned in the published letters of others.  Quite the contrary, and to the point of this dissertation, Schiller is 
usually mentioned only in passing.  In rare instances, however, the treatment is more substantial.  See, for instance, 
the coverage in: James, William, The Thought and Character of William James, vols. 1-2, ed. Ralph Barton Perry 
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935). 
 
19
 Abel, The Pragmatic, provides a concise documentation of works related to Schiller; Winetrout, F. C. S. 
Schiller (interested readers may wish to consult a review of this work and Winetrout’s response, both of which 
suggest the extent to which one philosophic view can shade the evaluation of another: Foster McMurray, review of 
F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Philosophy and Education 7, no. 4 [Fall 1972]: 370-9; and Winetrout, “Reply to Foster 
McMurray,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 7, no. 4 [Fall 1972]: 379-82); Herbert L. Searles and Allan 
Shields, A Bibliography of F. C. S. Schiller (San Diego: San Diego State College Press, 1969), an exhaustive and 
invaluable chronological survey of almost all of Schiller’s works. 
These four authors provided the impetus for the study of Schiller in the 50s and 60s.  Other works they 
authored dealing with Schiller include: Reuben Abel, ed., introduction to Humanistic Pragmatism: The Philosophy 
of F. C. S. Schiller (New York: Free Press, 1966), 7-11; Kenneth Winetrout, “Aspects of F. C. S. Schiller’s Concept 
of Truth,” Educational Theory 6 (April 1956): 105-22, “Must Pragmatists Disagree?  Dewey and Schiller,” 
Educational Theory 10 (January 1960): 57-65, “William James and F. C. S. Schiller: An Essay in Honor of 
Schiller’s Centennial Year 1964,” Educational Theory 14 (July 1964): 158-67, “F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937): Some 
Centennial Thoughts,” Personalist 45 (July 1964): 301-315; Herbert L. Searles, “Pragmatism Today,” Personalist 32 
(1951): 137-52; “The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller,” Personalist 35 (1954): 14-24; and Allan Shields, “An 
  8 
comparative treatments to relatively minor references to portions of his work—have been 
undertaken.20     And the most recent critical engagements of his work (excepting the works of 
John R. Shook and Steven Mailloux) are over a decade old.21   
                                                                                                                                                       
Exposition and Critique of Humanistic Voluntarism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937),” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Southern California, June 1951), “F. C. S. Schiller: An Unpublished Memorial by John Dewey,” ed. 
Allan Shields, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 3 (1967): 51-4, “Some Impressions of F. C. S. Schiller,” 
Personalist 55 (1974): 290-7.  This latter essay by Shields is actually a collection of survey responses from 
philosophers regarding their knowledge of Schiller’s teaching, criticism, philosophical impact, hobbies and the like.  
The dichotomy between Schiller being perceived as good/bad is, on most counts, interesting but not revelatory.  
Most fascinating, though, is a reply as to what ‘kind of man’ Schiller was (on page 296) by John Burton Sanderson 
Haldane.  In it, Haldane posits, after noting how interesting he found Schiller’s beard as a child, that Schiller was 
either “held by the superior attractions of a celibate life in college” (scholars at Oxford were, for a time, asked to 
maintain a temporary period of abstinence) or “homosexual (not necessarily overtly).” 
Two authors provide more recent work discussing Schiller’s influence.  Steven Mailloux, Professor of 
English and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, has given respectful treatment to Schiller. 
See Mailloux, “Introduction,” 1-31; “The Sophistry of Rhetorical Pragmatism,” Reception Histories: Rhetoric, 
Pragmatism, and American Cultural Studies (London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 20-42.   John R. Shook, 
Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Pragmatism Archive at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, provides 
an instructive, and critical, assessment of Schiller.  See “Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott (1864–1937),” 
Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century British Philosophers (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2002), 979-983.  Shook also 
authored an amended, and greatly improved, version of the Searles and Shields bibliography (and offers an on-line 
version of the article listed above) available at the Pragmatism Cybrary: www.pragmatism.org/history/Schiller.htm. 
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 Nor are these instances the only ones that indicate Schiller’s excise by exclusion.  The 
absence is palpably felt in commentaries on pragmatism.  For although pragmatism suffered 
scorn in the decades immediately following the Second World War, 22 pragmatism has witnessed 
a robust and productive reemergence on the intellectual scene since the 1980s.  Richard Rorty’s 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), Cornel West’s The American Evasion of Philosophy 
(1989), John Patrick Diggins’ The Promise of Pragmatism (1994), The Revival of Pragmatism 
(1998), a collection of essays edited by Morris Dickstein, Louis Menand’s The Metaphysical 
Club (2001) and numerous others have sought to reassert pragmatism’s relevance to the present 
day or to trace out the historical foundations underlying its development.23   What is lacking, 
though, is any sustained coverage of Schiller’s contributions to pragmatism’s history.  What is 
striking is what little these works do contain relating to Schiller seems to suggest his continued 
relevance.   What is unfortunate is that these snippets prove only to transition back to the 
accepted triumvirate, point towards the inclusion of a rather more extended family, or revise the 
pragmatic view in often radically different ways. 
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To be clear, the aforesaid are the works of learned scholars.  I have no major qualms with 
what the authors are discussing, nor do I wish to challenge the points that they make.  My point 
is much more specific.  These substantial works have done much to reintroduce us to 
pragmatism; but they have done so with barely a nod to Schiller.  The first of these works to refer 
to Schiller is West’s.  Therein, Willard V. O. Quine comments on the scientific views of the 
“pragmatists James, Schiller, and Dewey.”   But West uses this as a transition to explain Quine’s 
relation to certain concepts found only in Dewey’s works.24  Diggins is next to reference 
Schiller.  He only notes that James argued in 1907 that “Pragmatists like Dewey and Schiller are 
not destroying all objective standards in rethinking the concepts of truth . . . .”25  Menand’s book 
contains three references to Schiller.  In the first, referencing the period of time around the late 
1890s, Menand references “James’s chief British ally, Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, at 
Oxford.”  In the second, it is a quote from Schiller in 1902, mentioning in a letter to James that 
“Dewey ‘seems to be teaching a sort of pragmatism at Chicago.’”  The final reference is a 
comment from the later critic of pragmatism, Randolph Bourne.  Therein, Bourne explains that, 
after taking courses from James and Dewey, he “contracted what he called ‘the virus of the 
Bergson-James-Schiller-instrumentalism.’”26  In each case Schiller is, as they say, in the mix.  
But in these capable hands, he is an extraneous ingredient.    
This dearth of coverage is all the more surprising when one begins to contextualize 
Schiller within the pragmatic milieu in the first decades of the previous century.  There is ample 
evidence to suggest that the tripartite origins of pragmatism via Peirce, James, and Dewey should 
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more rightly become quadripartite.  And, chronologically speaking, Schiller should be placed 
prior to Dewey in explicating the basic components of pragmatism.  As Winetrout notes: 
Schiller was very much recognized by Peirce and especially James as a progenitor and a 
protector of pragmatism. . . . On certain levels he antedated both James and Dewey as an 
explicator of this new philosophy.  Much of the source material for this conclusion was 
published before the key philosophical works of Dewey appeared.27 
 
One need not rely solely on Winetrout, himself an admitted champion of Schiller’s cause.  Less 
friendly critics concur.  Bertrand Russell argues that “Dewey . . . with James and Dr. Schiller, 
was one of the three founders of pragmatism,” eliminating Peirce on account of his self-imposed 
retirement from the pragmatic scene in 1905.28   Peirce, though exiled by Russell, supports this 
contention by stating in 1906 that “the brilliant and marvelously human thinker, Mr. F. C. S. 
Schiller . . . seems to occupy ground of his own . . . between those of James and mine.”29   It was 
only two years earlier, and only a few years removed from his time at Cornell, that Schiller 
intimates as much in his letter to James (who, it should be recalled, preferred Schiller’s use of the 
term humanism to either the general pragmatism or Dewey’s instrumentalism).   Alban Gregory 
Widgery (1887-1968), in his 1927 work Contemporary Thought of Great Britain, is even more 
pointed in asserting that Schiller’s place in the chronological development of pragmatism is prior 
to that Dewey: “Schiller’s thought was not a product of the discussion of Pragmatism in the first 
decade of the century; his work was a predisposing cause of and a leading part in that 
discussion.”30  However, this claim may be taken as a slightly dubious boast.  Though not 
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entirely out of step with the sentiments expressed, it is clear that Schiller’s literary and 
philosophical involvement in pragmatism proper only occurred after his four year stint at Cornell 
in the late 1890s and was the result of James’s nearby influence at Harvard. 
1.2 THE RIGHT TO POSTULATE: SCHILLER’S VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM 
His position in the pragmatic family aside, Schiller’s pragmatic humanism was a personality-
driven, human-centered, philosophy.  It operated as a response against the Anglo-Hegelianism of 
his idealist peers at Oxford, just as James and Dewey reacted to its derivations in the States. 31   
Taken charitably, Idealism stressed the theoretical possibility of constructing a universal 
metaphysic.  Taken less kindly, Abel argues that Idealism was marked by “absolutism, 
authoritarianism, monism, rationalism, and intellectualism.”32  Schiller’s approach, in contrast, 
was based in the view that “all acts and all thoughts are irreducibly the products of individual 
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human beings, and are therefore inescapably associated with the needs, desires, and purposes of 
men.”33  As he states in the 1907 (a reworking of arguments he had put forth in 1905) “The 
Definition of Pragmatism and Humanism”: 
Human interest, then, is vital to the existence of truth; to say that a truth has 
consequences and that what has none is meaningless means that it has a bearing upon 
some human interest.  Its “consequences” must be consequences to someone engaged on 
a real problem for some purpose.34 
 
And truth, for Schiller, is found in verification by way of application: “Hence all real truths must 
have shown themselves to be useful; they must have been applied to some problem of actual 
knowing, by usefulness in which they were tested and verified.”35  Thus truth is not static nor is 
it eternal.  Moreover, truth is applied and useful only within a certain set “sphere of application” 
by which its use is tied to its purpose in a given situation.36 
Such use, and understanding of use, is therefore the domain of humans.  Humans 
recognize that they make choices as to and between truths and their applications.  These choices 
are subject to—in contrast with what Schiller saw as the robotics of materialism or the 
absolutism of the rationalists—“the permeation of all actual knowing by interests, purposes, 
desires, emotions, ends, goods, postulations, choices, etc.”37  Thus pragmatism, while not 
forming a logical system to organize human action, nonetheless provides “an epistemological 
                                               
33
 Abel, introduction to Humanistic, 8. 
 
34
 Abel, Humanistic, 59; this and subsequent citations in this section will include references to Schiller’s 
book—as many of his chapters in books were originally found in journals—as well: F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in 
Humanism (London: Macmillan and Co., 1907), 5. 
 
35
 Abel, Humanistic, 61; Schiller, Studies, 8. 
 
36
 Abel, Humanistic, 63; Schiller, Studies, 9. 
 
37
 Abel, Humanistic, 64; Schiller, Studies, 11. 
 
  14 
method which really describes the facts of actual knowing.”38  It articulates the means by which 
options are decided upon, tested, and then accepted in everyday life. 
But pragmatism is connected to the larger framework of Schiller’s humanism.  Simply 
put, humanism is a philosophical approach to ameliorating human problems.  Or, in his words, 
“it demands that man’s integral nature shall be used as the whole premises which philosophy 
must argue from wholeheartedly, that man’s complete satisfaction shall be the conclusion that 
philosophy must aim at.”39  As a result, pragmatic humanism can be understood in two ways.  
Pragmatism is the method by which to apply humanism; or, framed differently, humanism is the 
pragmatic approach writ large.  Together, then, they provide for the basis of arguing against any 
complete or systematic metaphysics since: (1) knowing is subject to human idiosyncrasies, and 
(2) knowledge (or truth) is subject to the conditions of the time in which it occurs.40  The goal of 
eradicating human dilemmas is always predicated on the contingency of human practices. 
Schiller’s pragmatic humanism also ventures into the realms beyond our cognition, if 
only to attempt a more scientific approach to those realms.   A significant portion of his time was 
spent working on psychical research, with his involvement in the British SPR dating back to his 
days at Balliol in the 1880s.  As Winetrout notes, “Schiller saw the question as not only 
profoundly philosophical but as downright practical.”41  And he approached the issue of 
researching immortality, channeling, and mediums with a scientific rigor that sought at “getting 
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such a grasp of the conditions of such events that they can become predictable and ‘normal’.”42  
He went so far as to argue for the creation of a foundation to study immortality and “went about 
searching for evidence of the afterlife as deliberately as we go about our huge chemical 
laboratories looking for new ways to kill houseflies.”43  
In regards to religion, Schiller argued in 1924 that it “is not a homogeneous body of 
belief, but rather a medley, to which various motives and attitudes, good, bad, and indifferent, 
have contributed.”44   As such, and in-line with the previous discussion, he argued that “religious 
truths also will begin their careers as postulates, and will need, and will receive, verification by 
experience.”45  And, should one question the issue of God, they should go about it pragmatically 
as well: “’God’ is a postulate, or rather a number of postulates, to be tested, like all postulates, by 
its working.”46  All of these areas of study were, to Schiller, necessary and compelling; and, 
operating from a pragmatic and humanistic perspective, seem tied to the James’s hypothesis that 
“there is no source of deception . . . which can compare with a fixed belief that certain kinds of 
phenomena are impossible.”47  
Schiller was also invested in, in contrast to the psychological interests of James and the 
educational and political interests of Dewey, the then flourishing eugenics movement.  Two of 
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his books—Eugenics and Politics (1926), Social Decay and Eugenical Reform (1932)48—deal 
specifically with the topic and three others—Tantalus; or, The Future of Man (1924), Cassandra; 
or, The Future of the British Empire (1926) and Our Human Truths (posthumously, 1939)—
elaborate on the topic in specific sections.49  While it is safe to say that most of his perspectives 
on eugenics have been relegated to the scrapheap, it is equally wise to suggest that Schiller’s 
views deserve, and will receive, further elaboration in subsequent chapters.  This elaboration is 
not simply because eugenics is a taboo topic.  Quite the opposite; it is because other pragmatists 
suggested in their writings tendencies tangential to (though never officially aligned with) the 
eugenics endorsed by Schiller.  In 1929, John Dewey published The Quest for Certainty.  In it, 
he noted that pragmatic philosophers are not concerned with a priori assumptions; they are 
interested in “. . . finding how authentic beliefs about existence as they currently exist can 
operate fruitfully and efficaciously in connection with the practical problems that are urgent in 
actual life.”  He went on to suggest: “Science advances by adopting the instruments and doings 
of directed practice, and the knowledge thus gained becomes a means of the development of arts 
which bring nature still further into actual and potential service of human purposes and 
valuations.”50  Is it so far-fetched to assume that pragmatists would see the then-promising 
“science” of eugenics as a basis for turning the potential into the actual?  Or, as a Peircean might 
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put it, are the interpretative possibilities of eugenics enough to suggest that science is guiding us 
closer to the “reality” of what science can provide?  Though this interpretation runs up against 
the criticism of certain historians of pragmatism (West and Diggins especially) it is, I think, a 
central and underdeveloped issue regarding the status of pragmatism as a method for resolving 
contingent situations: to what extent does pragmatism warrant specific types of action?  In the 
hands of Schiller, the question becomes even more pressing. 
Another crucial part of Schiller’s philosophy was the manner in which he articulated it.  
While Peirce was known to engage in spirited and, at times, humorous arguments, he is more 
likely known for either his penchant for triadic groupings or especially dense semiotic 
discussions.  And even a cursory glance at the writings of Dewey, by those either disposed to or 
suspicious of his arguments, will not suggest a significant emphasis on humor or wordplay.  In 
contrast, Schiller was consistently noted as a “vigorous polemicist” who wrote in a “sprightly 
and spirited” style that was accessible to everyone.51  Winetrout concurs: “the one thing on 
which everyone seems in agreement regarding Schiller is that he was a first-class wit—in small 
talk, on hikes, in classroom lectures, and in philosophic talk of the highest order.”52  But 
Winetrout also notes that even James, himself given to joking, “on more than one occasion  . . . 
begged his English friend to go a little easy in his horseplay and polemical jeers.”53  These dual 
tendencies are clearly present in Schiller’s preface to Pragmatism by D. L. Murray.  He first 
jokes that Murray’s youth is a necessity when dealing with pragmatism and demonstrative of the 
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fact that old philosophers are “a justification of death from the standpoint of social progress.”54  
Schiller then levels the accusation that “the critics of Pragmatism have produced only caricatures 
so gross as to be unrecognizable, and so obscure as to be unintelligible.”55  In other instances, 
such as “Must Philosophy Be Dull?,” his fury was even more pointed when he chided his peers’ 
use of wordiness and sterility at the expense of interest or clarity:  “The more pedestrian of 
philosophers wander about . . . with their heads in culs de sac; the more dashing pursue dead 
issues into dead ends. . . . Hence they leave behind them litter, but not literature.”56  This mix of 
style, polemics, and substance fueled Schiller’s writing at a time when the basic components of 
pragmatism were still being determined and debated. 
Schiller also complicates the accepted and simplistic notion that pragmatism was a 
distinctly American philosophical movement.57   Given Schiller’s involvement in the 
development of pragmatism, and his interactions with Peirce and James, interactions which go 
back at least to his time at Cornell from 1893-1897, it should be clear that its founding instigators 
did not all originate on this (itself presumptuous) side of the pond.  Schiller’s involvement in 
promoting pragmatism, indeed his articulation of it, complements the works of Peirce, James, 
and Dewey and adds nuance to our understanding of the pragmatic movement.  Moreover, his 
interest in psychical research, an interest he shared with James, and his involvement in eugenics, 
extend the range of issues which pragmatism sought to entertain, even as they complicate its 
origins.  More so, Schiller’s work tests the claim that pragmatism, beyond being distinctly 
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American, is essentially democratic.58   A comment by James T. Kloppenberg is telling: “This 
view of the relation between pragmatism and democracy [that ‘it is the form of social life 
consistent with pragmatism’], which intellectual historians have been urging now for a decade, 
helps explain the resurgence of interest in pragmatism.”59     
What, though, necessitates such an urge?  If it is the “distinctly American” label, we see 
in Schiller a rupture of the argument.  If it is a claim to solidarity and freedom from cruelty in 
neo-pragmatists like Rorty, there looms the issue of eugenics.  While it might be appealing to 
argue that Schiller operates as a deviation from pragmatism’s norm, I see it as more beneficial to 
ask how Schiller adds to the history of pragmatism which he helped to create and portions of 
which we now tend to ignore.  Understanding why Schiller was so vigorously discussed in his 
time is but one part of this dissertation.  Another is to examine why he is now so obviously not 
discussed.  And, finally, the aim is to understand how the previous two questions interact, how 
they might relate to and enrich the study of pragmatism as a historical movement and a 
philosophical concept.  The focus now turns not whether Schiller’s contributions deserve to be 
considered, but how best to bring them to light.   
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1.3 A MATTER OF METHOD(S): EXTENDING RHETORICAL BIOGRAPHY 
As stated at the onset, I propose this dissertation as a rhetorical biography.  Said biography 
examines the persuasive processes at work in selected and relevant discourse over time by a 
given person.  In my case, I attend to the development of Schiller’s argumentation, with 
particular focus on his humanistic pragmatism and the contexts in which it was created, the 
methods by which it was disseminated, and the reception that it received by different audiences.  
These processes have both public and private components.  The former exist within what Lloyd 
Bitzer has called the realm of “public knowledge”60 and consist of the published books, reviews, 
and articles written by and about Schiller.  The latter exist largely in archival form.  They consist 
of letters, memos, and other extant materials that were written either by or about Schiller, but 
have as yet escaped general publication.  They extend to include the records of the publishers 
who helped Schiller to publish his works, the readers who were asked to comment on those 
works, and unpublished correspondences which undertook, in whole or in part, to explain 
Schiller’s works.  This rhetorical biography uses these public and private components to 
understand how Schiller’s attempts to persuade both failed and succeeded in his time.  It also 
uses them to explain his absence in the development and received history of pragmatism after his 
death.  My hypothesis is that his being alive constitutes the single most important reason he is 
now neglected: he was able to manage and massage his message.  It also relates to my view of 
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the private side of the Schiller debate: when there was no sense that his public aspects were 
important, there was less reason for the private documents to either be created or referenced. 
But suggesting that a rhetorical biography affords a clew as to Schiller’s impact on 
pragmatism might be cause for pause.  He rarely used the term ‘rhetoric’ and he is obviously not 
a rhetorician in the classical sense of the term; Schiller is, patently, a philosopher.   But Schiller 
does adhere to the more current suggestions that rhetoric lurks in places once thought out of 
bounds.  He marshaled arguments in support of a cause.  He responded to critics with aplomb not 
often seen in other pragmatists.  And he offers a compelling example of a person who, though 
arguing for pragmatism, has been lost in the uptake that has carried it forward.  Schiller’s was an 
important, if now neglected, effort to propagate first generation pragmatism.  As such, this 
rhetorical biography is as much about reclamation as is it is about simple recognition.   
More generally, rhetorical biography is a species of rhetorical criticism.61  As a species, it 
differs from other forms of criticism in its focus.62  It is not generally construed as ideologically 
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based (Marxist, Feminist, Postmodernist).  Traditionally, rhetorical criticism was conceived of 
within a fivefold schema derived from classical rhetorical texts.63  Invention (or inventio) is the 
method whereby a rhetor seeks to create, that is, invent, the arguments that will be used to 
persuade.  Arrangement (or dispositio) provides the manner in which these arguments are 
ordered.  Style (or elocutio) is how the arguments, once arranged, are expressed.   Memory (or 
memoria) deals with the methods of recalling and presenting the arguments once they have been 
created, organized, and shaped.  Delivery (or actio) deals with the various ways—impromptu or 
extemporaneous, verbally or orally—in which the argument can then be presented to an 
audience.  Taken together, these five steps were suggested to be the sequential steps in the 
process of composing persuasive discourse.  By following them, rhetors might be able to craft an 
effective message.  By studying them, critics might be able to discern—in addition to 
scrutinizing situational variables such as place, topic, audience, and response—the success or 
failure of a given rhetorical act.   
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 As commonsensical as that sounds, the justification still might not suffice.  In 1963, 
Waldo Braden suggested that “rhetoric, public address, and rhetorical criticism” corresponded to 
the “theory, practice, and judgment in speaking.”64   So some might ask why this is not a study of 
public address.  My answer is best explained by reference to the above and in reference to the 
genus/species distinction.  With the extension beyond the spoken work granted, the tripartite 
division still provides an easily understood and obviously practical orientation to rhetorical 
criticism as a genre.  But rhetorical biography, as I conceive of it and as a specific form of 
criticism, attempts to provide an interpretative account of historical acts of persuasion: 
A historical interpretation attempts to empathize with a historical figure in order to 
understand the “proposed world” found in historical texts as best we can.  
Presuppositionless interpretation is impossible, of course, but the point of historical 
interpretation is to try to understand what is alien (or Other) about the text—what is not 
already articulated in our current thinking.65 
 
Schiller, as an object of rhetorical biography, is freed from what one instance of persuasion 
attempted and what one response thereto suggested.  What is deemed subject to judgment, that is 
to say criticism, are a variety of forms of address where persuasive techniques are utilized.   Such 
forms of address occur, not in isolation, but in response to and so as to advance additional 
arguments; they provide the instances that help the critic to solve “the rhetorical problem of how 
interpreters interact with other interpreters in trying to argue for or against different meanings.”66   
Rhetorical biography endeavors to understand Schiller not just as a snapshot discarded, but as a 
partially obscured player in the historical promotion of pragmatism.   
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As with any form of criticism, rhetorical biography admits of a variety of methods of 
assessment.   Thus it is best to explain what critical tools underlie this study.  If any one of the 
traditional processes is paramount in this study, it is style.  Schiller, as has already been noted, 
was the literary arm of pragmatism.  He was a fierce polemicist, trading barb for barb and 
witticism for witticism.   But this tool can be further refined.  If any one aspect of style is key to 
understanding Schiller’s reception, it is the figure of repetition (repetitio).   As a stylistic device, 
repetition is used to: (1) clarify positions, (2) emphasize their importance, and (3) to arouse an 
emotional response.  And Schiller’s polemical sallies, especially in the formative years of 
pragmatism but also in his later writings, consistently returned to specific issues central to his 
understanding of the aims and practices of pragmatic humanism: formalism in philosophy and 
logic, the relation of religion and science, and the relation of theory to practice. 
Granted, this focus on style is a choice.  The classical canon of rhetoric clearly suggests 
that it is only one part in a larger matrix of concerns.  But style occupies the seat in rhetoric 
where the manner of articulation is considered.  And style is, as exemplified by Schiller, 
demonstrative of persuasion as more than merely method, as also the reception to that which is 
produced.  As Mailloux notes, “persuasion refers to both a rhetorical process and a result of that 
process.  To be persuaded is to take on a new persuasion.”67  We should add, of course, that the 
reverse is equally true: to not be persuaded complicates how one understands the processes of 
persuasion that were utilized. 68   What’s more, style functions as the point in the process 
                                               
67
 Mailloux, Reception, 103. 
 
68
 A neglected piece of rhetoric’s rhetorical history in departments of communication makes this point, 
albeit in focusing solely on spoken discourse: “. . . a speech otherwise persuasive may fail of effect because the 
speaker lacks a persuasive ethos . . . How many a good policy has been beaten or postponed for want of proper 
presentation!  How many a just and able man has suffered because of an unpersuasive announcement of his 
purposes!” (Hoyt H. Hudson, “The Field of Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of Speech Education 9, no. 2 [April 1923]: 
174-75). 
  25 
whereby what is conceived is translated into what is conveyed.  “Without style or verbal 
expression, invention and disposition could have no effect.  And it is style that provides the basis 
for memory and delivery.”69  Style, as a consequence, is surely one of the most important factors 
in Schiller’s arguments for pragmatism.  The printed page provides only certain clues as to the 
methods of persuasion.  It is, as it were, actio laid bare but static.  Responses to those pages 
provide interpretative clews as to the reception of others; but, again, this is delivery in isolation.   
Style, conceived within the framework of this rhetorical biography, goes beyond the stationary 
texts to use additional sources—historical, political, philosophical, archival, and otherwise—so 
as to reference inventio and dispositio in service to understanding how memoria and actio were 
possibly shaped.70  In short, it the style of Schiller’s arguments that is the overriding focus of this 
study.71 
This approach to style, regarding it as both a process of constructing discourse and as a 
recognition of how discourse is received once constructed, is informed by work both inside and 
outside my discipline; it is based in the works of a professor of communication studies and a 
social psychologist.  In some older traditions (and as is often and unfortunately still the case with 
the general public) rhetoric was seen as mere style, denoting a speech devoid of substance and 
flush with purple prose.   In such conceptions, the processes of persuasion amounted to nothing 
more than trickery, to dazzling displays designed to dupe dolts.   Recently, however, Robert 
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Hariman has pointed towards a more nuanced view.  In discussing the rhetoric of politics as it 
applies to the day-to-day life of academics, and distancing himself from the negative 
manifestations of style noted above, Hariman suggests “relations of control and autonomy are 
negotiated through the artful composition of speech, gesture, ornament, décor, and any other 
means for modulating perception and shaping response.”72  But Hariman supports my more 
expansive conception of style by positing it as “an analytical category for understanding a social 
reality,” a method of analysis that is not simplistically reducible to a given artifact (a speech, or 
book, or so on) nor independent of the context in which it is found manifest (the circumstances 
of its production, the causes of its creation, and so forth).73   
This view of style is complimented by Michael Billig’s rhetorical approach to the 
psychology of argument.  He argues that “a good speech is that which succeeds in its aims of 
persuading the audience, regardless of whether the message has been tastefully delivered or not” 
(italics mine).74  But Billig has gone on to tacitly imply that style, when it is not conceived as 
that which is merely ornament, operates in service to rhetoric.  And he does so in reference to a 
group of thinkers, the Sophists, whom Hariman has approvingly noted, while referencing the one 
that Schiller most admired and wrote favorably about: Protagoras.  As Billig states: “Protagoras 
possesses arguments, not slogans, and he is an adversary whose message has content as well as 
witty and urbane packaging.”75  As he goes on to argue regarding the Platonic dialogue 
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Protagoras: “[It is] a vivid portrait of the man and his style.”76  Here we see Billig, who admits 
the link between persuasion and style has been “neglected,” and who admits of his limited 
awareness of the work done in communication studies, pointing towards the more robust 
conception of style supplied by Hariman which I endorse in this study.77  
But this approach to style necessarily grapples with three interdisciplinary and 
concomitant issues: contested notions of the term public, the questioned viability of a rhetorical 
hermeneutic, and the potential for an altogether too Whiggish approach to history.  Regarding the 
first, this dissertation is an attempt to recapture Schiller’s persona within the public to which he 
most attended.  Schiller dealt primarily with his academic ilk.  And he did so in an era when 
authorial intent meant more than simply placing your name at the end of an article.  His writings, 
signed philosophical arguments, were part of a trend started towards the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, a time when Schiller was already publishing and was beginning (at Cornell) 
to interact with pragmatism explicitly.  This move to focus on the author within the context of 
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the journal or book jettisoned anonymity in favor of agency; the “effect was to transfer authority 
from the corporate text to the individual contributor and thus understand authority as properly the 
outgrowth of individual personality and competence.”78  That such agency is complicated by 
other factors—such as the relative degree of anonymity still afforded by the then-common 
practice of providing only first initials and then a full last name—is not in dispute.  But in the 
history under review, the arguments are signed by an author and signify a given stance within a 
community of philosophers.  No longer was the impersonal journal seen as the agent of change; 
no more were unsigned articles accepted as part of a collective and anonymous judgment.  
Authors were responsible to their opinions, and their opinions were evaluated as much for what 
was said as for how it was said.  The judgments rendered upon Schiller operate, then as now, as 
means of qualifying the extent to which his views are seen as reasoned or groundless, pertinent 
or obstinate.   
Recent attempts to complicate publics are a welcomed expansion of what had been a 
largely ossified, and unquestioned, matter of course in certain circles.  But an expanded 
vocabulary need not imply forsaking pre-existing conceptions of public(s).  While Jonathan Rose 
purports to deal with “the actual ordinary reader,” and Robert Asen and Daniel Brouwer 
interrogate publics by positing their counters, this work of necessity works to reclaim the 
intellectual public.79  I realize that part of the problem with any conception of an intellectual 
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public is that it has for too long stood in, as implied or explicitly stated, as the public to which all 
judgments are deferred.  But, in the case of Schiller, the use of an intellectual public is grounded 
in the practices of those offering arguments.  He, in contrast to Rosa Eberly’s citizen critics, 
largely wrote in academic journals and sought to engage other philosophers in debates about the 
nature of their pursuits.80  
Regarding the issue of a rhetorical hermeneutic, I believe I have established that this 
project references more traditional forms of rhetorical criticism even as it necessarily extends 
itself to newer conceptions of the same.  By being grounded (or is it set adrift) in the pages of 
text that form this conception of Schiller, there is the danger of developing a myopic version of 
close-text analysis, of reading the text as text and apart from any of its historical or contextual 
influences.  But, given the range of this project, and its focus not on any one given text of 
Schiller’s or any one given reading of what pragmatism is said to mean, I am hoping to trace out 
similarities and dissimilarities in the private and public components of Schiller’s arguments, 
occurrences that help to compensate for any moves towards creating what John Guillory calls 
“subjective universality.”81  Granted, even within a seemingly stable historical context, those 
situated as ‘philosophers’ or ‘pragmatists’ are free to roam about and disagree on what 
constitutes the context(s) to which they all ascribe.  That Schiller and Rorty are pragmatists is a 
given.  That being pragmatists invests their works with different focuses suggests what is gained 
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by this dissertation.  By supplementing accepted, if conflicting, contemporary understandings of 
pragmatism, we develop a fuller—though by no means complete—picture of it as a development 
in the history of philosophy.  By framing Schiller’s pragmatism within the larger historical 
context of which he was but one part, one runs less risk of proscribing his views as either all 
encompassing (what holds there holds elsewhere) or fixed (what is a condition of this exchange 
is necessarily distinguished from the next).  For me, a rhetorical biography is but one way to 
engage a given object of study; it is neither a master key nor a broken door.  It is a pragmatic 
“form of cultural rhetoric studies that takes as its topic specific historical acts of interpretation 
within their cultural context.”82  The central point is that the interpretative aspect is double-sided: 
it is an explanation of what persons meant that must always be shaded by what we understand 
them to mean.  That it can be productive is what renders it a methodological option as opposed to 
a theoretical dogma.83 
 In much the same vein, I am resisting the potential to engage in what Michael C. McGee 
has noted as the “Whig fallacy,” the attempt to hold past historical examples to current rhetorical 
practices.  He argues that this bias is “counterproductive first because it tautologically reinforces 
a monistic view of rhetoric—but more than that, the bias undercuts an opportunity to see rhetoric 
functioning in relatively ‘closed’ societies.”84  Clearly, the pragmatism of Schiller’s time is not 
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the pragmatism of Rorty’s time.85  And therein lays the necessity of rhetorical biography dealing 
in one at-least-now-accepted, and repeated, truth: “there is no substitute for research in primary 
sources.”86  This biography, aimed at Schiller’s relevance to and absence from pragmatism, must 
extend beyond the paltry coverage he has obtained.  It must use the archives of his work, the 
opinions of the same, and the documents that exist in between what was written by and about 
him.  His arguments will be held up to the counters of his peers.  The books and articles he wrote 
will be subject to the reviews they garnered.  Even the stated positions found in those texts will 
be examined in light of what he argued behind the scenes in letters to publishers and to friends.  
The cliché “the less that is said” is hopefully then transformed into “the more that is understood.”  
This rhetorical biography, as was intimated at the onset, seeks to accrue benefits in three 
areas: the intellectual history of pragmatism, rhetorical history/criticism, and reception studies.  
As regards the first, this is both the fragmented history of a man and a contribution to the 
fragmented history of pragmatism.  Schiller speaks not to, but for, pragmatism.  He accounts for 
its origins even as his disappearance might spark anew a dialogue over a century in the making.  
Secondly, Schiller provides a new resource for a historically important method of inquiry.  His is 
not a set speech, nor is he recognized as putting forth a required set of orations.  But a rhetorical 
biography of Schiller points to the growth in rhetorical scholarship even as he, as an object of 
inquiry, extends its subjects.  Thirdly, this dissertation seeks to texture the former two by 
recognizing the calls of Mailloux (a cultural critic and a literary interpreter) and Hariman (firmly 
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ensconced in the Speech Communication tradition) and by highlighting the interplay of both.  
The publications penned by Schiller tell the tale of the published Schiller.  They enact a routine 
of reflection and revision as familiar to the published author as to the public consumer; they are, 
in a word, tactical.  But the Schiller who published was a person who puzzled over how he would 
be interpreted.  Tucked away in letters, departmental memos, and private records are the clews as 
to who he was before and after the last draft was sent off to be editor.  I should finally add, 
independent of the above noted benefits, that this is a work of valuation.  I see in Schiller an 
untapped source of new discussion, debate, and, yes, controversy.  And to be clear, this is the 
Schiller I see.  But that is, ultimately, the point.  No author choose a topic at random, at least not 
one who hopes to be put to print or at best not one who follows it through to the printing process.  
As banal as it might seem, it stands to be mentioned: I am invested in putting Schiller back into 
the pragmatic canon and I welcome, for hopefully good but cognizant of ill, what such an 
investment might incur.  The structure of this venture is the last part of this chapter. 
1.4 A LIFE IN THE DETAILS: THE OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
1.4.1 Evolution and the Spirit 1882-1897.  
Schiller’s English upbringing was, without exaggeration, a refined one.  He was trained in the 
best schools and excelled in his studies.  This provides only the back-story.  For, even as an 
undergraduate and graduate student, Schiller was establishing his philosophy and revising its 
meaning.  And he was doing so amidst the powerful strains of British Idealism operative in 
English philosophy at the time.  His Riddles of the Sphinx (1891) is a philosophical 
“metaphysic” cast in the garb of evolutionary science.  But it is also a transitional work.  In the 
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years prior to its publication Schiller works to reconcile his decidedly idiosyncratic views of 
religion with the emerging “faith” in science.  In the years after its release, he attempts to merge 
the two into a philosophical position that avoids both abstract spirituality and mechanic 
naturalism.   
In the late-1890s Schiller works to turn his studies at Cornell into a long-term tutorship at 
Corpus Christi.   More important than these career changes, though, are the theoretical insights 
he gained while in America.  During a time that can arguably be classified as pre-pragmatic, 
Schiller made the acquaintance of William James and became captivated by the older mentor’s 
work in psychology.  James’s psychology—with its blending of the personal, the social, and the 
spiritual—only further refined the concepts that Schiller had been working to bring together prior 
to leaving England.   And, as he returned, Schiller set off on a path that was a complex mix of his 
earlier ideas and newest insights. 
In Chapter Two I will tell a two-part tale.  It is, in one sense, a history of Schiller’s 
educational beginnings.  Philosophy still saw the blinding lights of Idealism trace their paths 
across the walls of universities in both Britain and America.  At the same time, however, the 
halls behind those institutions’ walls were markedly different.  Oxford, not yet weaned from its 
almost constant diet of the classics, was still truly a bastion of the Victorian elite.  Cornell, by no 
means a Land Grant school, was operating from the American principle that elites were of 
different sorts: the bureaucrats who controlled the business of the institution and the professors 
who were charged to take care of the minds housed therein.87  In another sense, however, this is 
the history of Schiller’s introduction to what would become pragmatism.  Schiller, as a student 
and then academic, was swimming amidst the powerful currents of the ebbing swell of Anglo-
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Hegelianism thought.  This approach to philosophy extended beyond Britain’s shores and even 
touched upon another of the early pragmatists, Dewey.  But, in Schiller’s early academic years, 
we can trace the interests that signal his distance from Dewey and closeness to James. 
1.4.2 The Psychology of Pragmatism 1898-1905.  
Schiller’s return to England coincided with the announcement of pragmatism in America.  In the 
span of a year, James published The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy 
(1897) and Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898).  These two books set off a 
blaze of debate, in both America and Europe, which pitted the defenders of Idealism against the 
advocates of this new, ethical, “practicalism.”  They also signaled the start of a long and valuable 
series of correspondences between James and Schiller.  By the time pragmatism was announced 
to the British philosophical public in 1900, Schiller was already well on his way to articulating, 
and defending, pragmatism to his peers.  But it is pragmatism of a very specific sort.  It traces 
back to James’s volitionally-tinged psychology, with its subjective-centered handling of the 
objective world.   And it points toward what even then James is calling “radical empiricism,” to 
the role that individuals play in comprehending and interpreting the world . . . as they conceive 
it. 
Schiller’s strategy for promoting this cause, one that was to be repeated throughout his 
career, was to mix seriousness with satire.  In 1901, he unleashed Mind!, a satire of the venerated 
Oxford philosophical journal.  Not content merely to topple dead idols, Schiller chose also to 
focus his ire on living representatives of Absolute Idealism.  In 1902, he published “Axioms as 
Postulates,” arguing that the will to believe was a right and a tentative, and adapting, one at that.  
The results, like the strategy, were mixed.  Defending the novelty and risk of a world in flux 
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gained him a measure of popularity.  But it gained him an equal measure of notoriety.  James, 
welcoming all comers to this new approach, warns Schiller that the satire might come to impede 
the substance of his contributions.  Schiller paid little heed to the warnings.  Instead he attempted 
to outflank the opposition by changing the rules, and names, of the debate.  If James’s 
pragmatism was the psychological method, then Schiller’s humanism was meant to be its 
expansion to cover all aspects of human inquiry. 
In Chapter Three the central issue is one of proximity.  While Schiller is far afield of 
James’s proclamations for pragmatism, he is much closer on several other counts.  In the first 
place, the affinity he shows for James’s views and the lengths to which he goes to defend those 
views suggests no mere hanger-on to the cause.  Point in fact, Schiller’s defense of pragmatism is 
as much an argument for what he brought to the cause as it is for the spaciousness which James 
desires.  In the second place, James’s call to arms—against formalism, against abstraction, 
against philosophy itself—can be traced back to the influences that British philosophy had on 
philosophy in general.  As a result, Schiller is much closer to the source of the prevalent 
idealistic currents.  While James carries on genial disagreements with Josiah Royce in the 
confines of Cambridge, Schiller is doing battle with the Bradleys, McTaggarts, and Taylors who 
continue to hold court at Oxford and Cambridge.  His distance from James likely contributed to 
his willingness to ignore warnings; his closeness to his chosen foes likely blindered him to the 
consequences.  
1.4.3 The Mettle of Humanism 1906-1910.   
Having sided with pragmatism, and then with the more expansive humanism, Schiller must 
demonstrate that the former leads into the latter.  To do so, he adopts the exemplar Protagoras 
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and, with him, the dictum: “man is the measure.”  These choices are well suited to his particular 
philosophical outlook.  If James’s psychology provides the mechanism by which to understand 
the human consciousness, then his pragmatism provides the method by which to organize and 
control its functions.  If the human mind can conceive of realities heretofore unproven, can 
postulate an existence beyond what is considered reality per se, then pragmatism can be made to 
undertake an examination of the world beyond philosophy per se.  So conceived, philosophy’s 
domain is humanity’s domain.  And the terminus of humanity’s potential is only a measure of the 
constraints it places upon itself. 
This is, notably in the collection Studies in Humanism (1907) and the extended essay 
Plato or Protagoras? (1908), an expansive and optimistic outlook.  But this attitude is advanced 
along shriller lines as well.  Schiller becomes increasingly fixated on proving the errors of those 
not enamored of this way of thinking.   The result is the creation of an anti-exemplar: Francis 
Herbert Bradley.  If Protagoras suggests the potential in man, Bradley stands in for his failures.  
As pragmatism resolves problematic situations, Idealism devolves into tired clichés. While 
humanism champions optimism, Bradley’s philosophy traffics in pessimism.  The serious and 
satirical mix uncomfortably in these, and other, debates.  The humor of Mind! now approaches 
ridicule.  The keen insight that so moved James—the unwavering defense of the progressive 
powers of the human mind—now stumbles over a stationary and respected object of scorn.  
Chapter Four, then, is an examination of consequence.  As much as James’s death in 
1910 is devastating, James’s warnings had largely gone unheeded.  Schiller plowed ahead, rarely 
stopping to consider that the sum result of his arguments would not be cowed acceptance.  On 
page after page, though, the message was rarely altered: (1) to fall for traditional philosophy is to 
court absurdity, (2) to ignore circumstance and context is to divorce theory from practice, (3) to 
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wallow in formalism is to avoid risk as much as it is to banish novelty.  But James’s voice had 
served a regulative function.  He was a sounding board for arguments in development, an 
inspiration for well-lobbed refutations.  And now he was gone.  As much as the most telling 
consequence is a rebuke to professional advancement, the more lasting outcome is personal.  
Schiller and humanism, his passionate defense of Jamesian pragmatism, are now left to fend for 
themselves. 
1.4.4 The Long Shadow 1911-1919.   
Absent James, Schiller continues his defense of pragmatic humanism.   The arguments veer from 
personal attacks to pointed refutations of formal logic.  But there is a new counter to Schiller, 
one not based in his oft-repeated complaints about Idealism’s defenders and their creeds.  He is 
now forced to defend the memory of James against competing interpretations from within the 
pragmatic camp.  His earlier distance from pragmatism in America fueled his arguments and 
gained the movement (not always favorable) attention.  But it is now being suggested as a divide 
that renders Schiller’s views out of touch with more recent development.  And his only 
substantial philosophical work of this period, Formal Logic (1912), does nothing to allay the 
suspicion that Schiller’s role was and is as a defender and not promoter. 
The work that Schiller undertakes during this period runs up against the realities of the 
past even as it is contextually anchored to the stark details of the present.  The humorous 
invectives again prove corrosive to his career.  Schiller is twice more rebuked in his attempts to 
gain a professorship.  Not surprisingly, the jobs go to persons more suited to the ideals and 
Idealism of Oxford.   All this transpires against the backdrop of a Europe in decline and then at 
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war.   The optimism that heralded the birth of pragmatism is less in view.  Its view of the future 
as pregnant with potential is cast in the shadows of uncertainty. 
Chapter Five is a tale of the ruptures brought about by social and personal factors.   I will 
focus on the developing split in Schiller’s scholarly persona as perceived by those he addressed.  
On the one side, and primarily among his few European devotees, we are told that “in the sleepy 
world of modern philosophy F. C. S. Schiller stands for an idea which is very simple, and has for 
that very reason been long forgotten: the idea that theories should lead to practical results.”88  On 
the other, we are told that Schiller’s Formal Logic “lacks the sympathy of reinterpretation which 
his subject demands; and its frequent lack of fairness to the older point of view, as well as its 
neglect of all the more concrete modern discussions of Logic . . . go far towards destroying the 
seriousness and usefulness of the understanding.”89  These tumultuous years bring into stark 
relief the status of pragmatic humanism.  It is a salve for those wanting hope, an irritation to 
those seeking more.   
1.4.5 The Risks of Doubt 1920-1926.   
World War I proves a turning point, as a mere matter of dates or as a more profound pivot, in 
Schiller’s pragmatic humanism.  He retains an interest in previous subjects—science, religion, 
and logic—but suggests that pragmatism is meant to discuss other issues of import.   This shift is 
telling.  One notes that his studies in humanism have been translated into problems, not just of 
contingency, but of belief.  This is a seemingly Jamesian question of the will and what it can 
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accomplish.  But there is now an edge to such queries of accomplishment.   Questions of 
survival, of the future of man, now occupy as much if not more space than issues of seers and 
science. 
The figure of Tantalus seems ominous.  After Zeppelin attacks, decimated cities, and 
depictions of barbarous battlefield tactics, Schiller questions the degree to which man is the 
measure of crafting his own pragmatic, and humanistic, destiny.  The end to war only signals, for 
Schiller, piecemeal adjustments and no long term solutions.  Tantalus, having given up his father 
Zeus’s secrets, is destined to be denied food or drink as he suffers in a pained pool of his own 
making.  England, and the world, are ripe for a solution to this ebb in human potential.  Schiller, 
in short, returns to reflect upon Darwin as he casts his gaze towards the unsteady glow beyond 
the caverns of contemporary philosophy. 
In Chapter Six I will emphasize the developing gap between what Schiller’s pragmatic 
humanism argued for and what Schiller saw as happening to the world around him.  Schiller still 
pursues with vigor his other interests, jabbing and jesting with his cohorts and critics.  But the 
present day seems to be slipping beyond his grasp.  For Schiller, modern man is Tantalus, 
precariously perched on the brink of becoming “more bestial than any beast.” 90 This is Schiller, 
the skeptic of science, making predictions hedged by only the slightest of qualifications.  This is 
a pragmatist searching for a way in which the possibilities of humanity can be translated into 
practical results.  But it is a search tinged with a heretofore unexpressed degree of doubt.  The 
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progressive nature of Schiller’s pragmatism, set against the stark depictions of a war that didn’t 
end all wars, seems all the less secure in its provisionality. 
1.4.6 Out of the Light, Into the Cave 1927-1939.   
At sixty-two, with no prospect of promotion and failing health, Schiller has resigned his post at 
Oxford.  But he does not remain idle.  Schiller is now a transnational talent, splitting his time 
between America and Britain, afforded a chance to lecture at places such as the College of the 
Pacific, Claremont, and the University of Southern California.  He is allowed the luxury of 
expanding upon those topics which mean the most to him, to reiterate the themes that have 
dominated his philosophy for the past several decades.  In 1935, he permanently transitions from 
England to California with the help of his new wife.  Though still drafting articles and reviews 
for the Personalist, he resigns his post at USC.  His new life is, as they say, short-lived.  He dies 
in California only two years later, on August 6, 1937, at the age of seventy-three.  
Schiller’s arguments during this time are slowed by the decline in his health and by the 
aggressive travel schedule he maintains.   But his focus does not waver in those arguments he 
does offer.  He continues to question the promotion of traditional logics.  Though the shift has 
been from the formal to the symbolic, Schiller continues to assert that a reduction of thinking to 
form without context is the creation of thinking without consequence.  In their place Schiller 
attempt to provide a productive Logic for Use (1929).  He remains confident that the “real” 
world extends beyond the domain of accepted philosophy.  In Social Decay and Eugenic Reform 
(1932), Schiller urges that a love of wisdom demands the reform of the social circumstances 
which give rise to the development of individuals.  In Must Philosophers Disagree? (1934) he 
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argues that such a love should extend also to consider the implications of recent science and 
current educational practices.  
Taken generally, Chapter Seven would seem to focus on the summation of a prolific 
career.  But there is more.  There are final attempts by him to salvage the Jamesian wing of 
pragmatism of which Schiller felt himself the chief representative.  These arguments face a solid 
wall of criticism raised by the American pragmatists reared on the semiotics of Peirce, a 
differently interpreted James, and the social scientific instrumentalism of Dewey.  There is also a 
sense of paradox, of conflicted resignation, in the posthumous Our Human Truths (1939).  The 
Idealism Schiller had long fought lay dead in no small part due to his work.  But the cause of 
pragmatism he long championed was now in the hands of others.  His final comments, then, are a 
mix of hope and doubt.  The hope that pragmatism will continue to face up to the diversity of its 
interests; the doubt that the world he sees is the one best suited to that challenge. 
1.4.7 Conclusion: The Pragmatism of Appearances.   
Chapter Eight is, then, an attempt to pull together all of the topics Schiller dealt with—logic, 
science and history, psychical research, and eugenic reform—during the course of his career.  It 
is an attempt to explain the appearance of pragmatism today as it is refracted through the 
pragmatism that Schiller helped to instigate.  By examining Schiller’s reception while alive, we 
might more fully understand the important role he played in bringing pragmatism to the attention 
of the philosophical public.  By examining the philosophical narrative that emerged after he died, 
we might more clearly understand the role Schiller’s reception played in his removal from 
pragmatism’s history.  The result is both revisionist and interpretative.  It is the first in that it 
proposes an alternative to the historical narrative about pragmatism that developed from the 
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1940s through the 1970s.  It is the second in that it argues for what Schiller, reintroduced to the 
fold, can add to a range of current discussion in which pragmatism plays a role.   
This gathering of strands is, as it were, tied to the methods of this rhetorical biography.  It 
focuses on the style of Schiller’s arguments as much as their content.  And it emphasizes the 
repetition of key themes as much as it scrutinizes specific instances of argument.  It attends to his 
works, as published and as privately poured over.  It lets Schiller have his say, but rarely asserts 
that his version of pragmatism is the final word.  This dissertation, as an act of interpretation, is 
predicated on what my acts, as an interpreter, are able to discern.  In that sense, this final chapter 
is much the same as pragmatism itself. 
You see, pragmatism is like all theoretical constructs.  It suffers and succeeds in the 
narratives told, often with insight and occasionally with style, by way of the interpretations 
offered.  Is pragmatism prophetic or is it public and private?  Is the suggestion of pragmatism as 
American and democratic the result of American and democratic hopes in those who put quill to 
well?  As a theoretical tradition, it is most certainly all of those things.  But it has, until lately, 
been told as a tale with a truncated cast.  Schiller affords us a chance to examine anew what the 
past and the present have to say . . . about themselves and each other.  In parsing out the 
distinctions between old and new pragmatism, Kloppenberg’s comments are telling in their 
relation to the appearance(s) of pragmatism: 
Just as people in the past selected parts of their experience to record and preserve in the 
records that they left us, we select parts of the past to examine and we choose how to tell 
our stories.  But to admit that interpretation is important is not to claim that everything is 
interpretation.  It is crucial that we historians be able to distinguish what happened from 
what did not, and what was written from what was not, and our discursive community 
must test its propositions in the widest range of public forums.91 
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It appears, then, that the insights gained from examining Schiller’s role in pragmatism accrue 
sanction, not only from what his documents detail, but from what pragmatism’s defenders 
demand.  And, well aware of the daunting task they have undertaken, I tip my hat to them and 
offer this work as a humble extension of their own. 
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2.0  EVOLUTION AND THE SPIRIT 1882-1897 
I care only about the question whether he [Lotze] does or does not argue from the interactions 
 to a unity which explains them, and is their ratio essendi [basis for being], while they are its ratio 
cognoscendi [basis for cognition].  For I contend he has no right to argue thus.1 
 
Suggesting the trajectory of a writer’s thoughts is as much about guessing as it is about knowing.  
When that writer is little known, and even less obliged by the records kept, it is often the guess 
that wins out.   But, by holding to those records and using them as a guide, one stands a better 
chance that one makes a reasoned estimate.  Such is the hope with these years in Schiller’s life.  
The public Schiller was, as is still often the case with fledgling academics, not often in view.  He 
published very little till he had his degree in hand.  The private Schiller was, to be fair, buried in 
books.  Yet those private documents which do exist, coupled with the public ones that have 
received little scrutiny, help to craft a picture of Schiller attempting to picture a philosophical 
view bigger than the one he received.  It is against, and eventually beyond, Idealism that we find 
Schiller to be struggling.  It is between, and then within religion and science, that he comes to 
find the answers. 
This is, to be accurate, the pre-pragmatic era.  Peirce’s contributions had yet to be 
reclaimed.  The Metaphysical Club had yet to be recovered.  Even the term, pragmatism, had yet 
to be crafted.  For much of this period, Schiller is at work in England and under the influence of 
the dominant strain of British philosophy, Absolute Idealism.  It is from this vantage point that 
he crafts his first work, Riddles of the Sphinx (1891).  But, shortly thereafter, he finds himself 
within the developing grasp of American philosophy.   The influence comes less from his 
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conflicted tenure at Cornell.   It has more to do with the ideas issuing from a nearby school, 
Harvard.   For it is the psychology, and the support, of William James that offers Schiller the first 
inkling of how to harmonize his contested British training with his idiosyncratic philosophic 
leanings.  In these years the fundamental components of pragmatism are already in place; it is no 
stretch to add that the essentials of Schiller’s pragmatic humanism are also in view.   
2.1 THE GROOVES OF A BRITISH EDUCATION: SCHILLER’S EARLY YEARS 
Schiller’s records only allow as much access as their details provide.  And prior to Schiller’s 
entry into Balliol, they yield little.  They do draw up one childhood fact: as a young lad Schiller 
was not a great writer.  The future stylist was, in a word, a “poor” writer.  Whether this 
deficiency in writing was due to having spoken German as a child, one cannot say.  But the scant 
information available suggests that it was more a matter of concentration, not comprehension.  
The “Lower School Report of Conduct and Progress for Easter term 1872” from Belsize Manor, 
Hampstead, finds the eight-year-old Schiller receiving “highly” and “very satisfactory” marks in 
Geography and History, and “progressing rapidly” in English; but, as regards Writing, he is “not 
careful, but improves.”2   
  This problem follows him in his transfer, at age ten, to the School at University College, 
London, in 1874.  As regards Schiller’s “conduct, diligence, and progress” in subjects such as 
Latin and Arithmetic, English and Geography, he usually places one (out of three), occasionally 
two, and averages in the middle to upper portion of his class.  But his Writing skill is noted as a 
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“lit. slow,” his marks for diligence and progress are both three, and he is ranked thirty out of 
thirty-one boys.  What a difference a year makes.  By the “Third Month of Lent Term [April] 
1875” his Writing records have improved and, save for an extended absence in the second month 
of the Summer Term [June], he consistently receives ones and twos in the three evaluation areas, 
and averages near the top of his class in all subjects save Math.3 
The anecdotal evidence suggests that this improvement carried over into Schiller’s time 
at the Rugby Boarding School, Rugby.  In 1880, at age sixteen, his father received this report 
from the Headmaster, Thomas William Jex-Blake:  
My dear Sir 
 I am thoroughly content with your son.  He has done a good term’s work; and a 
good Examination for his age. 
 He has an excellent understanding, and many aptitudes: is pleasant to teach or to 
deal with: and shines in confidence. 
 He is a little desponding if any part of his work falls below a high standard, e.g. 
Verification; but this is not reasonable, for he does his worst work well, considering his 
age, and is a very promising boy. 
 The Reports sent in to me, are  
Math.  Has ability but wants accuracy. 
Optics.  Very fair French.  Hardly his best. 
Altogether we should be thankful. 
Yours sincerely4 
 
If anything, there was little semblance of the fellow who had been a little slow at the School at 
University College.  “While at Rugby he showed decided symptoms of intelligence, so he was 
picked as a probable winner in the scholastic race and put in training for the classical 
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scholarships.”5   These scholarships provided the monies—in the form of prizes for which 
classmates would compete in the recitation of classical verses and the like—that covered one’s 
stay at the school.6  Should the student be particularly adept, these competitions could help pave 
his (girls were not admitted until 1976) way into one of Oxford’s colleges by way of what was 
known as the Balliol Scholarship.  Both of which happened.  “Much as Schiller detested making 
verses in a dead language, he did it so well that he got a Major Exhibition.  This gave him three 
hundred and fifty dollars for five years as well as four hundred and fifty dollars in Exhibitions 
from Rugby.”7  On 17 October 1882, Schiller matriculated to Balliol. 
It is difficult to overstate the import of Schiller’s arrival at Balliol.  Slosson manages to 
do so.  At the same time, however, he accurately assesses the world to which Schiller was being 
entrusted.  Having secured the scholarship, Schiller was free to continue his education at a good 
school. 
But it also meant that he had sold himself to run in a harness for another four years at 
Balliol and was obliged to master a philosophy which he already felt to be a fraud.  T. H. 
Green had died just before Schiller came up and had been sainted for the greater glory of 
Balliol, and it seemed to the tutors good pedagogy to set their pupils to begin the study of 
philosophy with Green’s “Prolegomena to Ethics.”  Most of the boys confronted with this 
abstruse introduction came to the conclusion that it was a wonderful metaphysics because 
they could not see any sense in it.  Schiller very curiously came to the opposite 
conclusion from the same premise.8 
 
That the eighteen year old Schiller, like many eighteen year olds, might have been a bit of a rebel 
is hardly far-fetched.   That he had already pronounced as “a fraud” philosophy, one assumes of 
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the idealistic sort, is less likely.  It is far more even-handed to say, given what the records do and 
do not say, that Schiller rapidly came to view Balliol, and Oxford by extension, as out of step 
with his developing philosophical views.  Key to this developing schism were three men who 
stood large in the dealings of Oxford at the time: Benjamin Jowett, Thomas Hill Green, and 
Francis Herbert Bradley.  And all three men were witness to what is best expressed, as one reads 
through the commentaries on them and Oxford at the time, as a Jamesian ‘buzzing confusion’: a 
conflicted reliance on the classics in the Examination System, the emerging influence of 
Darwinian evolutionary theories, and a newly articulated social/philosophical approach by way 
of German, rather than English, exemplars.   
Like the competitive system at Rugby, Oxford found itself beholden to a system far 
different than the one that had existed at the start of the 19th century.  Then, the passing of exams 
was heralded with scraps of paper barely worth the printing.  But, by the 1870s, the examinations 
were part and parcel of an undergraduate student’s life, with Balliol emerging as the leader in 
Greats system.  The Greats represented, in the views of many, the culmination of the Victorian 
education.  It was a two part examination system which exemplified what it meant to be a truly 
“cultured” University student: (1) Classic Moderations, or Mods., with a focus on “language and 
literature”; and (2) Literae Humaniores, or Lit. Hums., with a focus on “history and 
philosophy.”9  Concomitant with this development was the bureaucratic system by which it was 
carried out.   Reams of paperwork were published for both studying and heralding the 
examinations.  Localized examination agencies were set up throughout the country.  And Oxford, 
in 1882, cemented the rise of the system with the opening of the opulent and self-evidently titled 
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Examination Schools.  The writer John Ruskin, returning to his alma mater, responded in a 
manner not out of step with the views Schiller would express later in life.  He “found the 
influence of examinations all-pervasive as compared with his undergraduate days, [and] thought 
it ‘expressive of the tendencies of the age’ that Oxford had spent a vast sum on a highly 
ornamental building ‘for the torture and shame of her scholars.’”10   
Jowett (1817-1893), within this milieu, provides the organizational foil to Schiller’s 
developing antagonisms.  As a tutor since the 1840s and the Master of Balliol from 1870-1893, 
Jowett was beset with the task of adapting Balliol to the realities of the time.  He had, in essence, 
to meld his own views to a world that had witnessed the publication of Darwin’s The Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859).   His answer was a novel synthesis (no pun 
intended) of religious belief and progressive interpretation.  In 1860, Jowett and several peers 
published Essays and Reviews.  Therein, he “argued that the Bible must be interpreted like any 
other book, if it is to be understood properly.”11  Rather than cast a death knell for religion (as 
some harsh critics assumed), Jowett saw this as a corrective in favor of religion in an age of 
reason.  Like other religious men of the time, “he believed the greatest danger to religion was to 
be found, not in reason or science, but rather in the possibility that intelligent and good men 
might reject what is true in Christianity because of the implausible form in which it was 
presented to them . . .”12  At the same time, Jowett was perhaps most responsible for instilling in 
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Green, his student, an interest in German philosophical thought.  But by the time of Schiller’s 
arrival, Jowett can be found already to exclaim: 
‘I have been reading German philosophy,’ he writes on August 10 [1881]—‘an old love 
to which I return.  It has died in Germany and come to England.  But it is with regret I see 
the amount of genius that has been spent in spinning imaginary systems.  Yet I seem to 
get something from them, though not what their authors intended.’13 
 
One of Jowett’s “disciples” puts the point of difference humorously such: “They say at Oxford 
that both Jowett and T. H. Green plunged into the whirlpool of German metaphysics, that Green 
was permanently engulfed, but that Jowett at least made his escape.”14 
Whether an escape or retreat for the old don, his younger pupil was not simply taken over 
by Hegel.  If anything, Green (1836-1882) is seen molding a Hegelian skin around the particular 
needs of his British context.  Like Jowett, Green attempts to make sense out of the classical and 
religious traditions of Oxford while, at the same time, adapting them to the implications of: (1) 
an enlarged (Germanic) philosophical viewpoint, and (2) a new scientific (Darwinian) 
worldview.  And it is no oversimplification to suggest that these changes in Oxford coincided 
with the dates that Green spent there.  The question is what approach did Green take?  In a gloss, 
Green took to enlarging and abstracting the more traditional religious notion of God so that it 
was “in someway immanent within all creation, possibly evolving in creation.”15  A God made 
Good, or Absolute, could thereby envelop, or subsume, the changes suggested in a Darwinian 
account of nature.  It could respond to the objections of those who wished to enshrine the 
Lockean and Humean (British) approaches over and against the Kantian and Hegelian (German) 
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counterpoints.  Green labeled the promoters of the former view “sophists” and, in 1868, 
chastised them.  As W. H. Walsh explains: 
In an all too brief characterization of the type of thinking involved Green mentions four 
points: that it works with sharp dichotomies which a sounder philosophy would leave 
fluid; that it ‘abhors the analysis of knowledge’, meaning, I think, that it takes the facts of 
the cognitive and conative situations as revealed in immediate consciousness as final and 
uncontroversial; that it accepts certain key ideas without further investigating their 
origins or establishing their validity through critical examinations; finally, that it must 
‘ultimately be skeptical and destructive’, the first because it is in too much of a hurry to 
be consistent, the second because ‘its dichotomous formulae are inadequate to 
comprehend the real world of morals, religion and law’.16 
 
In the period of time between his entrance into the school in 1855 and his death in 1882, Green 
worked—as student, fellow, tutor and then professor—to develop this more fluid philosophy and 
to bring it to fruition within the halls of Oxford.  And Green, like his mentor, sought out ways to 
apply his philosophical approach.  While Jowett primarily attended to the governance and 
dominance of the school with which he came to be so intimately associated, Green branched out 
to engage in political reforms such as the temperance movement.  Philosophy at this time was, to 
be sure, active inside and outside the walls of Oxford.17 
In contrast to Jowett’s and Green’s philosophical approaches, Bradley (1846-1924) seems 
out of sorts.  To push this point too far would be unfair as Bradley.  For, unlike the previous, he 
was the young heir to the academic groundwork laid by Jowett at Balliol and the philosophical 
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outline that Green articulated.  When A. M. Quinton suggests, that alongside the public and 
academic work of Green, Bradley “looks pretentious and self-indulgent,”18 he is upholding oft-
raised impressions but not holding to manners.   That being said, it is not at all easy to develop a 
positive picture of the man.  Often sickly and by even sympathetic accounts somewhat reclusive, 
Bradley existed in a realm that was, for good and ill, largely cut off from the day to day affairs of 
Oxford life.  Even Philip MacEwen, in a book dedicated to an exploration of Bradley’s thoughts, 
couches his analysis in ambivalence.  He labels his work an “example of trying to understand 
Bradley as much as possible on his own terms.”19  What, then, of those terms?  Like Green, 
Bradley was an inheritor of the German infusion into Oxford’s canon fostered by Jowett.  Unlike 
Green, and owing to his particular circumstances—tenured as a Merton Fellow in 1870, he 
taught no classes and remained in that position till his death—Bradley pushed the implications of 
Absolute Idealism (or British Hegelianism, and sometimes intellectualism) further in the 
metaphysical direction and was it’s times most heralded exponent.  In simplified form, 
something detractors and defenders both admit particularly difficult when discussing Bradley, 
the most crucial component of his philosophy, and the one that will undergo substantial analysis 
later, is this: that which is real is not contradictory.  As Philip Ferreria explains: 
Indeed, the difference between what is understood as ultimately real and what is not (that 
is to say, “appearance”) is most often stated by Bradley in just these terms.  The real, we 
are told, is real precisely because it contains no contradiction or inconsistency.  Its 
                                               
18
 A. M. Quinton, Absolute Idealism, David Hicks Lecture on Philosophy, British Academy (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), 3.  To be clear, Quinton’s assessment of Absolute Idealism is one amongst 
numerous and often detailed studies.  Several, ranging from older treatise to newer analyses, that interested readers 
might find useful include: G. Watts Cunningham, The Idealist Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy 
(Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1933; reprint 1967); Peter P. Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British 
Idealists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Sandra M. Den Otter, British Idealism and Social 
Explanation: A Study in Late Victorian Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); W. J. Mander, ed., Anglo-
American Idealism, 1865-1927 (London: Greenwood Press, 2000). 
 
19
 Philip MacEwen, introduction to Ethics, Metaphysics and Religion in the Thought of F. H. Bradley 
(Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), xxiii. 
 
  53 
diverse aspects and differentiated elements are such as to always be both wholly 
intelligible and completely necessary. . . . he believes the internal structure of reality to 
always possess a “reason why” and a “because” that would—if we could apprehend it—
provide a complete satisfaction to our fundamental need to know.20 
 
This is Green’s criticism of the “sophists” taken on a far larger scale.  It denigrates the argument 
from experience even as it privileges the experience of the isolated thinker.  This is a 
metaphysical system posited, not on the traditional views of British empiricists, but on an 
evolutionary synthesis postulated, though not as yet experienced, by the mind. 
In reviewing the preceding, it is difficult nowadays to understand the impact this 
philosophic and academic arena would have on a newly minted and freshly rewarded student 
such as Schiller.  But, if we recall my comment as regards the buzzing confusion of these times, 
we can also reach some conclusions.  By the time Schiller reached Balliol’s halls, Absolute 
Idealism had become the operative mode of philosophic thought at Oxford.  In response to the 
crisis of religious conscience aroused by Darwin and in answer to the political needs of the 
times, Absolute Idealism—still intermingled with connecting strands of classical thought from 
Aristotle and others—exerted its will upon the new rows of students.  And what will.  As 
Quinton argues, it “arose in something very like a philosophical vacuum,” and “exercised full 
intellectual authority in Britain in the three decades between 1874 and 1903.”21   But a vacuum 
may be an imperfect metaphor.  Subject to the philosophical right of way given to Absolute 
Idealism, Schiller is seen to be pushing against the walls of the halls in which he excelled. 
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2.2 KEYS TO THE RIDDLE: SCHILLER’S FORMATIVE WRITINGS 
Unlike his early years, there is more public and private documentation related to Schiller’s time 
at Balliol.  The Balliol Register, for its part, summarizes these details: Schiller received a 1st in 
Classic Moderations in 1883; a 1st in Literae Humanitores and his B.A. in 1886; and he was a 
Taylorian Scholar in German in 1887.22  These items alone attest to the fact that, as much as he 
may have found the processes surrounding him fraudulent, he excelled in giving his getters what 
they wished.  Yet the varied writings found in his diary and notebooks23 suggest the Schiller was 
dealing with at least three concomitant issues: (1) his frustration with his training at Balliol as it 
related to, (2) the hypocrisy of the established views of religion, and (3) the philosophical 
implications of, and problems with, holding to them in the world post-Darwin.   
One note, upon first glance, seems rather banal.  But, upon inspection, it points to 
frustrations that Schiller would carry with him throughout his career: 
May 8: Happy Thought. [words crossed out] The Use of Radicals after Death.  To 
suggest novelties in punishment to His Satanic Majesty. (c.s) ‘Ah’ exclaimed Mr. 
Stockton (Tyndall) “the whole teachings of that school (Jenkinson-Jowett-Broad-Church) 
have always seemed to me nothing more than a few fragments of science imperfectly 
understood, obscured by a few fragments of Christianity imperfectly remembered.”  You 
forget that Dr. Jenkinsons Christianity is really a new firm trading under an old name + 
trying to purchase the goodwill of the former establishment.” (Leslie). 
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‘It is simply our modern atheism trying to hide its own nakedness, for the benefit of the 
more prudish part of the public, in the cast off grave clothes of a Christ, who, whether he 
he [sic] rises or no, is very certainly, as the angel said ‘Not here.’ (New Republic)24 
 
Several issues of context are needed.  Stockton (Tyndall) is Prof. John Tyndall, a contemporary 
of Benjamin Jowett’s.  The Jenkinson referred to is Jowett, in which he is recast as the offspring 
of the earlier Balliol Headmaster Richard Jenykins.  And Broad and Church are Schiller’s 
references to those liberal minded Anglican religious leaders, like Jowett, common at Balliol and 
known as Broad Churchmen (as opposed to their conservative counterparts, the High 
Churchmen).  The [Robert] Leslie referred to is a student named William Money Hardinge, who 
is alleged to have had a homosexual affair with a candidate for proctorship, Walter Pater, whose 
ascension Jowett blocked after having been his friend.  The whole affair, with the “coded” names 
in place, was written about by another Balliol student and philosopher, William Hurell Mallock, 
in his work The New Republic: Culture, Faith, and Philosophy in an English Country House 
(1878). 25    
Why such entry?  Not only does it take aim at the prevailing religious views at Balliol, 
but it suggests a certain aversion to what they suggest philosophically.  And why the comment, 
initialed by him, about the use of Radicals (which many of the Broad Churchmen were seen to 
be)?  It is clear that Schiller was in on the message of the satire, otherwise his entry would not 
have included Tyndall, Broad, or Church in parentheticals.  A later entry suggests that Schiller 
saw hypocrisy in the piety of those who wished to downplay the humanity of others so as to erect 
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their own conscriptions: “June 6-June 7: There is only one commandment + that is ‘Don’t be 
found out.’  It includes all others for with a future life, we may be sure that God will find out 
punish wickedness + without it it is all we want.”26  Again, we should stop to contextualize this 
comment.  John Jones notes that, as early as 1881, Jowett had developed a reputation “as a 
pompous know-all” that was summed up in an anonymous broadsheet: 
First come I.  My name is J-W-TT,  
There’s no knowledge but I know it. 
I am Master of this College. 
What I don’t know isn’t knowledge.27 
 
But how does this relate to Schiller’s notebook entry?  There is an aphorism ascribed to Jowett 
which reads: “Be a reformer.  Don’t be found out.”28  Clearly, or at least relatively so, we can 
assert that something about the Broad Church reformer(s) struck Schiller as flawed. Less than a 
year later, Schiller injects a bit of levity into his ruminations.  And it already demonstrates his 
talent for mixing humor and criticism as regards such solemn, for some, matters: “January 24: 
‘Yes he was a very pious man, but his faith was of the kind that moves laughter.’ (c.s.).”29  These 
points are actually quite in line with the more robust theory of humanism that Schiller would 
develop in later years.  What good is any standard that, conscientiously applied, ends in us doing 
more harm than good?  As Schiller states in January 1884: 
For although in the abstract we should never do wrong for ap any purpose whatever, yet 
as soon as we translate thought into action we find that it is impossible not to be 
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perpetually sinning.  I mean that as Absolute Good + Absolute Evil do not exist on Earth 
we cannot do an absolutely good or absolutely bad action. . . . This doctrine ceases 
therefore to be immoral as soon as we realize that we are what we are in consequence of 
our own actions. either in this life If it is objected that it makes Value identical with + 
dependent upon Knowledge I would answer that it undoubtedly explains the fact that 
Virtue is so dependent. . . . Unless some such principle as that of the ends justifying the 
means is adopted all moral action is rendered impossible.30 
 
For Schiller absolute injunctions, even those couched in the most benevolent of terms, turn out to 
be flaccid in the world of everyday experience.  
But Schiller was already, informally and formally, moving beyond the realm of everyday 
experience.  His early interest in psychical research is clearly in view.  In a lengthy entry, dated 
20 June 1884, Schiller relays his involvement in a “slate writing séance” featuring the medium 
William Eglington (1858-1933). 31   He was accompanied by another young academic, All Souls’ 
Fellow William Chadwick Oman (1860-1946).   The premise is that the medium, acting under 
the influences of spirits (ethereal, not potable), provides the writings of the dead upon the slate.  
Schiller’s explanation includes a description of the room as well as a diagram.  After several 
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failed attempts, and two minor engagements with other spirits, another spirit manifests itself and 
provides the following message upon the slate:   
We are glad to be able to give you this convincing proof of our power under conditions 
that are impossible as far as is at present known.  Spiritualism must be of value to you in 
your daily lives if you will but apply it; and it will bring you much comfort in the hour of 
need. 32 
 
Schiller leaves impressed as to the believability of the sitting, commenting on the manner of the 
message’s inscription and how it diverged in form from the other two manifestations.  And he 
concludes his entry stressing that his account, written a day after the sitting, was undertaken 
without recourse to embellishment. 
The details of this entry are warranted on several counts.  First, this is the earliest account 
of Schiller’s lengthy involvement in psychical research.    As such, it establishes his willingness 
to explore issues of religion and philosophy in ways not commonly accepted then or now.  
Second, and in reference to the discussion preceding it, it helps to contextualize how Schiller 
responded to the circumstances of his surroundings.  As difficult as it may be to now fathom, 
increased interest in psychical research corresponded with the rise of Absolute Idealism and, 
more generally, with crisis of conscience experienced by those coming to terms with unsteady 
mix of religion and science in Victorian England.  Schiller’s interest in psychical research, then, 
is an alternative to the philosophical and religious approaches dominant at Oxford at the time.  It 
also contains a crucial component related to his philosophy: the application of ideas.  This spirit 
or, more likely, Eglington, supplied two young academics with the suggested extension of the 
philosophy prevalent at the times.  Schiller took the message to heart.  He signaled the 
authenticity of his interest when, by the end of 1884, he was listed as an associate to the British 
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SPR; by May of the following year, he was listed as a member of the newly formed Oxford 
branch of the same.33   
As of July 1885, Schiller is holding to an inter-active view of religion and philosophy in 
accord with his entry date 3 March 1884 (“we are what we are in consequence of our own 
actions”).  As he states, “Religion is a kind incarnate Philosophy, materialized in institutions. . . . 
Philosophy differs fr. a theory in that the end of the one is Action of the other is Knowledge.”  
What, then, is the “theory” of which he is speaking?  It would seem to be that other frustration of 
the time, science.  “Science can never become a religion for it is of its essence to be tentative, 
hypothetical, aims up at Knowledge, whereas Rel. is necess. Dogmatic, aiming at action. . . . Sci 
can never consider any thing certain must always be ready to examine + accept new facts 
conflicting with the old or rather the old interpretation.  Hence it cannot afford a bias for action.”  
By being theory bound, science is static, tentative.  But then Schiller adds this: “Really the 
interpretation of the fact is far the more important thing + we can hardly take a step without 
theorizing.”34   The point seems conflicted, even contradictory, at first glance.  Yet it again points 
to Schiller’s developing philosophical views.  Here action is interpreting, is theorizing; it is the 
step after science, as Schiller defines it, where the speculation has been turned into the 
consequence of acting on what has been considered.  But it is Schiller’s entry eight days later 
which gives a clue as to what is to come: “I don’t think Christianity will perish, it is the only 
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alterative to pessimism.”35  Schiller is stating his conflict plainly.  In a religion without God and 
in a science without action, one is reduced to being, for the one, a player in a partially written 
play, for the other, a victim of chance.  Is there an alternative?       
It seems that there is.  In an undated diary entry from December 1886 the twenty-two 
year old Schiller, fresh off receiving a First in his Lit. Hum., is finding a way out of the grips of 
pessimism.  He finds the revolution in his thinking striking: “A mighty change has come over the 
spirit of my dream since the last phil. entries in this book.”36  And it is, again, a contextual 
solution born of his recent experiences.  As he goes on to state:  
It is not that Pes. can be disproved or that its practical impos. is anything of an arg. agst. 
its truth, but it necss. disposes us to seek of pess. a positive solution wh. shall not be 
uncon unworkable if one can be found that will explain the facts.  And the one condition 
any such a positive solution I had long recognized to be the doctrine of the immortality of 
the soul.  Of this doctrine I have lately acquired a far greater practical certainty (tho’ 
already always theoretically holding it) owing chiefly to some Planchette writing expr. 
carried on last summer.  Nor will I deny that a first in Greats made many things appear in 
a somewhat diff. light, tho’ the changes had commenced before this.  The result is that I 
have become a convert to Optimism + inclined to hold that all will end well + that all’s 
well that does so.  
 
Schiller realizes this is not a logical proof given the world around him:  “. . . this view cannot be 
disproved in any world wh. contains evil + hence Optimism must in the last resort be a matter of 
Faith (not of Hope, for we must act on (practical) certainties + not on probabilities).”    
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He also realizes, as a guide to action, optimism promises only tentative guidance.  But, by 
being tentative, it is also open to revision and improvement.  At the end of the month, he adds a 
supplement which reads, in part: 
Evol. can no more explain why certain actions shd. call forth moral feeling any more than 
why others shd. give rise to intellectual or other pleasurable feeling. . . . almost 
everything has been considered R or W. at diff. times + in diff places + that cases may 
arise in wh. it is almost imposs to tell wh. side is right + wh. wrong. . . Hence the 
instability + variation in our judgments of R. + W.  If we wish to oppose a certain 
proposal we first show say we don’t like it + it wd be unpleasant for us, if pressed give 
reasons for thinking it unwise + finally work ourselves up into calling it wrong.  
“Criminal folly’ is the strongest epithet we give to it.  But it is true that the we are usually 
way in the habit of regarding some thgs as is [sic] as merely pleasant or painful, of others 
as wise or foolish + others as right + wrong + it is only (mainly bec to show a thg is 
painful is the most obvious way of preventing it, then to show it is foolish + it is only in 
the minority of cases third time that we need fall back on the triarii [third line of Roman 
defense] of dissuasion, the mor. judg.) . . . Hence it follows that what we call moral. is 
susceptible of growth + change + that many things wh. are obviously seen to be 
conducive to the objective end are yet not recognized as Duties. . .37 
 
This theory still holds to some vestiges of Spencer’s ethical theory.38  But the comment on 
Duties points to the fact that Schiller sees this theory as extending beyond Kantian metaphysics.  
He concludes: “this doctrine of Ethics wd. correspond [inserted: “is an extension of”] to the 
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Kantian doctrine of Knowledge + Noumenal [that which can be conceived but not experienced] 
R. + W wd like Noumenal Truth be merely a limiting conception while ordinary actual Moral. 
like ordinary phenomenal Truth wd be based on experience.” 
On a metaphysical level, Schiller is grappling with a rather large question.  It is a 
question that Spencer raised in First Principles:  “To understand how Science and Religion 
express opposite sides of the same fact—the one its near or visible side, and the other its remote 
or invisible side—this it is which we must attempt; and to achieve this must profoundly modify 
our general Theory of Things.”39  On a personal level, Schiller is working through the tensions 
found in his diary entries of 14 and 22 July 1885.  Such work call for the integration of an unruly 
mass of materials—his psychical research experience, the process of the Greats, the works of 
Spencer and Kant—so as to develop a clearer philosophical picture.   It is an attempt that finds 
him within proximity of, if not amidst, the Idealists—a division of what is experienced and what 
is felt—and still at a distance from the pragmatism and humanism he would later develop.40  
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 The degree to which Schiller is still beholden to, but struggling with, Idealist concepts is clear in this 
entry from 1887: “If Idealism proves anything it proves that the Kosmos exist not only in Mind but in our Mind + 
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Such labors will culminate in 1891’s Riddles of the Sphinx.  But life has a way of interrupting 
weighty exposition.   
The mundane issue of money interrupted the process of writing.  In 1887, after receiving 
his Taylorian Scholarship, Schiller sought out a position teaching German at Eton that might 
supply him with the necessary funds to return to Oxford, complete his thesis, and receive his 
M.A.41  Little is known of his time at Eton.   P. Hatfield, Eton College Archivist, provides this 
information: “He was in fact here from January 1888 to July 1889 as Foreign Language 
Assistant. Dr. Warre, the Head Master, reporting his engagement to the New Governing Body in 
February 1888.”42  If we take Schiller at his word, from the very beginning it was just a job, and 
not a particularly enjoyable one at that.  In 1888, only three months into his stay, he writes: “. . . I 
                                                                                                                                                       
that is id. belongs unconditionally only to the Infinite (Lotze Micro 687 Trans) –.”  (F. C. S. Schiller, 7 March 1887, 
Notebook #11, n.p., 1882-1899, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special 
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).  It is possible to track 
down the actual lines he is referencing in the actual text that is being referenced.  Moreover, the last line of his entry 
(italicized above) turns out to be an incomplete quotation of Lotze; the rest of the sentence is as follows: “. . . but 
like all that is good appertains to us only conditionally and hence imperfectly” (Rudolph Hermann Lotze, 
Microcosmus: An Essay Concerning Man and His Relation to the World, vols. 1-2, trans. Elizabeth Hamilton and E. 
E. Constance Jones [Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1885], 687).  The reason for leaving this out can only be inferred, 
but it would seem that the issues of “conditionality” and “imperfection” were ones he was seeking to revise in what 
came to be Riddles of the Sphinx. 
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 In advance of securing the position, Schiller solicited the recommendations of his wards at Rugby and 
Balliol.  The first, T. W. Jex-Blake, wrote of Schiller: 
Mr. Canning Schiller was under me at Rugby for several years, till ’82, + was one of the ablest boys I had 
in the VIth Form during 13 years of Headmastership.  He had singular freshness of mind, and genuineness 
of character; and I expected great things of him.  Those who have known his Oxford work, can speak more 
certainly of him; but he always had my good will + esteem, + I think highly of his powers + aims. 
The second, Jowett, announces: 
I have a high opinion of Mr. Schiller, who has been an Exhibitioner of Balliol College + has obtained a 
First Class both in the 1st + 2nd Public Examinations.  He is a young man of excellent character, who 
possesses a great deal of natural vigour + ability.  He is a good classical scholar + also I should think, an 
unusually good German scholar.  He is frank + pleasant in his manners + popular among his fellows. 
I have no means of estimating his powers as a teacher; but I think that in other respects as far as I can 
judge, he would be a very good master in a Public School.  He was himself educated at Rugby. 
(Thomas William Jex-Blake, 9 October 1887; Benjamin Jowett, 18 October 1887; Recommendations, Box Three, F. 
C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, 
University of California, Los Angeles). 
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desired to be a master of those that know, but have become only a master of those that don’t 
know.”43   Nor was he appreciably more impressed with the abilities of his colleagues: “+ if one 
wanted to examine yr. know of Germ. one wd have to ex. it under a microscope.”44  Perhaps it 
was best for all involved that Schiller took this “temporary” position for “just long enough” to 
secure the funds he needed to complete his M.A.45  But Schiller found at least two other ways to 
fill his time at Eton.  The first shows his developing use of psychical research within his 
philosophical framework; the second demonstrates his ire at supposed affronts.   
While Schiller was at Eaton he was most assuredly reading the pages of the Proceedings 
and the Journal for Psychical Research and, particularly, the developing theories of Cambridge 
classics professor Frederic William Henry Myers (1843-1901).  Along with SPR founder and 
Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), and others, such as author and founding 
member of the Fabian Society—a precursor to the Labour Party in Britain—Frank Podmore 
(1856-1910), Myers represented the first and most active generation of psychical researchers.  
All of them saw the psychical as one potential way in which to harmonize the religious leanings 
of their Victorian upbringing with the newer approaches to science.46  But it was Myer who 
unabashedly mixed the two together, arguing that his psychology was “a science of the soul.”47 
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One of Myers’s earliest projects is discussed in the January 1887 Proceedings of the 
Society for Psychical Research.  In “Automatic Writing” he argues that it demonstrates varied 
states of consciousness.  While Myers believes such automatism can have both intentional and 
telepathic underpinnings, he urges that it may also indicate an evolutionary leap by which 
“thoughts and feelings thus found issue which were in some respects deeper than the subject’s 
ordinary consciousness.”48  Such leaps would not signal a secondary automatic impulse—as 
when the routine of learning to play a piano becomes instinctual through repetition—but, rather, 
a primary impulse heretofore thought beyond the realm of recognized volition.49  Central to 
Myer’s claim is a very specific case study: a letter dated 22 January 1887 in which Schiller, his 
brother, Ferdinand Nassau Schiller, and sister, Lisbeth, retell an instance of automatic writing.50  
The Report of the General Meeting three months later is appreciative, even sympathetic, but 
asserts that the conclusions must remain tentative until the mechanism(s) underlying 
automatism—which includes “table tilting, trance speaking, and the like”—are better 
understood.51  In March of 1888, Myers again insists on the importance of the topic and, again, 
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 Frederic W. H.  Myers, “Automatic Writing.—III,” Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 4 
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utilizes a letter (dated 18 September 1887) from Schiller that recounts an instance of writing in 
line with his theory.52 
In March of 1889 Thomas Barkworth responds with a letter to the editor of the Journal of  
the Society for Psychical Research entitled “Duplex versus Multiplex Personality.”  He wonders 
if Myers, rather than shining light on the multiplicity of personality, might be taking a split in 
personality too far.  Noting that Myers, in moving beyond cases of automatic writing, had to rely 
on the testimony of persons with recognized mental conditions, Barkworth wonders if the 
“spirit” being channeled may only be an indication that “something has got loose in the[ir] 
head[s].”  Better for Myers to recognize a “Duplex Personality” and one that is still taken as part 
of the “irreducible Ego.”53  A month later Myer’s responds.  He believes that Barkworth’s 
attempt to save the Ego has led him to conflate it with the personality.  For though the Muliplex 
personality “splits up our psychical being into a number of co-ordinate personalities” it does no 
harm to the idea of a persisting Ego; rather, it points to the fact that the Ego “finds at different 
moments very different channels or capacities of self-manifestation.”54  Barkworth, for his part, 
finds this an unacceptable continuance of conflation.  A personality does not vary on a whim; it 
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“is not a mood or state.”  To rend the Ego apart by reference to varied personalities is to destroy 
that which purportedly transcends one state of consciousness.55 
In October 1889, Schiller steps in to attempt a mediation of the dispute and meditation on 
the terms under consideration in a letter to the editor entitled “Multiplex Personality.”  He frames 
the crux of the debate thus: “What must be the inner constitution of the self so as to include the 
phenomena of multiplex personality, and in what sense can we speak of ‘secondary selves’?”56  
Schiller sees the problem with Myers’s and Barkworth’s argument as the result of materialistic 
interpretations of personality; that is, that multiple personality is an effect of “peculiar physical 
conditions,” which render them only minor variations.  These variations are then viewed as the 
changes that the self undergoes in response to physical conditions, rather than as distinct and 
separate secondary selves that exist in reference to a primary self.57    
Schiller suggests that the explanation lies in a non-materialistic interpretation whereby 
the psychical can actually influence, change, or control the physical; where, for instance, “a 
hypnotic suggestion can destroy something so physical as the pain of organic disease.”58  Such a 
non-materialistic focus shifts the grounds and terms of the previous debate.  Schiller wishes to 
distinguish individuality, which is the character of “being an ‘individual’” possessed by all 
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matter, as being less than the designation of personality.  This use of personality, in contrast to 
the materialistic term body, could be further improved upon by reference to a Transcendental 
Ego, which would be inclusive of the non-materialistic components of: “the phenomenal self or 
normal consciousness”; “the ‘secondary selves’.”59  If such a transcendent personality is 
recognized as “the ideal or aim of the evolution of the other two” it renders Barkworth’s worries 
moot insofar as the physical is a component part of a larger whole.60  This discussion points to 
the increasing importance Schiller places on the persistence of personality.61  Another discussion 
started just a few months later points to how persistent Schiller can be. 
  Sometime between 1897-1899, Schiller set to work on translating a part of Johann 
Eduard Erdmann’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie [1865, revised 1878].  The 1890 
English edition, A History of Philosophy, edited by Williston Samuel Hough, was a sprawling 
three volume set in which Schiller is listed as being “late Exhibitioner of Balliol College, 
Oxford” and having contributed “The Ancient Philosophy (vol. i, pp. 1-222).”62  That same year, 
an anonymous note in Mind finds faults with some of the translation (there were six translators 
involved in the project), and also with some of Erdmann’s choices or omissions regarding 
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  69 
specific philosophers.  But the review argues nonetheless that the book is a “matter for real 
congratulation” generally and is “specially welcome” as regards its discussion of philosophy 
since Hegel.63  The reviewer in the Oxford Magazine, J. E. H., also offers the volumes high 
praise . . . at first.   He notes that the “excellent work . . . deserves to be ranked first amongst all 
contemporary writings, and places all students of philosophy under a great obligation.”64   But, 
like the Mind review, there is the issue of the translations.  And “the worst offender is Mr. 
Canning Schiller,” who seems only to have been picked due “to his name and his possible 
nationality.”65   
Schiller takes umbrage at this review.  Though his initial letter is lost, one can gather the 
tone of it from editor Alfred Denis Godley’s (1856-1925) response on 5 June of 1890: 
Dear Schiller, 
 In re your complaint of the review. 
 Any letter that you send to the Magazine on the subject I shall be happy to 
publish: and if the reviewer replies, as I suppose he would, I will put in your answer if it 
is not too long – e.g. not over half a column.  In this way you will certainly have more 
communication with the reviewer than you would possibly have had otherwise, and you 
will also have an opportunity of justifying yourself to the public. 
 I confess I am unable to see that the circumstances are in any way exceptional (I 
only wish that incompetent reviewing was exceptional), or such as to warrant any 
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departing from the usual practice in such matters.  I know very well that the review was 
written without any sort of animus against you personally,66 
 
This, then, is the first occurrence on record suggesting that Schiller was prickly about criticism 
directed towards him.  And he sees the circumstances of the review as not only exceptional, but 
suspicious: “I think it rather hard that the censorship should be exercised upon a reply a well 
merited castigation of an article which unfortunately escaped a much need bowdlerization, 
especially when its gros incompetence was so gross that it could not but arouse suspicions that it 
was not accidental.”  He labels Godley’s hesitancy to publish a response as editorial “protection” 
for J. E. H.’s “misdeed.”  Further, he questions the editor’s claim that it was simply a sign of 
incompetence: “I did not understand your assurance to cover concerning J.E.H.’s good faith to 
cover the possibility of his having been the instrument of 3rd parties, especially as you could not 
give it me [sic] when I first asked you about it.”  Thus Schiller urges that his revised response to 
the review be published, a version of which retracts suggests of “malice” and “casts direct 
imputations only on J.E.H.’s intellect.”67 
Godley replies that he is willing to print Schiller’s letter, but only insofar as it deals with 
actual mistakes.  He is unwilling “to print reflections on the honesty of the Magazines reviewers: 
if they were to be exposed to the annoyance of being accused – and quite groundlessly – of want 
of good faith, I should never get any one to review books at all.”68  Schiller’s response two days 
later is more subdued but nonetheless unconvinced.  He will accept Godley’s word that the 
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review was not meant to be “malicious”; but he still wonders whether the reviewer was “used as 
an instrument of third parties.”  If not intentional, the review at the very least suggests to Schiller 
“incompetence so gross” that the readers would be astonished.69  Seemingly exasperated, Godley 
replies two days later that the course of action is as he first stated it would be.  Schiller should 
write a letter and, should the reviewer feel the need, he will respond to Schiller in kind.70  All this 
over a review of a translation of another person’s work and one begins to get a sense of what 
Schiller, with a more robust and personal philosophical view, will do when critics impinge on his 
work.  Such speculation will, however, have to wait.   
2.3 ‘IDEALISM WITH A DIFFERENCE’: SCHILLER’S RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX 
Upon returning from Eton to Oxford, Schiller sets about finishing his advanced degree and, in 
1891, receives his M.A.   This is also the year that sees Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the 
Philosophy of Evolution published under the anonymous moniker A. Troglodyte.  Many of the 
themes developed in the previous pages— the relation of religion to science, the choice between 
pessimism and optimism, the concept of immortality, the unifying nature of the Transcendent 
Ego—are found here in expanded form.  Here also is the first clear instance of Schiller’s 
complaints regarding logic.  And another theme, first noted in his 1884 diary, reemerges so as to 
unify his discussion of all of them: the practical.  This work importance is twofold: (1) it 
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provides a rather clear, though admittedly idealistic, precursor to pragmatism, and (2) it does so 
independently of the psychological work that James was conducting in America. 
What is striking, though, is the paucity of coverage that this work has received, even from 
some of his more contemporary biographers.  Rueben Abel, the most sympathetic of 
commentators, while full well recognizing that “Schiller’s Goliath was the Absolute Idealism of 
Anglo-Hegelianism” represented by Green, Bradley and others, finds no place for the work in his 
summary of Schiller’s philosophy.71  Herbert Searles and Allan Shields, in noting that it was in 
its time taken to be the work of “a genius of 25 years” go on to posit that it “still bears close 
reading” but for reasons not expressed.72  Kenneth Winetrout, in urging that Schiller deserves to 
be more well known, suggests that one reason is that he (alongside James, Dewey, and Mead) 
showed a “ready willingness . . . to treat big and thrilling problems that gave early pragmatism 
both a warmth and vigor that is all too often missing in philosophy.”73  This, then, is the work of 
genius, developed within the stronghold of Idealism, which provides the pivot where Schiller 
changes from being a student to a philosopher, a mere critic of his learning to a proponent of 
what came to be pragmatism.  But it is more.  It is the resolution of the tensions, first advanced 
anonymously in his notebooks and then by degrees in his involvement in the Myer’s debate, of 
his academic training.  As such, it deserves this more detailed analysis as it stands in closer 
relation to his subsequent philosophy than his previous commentators suggest.    
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Schiller explains, in the third person, that this work originates from a felt lack in current 
philosophy:   
It was the sense of this want, of the absence of any interpretation of modern results in the 
light of ancient principles, which prompted the author to given what is substantially a 
philosophy of Evolution, the first perhaps which accepts without reserve the data of 
modern science, and derives from them a philosophical cosmology, which can emulate 
the completeness of our scientific cosmologies.74 
 
Such a project is predicated on seeking accord between science and religion.  It seeks to strip 
away the demarcations whereby “science is defined as the knowledge of the manifestations of 
the Unknowable”, “God has become an unknowable Infinite, and Faith has been degraded into 
an unthinking assent to unmeaning verbiage about confessedly insoluble difficulties.”75  So what, 
then, are the Riddles?  It “is merely the articulation of the question, What is man or what is 
life?—and concerned merely with the relation of man to his Cause [“God”], to his Environment 
[“the world”], and to his Future [“immortality”].”76  The answer can be framed in four ways: 
Agnosticism, Scepticism, Pessimism, or Evolutionary Metaphysics. 
Agnosticism is of two sorts: the scientific type espoused by Spencer and the 
epistemological view championed by Kant.  Both lead, for Schiller, to enlightened but dead ends.  
And both are open to a general complaint Schiller first raised in Schiller’s 1884 and 1885 
notebooks.  To claim “I do not know” involves one in an infinite, and impossible, regress: “If we 
were purely thinking beings, it would obviously be the right attitude towards matters not known.  
But as we have also to act, and as action requires practical certainty, we must make up our minds 
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in one way or the other, and our acts must belie the professions of our theory.”77  The objections 
against the two sorts are variations on this very problem.  By casting out God, Spencer eliminates 
potential cause from the unity he seeks, deferring it to a realm that can’t be known; Kant, by 
vouching for God, renders the belief moot in a theory that can’t prove the personal belief.  Here 
again, Schiller seeks to refine his discussions of 1885-1886: 
The fact is, that this demand for an impossible suspense of judgment is based upon a 
confusion of scientific and philosophic certainty.  In science, certainty=great probability, 
and impossibility=an off chance; and hence in pure (as opposed to abstract or applied) 
science, certainty is neither frequent or necessary.  But in philosophy, which is the 
science of life, we require from our theory practical certainty in addition to its theoretic 
probability, and as we must act, we must act often on very slight probabilities.78 
 
Schiller also takes the Agnostic position to be contradictory in its move from what is known to 
what is not.  In doing so, Agnostics enact a shorthand taken as revelation, but operating on 
groundless faith.  Simply put, what is not known isn’t.   To profess your belief in it (‘the 
Unknown which somehow you know’) is as much the same as assuring that it can never be 
known (‘it is Unknowable but you know that it is such’).  Better that they should “no longer be 
allowed to decorate their first principle with an initial letter, for to spell it with U, is to like it to 
reality in the known world, to attribute existence to it, to make an adjectival negation of 
knowledge into substantial fact; in a word, to hypostasize it.”79 
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For Schiller, Scepticism is the necessary and more productive outcome of Agnosticism.  
It recognizes the extent to which “I do not know” can be taken and admits of its implications; 
“for it is Agnosticism perfected and purified from prejudice.”80  Everywhere one looks, there 
seem to be indications which approve the Sceptic’s tenor.  Concepts such as Matter, Space, 
Time, and Energy are accepted as fact, but of how many different, and changing, definitions do 
they admit?  The farther one goes back, the clearer it becomes that these concepts—whittled 
away by savages and refined by scientists—have never stayed put, never admitted of a facticity 
that permits close inspection: 
For all reality is immersed in the flux of Becoming, which glides before our eyes in a 
Protean stream of change, interminable, indeterminate, indefinite, indescribable, 
impenetrable, a boundless and groundless abyss into which we cast the frail network of 
our categories fruitlessly and in vain.81 
 
So the sceptic trumps the agnostic.  The historical record demonstrates not that we “do not 
know” but that “we cannot know.”  And here we meet the sceptic perfected, the Idealist.  The 
idealist takes the belief that we cannot know and postulates beyond it.  “For according to the 
most recent researches of logicians, all significant judgment involves a reference of the ideal 
content recognized as such—and it is this which we express in judging—to an unexpressed 
reality beyond judgment.”82  And where practice demonstrates that we get along well enough 
with only flawed approximations of judgment, it is only the case that sceptics have not pushed 
hard enough beyond the theoretical to show how the practical is subject to the same. 
But, for Schiller, this must lead to Pessimism.  For to admit, as most sceptics do, that in 
practice our knowledge and judgment appear to work is not the same as saying that they do 
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work.  The pessimist takes the view that we cannot know and infers that “the world contains 
nothing which admits of rational interpretation.”83  And if we take the four main aims of life, the 
corners which square the consideration of the Riddles, we find the pessimist’s answers at every 
turn.84  Happiness, the reaching of or adaptation to a desired end, is foreclosed by the chances of 
fate and circumstance.  As much as good men may prosper, equal amounts fail.  Goodness, our 
conduct as held to standards of morality, is just as tenuous.  For what standard can hold that does 
not become an imposition on the doer or an ideal always just out of reach?  Aesthetics, or our 
discrimination of beauty, seems at first a respite from the futile pursuit of happiness and 
goodness.  But it is no less subjective nor fraught with difficulty.  By developing a discriminating 
temper, we recoil at that which falls outside of it.  Filling the void are those not wanting to avoid 
the vulgar but rather to reform it: “It is not from the resignation and retirement of the 
aesthetically-minded that the great ‘reforms’ of history have received their impulse, but from the 
moral enthusiasm or party spirit of men whose every step was marked by brutal utilitarianism or 
unbeautiful fanaticism.”85 Intellect, or Reason, provides no better comfort.  For a developed 
reason only makes us more acutely aware of just how far we are from any ideal standard which, 
by the pessimist account, it is already foolhardy to aspire. 
Schiller suspects that the inevitable fall into Pessimism is based in the rejection of 
metaphysics, “of a systematic examination of ultimate questions, and of its bearing upon the 
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theory and practice of life.”86  But he also asserts that the basis of metaphysics is in need of 
repair if it is to provide an account which frames theory and practice in a positive manner.  The 
only irrefutable basis upon which to build a system is this: “The existence of the Self [or soul] is 
at present asserted only as the basis of all knowledge, and in this sense it cannot be validly 
doubted.”87  Such a system “would be realized when all our explanations made use of no 
principles which were not self-evident to human minds, self-explanatory to human feelings.”88  
This metaphysics (which Schiller calls “concrete,” as opposed to the “pseudo” or “abstract”) 
must be based in the workings of evolutionary science but also, by being philosophical, a 
corrective on those workings; “in other words, they must proceed from the phenomenally real to 
the ultimately real, from science to metaphysics.”89  Such a method is a species of the historical 
method and supplies it with a corrective on past attempts at metaphysics.  It, rather than using the 
lower to explain the higher, proceeds by “the assertion that historical research leads us from the 
more complex to the simpler, and ‘explains’ complexity by deriving it from simplicity.”90  In this 
way, the flux of Becoming, the bane of previous metaphysical systems, is seen as “the process 
which works out the universal law of Evolution.”91 
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What are the implications of this metaphysics?  There are four, with the first implying the 
results of the second and third.  First, and in a suggestion which both downplays and also asserts 
the role of humans in the process just described, it is teleological: 
The end to which it supposes all things to subserve is not the good for man, and still less 
for any individual man, but the universal End of the world-process, to which all things 
tend, and which will coincide with the idiocentric end and desires of the sections of the 
whole just in proportion to their position in the process.92 
 
Secondly, it is teleology which is predicated on progress.  If the evolutionary approach is to be 
seen against the pessimist denial of metaphysics, it must be on the point that the end of the 
world-process is an ideal one.  So, as society is more and more perfected, the individual is as 
well.  This point, however, suggests more than it first appears.  For the world-process subsumes 
the world—and with it the individual and society—in its realization of the universal end.  The 
limitations that I (as what Schiller calls “the phenomenal self” wherein resides ego but only as 
consciousness) see now as a higher stage in evolution must, by virtue of the process, exist as a 
potentiality for me at a still higher stage.  The limitations of Time and Becoming, so vexing to 
the past metaphysics, are points to be overcome.93  And, in being overcome, they give rise to the 
promise that the limitations of Matter, by virtue of Force, will transcend into Spirit (into what 
Schiller calls “the Transcendental Ego”).94  Such transcendence also carries with it implications.  
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If our potential suggests the ability to transcend the normal perimeters of reality (the world as we 
know it), it also suggests that our relation to the world process is different from other 
metaphysical systems.  At the stage of transcendence the phenomenal self ceases to be and is 
imbued “with all its powers and latent capabilities of development, the ultimate reality which we 
have not yet actually reached.”95 
Third, this form of teleological process implies a place for and a relationship with God.  
If we are to ward off a fall back into pessimism, we must ask: what caused the World Process?  
Any answer other than God, leads us back to the previous metaphysical systems.  So Schiller 
argues:  
For being non-phenomenal, the idea of coming into existence, or Becoming, which is a 
conception applying only to the facts of the phenomenal world, would not here be 
applicable.  If, then, God is such an existence, such a conception of God satisfies both the 
requirements of our demand for causation and solves the difficulty which the conception 
of a First Cause presents, if taken in an absolute sense.96 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
holds that they are ascribable to “the direct action of divine force” (Riddles, 277).   The argument is, to my mind, 
exceedingly complex.  But it seems to center on Schiller’s acceptance of transeunt (or, producing an effect beyond 
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 But this view of God is regulated by the demands previously expressed.  If previous systems 
failed by attributing cause to the unknowable, Schiller contends that this view of God is limited 
to answering only the issue of cause itself.97  In so crafting a finite God, one attributes to God 
only the activity necessary to craft the process, freeing the concept of a Deity from the issues—
such as the existence of evil, the reality of pain—that it is part of the world-process to sort out.   
To otherwise ascribe infinite powers to God is, in the words of Schiller, to transform the world 
into “an unintelligible freak of irresponsible insanity.”98   
This further implies that our relationship to God, as part of the process, is a personal one.  
If God is freed from responsibility for evil and pain, we become the responsible actors in the 
process: 
The assertion, therefore, of the finiteness of God is primarily the assertion of the 
knowableness of the world, of the commensurateness of the Deity with our intelligence.  
By becoming finite God becomes once more a real principle in the understanding of the 
world, a real motive in the conduct of life, a real factor in the existence of things, a factor 
none the less real for being unseen and inferred.99 
 
God, in short, becomes a pluralistic concept which the many may share and not a monistic 
abstraction which all must accept.  It is a concept which aids us in overcoming the world as it is, 
in a progressive process of which we are important players. 
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Fourth, if the process does not warrant against the development of our potential, what is 
to suggest that this world is but one stage in the world-process?  What is called for is not the 
dismissal of the consciousness we experience as phenomenal selves, but the expansion of life to 
include the continuance of our egos after death.  And as ego is a form of consciousness, one 
which admits of variations, so to would there be variations in what constitutes our personal 
immortality.  The conditioning factor would be memory.  For “it is only by means of memory 
that we can identify ourselves with our past; it is only by memory that we can hope to enjoy the 
fruits of present efforts in the future.”100   As we do in life, as a phenomenal fact, so too will we 
do beyond death, as a continuation of the world-process. 
Schiller concludes that this system seeks to obtain “a harmonious society of perfect 
individuals, a kingdom of Heaven of perfected spirits, in which all friction will have disappeared 
from their interaction with God and with one another.”101  But this ideal of harmony implies a 
further change, a change in the nature and function of God.   In what manner, though, Schiller 
cannot say.  For this metaphysics, like all metaphysics, is yet trapped in the realm of the 
phenomenal self.  It can seek to obtain truth, but must give pause to the limitations of thought, of 
consciousness.  Thus, like all belief systems, it must proceed on Faith: “what though he show 
what truth must be, if truth there be, he cannot show that truth there is.”102  For it is only faith 
that proceeds to pass beyond pessimism; and only faith as acted upon that demonstrates belief.  
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And here Schiller returns to the distinctions between science and religion of some years past, to 
the difference between theorizing faith and philosophizing belief:  
It is a mistake to suppose when all has been said all has been done; on the contrary, the 
difficult task of translating thought into feeling, of giving effect to the conclusions of 
reason, and of really incorporating them with our being, still remains.  And it is this 
incompleteness of mere thought which philosophy recognizes when it leaves us with an 
alternative.  This guards against the delusion that intellectual assent is sufficient for life.  
Because philosophy is practical, mere demonstration does not suffice; to understand a 
proof is not to believe it.  And in order to live rightly, we must not only assent that such 
and such principles are conclusively proved, but must also believe them.103 
 
Uncertain though our faith in the process might be, Schiller argues that belief may be enough to 
make it so.  What is certain, however, is that this is the culmination of Schiller’s academic 
tensions.   
The book generated a number of reviews, both popular and philosophical, in 1891 and 
1892.  The National Observer calls it “a book of considerable force and interest” wherein the 
author’s “thinking is genuine and his writing good.”104  The Guardian, disagreements 
notwithstanding, applauds it willingness to explore theological issues even if it finds the 
“interesting” style “at time florid and rhetorical.”105  Nature suggests that the book treats the 
Riddles with “considerable, though frequently misguided power.”106   Alexander Macalister, in 
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The Critical Review, notes that the book is written “with the freshness of a discoverer,” but faults 
it for “a tendency to make human faculty the measure” of all things and for not in the end 
providing answers to the metaphysical questions posed at the onset.107  But two longer notices 
more clearly shed light on the nature of the academic reception, positive and negative, that this 
work received.   
In the October 1891 Mind, T. W. sees the work as methodologically conflicted but 
inferentially provocative.  He first notes the dominant idealistic influences in this work’s 
approach to evolution—“The process of evolution, though all its stages, consists in the perfecting 
of individual existences by their grouping into more and more perfect societies”—while also 
emphasizing what was to later become a more pragmatic method—“The characteristic of the 
concrete metaphysical method is to be consistently and consciously ‘anthropomorphic,’ 
explaining everything from individual existences viewed as analogous to ourselves.”108  The 
resulting pluralistic Idealism of this metaphysic is “defective” in its “rejection of 
‘epistemological’ and ‘psychological’ methods.”109  At the same time, however, he praises 
Schiller for seeing “clearly the weaknesses of an attempt to found a philosophical theory on the 
objective assumptions of physical science.”110   Yet the work yields insight in its discussions of 
monads (a spiritual substance out of which material properties are produced) and immortality.  
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The former are held to produce, through their interaction, the appearance which we label the 
“external world”; the latter occurs when the memory of former, always persisting, is of 
“sufficient concentration of consciousness” to fuse that persistence into a personal form.111 
French’s review in the September 1892 Philosophical Review also questions the method 
and applauds what it infers.  He sees the work as an attempt “to construct a modern metaphysic 
on the foundation of the latest results of science.”112  These new developments create the wedge 
which allows for the suggestion of Idealism; that is, they point towards a non-phenomenological 
[a reference to the noumenal monads] cause for the world which implies a transcendent Deity.113  
And French, while greatly complicating the prose, arrives at a summary similar to T. W.: 
The one ultimate reality, God, appears to us as the material world; the other ultimate 
realities, the Transcendental Egos, appear as our present phenomenological selves.  The 
cosmos of our experience is a stress or interaction between God and the Egos. . . As the 
Egos are ultimate realities, God cannot annihilate them; the most that can be done is to 
bring them into harmony with the Divine Will. . . . In so far as the self is spiritually 
developed, and has attained to its ideal, the Ego, it will persist into the future.114    
 
French ends by noting that the “style is clear, and the careful analysis of contents is a 
commendable feature of the book.”  The only criticisms are twofold: (1) its “avowed contempt 
for epistemology and . . . uncritical acceptance of individualism seem to us sources of real 
weakness to the work as a whole,” and (2) it arouses repugnance by “appearing anonymously 
and with a fancy title.”115  
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 The bias against anonymity aside, what both reviewers single out for praise is what is in 
line with the tenor of the times: a religious source which gives sense and purpose to an 
experienced world.  What they both question is the non-Absolute form which gives rise to it: a 
personalized conception of the source.  Looking back, we can see the process by which Schiller 
came to these conclusions, even if we rarely see—in a nuanced jab at Jowett or a loutish lob at 
J.E.H.—the style that would come to carry them forward.  In 1884, Schiller’s philosophical view 
was one of rebellion against the abstractions of Balliol; the emphasis was on how the ethical and 
moral were matters of practical consequence.  In 1885, Schiller began to struggle with what 
science suggested, with what it did to complicate his view of, literally, religious practice and 
philosophical knowledge.  1886 and 1887 found Schiller, by reference to Spencer’s enveloping 
evolution as against strictly materialistic interpretations of Darwin, crafting an Idealism that 
promised not only personal connection with the spiritual, but our continuance within it.  The 
intervening years culminated in a work that, as a later commentator suggested, was “Idealism 
with a difference.”116  It was a view which, not to put too light a point on it, demanded to be 
tested.  While the following academic test was not a good one, the philosophical sparring, and 
company, proved invaluable. 
2.4 A TRIP ABROAD: SCHILLER’S “EDUCATION” AT CORNELL 
When Schiller arrived at Cornell in 1893, the Sage School of Philosophy was barely two years 
old.  But it was developing the trappings of a full-fledged American institution.  It housed a 
psychological laboratory that had been started in 1891 by Frank Angell (1857-1939), a former 
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student of Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Lepzig.117  It had just begun the publication of the 
Philosophical Review.  It already attracted scholars with distinguished reputations.  But we have 
little to reference as regards Schiller’s arrival at Cornell save his own words.  On his 
“Application of Graduate Student,” Schiller lists the dates on which he received his B.A. and 
M.A.  He also provides a brief overview of the work he did pursuant to those degrees.  In an 
apparent nod to the displeasure he felt at Eton, he only references this period of time by saying: 
“+ after an interval of 2 years (during which I translated the 1st part of Erdmann’s Hist. of 
Philosophy).”  He lists his Ph.D. interest areas as: “Philosophy (with special reference to 
Metaphysics + Logic)”; “Ancient Philosophy”; and “Psychology.”118  The form is endorsed on 
the bottom by three of the young department’s faculty members: James Edwin Creighton (1861-
1924, Professor of Modern Philosophy, first president of the American Philosophical 
Association), William Alexander Hammond (died 1938, Professor of Ancient Philosophy, 
graduate of Harvard, editor of the Philosophical Review) and Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-
1927, Chair of the Psychology Department, head of the psychological laboratory, and editor of 
Mind).119   
                                               
117
 Frank Angell’s tenure was brief.  A year after having taken the post, he departed Cornell for the newly 
formed Stanford University in California (“Welcome,” Department of Psychology, Cornell University, 2006, 
available from http://comp9.psych.cornell.edu, Internet; “Memorial Resolution: Frank Angell [1857-1939],” 
Stanford Historical Society, 2006, available from http://histsoc.stanford.edu/pdfmem/AngellF.pdf, Internet).  
German psychologist Wundt (1832-1920) founded the first experimental psychological laboratory.  Frank Angell is 
not to be confused with his cousin, James Rowland Angell (1869-1949), who was also a psychologist.  Like Frank, 
James Angell studied with Wundt.  Unlike Frank, he also studied briefly with William James and went on to teach 
with Dewey at Chicago.  For more information on J. R. Angell, readers are directed to Donald L. Kneessi, 
“Datelines: James Rowland Angell,” PSYography: Internet Source for Biographies of Psychologists, 2006, available 
from http://faculty.frostburg.edu/mbradley/psyography/datelines_jamesangell.html, Internet. 
 
118
 F. C. S. Schiller, “Application of Graduate Student,” 12/5/636, Box Twenty, Courtesy of the Division of 
Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Cornell University, Ithaca. 
 
119
 The historical overview and the bibliographic material related to those endorsing Schiller’s application 
are found in: Morris Bishop, A History of Cornell (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 276-8. 
 
  87 
 We also have little in the way of detail regarding his time once he arrived and before he 
unceremoniously left Cornell.  The Balliol College Register simply lists him as “Union Soc. 
Instructor in Philosophy.”120  Abel says, “he left Oxford to go to Cornell, where he was an 
instructor in logic and metaphysics (succeeding Frank Thilly), and did additional graduate 
work.”121  It is Marett alone who attempts a contextual, if breathless, assessment of what led him 
to Cornell and what it was that he found: 
Hitherto little else than a metaphysician, classically trained and familiar with German 
philosophy—too familiar, in fact, to be able to regard it as verbally inspired—he now 
breathed the atmosphere of what was philosophically no less than geographically a New 
World.  Here, for instance, there were psychological laboratories the like of which were 
not to be seen in Oxford. . . . he found in the American Universities a greater readiness to 
bring the physical sciences and the humanities together within one universe of discourse 
than was possible in Europe wherever the scholastic tradition survived.  Now, too, he 
began his lifelong friendship with William James, philosophically his alter ego.122 
 
There is something to this description.  While there is no evidence of him working in the 
psychological laboratory of Titchener, there is evidence to suggest that he was attempting to use 
the American venue as a place to work through the ideas expressed in Riddles.  In three specific 
debates, occurring in the pages of Mind and the Philosophical Review, Schiller sought to test his 
arguments regarding Idealism against the defenders of its practices.  In other articles, he worked 
to draw out the implications of a world not cut off from God or the progressive hand of man.  
Freed from the constraints of the Oxford system, his authorial voice and philosophical viewpoint 
become more refined.   It is where the ‘Idealism with a difference’ begins to transform into 
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pragmatism with a humanistic purpose.  And this transformation coincides with the beginnings 
of what was to become an intense and reciprocal friendship with James. 
 Properly speaking, the first of these debates begins a year prior to Schiller enrolling and 
teaching at Cornell.  In May 1892, David G. Ritchie (1853-1903, a former teacher of Schiller’s at 
Balliol, then of St. Andrew’s in Scotland) asked “What is Reality?” in the Philosophical Review.  
Ritchie is intent on proving “that the vulgar are being deceived by words, and that not ‘Realism’ 
but ‘Idealism’ corresponds to what the plain man really holds, if he can only be induced to go 
behind deceptive forms of ordinary speech and think the matter thoroughly out.”123  Central to 
this argument is the view that science extends, rather than contradicts, ordinary belief, as it posits 
coherence as that which creates an “intelligible system.”124  And such a system must point 
towards the integration of its discrete parts if coherence is to be maintained.  Thus any sense of 
dualism between reality and ideality is collapsed into the system; “Science leads us to Monism; 
and Monism, to be philosophic, must be idealistic.”125   
 This view of coherence points to the fundamentally moral, and teleological, nature of 
reality, a nature which ordinary language often betrays.  When a commoner says something is a 
“real jam” they are pointing towards a gap in attaining something.  This gap posits what is and, 
in doing so, implies its opposite.126  There remains, however, one “formidable objection” to these 
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suggestions: the sole reality of the individual.  Rather than posit individual as self—that which 
stands in relation to other objects—Ritchie asserts that it is that which extends beyond such 
relations.  For Ritchie it is the subject logically implied in all knowledge, the “Transcendental 
Ego” or “ultimate reality” which we can never know as an object, and which therefore can never 
be reduced to the relations implied in discussions of self.127  Ritchie argues that this explanation 
goes beyond the “uncritical metaphysics” of both the ordinary and scientific explanations of 
reality via the more encompassing explanation of philosophy.128  
 In September of the same year, Schiller begins “Reality and ‘Idealism’” by extending 
compliments to Ritchie regarding the clarity of his views, the precision of his phrases, and the 
intelligence of his organization.  But Schiller supposes it too much to assume that a Neo-
Hegelian’s substance would match his style. Specifically, Schiller argues that Ritchie makes a 
mistake common to idealist metaphysics: he reduces all discussion, and understanding, of reality 
to thought.  But thoughts are often contradictory, if not outright incoherent, as experienced in 
time—historical traditions, for example—and between persons—those who hold at any given 
time different traditions.   Thus, “upon Ritchie’s own showing rationality is not an ultimate 
test.”129  What, then, the measure? 
For Schiller, the measure is practice.  And, in contrast to Ritchie, he argues that the 
problem of incoherence is not removed by way of an overarching system of reality.  It is worked 
through by way of use . . . in the everyday humdrum version of the same.   Quoting James, 
“whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life, are things of whose 
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reality I cannot doubt.”130  Such use renders Ritchie’s deference to the Transcendent open to 
scorn as only a debating device:  
This free and easy appeal to the Deity, in the midst of a discussion of human knowledge, 
in order to silence an opponent and to fill up any gap in argument, ought surely to be as 
severely reprobated as the medieval practice of ascribing any ill-understood fact or bit of 
knowledge to the agency of the devil.131  
 
Even if the “individual” is not always the isolated self, it is a “hypothesis and an ideal, as well as 
a characteristic of reality.”132  And the allowance for it to work itself out as a process and a 
hypothesis, signals a productive move away from “the crudeness of our ‘universal laws’” and 
“nearer to the subtlety of nature.”133  
In March of 1893, Ritchie replies to Schiller’s “very vigorous and skillful attack.”134  A 
central conceit of his complaint in “Reality and Idealism” is to align Schiller with others who 
seem to share his views.  As Ritchie argues:  
It may serve the convenience of those interested in the problem, if I add, that in writing 
my paper I had in view, not merely the widespread reaction (in Great Britain at least) 
against what has been called Neo-Kantianism, but in particular a recent work entitled 
Riddles of the Sphinx (noticed and analyzed in the REVIEW, Vol. I, No. 5), a work with 
which I may assume that Mr. Schiller is acquainted and with which I should imagine he 
is in substantial agreement.135  
 
Ritchie takes on Schiller, and Schiller, for assuming that the basis of reality is reducible to the 
character of the self.   To him, this is an appeal to faculty (and faulty) psychology, suggesting 
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that one can talk of the real as if it meant anything one wanted it to mean; “before I discuss what 
a griffin or a chimera is, must I presuppose that the griffin and the chimera exist?”136  More 
seriously, this appeal to whatever one thinks to be real pushes Schiller into league with the 
mentally defective and the scientifically discredited, towards the appropriation of “past 
traditions” of which he can give no reference as actual experiences, and involves him in 
quibbling over details in Ritchie’s work that he chooses to ignore in his (meaning: the author of 
Riddles) own.137  In the final analysis, Ritchie turns Schiller’s argument for practice and use into 
arguments of never ending doubt.  For, if everything is “becoming” it can only be doing so out of 
one state and towards another; to be otherwise and as Schiller states it, it forms “a basis for a 
skepticism which negates itself the moment it is taken quite seriously.”138  
Despite Ritchie’s protests, and in the very same issue, Schiller still feels that he has 
understood Ritchie even if Ritchie doesn’t like the interpretation.   If anything is amiss, it is that 
he “supposed that we were discussing something more interesting than the philological meaning 
of the word ‘reality,’ and dealing at least with propositions and ‘ideal contents,’ if not with the 
reality which is beyond and provokes them.”139  Moreover, and given that Ritchie was no more 
clear, it seems unfair to argue that Schiller is being “uncritical” or relaxed in his approach to 
philosophy or to terms.  As to Schiller’s trafficking in the defective or scientifically suspect, 
again, it would help if the errors Ritchie charges him with were not “ones which [Ritchie’s] own 
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treatment involves.”140  He is also willing to defend his honor and that of the author of the 
Riddles of the Sphinx, noting that neither of them (him) suggested that the individual existed out 
of time; rather, it is that the individual demonstrates flexibility in time.141 In the end, Schiller 
sees their disagreements as insurmountable, as much for Ritchie’s insistence on the monopoly of 
ideals as for the literal expanse of “the broad Atlantic.”142  
As with Ritchie, Schiller uses his present time at Cornell to test the views of another 
person from his British past.  However, Schiller’s relationship to James Ellis McTaggart (1866-
1925) was slightly different.  Schiller was a relative peer and had in fact spent time with 
McTaggart; he was a friend of Schiller’s brothers and had vacationed with the Schiller family.  
But their proximity growing up stands in marked contrast to the chasm developing between their 
philosophical views.   While Schiller resisted his Idealist teaching, McTaggart sought to make 
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sense of it.  Even before Schiller arrived at Cornell, McTaggart was attempting to revise Hegel’s 
metaphysic so as to amend it to the implications of British Idealism.143  This process led him, in 
1894, to push beyond Hegel in a series of articles in Mind.   McTaggart frames his project thus:  
 The conception of the dialectic process as eternally realized involved the assertion that 
the universe was fundamentally perfect, and that Hegel’s attempt to explain away the 
obvious imperfection around us, by treating it as a delusion, had failed to bring the 
perfection of reality, and the imperfection of appearance, into harmony with one 
another.144  
 
And so he takes as his task a way out of Hegel’s delusion.  He finds no solution in the works of 
Bradley.145   
Thus he returns to Hegel’s central premise that the real is rational.  We can rule out its 
counter, that the real is irrational, on the grounds that a rational argument cannot use irrationality 
                                               
143
 In 1892, McTaggart questions the relationship of Hegel’s categories.  And in their relations, Hegel’s 
dialectic is open to criticism: each stage does demonstrate a certain degree of difference from the others rendering 
them not progressive or fluid but, to a degree, self contained; “we have seen that in the dialectic the relation of the 
various finite ideas to one another in different parts of the process is not the same.”  The result is that the Hegelian 
dialectic as set forth by Hegel “does not completely and perfectly express the nature of thought” (James Ellis 
McTaggart, “The Changes of Method in Hegel’s Dialectic,” Mind 1, no. 1 [January 1892]: 65; 67; 71). 
In 1893, McTaggart modifies his position.   He now argues that Hegel’s categories do grow out of each 
other.  But they are, and this seems to be a retention of the qualms of a year previous, markedly different from a 
“temporal succession.”  For if the Absolute Idea is to be seen as a culmination of each successive category, it exists 
outside of time “eternally in its full perfection.”  Leading from this suggestion all sorts of conclusions follow.  If the 
Absolute Idea is outside of time how can it then effect changes in time?  Or if the dialectic of Hegel proves to be 
superior to time metaphysically, it may mean that time “however suited it may be to the finite thought of every-day 
life . . . is not an ultimate reality.”  These implications leave McTaggart glum.  We are forced into a retreat towards 
the eternal which remains, despite time, perfect, in contradiction of the facts of our existence.  “In so far as we do 
not see the perfection of the universe, we are not perfect ourselves.  And as we are part of the universe, that too 
cannot be perfect.  And yet its perfection appears as a necessary consequence of Hegel’s position” (James Ellis 
McTaggart, “Time and the Hegelian Dialectic. [I.],” Mind 2, no. 8 [October 1893]: 490; 494; 496; 506). 
 
144
 James Ellis McTaggart, “Time and the Hegelian Dialectic. (II.),” Mind 3, no. 10 (April 1894): 190. 
 
145
 His argument here centers on Bradley’s search for non-contradiction.  To force Bradley’s dichotomy 
between reality and appearance necessitates either: (1) a search “for the apparent imperfection, some cause whose 
existence will not interfere with the real perfection”; or (2) accepting that the individual is but an appearance, a 
distortion, which cannot help but be a meager approximation of the real.  But neither position gets around the 
problem of a real that is perfect containing, as appearance or as reality, imperfections (McTaggart, “Time,” II, 191-
2).   Nor is the remedy found in the assertion of a positive cause of imperfection or an a priori argument for the 
“essential rationality of the universe”   The former would assert that out of something perfect came something 
incomplete, the latter would posit irrationality as so transient a thing that it loses its force as an opposition to 
rationality (McTaggart, “Time,” II, 194-5). 
 
  94 
as its conclusion.146  So in what form, then, would such rationality exist?  Would the assertion of 
duality do better at matching the “chequered condition of the actual world?”147  Surely not, as 
unity cannot be found and independence cannot be had in plurality.  Thus we turn to monism as a 
form and posit irrationality and rationality, not as independent, but as related.148  It is at this point 
that McTaggart engages in a bit of theoretical gymnastics: to go beyond Hegel one must 
subsume themselves within his system.  He opines that we should take Hegel’s dialectic and the 
imperfection of the world not as contradictions, but rather as contraries which we are at present 
unable to resolve.149  In doing so, we actually advance along the lines of thought put forth by 
Hegel; “for, as has been said, the dialectic always advances by combining on a higher plane two 
things which were contradictory on a lower one.”150  That we can’t see this yet only suggests we 
have yet to obtain a plane where such synthesis is possible. 
Schiller’s response to this theorizing would have to wait until the 1895.   The records 
indicate that, aside from a full schedule of teaching and studying, Schiller was engaged on at 
least two other topics in 1894.  First, the new edition of Riddles came out.  The only change 
made to the book is that it now, to Ritchie’s surprise perhaps, contained Schiller’s name.  
Second, it would seem that another object was occupying Schiller: the University of Chicago.  In 
a diary entry occurring sometime prior to October of 1894, he makes this humorous comment: 
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“Phily at Chicago is Dewey + Strong with occasional Tufts of wool. (cs)”   Clearly, Schiller is 
aware of the details of the University, at the time only a few years old, and its leading 
philosophical/psychological (it helps to recall that the terms had yet to take on distinctive 
features for British philosophers) figures: Dewey, the newly appointed chair of the philosophy 
department, Charles Augustus Strong (1862-1940), former student of James and the associate 
professor of psychology who was to leave the following year for Columbia, and James H. Tufts 
(1862-1942), recent professor and future philosophy department chair.  That these figures, 
among others, would come to be associated with the developing “Chicago School” of 
pragmatism needs be deferred for later.  But his punning does seems indicative of a developing 
preference for what the American, as opposed to British, system of education had to offer.  As he 
notes a few lines later, “A varsity cd make gt success by giving superior pedigrees. (CS).”151  
Contextually, it helps here to remember that varsity is etymological shorthand for a British 
university.    
In January 1895, Schiller concerns return to McTaggart with “Metaphysics of the Time-
Process.”  He starts his reply with a kindly query as to whether or not his “interesting 
investigation . . . has obtained the attention it merits, [for] the problem he so ably has handled is 
of such vital importance . . . that no apology is needed for a further discussion of his results.”  
Schiller even grants that, with “almost scholastic ingenuity,” McTaggart has proven that “there is 
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no known way of reconciling the (admitted) existence of the Time-process with the (alleged) 
‘eternal perfection of the Absolute Idea.”152  But before McTaggart nestles to his bosom the 
positive position of an as yet unknown synthesis, Schiller must ask one more question: why 
would one even hope to find a resolution of actual time in Hegel, or in “all systems of abstract 
metaphysics?”153   
As abstractions, metaphysics—Hegel, Spinoza, Plato or otherwise—derive their force 
from being “out of time” and can no better explain time than they can deal the distinction 
between the conceptual and the practical.  But the former are, as Schiller suggested in dealing 
with Ritchie, held to the latter; the “abstractions of metaphysics, then, exist as explanations of the 
concrete facts of life, and not the latter as illustrations of the former, and the Absolute Idea is not 
exempt from this rule.”154 And the abstractions of philosophy can improve their form if they take 
note of their scientific counterparts, if they are pointed back to reality even if they must abstract 
initially from it.  Framed in this way, abstractions are not the contours of super-structures.  They 
are hypotheses which are subject to further tests by the concrete facts of existence.155  Such an 
applied approach to questions turns its back on answers beyond our reach.  But it turns towards a 
“future for hope, a future for philosophy, and a philosophy for the future.”156   
These debates with Ritchie and McTaggart, taken generally, yield suggestions as to 
Schiller’s developing manner of argument.  But they contain something much more specific and, 
as regards the future of Schiller’s philosophy, much more important: the integration of Jamesian 
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psychology into the worldview Schiller expressed in Riddles of the Sphinx.  Recall that Schiller 
utilized James’s arguments as regards the constitution of reality in his response to Ritchie in 
September 1892.157  This argument is, as has been stated previously, pre-pragmatic.  It comes 
seven years prior to the term pragmatism even being uttered.  It is from James’s 1890 The 
Principles of Psychology, vol. II, in the section “Belief,” in the chapter entitled “The Perception 
of Reality.”  In Schiller’s argument with Ritchie, he also references James’s contextual definition 
of reality; that is, “reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life.”158  But there is 
more.  In between James’s definition of reality and his suggestion of the “intimate and 
continuous” nature of the same is this comment: “The fons et origo [source and origin] of all 
reality, whether from the absolute or practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves.”159  
We will put off a discussion of how important this personal, subjective, attribution of reality is to 
Schiller’s philosophy.  But we can formulate a more complete picture of the relationship—by 
virtue of when they were written and what they focused on—between Schiller’s debates with 
Ritchie and McTaggart.  The former is the first articulation of the Jamesian as it relates to 
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Schiller’s philosophy; the latter is the application of those insights into the now established battle 
with British Idealism.160 
These theoretical insights were cemented by another, more concrete, occurrence.  
Whether the end of 1895 or the start of 1896, Schiller met William James.161  On 9 January 1896, 
James sent Schiller this note: 
Dear Mr. Schiller, 
 Many thanks for your Riddles which I shall, I know devour with voracity, though 
probably not with promptitude for reasons connected with the course of life, that you 
probably know as much about as I do. 
 It seems a swindle that my remarks should have made you give me the book.  I 
shall certainly give you my next one if such a thing exists.  I was just thinking of ordering 
your volume when it arrived.  Many thanks, once more! 
 Yours sincerely162 
 
How and when the meeting leading up to this letter came to be is uncertain.   Herbert L. Searles 
states that “Schiller had met William James somewhere around 1895.”163  Winetrout agrees that 
“James and Schiller met for the first time in the mid-1890s,” but we must decide against 
Winetrout’s elaboration that this occurred “when Schiller spent some time in the James 
household during the Christmas holiday.”164  His evidence for this claim is a reference to volume 
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two of Ralph Barton Perry’s The Thought and Character of William James.  And, by the honest 
mistake of referencing a letter from November 1895, rather than one of the date 19 January 1897, 
Winetrout blend two perfectly demonstrable facts: (1) they did meet on or around the end of 
1895 as evidenced by James’s letter of January 1896, but (2) Schiller, as we shall see, spent the 
Christmas holiday of 1896, not 1895, with James.165 
 Regardless the actual chronology, 1896 was busy for Schiller at Cornell.  He publishes 
several essays,166 though one in particular begs close inspection for the reaction it arouses from 
James.  In May, Schiller took on one of British Idealism’s most intimidating reference points.  In 
“Lotze’s Monism,” Schiller sought to establish five propositions: (1) Lotze’s own principles do 
not suggest the “unity of things,” (2) his argument for such unity disrupts his actual insights, (3) 
that it does not solve the questions which it sought to answer, (4) it stand in contrast to a “the 
religious conception of God” and with Lotze’s treatment thereof, and (5) even if it is connected 
to such a conception it adds nothing of value.  Schiller supposes that the reasons for such 
problems are easily explained: by moving through the process of a subtle and creative argument, 
one, the writer or the reader, is lead easily to accept a conclusion which “certainly would not 
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have passed muster at the beginning.”167  These problems have a clear source.  And they are tied 
to a criticism which Schiller would apply more generally in years to come: the a priori.  Lotze 
treats the Absolute, in its unity “as prior to, and more real than, the plurality of things it serves to 
connect.”168  Thus understood, Schiller turns to the five arguments proper. 
 As regards Schiller’s first proposition, nothing proves that unity is necessary for 
interaction, save to the extent that unity is conceived of as being inclusive of things, not an all 
inclusive thing in itself.  Indeed, interaction implies the coexistence of things which exist within 
a plurality; “in every case in which we predicate the coexistence of several things, we imply that 
they directly or indirectly act on one another.”169  The problems within the second are the result 
of not seeing the problems in the first.  Given that Lotze had to posit the unity of the Absolute, he 
asserted that the influences of one on another (the question of causation, or what is here referred 
to as transeunt action), were actually subsumed within and the result of the unity itself (referred 
to here as immanent action).  But Schiller suggests this is the translation of what is 
psychologically apparent in our lives—that “we can change, because we are conscious beings 
with a feeling of our identity”—which holds no warrant.170  For if the Absolute is a unity it 
cannot, like ourselves, recognize or even tender the suggestion that it might distinguish and 
adjust to transeunt actions imposed on it; there is nothing beyond Lotze’s Absolute.  An 
additional difficulty arises in Lotze’s suggestion of commensurability.  While it is true that 
nothing is strictly speaking incommensurable, that does not suggest its origins in an unchanging 
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unity; “the supposed origins of a commensurable world out of an infinite number of 
commensurable and incommensurable elements is [post-Darwin] thinkable.”171 As to the third, 
and given the results of the previous two, Schiller’s answer is succinct: “the Absolute is not a 
principle of explanation that has any scientific or philosophical value.”172  
 Turning to the fourth and fifth propositions, dealing with the conception of God as it 
relates to the Absolute, Schiller is quick to point out how readily Lotze’s argument breaks down.  
And the reason is simple: conceptions of a Deity differ from conceptions of an Absolute.  
Whereas a God directs and guides, “the Absolute could have no plan and guide nothing.”173  And 
at every point that Lotze attempts to explain the Absolute as if it were a Deity, it suggests the 
tension of merging two concepts not fitted for each other.  In its struggle to propel itself through 
“a succession of phases” it demonstrates an “internal instability,” lurching adjustments in motion 
that lead Schiller to the comparison of a drunkard.174  If it must contend with the nature of evil, 
Lotze must stand quiet or else allow that it admits of possibly two Absolutes.  And such silence 
would be enough if all that was called for was honesty.  “But one has the right to expect that a 
philosopher whose arguments lead him into such manifest bankruptcy should be prompted to 
reexamine and possible revise his premises; and this Lotze fails to do.”175  More generally, and a 
touch more kindly, Schiller suggests that Lotze’s foray into a theological Absolute is of 
philosophical value; it shows “the futility of the a priori proofs of God’s existence” and the 
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necessity of formulating “the proofs a posteriori, and basing them, not on the nature of existence 
in the abstract, but on the nature of our empirical world.”176   
 This push away from the abstract Absolute and toward the empirical merits the support of 
his new ally, James.  In June 1896, James writes:  “My dear Schiller [I propose that we cease 
Mistering each other?]  I should in any case have written to you to day even had I not received 
your letter, simply to express the pleasure with which I have just read your article on Lotze in the 
last Phil. Rev. You carry me with you in all your positions.”  James goes on to say that his 
admiration is as much related to the essay’s “classical simplicity and directness of style and 
arrangement” as it is to the actual content.  Like Schiller, James is not ill-disposed to an idealistic 
conception of reality; rather, it is the intrusion of an a priori Absolute: “The idealistic hypothesis 
can stand on its own legs, and need not be that of an absolute thought in any case.” 177  This is 
followed three months later with James’s impressions of the Riddles which he had received at 
the start of the year: 
I must sit down whilst the warm fit is on me, + express my very great delight.  How 
strange that a book so capitally written, so “live,” so original, so bold, should be so little 
known!  That I myself who am so exceptionally in accord with its fundamental positions, 
should until now have [] no. red [sic] its contents!  But don’t fear!  It will be known + 
little by little quoted, and then some fortune will be made.  It is too rich as it now stands.  
It is a young man’s work – he puts in at once it all his system.  When you dole out 
benefits the small change of many of your chapters more technically and formally, 
attention will be drawn to the whole system thing.  The speculations of the last chapter 
are foreign to my range – I am too timid – but they have struck me very much.  I only 
mean this for a general hurrah, so I go into no detail.  I can foresee a more or less 
systematic siege of plu monism + absolutism on my own part for the rest of my days (so 
far as I may retain ability to do anything) and it cheers and enlivens me immensely to 
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find a Gleichgesinente Menschen [akin to an “equal man”] of such superior power to 
follow. 178   
 
The last of these notes is important in that it highlights the extent to which Schiller and James are 
in agreement.  But it also suggests that the range of Schiller’s argument, particularly as it leans 
towards the issue of Immortality, extends beyond that of James.  And it is clear that James is 
hoping that Schiller will place his views into style—“more technically and formally”—so as to 
broaden its appeal with interested readers.   Such quibbles aside, it was only three months later 
that Schiller finally spent that Christmas holiday with the James and his wife.    Reflecting on it 
afterward, in a letter to the previously discussed psychical researcher Frederic Myers, James had 
this to say: “Schiller spent the Christmas holiday with us, and I find him a peculiarly delightful 
fellow.  His philosophy and mine run abreast in an altogether gratifying way to me.”179    
Others, however, are interested in discussing Schiller’s peculiar take on Lotze.  In the 
January 1897 Philosophical Review, W. J. Wright praises the originality of Schiller’s paper, 
hoping “that other writers of equal knowledge, and equally facile pens, may be stimulated to 
contribute their views upon this important philosophy.”180  The praise is short-lived.  Wright 
argues that Schiller leads readers “into a maze of misconceptions.”181  And, if one takes Schiller 
at his word, Wright accuses him of being a modern primitive, trusting all that the senses suggest.  
This is flawed, counters Wright, because “merely given experience tells us nothing of action or 
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interaction.”182  Thus Schiller is wrong to accuse Lotze, on the basis of a naïve empirical 
psychology, of not justifying the Absolute.  Point in fact, Lotze’s system does justify itself 
because it extends beyond the range of Schiller’s arguments. The Absolute so shapes things as to 
appear orderly and uniform, and does so by way of phenomena which “are made to appear in our 
minds, and bear witness to the immanence [as opposed to transeunce] of the One in the 
Many.”183 
Schiller is glad to have (at) Wright’s reply in the very same issue.  First, because it allows 
him to reiterate that his “immanent” criticism was not intent on “wrecking” Lotze’s philosophy; 
rather it was directed “against his Monism alone, and the method whereby he reaches it.”184  
Second, because it allows him to clarify his points.  His argument against the necessity of unity 
was based on the necessity of interaction; thus, for him, a plurality of coexisting objects in reality 
calls into question a unity meant to subsume them.  More specifically, his argument was that 
Lotze failed to see how that would bear on the consequences of asserting unity, against the 
reality of the world: “he did not perceive the necessity of passing from the affirmation, ‘There is 
a world’ to ‘ergo, there is interaction.’”185  All of this relates to Wright’s complaint that Schiller 
misreads Lotze.  Schiller responds that it is actually the case that Wright selectively reads Lotze 
so as to justify the Absolute.186  To this point, Schiller queries: 
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What, moreover, does Professor Wright have to say to the passage immediately preceding 
the paragraph from which he quotes, in which Lotze claims that ‘the fact that there are 
reciprocal actions (interactions) will compel us to believe in a real unity of all things, and 
a common source whence they have flowed’?187   
 
In this way, Schiller sees Lotze as admitting the necessity of the parts which would warrant any 
attempt at constructing a unified system.  And these parts, so casually dismissed by Wright, are 
not some “primitive” retreat from the glory of the Absolute.  They are, for Schiller, a damning 
indictment of deductive abstraction.   They cast into doubt any Absolute which renders that 
which creates it absent, “a One which is no longer compatible with the existence of the 
Many.”188  As with James, Schiller does not want to conflate a desire for order with the 
perception of complexity.   
2.5 A TRIP, ABROAD: SCHILLER’S DEPARTURE FROM AMERICA 
In the months that follow these philosophical salvos, Schiller is involved in complexities of a 
more academic sort.   They culminate, most basically, in Schiller failing his orals and returning 
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to begin a career at Corpus Christi.  Until recently there has been very little detail as regards 
specifics.   Slosson offers two scenarios: (1) puff chested from the offer of a job at Oxford, 
Schiller chose not to take the exam seriously; or (2) being so sharp a mind and already so far 
along the path to pragmatism, Schiller “turned the tables” on his unhappy examiners.189   Marett 
suggests that “he received the call to Oxford for which his soul longed and his friends had long 
prayed and, it may be, schemed.”190  Abel says that Riddles “was unsuccessfully offered for his 
Ph.D. thesis.”191  Winetrout simply says that “he failed the doctorate oral in philosophy.”192  
Cornell’s published history, for its part, provides an amusingly succinct tale: “[Schiller] failed 
his orals for the Ph.D. and was bidden to take a make-up.  He decided not to bother; he strolled 
under the window of the room where his committee waited to examine him, and then strolled 
significantly away.  So at least the story ran; and he was certainly not reappointed.”193 
 The internal documents regarding Schiller’s termination at Cornell are no more 
definitive.  In a letter drafted by the Committee on Graduate Work and Advanced Degrees to the 
Dean of the University Faculty at Cornell University, it is stated that Schiller was given an oral 
examination in Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics, and Psychology on 26 May 1897.  But “the 
committee found unanimously that Mr. Schiller had failed to satisfy the requirements of the 
examination.”  Being shocked at the “wholly unexpected and unforeseen” result, and hoping to 
“eliminate the accidents of an oral examination,” they arranged for Schiller to retake the exam in 
writing on 2 June 1897.  On that date Schiller arrived late and declined the examination, stating 
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that, among other things, having secured a position at Oxford meant that any degree from 
Cornell would only have “sentimental value.”  The same afternoon a note was received by the 
chairman of Schiller’s committee which stated that, “owing to circumstance of which you have 
heard and which I should have been delighted to explain to you fully if you had called, it will be 
impossible for me to take an examination of the length you announce to me in the postal card I 
have just received.”194   In two letters dated 4 June 1897, Schiller disputes the Committee’s 
findings.  In the first, addressed to the President of the University,  protests that his committee 
has not informed of their decision regarding his exam and that he has heard rumors to the effect 
that he “was supposed to have withdrawn his candidature.”195  In the second, to Professor White, 
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Schiller states in part: “I understand that no report was sent in my case . . . The whole proceeding 
strikes me as equally irregular in form + discourteous in substance.”196  
 Slosson’s first scenario and Schiller’s committee’s report seem nearest to the truth.  The 
private documents suggest that Schiller was campaigning to secure a position, in America or 
Britain, as early as 1895.  In Schiller’s files there is a recommendation dated 16 June 1895.  It 
reads: 
 Mr. C. Schiller B.A. of Christ Church Balliol College, Oxford was my colleague 
and assistant at Eton for a period of five school terms (Lent 1888 – Mid-summer 1889).  
During this time he was mainly engaged in the teaching of German, both in the Army 
Class and the general body of the school.  As head of the German department I had ample 
opportunities of making myself acquaintd with his work and forming an opinion of his 
acquirements. 
 Mr. Schiller is an excellent German scholar, having in fact a perfect command of 
the language, and is an able and successful teacher.  He speaking + writes German as 
fluently as English, but has also made a thorough study of the literature and philology, as 
is shown by his having gained the Taylorian scholarship at Oxford.  I can only add that in 
my opinion he is a man admirably fitted to fulfil the duties of a lecturer or professor of 
German language and literature at an English University. 
R. A. Ploetz M.A. 
Magd. Coll. Oxon 
Senior German master at 
Eton College197 
 
His correspondence with James does nothing to eliminate the suspicion of a campaign.  In a 
letter of 9 June 1896, James notes that he is “I am sorry you want to leave America but on the 
whole am not indignant. . . . Wishing you success – though as an American.  I hate to lose 
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you.”198  In September of the same, and when Schiller would have been on a vacation abroad, 
James hopes he “will come back to this country, which after all has its good ‘pints.’”199   
An even clearer indication Schiller was seeking the help and counsel of those outside of 
Cornell is this letter from James on 22 January 1897:   
Dear Schiller, 
 I have just got yours of the 16th forwarded from L.   I write by the same mail to 
the “President” of Corpus Christi – though that seems to me an incredible title – 2nd 
thoughts I will put “Head” on the outside and apologize inside for my ignorance.  I shall 
wait to be asked before writing to Low.  I recommended you last week to Prof. King of 
Oberlin (who had written for advice) as the best man I know who was out of place.  He 
replied that he had his eye on you already.  O. would be a good sociological study, 
though I fear you are not gospel-hardened enough to stand such an environment. 
 I am up here for the holiday week – thermometer 6 yester morn, and I with “pink 
eye” – so no more. 
Yours ever200 
 
Only two months shy of his first scheduled examination, Schiller is all but certain that he is 
leaving.  James’s response to this news exposes the depths of his feeling for his younger protégé.  
In a letter dated 6 March 1897 James exclaims:  
I am shocked and outraged at what you tell me of Cornell no longer requiring your 
services.  Their finances must be very much straitened indeed to make them confront 
such a decision.  If only we could get you here!  You and I could then found a regular 
school of pluralism, and sweep the country. . . . It cannot be that you will lack 
employment for long, and I will write you testimonials by the yard, whenever you apply 
to me for such a thing.  You are certainly one of the two or three constructive 
philosophers in the country. 201 
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But the question is why he is leaving.  Schiller replies on 16 April that the issue is not financial; 
rather, it is the fact that Titchener wants to promote another student.  As a consequence, Schiller 
has already sent in applications to both Corpus Christi and Columbia.202   
Whatever the intrigue involved, it is clear that Schiller was no mere victim of the 
situation.  Even if his time at Cornell was limited due to a rift with Titchener, Schiller had been 
contemplating a departure a year prior to his defense.   For at least several months, he had been 
actively seeking James’s help to secure an alternative place of employment.  So, in April, with 
applications already sent in, the upcoming oral exam was likely less on his mind.  By the time of 
the oral retake in June, the positive response from Corpus Christi made the idea of taking another 
exam so as to get a doctorate—it was of no use at Oxford and would do nothing to keep him at 
Cornell—even less appealing.  This is confirmed in a letter that Schiller must have sent out in the 
days immediately prior to the protest at his “irregular” treatment at Cornell.   Given James’s 
response, there was no mention of the failed orals or the written follow up he failed to take. 
Rather, it was to inform James that Schiller had secured a position at Corpus Christi.   On 5 June 
1987, James’s writes: “I heartily congratulate you on the appointment, though I am very sorry 
that we are to lose you.  I was always hoping you might become an inveterate yankee.”  And it 
looks as if Schiller was also trying to arrange a final meeting before he went abroad.  “There is 
nothing I should like better than to have a long talk with you before you go, but I can make no 
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appointments for a few days. . . . What is your earliest possible date of arrival?”203  Whether this 
meeting happened or not, we do not know.   
But we do know that time spent not studying for a written exam was being put to good 
use.  Schiller was working on one last ‘American’ article prior to his departure, the June 1897 
“Darwinism and Design” in the Contemporary Review.  Schiller begins by asking: what 
difference it makes in our attitude towards life if we “believe it to be inspired by intelligence, or 
hold it to be the fortuitous product of blind mechanical forces.”204  Noting that the most 
contemporaneous argument from design argues “from the existence of adaptation to the 
existence of an adapter,” Schiller posits a concomitant problem: the existence of defect commits 
a supporter of this view to accept said defect as part of the design.205  In response, the Darwinian 
argument removes the idea of intelligence, replacing it with adaptation meant only to secure 
survival.  Instead of being a crushing blow to the intelligence camp, he sees this as only a newer 
argument from design with Natural Selection standing in the place of the (or a) Deity.  This leads 
Schiller to advance several questions: (1) if survival is the ultimate within a Darwinian scheme, 
is it wrong to suppose that intelligence was developed for that purpose; (2) if variation is to 
supplant intelligence, is it begging the question to ask from whence it originated; (3) if these 
variations are subject to the demands of nature, what then is the basis for ruling out a priori 
demands imposed from beyond nature?206  His most basic point is that questions such as these 
demonstrate the Darwinian account cannot be said to be the death blow to arguments from 
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design or to arguments as to cause.  Indeed, the natural world demonstrates that species persist 
and resist change just as much as they degenerate “under the impartial operations of variability 
and natural selection.”207 
None of which is meant to suggest that the Darwinian account is without use.  Its 
significance “has been to establish once and for all the reality, universality, and importance of 
natural selection as a condition of organic life.”208  But it equally important to point out that there 
are rhetorical underpinnings to Darwin’s account.  As much as it was meant to explain natural 
selection, “there is abundant autobiographical evidence that Darwin himself elaborated his theory 
in support of evolutionism against creationism.”209  And to put forth an account that squared with 
such an interest, Darwin necessarily had to posit “indefinite accidental variation,” leaving to the 
side any question as to why it happened.210  The result, then, was the creation of a 
methodological simplification that was useful, but not true, that provided a productive way to 
look at facts, but should not be mistakenly made into the facts themselves.211 
To Schiller, such an understanding more accurately does justice to Darwin’s account of 
natural selection, even as it makes clear that said account in no way rules out a teleological 
explanation of evolution itself.  What remains, however, is the question of how the Darwinian 
account of selection and the teleological account of cause can be squared with existence of 
progression, of persistence, of degeneration.  To Schiller, the answer is that “the power that 
makes for progress, a power which we may suppose to work for nobler ends, can render natural 
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selection also a pliable instrument of its purpose, a sanction to enforce the law of progress, a 
goad to urge on the laggards.”212  As a productive account, natural selection shows us adaptation 
at work while teleology suggests “a power that intelligently adapts means to ends”; as a negative 
account, natural selection weakens antiquated arguments from design that suggested things were 
as they should be and points us to the hope “that everything is being made perfect.”213  Both, in 
service and support of each other, thereby help man to fashion a world not ready made with an 
attitude more optimistically inclined. 
This article is of note for several reasons.  First, as a parting shot it is aimed, not back at 
America, but towards England.  This point shouldn’t be minimized.  In these years it would be 
premature to even speak of his style of pragmatism, as it is not until he returns to England that 
this all coalesces into something akin to that name.  But it is proper to speak of the views that led 
to pragmatism, of the groundwork that Schiller had done in America.  For, aside from the work 
he had done prior to arriving in America for the Journal and Proceedings of the Society for 
Psychical Research—already a professed believer in a world big enough for a Diety—and a lone 
response to the family acquaintance McTaggart—already a decidedly non-Hegelian as regards 
abstract metaphysics—in Mind, Schiller’s philosophical confidence was gained in the pages of 
the in-house journal, Philosophical Review.  Second, this can be seen as more than a shot; it can 
be taken as a printed statement of his views to that point in time.  And it is a statement that 
encompasses both Evolution and the Spirit.  It is the former as both a historical process and as a 
progressive ideal; it is the latter as the suggestion that belief can promote both the process and 
the ideal.  Finally, and while it would be hasty to call it Jamesian, it is an indication of the 
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direction in which Schiller would take his philosophy in the years ahead.  Those years were 
surely on his mind as, with summer upon him, Schiller set sail on his return trip home. 
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3.0  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRAGMATISM 1898-1905  
The suspicion is in the air nowadays that the superiority of one of our formulas to another may 
not consist so much in its literal ‘objectivity,’ as in subjective qualities like its usefulness, its ‘elegance’ or 
its congruity with our residual beliefs.  Yielding to those suspicions, and generalizing,  
we fall into something like the humanistic state of mind.1 
 
They are the most mundane matters of record: in 1897 Schiller traveled across the sea to bring 
his philosophical views back to Oxford; James traveled across the country to bring his “will to 
believe” to American philosophers.  These two details yield a near perfect demonstration of the 
gulf that separated the two men.  The division was, by turns, literal and figurative.  But it was not 
philosophical.  James had as much as noted their “metaphysical” kinship in the years previous, in 
the years leading up to James’s publication of The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy (1897) and the lecture Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898).  It 
was, first, a physical distance that placed Schiller beyond the birth of one term with which he 
was to be identified for the rest of his life: pragmatism.  And it was, second, at an emblematic 
distance—entrenched once again in the citadel of Oxford—that Schiller would marshal the 
term(s) to describe, and the style to defend, the philosophical disposition he shared with James.    
Those terms would culminate in Schiller’s own statements as to the nature of pragmatism 
and, then, pragmatic humanism.  Here, too, there is a sense of difference.  And it is a difference 
as regards strategy.  James’s goals leaned towards inclusion and pluralism, to harmonizing 
differences.  Schiller’s arguments tilted towards the subjective side of Jamesian psychology, 
towards a highly personalized conception of reality and an outright disdain for monism.  Some 
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could be brusque.  Schiller’s spoof Mind! (1901) was a leering jab at his elders at Oxford as 
much as it was a satire of philosophy proper.  Others were more calculated.  “Axioms as 
Postulates” (1902) forsook mockery to suggest the range to which pragmatic thinking could be 
extended.  And some were simply twice told tales slipped into sturdier boards.  Humanism: 
Philosophical Essays (1903) culled together both the pre- and proto-pragmatic essays that were 
thematically similar if not systematically developed.  This, too, was demonstrative of Schiller’s 
tendencies.  James was already urging Schiller to dedicate his time to more formal treatment of 
his (and James’s) pragmatic views.  But Schiller—whether due to his temperament, his workload 
as a tutor, or a bit of both—chose a different approach.  In countless journal articles and reviews, 
he attempted to wear down the opposition by sheer volume of argument.  In doing so, he often 
sided with polemic aimed at living targets: minor nuisances such as Harvard psychologist Hugo 
Münsterberg and formidable Idealists such as Oxonian Francis Herbert Bradley.  In these heady 
days, such tactics provide dividends even as they portend negative consequences. 
3.1 ‘TO HOPE TILL HOPE CREATES’: THE BIRTH OF PRAGMATISM  
 
The arrival of James’s 1897 work, The Will to Believe, on the philosophical scene was cause for 
commentary.  Dedicated to Peirce, it provides the first published discussion of the concept of 
radical empiricism.  James offers this definition: 
I say ‘empiricism,’ because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions 
concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modifications in the course of future 
experience; and I say ‘radical,’ because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as a 
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hypothesis, and . . . it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all 
experience has got to square.2 
 
Several points are worth note.  First, this is not the sort of empiricism that the Absolute Idealists 
loathed and dismissed.  It is not the objective before the eye but the subjective nature of that 
which lies beyond us.  The irony is that this suggests a similarity with Idealism.  But the radical 
aspect of this concept undoes the comparison.  It is not modification so as to justify unity; rather, 
it is modification as a consequence of subsequent experience.  And this concept extends in none 
too subtle ways from James’s The Principles of Psychology.   Therein, and in the 1892 Briefer 
Course, James defined psychology as the “description and explanation of states of consciousness 
as such.”   These states are related to the Empirical Self, or Me, which James further divides into 
the Material Me and the Social Me.  But to these he adds the Spiritual Me, “the entire collection 
of consciousness, my psychic faculties and dispositions taken concretely.”3  Here, again, one can 
see the tinge of Idealism.  But it is not of an absolute sort.4  Like Schiller’s arguments during the 
late 1880s with Barkworth and Myers, this is Idealism pinioned by experience and bracketed by 
personality.  Consciousness resides within the individual; it is not beyond the individual.  Thus 
understood, a (radical) empirical examination of experience frames a psychological 
understanding of the consciousness of individuals therein.  Now, this might seem a slight quibble 
between two antiquated philosophical positions.  Then, this was nothing less than to cleave the 
head off the established philosophical idol. 
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Interested readers take note of James’s radical propositions.  In September, the Dial 
posits who the audience for The Will to Believe would be.  Though subtitled “essays in popular 
philosophy,” James’s message is clearly directed at the philosophical, not general, public.  The 
distilled message?  That a credulous belief in science binds one to a flawed sensitivity as regards 
matters of religion, of faith, of life and death.  For its part, the review supposes James’s interest 
in non-sanctioned practices demonstrates the limits of such belief; “the author’s chapter on 
‘Psychical Research’ affords evidence that he carries his own principle of believing the things 
that we want to believe a little farther than most clear-sighted thinkers are willing to carry it.”5  
James, like Schiller before and after him, is chastised for pushing against the boundaries of 
sanctioned philosophy.  The will to believe is mis-translated by suspicious readers into believing 
whatever you will. 
A month later, Schiller provides an effusive counterpoint in Mind.   Never was Schiller 
seen, before or after, to dote so heavily (sweetly, we might say) upon a philosopher.   He calls 
James’s volume “admirable” and a “delight,” noting “the grace of his style, the raciness of his 
phrases, the stimulus of his originality, in short the deftness of the manipulations whereby he is 
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wont to charm the heavy indigestible dough of philosophic discussion to rise up into dainty 
shapes that need be disdained by no intellectual epicure.”6  But Schiller is as much calling into 
question the ambiguity of James’s prose as he is celebrating it: “he pretends only to express his 
personal feelings.”7  If that is the case, to whom then should additional praise be directed?  
Schiller suggests that James comes from a lineage of thinkers, particularly the German 
philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche, who questioned rationalism and lead 
to what James has termed, radical empiricism.8   So, in turning his back on the “infallible a priori 
tests of truth,” Schiller is wont to insist that James’s views are not “altogether new and 
indisputably true”; rather, he is the latest philosopher to note that wisdom is grounded in human 
experience.  The rationalist route once more stands exposed as futile for, “if then there existed 
absolute truth, of which man was not the measure, it would be most natural that the human mind 
should prove inadequate to its comprehension.”9   
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The responses from James and his wife, Alice, were almost as buoyant as the review.  On 
18 October, Alice James writes:  
You are the wise man who speaks the just word!  I have just read your review of the Will 
to Believe in Mind – it came this morning – and I must tell you how it has rejoiced me.  
You have read with sympathy and you interpret more skillfully than any one the faith my 
husband holds.  There has been much praise of the book of a general sort but nothing that 
has caught its true worth as you do.  For your generous praise I am truly grateful and I 
find myself regretting afresh that we have known you only to lose you.10 
 
Atop the note, in William’s hand, is the notation: “My wife on reading your review could not 
control herself and blossomed out in this.”  For his part, James responded five days later: 
Did you ever hear of the famous international prize fight between Tom Sayers + Heenan 
the Benicia Boy, or were you too small a baby in 1857?  The Times devoted a couple of 
pages of report + one or more eulogistic editorials to the English Champion, and the 
latter, brimming over with emotion wrote a letter to the Times in which he touchingly 
said that he would live in future as one who had been once deemed worth worthy of 
commemorations in one of its leaders.  After reading your review of me in the October 
Mind (which only reached me 2 days ago) I feel as the noble Sayers felt, and think I 
ought to write to [George Frederick] Stout [the editor of Mind] to say I will try to live up 
to such a character.  My past has not deserved such words, but my future shall.  Seriously 
your review has given me the keenest possible pleasure.  This philosophy must be 
thickened up most decidedly – your review represents it as something to rally to, so we 
must fly a banner + start a school.  Some of your phrases are bully: “reckless 
rationalism,” “Pure Science is Pure Gook,” “infallible a priori test of truth to sever us 
from the consequences of our choice,” etc etc.  Thank you from the bottom of my heart.11 
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This letter is an early and important suggestion of the reciprocity of influence that was growing 
between James and Schiller.  The psychologist cum philosopher, chastised for muddled thinking 
in the Dial, has found philosophical companionship.  This friendship, spurred on by Schiller’s 
jaunty turns of phrase, is substantial enough to push James forward.  The letter suggests, no less, 
Schiller’s part in foisting the banner so soon to fly in the face of the philosophical status quo. 
He doesn’t have to wait long.  Less than a year later, James’s gives his 1898 Berkeley 
lecture entitled Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results.  This, and its subsequent 
publication in the same year, provides for a rallying cry refined into a philosophical statement of 
purpose: “To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider 
what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involves . . . Our conception of these 
effects, then, is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has 
positive significance at all.”12  Expressed “more broadly” by James than by the person to which 
it is attributed, Peirce, pragmatism (or its discarded co-moniker, practicalism) reduces 
philosophical statements “to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience.”13   
What, then, is the significance of James’s works for Schiller?  James has become a 
philosophical touchstone who provides Schiller with the organizational schema to frame his 
‘Idealism with a difference.’  In retrospect, this strikes one as a significant moment in the 
development of Schiller’s philosophy.  Which it certainly is.  But a rhetorical biography errs the 
more it holds to the grooves already made, albeit sporadically, in the historical tale of Schiller.  
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As by his supporters’ telling, the Riddles of the Sphinx is a youthful work distanced from 
Schiller’s later writings.  By the evidence, it is in that metaphysic that we already see the 
emerging views to which Schiller would later affix the pragmatic and humanist descriptions.   On 
his opponents’ slight, Schiller took on Jamesian views and became their mouthpiece.  Point in 
fact, he saw in the arguments of James, particularly in Principles and The Will to Believe, 
support for his already established contention that treating a priori assumptions as unassailable 
truths was both philosophically flawed and psychologically crippling.  In Philosophical 
Conceptions he gained the term of art that would, for a time, serve to frame his philosophical 
project.   
The rhetorical point is that Schiller’s commentators have often taken in the big picture 
but failed to scrutinize its component parts.  His philosophy demonstrated a distrust of 
abstraction, even as it defended a personality-based account of reality, prior to meeting James.  
In Schiller, James found a like-minded thinker and a source of encouragement.   As the letters 
indicate, James, while agreeing with the basics of Schiller’s already developed philosophy, was 
encouraged to further refine his psychological thinking.  But the process, again, was reciprocal.  
James was also a mentor by which Schiller’s philosophy was revised.  The chief innovation 
undertaken was methodological.  In James, Schiller gained the volitional primacy of psychology, 
the radical empiricism of pragmatism, by which to continue his assault on intellectualist 
metaphysics.14   This is a proto-pragmatic step in completing the merger of science, religion, and 
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 Schiller’s later reflections on this time period serve to justify this assertion.  Commenting on Dickinson 
Miller’s criticism of James, Schiller says: “James’s principle was being misconstrued (by ignoring its demand for 
empirical verification) as an incitement to make-believe, instead of as an analysis of the psychological processes of 
acquiring beliefs” (Perry, The Thought, 2, 241).  Perry notes that he found this quotation “among James’s papers” 
but it also exists in seemingly identical, transcript, form in Schiller’s papers as well; see F.C. S. Schiller, Corpus 
Christi, to Charles Augustus Strong, 21 February 1910, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers 
(Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, 
Los Angeles.  A further version is also found in: F. C. S. Schiller, “William James and the Making of Pragmatism,” 
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philosophy that Schiller began in the 1880s.  And it is an advance that will be tested as Schiller 
turns to consider psychical research in the upcoming years.   
3.2 MYSTICISM AND MÜNSTERBERG: TESTING THE NEW ETHICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 
Schiller’s approach in two debates occurring in 1898-1899 is worth noting.  The topic, psychical 
research, is a long-standing interest.  But his arguments demonstrate two changes.  Fresh off the 
rapid developments of recent years, Schiller is found to be more thoroughly integrating the 
Jamesian into his philosophical worldview while junking the remnants of his idealist training.  
When Schiller sparred with Ritchie in 1892, he noted James’s psychology approvingly.  Now 
Jamesian empiricism is the criteria by which Schiller’s philosophy takes on needless abstraction.  
As a consequence of this new found theoretical vigor, Schiller also displays increasing self-
assurance in defending his views and attacking others.  In 1890, his jabs at the reviewer J. E. H. 
and the Oxford Magazine editor Godley were boisterous, but teetered on the cusp of paranoia.  
Now his complaints retain that energy, but are offered up with a confidence that borders on 
bravado.    
In the first debate, the topic is very close in substance to the one he discussed with 
Barkworth and Myers.  But, in a letter to the editor that appeared in the Journal of Psychical 
Research, Schiller’s criticisms of the views of St. George Lane-Fox[-Pitt] (1856-1932; an early 
inventor of an electric incandescent light) are more pointed and decidedly more polemic than 
                                                                                                                                                       
in Must Philosophers Disagree? (London: Macmillan, 1934), 97-8 [itself a reprint of an article appearing in the 
Personalist in 1927]. 
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witnessed in those discussions of automatic writing and levels of consciousness.  Then, Schiller 
sided against Barkworth even as he took Myers to task for the terms he used.  Now, there is no 
grasping for a Transcendental Ideal that would provide an answer for all sides.  What does Lane-
Fox say that raises Schiller’s ire?  In February 1898, Lane-Fox states, “I object to such phrases as 
‘Spirit Identity,’ ‘Discarnate Souls,’ and the like, as misleading or, at any rate, valueless, not so 
much because they convey finite ideas that are false as because they convey very little meaning 
at all”; “I say that the phrase ‘Spiritual Identity’ is either absurd or else it is vague or 
misleading.”15  He derides such a notion as only a “pernicious delusion, having a baneful 
influence in this world and responsible for much of the egotism, greed and malignity with which 
our present lives are afflicted.”16  
In a follow-up letter in March, Schiller describes this “self-confident” attack as proving 
nothing more that Lane-Fox’s “metaphysical prejudice against personality.”17  Giving some 
ground to get his own, Schiller admits that he is “the last to complain of a precise use of 
terms.”18  But he goes on to suggest that the assumption of a stable personality is not a retreat to 
obsolete philosophy. Lane-Fox can look to Lotze or, more recently, James for theories which 
suggest the same.  And, recalling his discussion with Myers and Barkworth, Schiller argues that 
his support of the concept of a “spirit” is just as likely to be attacked by materialists as it is to be 
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 St. George Lane-Fox, “The ‘Spirit Hypothesis’ and Mrs. Piper,” Letter to the Editor, Journal of the 
Society for Psychical Research 8 (February 1898): 184-5.  Mrs. Piper is Leonora Evalina Simmonds Piper (1857-
1950), the Boston medium who attracted the support of Oliver Lodge, William James, and Schiller among others.  
At one point, Piper claimed to act as the medium for the departed spirit of one of Schiller’s interlocutors from the 
previous chapter: F. Myers.  Lane-Fox was one of many who doubted her abilities as a manifestation of psychical 
power. 
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 Lane-Fox, “The ‘Spirit,’” 186. 
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 F. C. S. Schiller, “The Validity of the ‘Spirit’ Hypothesis,” Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for 
Psychical Research 8 (March 1898): 203. 
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 Schiller, “The Validity,” 204. 
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advanced by them.  So what, then, is the issue?  Schiller assumes that is a question of confused 
priorities for the critics, disputing the solidity of personality and distancing themselves from the 
suggestion of the transience of accepted experience: “The phenomenal world must be conceived 
as a state of consciousness, and the succession of conscious states may take us into a succession 
of worlds.”19  At present, such a hypothesis cannot be rejected outright.  And the use of the term 
“spirit,” far from having no meaning, seems to be of enough (confused) meaning to cause Lane-
Fox to attack it.  But, again, Schiller is loathe to ask for precision at the expense of exploration.  
The “adoption of too rigid a terminology” would, at present and as regards the spirit hypothesis, 
merely constrict further the range of options open to those inquiring into psychical phenomena.20  
Precision is of little value if the respondent misunderstands the meaning.  In a response to 
Schiller in April, Lane-Fox is not arguing that individuality, “a connected sequence of 
experiences, phenomenal or psychic, which experiences are interdependent and correlated, 
although extending over wide ranges of spirituality” terminates after death.21  He is arguing that 
it is faulty to attach to it any notion of a stable spirit; any conception of an “unchangeable ‘spirit’ 
occupying a definite position in space is an incongruity resting on the old fallacy that a cause is 
identical with its effect.”22  Schiller, too, is now willing to give up an argument of terms, seeing 
as how Lane-Fox now seems even more “unintelligible” than when he first voiced his objections 
to the spirit hypothesis.23 But, if Schiller understands the argument, it still sidesteps the question 
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 Schiller, “The Validity,” 205. 
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 St. George Lane-Fox, Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 8 (April 1898): 
225. 
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 Lane-Fox, Letter, 225. 
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 F. C. S.  Schiller, “Mr. Lane Fox versus Spiritual Identity,” Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for 
Psychical Research 8 (May 1898): 232. 
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of whether or not a spirit can be said to have a personality in the sense that we would attribute it 
to a living being.  The thrust of his response deserves to speak for itself: 
He talks about a “persisting individuality after death,” but admits no identity. 
Individuality “implies a connected sequence of experiences” (aware of itself as such or 
not ?)  “phenomenal or psychic” (are these exclusives?), “which are interdependent and 
correlated,” but not “anything that can properly be called identity . . . between one stage 
of individual existence and another.”  That is, state A causes another B, but there is no 
identity between A and B. Thus the “persisting individuality” is the fact that the world 
goes on, but the father is not the son. Truly a profound and inspiring dogma, the 
philosophic import of which I refrain from discussing. I will permit myself only one 
question, which it irresistibly suggests, and that is— Has Mr. Lane Fox any personal 
identity? If he has, what does it consist in?  If he has not (and I suppose he ought not to 
have on his own theory) how does he hold himself together and prevent his successive 
states of consciousness (‘stages of individual existence’) from getting lost, strayed, or 
stolen?  Perchance he keeps a big diary and traces in it the individuality of ‘Mr. Lane Fox 
from day to day.’24  
 
Not knowing whether this is to be described as “sublime” or “ridiculous,” Schiller decides it best 
to leave the questions of Lane-Fox, his theory, and his (apparent) lack of a personality for 
someone else to deal with.25 
In his reply in June, Lane-Fox is humble(d) enough to suggest he has “not yet succeeded 
in expressing” his “sound” position.26  Rather than make much ado, as Schiller suggests, about 
the issue of personality, he had failed to see it as an issue of import.  The main point is that there 
is nothing permanent about personality, be it as to the person or as to a spirit.  Personality, like 
all things save truth, is continuously undergoing change via “the process of evolution.”27  And it 
is here that Lane-Fox expresses a sentiment more aligned, in point and not brevity, with the 
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 Others also question Lane-Fox’s odd amalgam of terms.  The anthropologist Richard Hodgson (1855-
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upon himself” (Letter to the Editor, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 8 [May 1898]: 232). 
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Schiller of several years back who talked of a Transcendent Ideal: “in proportion as the mind 
becomes more enlightened, and becomes a true vehicle of truth, so it becomes less egotistical 
and loses in degree the essentials of personality, or, in other words, it becomes relatively freed 
from the false sense of isolation, greed, bigotry, vanity, hate, and lust.”28  So much closer to 
Schiller that he is willing to end on a note sounded by Myer, that “the growth of knowledge 
depends on the organized extension of the threshold of sensibility to wider regions of 
understanding and experience.”29   
But, in the final salvo offered in July, Schiller stands his ground.  Even if there are shades 
of the old Schiller in the Lane Fox discussion, the new Schiller does not see himself in “a 
rambling discussion of half-revealed metaphysical dogmas.”30  Schiller instead wants to again 
focus on whether or not personality exists, as manifest in spirit form, after death.  And Schiller’s 
insistence on this point is not now lessened by Lane-Fox’s attempt now only to humbly explain 
what he had originally insisted upon.  “If personality is tough enough to survive death it must be 
credited with the power to persist in its new phase of existence.”31 All this might strike the reader 
as a mere matter of course.  Yet it sets the stage on several key fronts.  First, it is precisely the 
issue of personality that should be highlighted.  As was noted, the need to dwell in discussions of 
monads, of Transcendent Egos, is gone.  The psychology of James has done away with the need 
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to traffic in terms of the old Idealist guard.  But it is personality—the lived and continuing 
presence of personality—that is amplified.  And it is Schiller’s enactment of personality, as 
advanced in a challenge to his (and James) views as to the nature of verification, which is about 
to be tested against a much less apologetic foil than Lane-Fox.   
In January 1899, Hugo Münsterberg (1863-1916) publishes “Psychology and Mysticism” 
in the Atlantic Monthy.   It pays to recall that he was the psychologist brought to Harvard, 
partially at James’s urging, who eventually took over duties in its psychology laboratories.  
Trained—like the aforementioned Angell at Cornell—by Wundt, Münsterberg is a consistent foe 
of all supernatural phenomena.32  He feigns to examine what the relation of psychical research is 
to that of psychology; that is, what role psychical research can play in answering psychological 
questions.  Throughout, he refers to said research as mysticism—“the belief in supernatural 
connections in the physical and psychical worlds”33—and maintains that it provides nothing that 
cannot be disproved by the methods of psychology.  As regards spirits interacting with the living, 
“the scientist does not admit a compromise: with regard to this he flatly denies the possibility.”34  
Nor can the psychical research respond that many things now understood were once “ridiculed” 
as preposterous; “it is wrong and dangerous from beginning to end, as it is in its last 
consequences not only the death of real science, but worse,—the death of real Idealism.”35  And 
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 Münsterberg, as much as he was a psychical skeptic, was a glorious self-promoter.  Bruce Kuklick is a bit 
restrictive in arguing that James had only a “single disagreement,” albeit a supernatural one, with Münsterberg on 
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 Münsterberg, “Psychology,” 76.  He uses the words of Frank Podmore to suggest that even psychical 
researchers admit that “well known causes” are behind most psychical experience (77).  In a strange case of 
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though Münsterberg is quick to acknowledge that he has never actually taken part in psychical 
research, he is equally nimble when it comes to the reason: “I believe that the facts, if they are 
examined critically, are never incapable of scientific explanation.”36   
Schiller retort, published as an 1899 supplement to the Proceedings of the Society for 
Psychical Research, reads as a confident counterpart to his squabbles earlier squabbles with 
Godley.  More confident, perhaps, because this is the defense of an emerging philosophy and not 
a singular instance of translation.  It is, whatever other factors may contribute, an example of his 
personality coming to the defense of his and James’s understanding of the philosophical 
conception of the same.  Referring to Münsterberg as “the lord of I don’t know how many 
thousands of dollars worth of psychological machinery” and his article as rife with 
“misrepresentations and misconceptions,” Schiller seems at a loss as where to begin.37  How is 
something which is “supernatural” to be connected?  Is it not the case that “psychical 
researchers,” not the slur-term mystics, set out to demonstrate with the tools of science that 
                                                                                                                                                       
commenting when the argument’s good, Schiller is in this very same month reviewing Podmore’s recent book, 
Studies in Psychical Research.  Therein, while also chastising Podmore for being too willing to accept the words of 
those who purport to be spiritualists, Schiller makes comments seemingly directed at Münsterberg (though it is 
unclear which article came out first).  The public, when contenting “itself with assurances that all the high priests of 
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Studies in Psychical Research, by Frank Podmore, Mind 8, no. 29 [January 1899]: 102; 105). 
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nothing supernatural per se actually exists?38  How is it possible to argue that new truths are 
found while, at the same time, arguing that he has actually proven that the claims of mystics are 
now overturned?  “This triumph of science over ‘mysticism’ which Professor Münsterberg here 
discovers is a triumph only over his own absurd conception of mysticism, while the new facts 
triumph, not over science, but over the prepossessions of the scientists who arrogated to 
themselves the monopoly of truth.”39  The larger issue is that Münsterberg, in having to uphold a 
haphazard Idealism where psychology and reality dare not meet, only commits himself to a 
course of study that sanctions the a priori against their possible harmony in the methods of 
science.40 
In May, James writes to Schiller regarding the Münsterberg article.  James’s tone is 
cheerful and congratulatory: 
Your review of Münsterberg’s unimaginably asinine not[e] was is the sweetest thing in 
that line I ever read –I believe no more classic a model of that kind of composition was 
ever written, with its humor, irony, + long all durecheinander.  You are in sooth an almost 
God like being.  The trouble is, I fear, that poor M. himself won’t feel hurt.  Not that he 
has no sensibility to irony, humor, + logic as formal modes of thought, but that he is so 
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fatuously stuck in his silly metaphysics as to be beyond the reach of any material effect 
from them in this case.  The Real life, which deals with teleologic categories, excludes 
psychical research, because it offers phenomena in time, + the real life is timeless.  
Science excludes them because they are mystical.  So there is no place for them in God’s 
great universe at all.  Happy M., to be the owner of so convenient a philosophy!41 
 
As if emboldened by this response, Schiller files an October review of Münsterberg’s 
Psychology and Life.  It is a glimpse into Schiller turning his personal dislike (of theory) into a 
personal attack.  Schiller’s view of Münsterberg’s style: “a popular tone with professional 
dogmatism”; of his grasp of the English language: “the book reads like a bad translation from the 
German, of which tongue the English reader desirous of understanding it, will require a 
competent knowledge”; of his choice of editors: “he should at least have chosen his literary 
advisers among his colleagues in the English department of Harvard University, instead of 
leaving to his laboratory assistants the ‘helpful retouching of his language.’”42  Schiller’s view of 
the actual content of the work is not much better.  It traffics in facts which are, in fact, 
“absurdities,” deals in antitheses which are “unsound,” and thereby demonstrates the “irritation” 
produced “when the consequences of inadequate assumptions manifest themselves.”43  
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James’s initial response to the review, on 11 October, is more of the same: “I am glad 
you have pitched into M.g.’s philosophy too.  It seems to me awful trash.”44   But his response 
eight days later is more detailed and contains within in it both criticisms of content and of style: 
I think you might easily with a page or two more have made your article on M.g. in Mind 
more effective.  You treat his absurd apriori dogmatism of Science too much as a separate 
doctrine; and all are about equally valuable.  He would be more sensitive himself to an 
attack along the whole front, than on this one position.  I am grievously disappointed in 
the sort of philosophic rubbish he is hatching out; though likely much of his psychologic 
work may prove valuable by being so . . . discussable.  I think your tone in the Mind 
article. . . reprehensible for its patronizing quality.  Only the Mysticism article deserved 
that tone.45 
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These two letters are indicative of what will become a pattern in James’s mentoring of Schiller: 
praise for attack, comments as regards criticism, and cautions as to style.  Coupled with his 
laudatory tone as regarded Schiller’s earlier response to Münsterberg, James’s seems unsure of 
how far is too far as regards “flying the banner” of pragmatism.46  That question isn’t going 
away.  Schiller’s output in the next several years veers from razing his peers to raising the British 
banner of pragmatism.  
                                                                                                                                                       
in the 19 October letter, “How playfully you can write! – it seems as ‘twere easily too, but it may not come so easy.  
The Educational Review article gives me a much better insight than I have possessed into your Oxford system.” 
To be fair, and in counter to those (such as Winetrout) who have claimed Schiller’s writings on education 
were more “amusing” than “profound,” it should be noted that Schiller also took on, albeit in generally minor 
forums, issues of clear educational importance in the years of 1888-1910.  For a sample, see [regarding the 
preferential election of teaching candidates] “The Philosophical Memorial Controversy,” Letter to the Editor, 
Oxford Magazine, 17 May 1899, Letters to Editors, Box Thirteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers Collection 191, 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; [the 
preeminence of Logic in new Lit. Hum. Requirements] “A Change in Greats,” Letter to the Editor,  Oxford 
Magazine, 28 May 1902, Letters to Editors, Box Thirteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers Collection 191, Department of 
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3.3 TO CARE (NOT) A WIT: THE SATIRE AND SUBSTANCE OF SCHILLER’S 
EARLY PRAGMATISM 
 The New Year, and new century, brings with it the first published British discussion of 
pragmatism: William Caldwell’s article “Pragmatism,” published in the October 1900 Mind.  
Caldwell (1863-1942), a professor of philosophy at McGill University of Montreal for the major 
portion of his life, is part of a rather large and varied assemblage of “Personal Idealists” active at 
the turn of the century.  And this is not his first foray into such matters.  Caldwell had published, 
less than a year prior, “The Will to Believe and the Duty of Doubt,” an article that sided with 
Miller’s critique of James’s philosophical positions.  Perhaps “sided” is the wrong term.  In that 
article and this one, Caldwell is seen struggling to synthesize the more recent philosophic 
developments with the traditional idealist tenets.47  Such a struggle is understandable, so long as 
one recalls that it is not Idealism, generally conceived, but Absolute Idealism, as exemplified in 
the works of Royce in America and Bradley in Britain, that James and Schiller rally against.  
Sympathetically framed, Caldwell is attempting a synthesis whereas Miller had sought a 
dismissal.  And what a blending of personages Caldwell attempts!  On one hand, Caldwell can 
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turn to the work of F. H. Bradley as warrant for the inclusion of the practical, an inclusion that 
we shall see hotly debated.  On the other, he can note that at this juncture the critical arrows are 
being thrown at persons such as Georg Simmel, now not seen as so close a member of the 
pragmatist fold.  Caldwell’s range suggests just how permeable the borderlands were for this 
new ethical/pragmatic approach to philosophy. 
Caldwell’s view, not unlike James’s and Schiller’s, is that pragmatism is a renewed 
approach to philosophy; “I prefer on the whole to think of the use that philosophy may make of 
certain facts that have been emphasized and reemphasized by recent psychology and 
epistemology than of a new philosophy.”48 And it is, on this view, an approach that “with the 
help of a few assumptions may be generalized into important philosophical truth—truth not only 
about the relation of reason to will but about the relation of thought to reality.”49  Primary among 
those assumptions is recognition that pragmatism is not mere method, but a “theory of reality” to 
which philosophy will more and more attend.50  As a theory, it recalls—if not always knowing or 
admitting it does—views espoused by philosophers as dissimilar as Hegel and Hume; views 
which, at their base, “engaged upon nothing but the one problem of investigating the real 
meaning for our human experience of alleged ideas and facts and principles and beliefs.”51  As a 
theory, it also essentially updates or improves concepts like Kantian Pure Reason by refurbishing 
them as purposeful, or teleological, grounds for actions.52  Pragmatism finds, in the scientific 
discoveries so doted upon by Peirce, no reason not to embrace metaphysics: “metaphysic, we 
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might say, is nothing if not practical; it is the one science that goes to work without any 
presuppositions, the one science that endeavours to find out what things really are as distinct 
from what they appear to be from particular or prescribed points of view.”53  
Granting that pragmatism “taken at face value, taken as a working principle . . . is good 
as far as it goes,” Caldwell then suggests its deficits.54  It is at this point that we should pause.  
For here lies what eventually becomes, especially in the case of quarrel between Schiller and 
Bradley, the major sticking point that divides pragmatism from Absolute Idealism—the move 
from the practical to the abstract.  And Caldwell’s overriding correction is, as we shall see, 
Bradley’s biggest critique: the lack of warrant for supposing the practical (or useful) as more 
important than the theoretical (or ideal).  More strongly put, Caldwell questions to what extent 
James’s emphasis on will, his “psychological philosophy of action,” paradoxically holds us in 
stasis.55  On the one hand, we “as yet have no rational theory of the possibility of [the future] 
being essentially different from present or past”; on the other, psychical energy “is so far from 
being different from physical action and reaction that it is by the progress of science being every 
day more and more closely assimilated to the type of reflex action.”56  Caldwell’s solution to this 
problem is “a philosophy of the real” wherein “the only possible aim of all theories is to explain 
the activity and the evolution that is in process all around us—that is in fact the essential nature 
of all reality”57  Caldwell’s comments again suggest that his can be seen as honest attempt to 
place pragmatism within the context of its times.  His argument above references what for James, 
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and Schiller, was a matter of clear importance: not to withhold from discussion any idea that can 
be believed.  Caldwell’s solution, taken in that light, only amends it to say, why discount a unity 
that as yet cannot be perceived?  What is striking is not how far Caldwell goes to amend 
pragmatism to Idealism; it is how far pragmatism does go before, on a dash, it turns away from 
Idealism of this sort.58  While not always clear in retrospect, Caldwell accurately captures the 
contractions of pragmatism’s birth. 
This is the flux within which Schiller is operating.  Now an international concept, 
pragmatism is seen as a threat to and potential ally for Idealism—personal, absolute, or 
otherwise.  Schiller, however, doesn’t take Caldwell’s bait.  Rather, he baits the idealists with 
(sometimes blue) parody.  His staging ground is rather isolated: Corpus Christi’s own Pelican 
Record.  Taking its name from the bird affixed to the college’s crest, it covers a range of topics 
from club meetings to lyrical verse to historical pieces.  The Pelican Record is not, to be clear, 
the Philosophical Review or Mind.   But it serves a clear purpose for Schiller.  Therein, in the 
years leading up to the publication of Mind!, Schiller teases out the philosophical implications of 
trying to forge the alliance of which Caldwell hoped.59  Two snapshots will serve to orientate us.   
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In December 1900, Schiller penned “Platonic Dialogues: A Sequel to the ‘Republic,’” 
and, in December 1901, “The ‘True History’ of Crete.”  The first, “found on papyrus recently 
discovered in the belly of an ancient crocodile of literary tastes,” finds Plato, Socrates, and 
Kephalos holding forth.60  The most humorous point comes in a comment from Socrates directed 
at Kephalos: “How can you, being a man, have children of your own to love until you have first 
loved the children of others?”  It is not the response, but the footnote which gives a sense of 
Schiller’s humor in these instances: “An indignant scholastic—probably an Alexandrine—has 
here written in the margin, ‘Look at the Greek, Socrates; look at the Greek.’”61  The second tale 
begins with Schiller pondering the meaning of Cretan inscriptions, only to discover that he is 
hungry.  So settling in for a wait at a nearby restaurant, Schiller turns his attention to a bit of idle 
spiritualism, “a little amateur table-turning.”62  It is at this point that another spirit’s presence is 
felt, and sets about unlocking the secrets of Crete: the myth of the Minotaur, that Daedalus was a 
“Director of Naval Construction” who embezzled money, and so forth.63  These points lead 
Schiller to conclude that what he has provided is spotty history at best.  What is of interest, and 
humor, is the infernal name of the spirit who unlocks these secrets:  “I felt a new spirit animating 
the table, and it soon spelt out its name, M-I-N-U-S. 
‘What are you?’ 
‘K-i-n-g.’ 
‘Of what?’ 
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K-r-e-t-e.’ 
‘Anything else?’ 
‘H-e-l-l.’ 
‘Really, I beg your pardon; I thought you were a mathematical symbol.”64 
These stories, like the sparring with Lane-Fox, might at first seem mere trifles, several spoofs 
that add up to some in-joking, well fed on the Classics education of Oxford.  But they are, as 
with the emphasis on personality in the former, of importance in understanding Schiller 
developing blend of educated insight and stylistic burlesque.  To this point, Schiller’s punning—
also on issues and figures of philosophy—was kept to his notebooks, much as his initial forays 
into philosophical quarrels were largely relegated to the pages of the in-house Philosophical 
Review.  Without these snapshots, Mind! arrives like a fragmentary grenade upon established 
standards.  With them, however, the blow is softened just a touch.  But it is also now hinted at, 
the looming and leering salvo at his peers being subject to several test runs on several test 
subjects.  
And, clearly, Schiller relishes the months of preparation leading up to the 1901 release of 
Mind!  Though the volume contains the contributions of others,65 it is clear that this is a labor, 
misguided some might say, of love and loathing.  A 5 April 1901 note from James suggests that 
Schiller had asked him to contribute.  But James opts out, saying, “If there ever was any comedy 
in me, its now extinct.  I ought to be saying my prayers, and not going to face the Maker with 
lewd jests upon my tongue.  No! Count me out. . . Keep it mulling and possibly matter will 
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accrete.  Royce might contribute.”  A few days later, James raises the same conflicted stance he 
did with Münsterberg, this time dealing with Bradley: “I think the parody on Bradley amazingly 
good—if I had his book here I would probably revive my memory of his discouraged style and 
scribble a marginal contribution of my own.”66   
And what of the final product?  Some general indication will have to suffice.  The 
frontispiece, colored a bright pink and protected with thin gauzy paper, proclaims to be a 
“Portrait of Its Immanence the Absolute.”  Upon pulling the cover sheet aside, one finds the page 
blank.  The instructions for use suggest the tone of what is to come: “turn the eye of faith, fondly 
but firmly, on the centre of the page, wink the other, and gaze fixedly until you see It.”  And why 
the pink paper?  Simple: “It is, of course, the pink of Perfection.”  The work purports 
contributions from F. H. Badly, T. H. Grin, I. Cant, and Vera Welldon.  And while it contains 
much in the way of acute satire concerning antiquated traditions, it also contains a heady 
skewering of those very much alive.  Two portions of “The M.A.P. History of Philosophy: 
Modern Philosophy,” serve as representative samples: 
A staid Merton Fellow, named B-----, 
Fell in love with the Absolute madly; 
A big book he wrote 
Its perfection to note: 
The Absolute looked at him, sadly. 
 
An excellent Master, called C-----, 
His beard so unfrequently pared, 
That it grew to such length, 
And imparted such strength 
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That no one to tackle him dared.67 
 
That these are dealing with Bradley and Edward Caird (1835-1908, brother of Scottish 
theologian John Caird), the man who replaced Jowett as Headmaster of Balliol, would be 
obvious to anyone in eyeshot of these pages then and within the reach of a standard history of 
British philosophy text now.  That it came with “the much-needed warning that a sense of 
humour is the salvation of a true Sanity of Mind!”68 seems to stack the deck in favor of those 
whose sanity could withstand a barely anonymous—the editor was “A. Troglodyte,” the one 
already unmasked in the 1894 edition of Riddles—upstart, one bent on overturning the long-
standing ideals of Oxford.   
Reception by the trade papers and popular press didn’t call for sensitivities of the same 
sort.  And the responses suggest that, out of the Oxonian pale, the reviewers were of varying 
temperaments.  The Literary Guide notes that the “comic ‘double’” provides “a number of 
parodies in the style of most of the famous philosophers, [and] contains also a very serious vein 
of ridicule, directed against the ‘Absolutism’ which seems just now to be so fashionable in 
English philosophy.”69  The Guardian calls it “a medley of parody, pure chaff, and other 
agreeable nonsense” which uses “the crazes of pseudo-philosophy” for its “excellent fooling.”70  
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Others aren’t as completely taken in by the fun.  Literature calls it an “elaborate burlesque of its 
learned namesake” that though “ingenious . . . never seems to know when to stop”; the fact that it 
has been published, says the reviewer with a wink, “is a new riddle of the Sphinx.”71  The 
Cambridge Review also suggests that as a full sitting “one gets tired of it, but as one turns over 
the leaves, one finds much that is amusing.”72   
The Morning Post adds a bit of context to the discussion.  Noting that as “profoundly 
learned as some of the contributions to the quarterly periodical Mind have been, it is not the 
place where he would look for anything demanding immediate attention.”  Thus, the Post fears 
readers are apt to mistake it for the real thing!  Once inside, however, one is treated to “a fine 
quiverful of shafts of varying degrees of sharpness in their points, mostly intended for the 
metaphysicians.”73  Schiller seems, on the whole, satisfied with the reactions his parody 
generates.  In a letter to Florence Thaw, he notes that “some of it is very hard reading + all of it 
has to be read in such a way as to remember that it never is either wholly frivolous or wholly 
serious.  Still I think as a whole it is distinctly funny, + calculated to revive interest in 
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philosophy!”74  If interest alone was the goal in this instance, then philosophy is his purpose in 
the next endeavor.   
The 1901 “Axioms as Postulates,” published in the multi-authored Personal Idealism, 
was in development since at least the time of Dickinson Miller’s review of James’s Will to 
Believe.  Indeed, if one is to take Schiller at his word, this essay grew explicitly out of his 
dissatisfaction with Miller’s article, with the tendency to overlook the necessity of verification.  
On the back of James’s letter of 27 January 1899, the one where he expressed “disappointment” 
with Miller’s review, Schiller has jotted down: “D. S. Miller asked me to reply to his art as W. J. 
wd not.  I said he had misunderstood W. J. + M appealed with the above result [the result 
referenced is not included].  This led me to write Axioms as Postulates to remove the 
misunderstanding.”75   James is aware that Schiller is working on the essay given his 
correspondence with Schiller in 1900.76  But James is also aware of the book proper given his 
acquaintance with members of the Personal Idealism movement at Oxford.77  After much jesting 
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and jabbing, this work is a return to academic form . . . if only for the moment.  Moreover, it 
stands as Schiller’s first extended discussion of his views post-Will to Believe, of the Riddles 
unlocked by Will. 
Schiller begins with a truism—each person’s experience of the world is personalized by 
their experience of it.  Left as is, this surely signals an arbitrary approach to knowledge, an 
                                                                                                                                                       
letter to James from English philosopher George Croom Robertson (1842-1892, then-editor of Mind) in 1881 (see 
The Thought, 1, 714).  Henry Sturt (1863-1946) is indexed once, in a letter from James to Schiller in 1903 (see The 
Thought, 2, 375).  A footnote to that letter directs readers to a subsequent reference which occurs, not surprisingly 
and not indexed, in the chapter related to Schiller.  And it is here that Personal Idealism is given its full berth in: (1) 
a series of footnotes, and (2) James’s and Schiller’s 1902-1903 letters—which will be discussed subsequently—
regarding the book (see The Thought, 2, 494-9).  It is in this section that the rest of the Personal Idealists are noted: 
Robert R. Marett (also indexed twice), William Ralph Boyce Gibson and F. W. Bussell (indexed once), George 
Frederick Stout, G. E. Underhill, and Hastings Rashdall (not indexed). 
What is amiss?  Simply put, and politely I hope, Perry has to organize his way around the British Personal 
Idealists so as to get beyond what is purportedly a “first phase” in James’s philosophy.  What did Perry wish to get 
around?  The complications the Personal Idealists create when moving James into line with American pragmatism of 
the Deweyian sort and New Realism of the Perryian sort.  There is textual evidence supplied by Perry to back up this 
claim.  When suggesting that he will discuss Personal Idealism later, Perry brackets that by reference to two persons: 
(1) Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), a professor of philosophy at Boston University who held to decidedly 
“common sense,” thus radical, views of religion;  and (2) Thomas Davidson (1840-1900), an independent Bostonian 
scholar with idealistic Hegelian leanings.  I realize that these are persons closer in proximity who, by their 
philosophical stances and personal relationships with James, provide robust comparative examples.  But it seems 
worth noting that they are not those Personal Idealists to which Perry feigned reference in his initial suggestions.  
Simply put, and in line with later discussions of Perry, to shore up his arguments he had to stay more thoroughly 
upon these shores. 
But the British Personal Idealists also provide for comparative examples in line with the discussion Perry 
implied he would include.  Sturt, in his biting criticism of Oxonian philosophy, has this to say about “Axioms as 
Postulate”: it “startled the world by its advocacy of a principle which might have been traced already in the work of 
Prof. William James and of several continental writers, and has now become famous under the names of Pragmatism 
and Humanism.  This essay . . . appears to me to have opened a new chapter in British thought” (Henry Sturt, Idola 
Theatri [London: Macmillan, 1906], 3).  That said, Sturt was not above (or is it below) asserting later in his career, 
“if the cosmic synthesis which men frame have any possibility of attaining truth, the cosmos must be dominated by a 
single intelligence” (Henry Sturt, The Principles of Understanding [Cambridge: University Press, 1915], 289). 
Pringle-Pattison supplies a contextual assessment of the impact of the Personal Idealists and Personal 
Idealism: “It is well known that the revolt against Mr. Bradley’s Absolutism was one main cause of the Pragmatist 
movement. . . . The accusation originally brought against Mr. Bradley by the Personal Idealists, who were the 
forerunners, and in some cases the pioneers, of Pragmatism, was based, in their own words, upon his ‘way of 
misunderstanding human experience’. . . or, in Mr. Schiller’s more drastic phraseology, ‘his inhuman, incompetent 
and impracticable intellectualism” (Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent 
Philosophy, The Gifford Lectures, Delivered in the University of Edinburgh in the Years 1912 and 1913 [New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1929], 225).   But Pringle-Pattison aligns more with the pluralism of James and Schiller.  
As against the abstractions of Idealists, or the unity desired by Sturt, he praises James for his approach to the 
psychology of adaptive states of self: it “seems to me an infinitely truer way of representing the march of our 
conscious life than the conventional idea of an unchanging self or Ego outside of the succession altogether.”  And he 
sides with Schiller’s suggestions that such a succession lends itself to a desire for and belief in a future life where 
personality persists (Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of Immortality, The Gifford Lectures, Delivered in the 
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isolated view more akin to Schiller’s conception of Idealism than to pragmatism.  But Schiller 
goes on to suggest that there are two caveats: 
The first of these is that the whole world in which we live is experience and built up out 
of nothing else than experience.  The second is that experience, nevertheless, does not, 
alone and by itself, constitute reality, but, to construct a world, needs certain assumptions, 
connecting principles, or fundamental truths, in order that it may organize its crude 
materials and transmute itself into palatable, manageable, and liveable forms.78 
 
Schiller recognizes that this point, that reality is made by the shaping of our experiences, is open 
to attack.  To exclaim that ‘what I experience is what I experience’ seems only to circle back 
around and again suggest the initial truism.  But it is the simplicity of this assertion which 
provides the clew as to Schiller’s argument.  For in science, as in history, what is of consequence 
is not some ready-made, pre-existing, form which we yearn to discover.  What is crucial is the 
extent to which one or another experience succeeds in moving forward our understanding of 
reality.  And experience is tested by experimenting with it.  Not always in the rigid manner 
assumed of the sciences, nor always clearly in view of the one doing the testing.  “I observe that 
since we do not know what the world is, we have to find out.  This we do by trying.”79  And so 
often as we may succeed, it is just as likely that we will fail.  But that, in and of itself, is more 
matter for future experiment, more qualification to the world we work so eagerly to understand.  
For experimenting is not a merely flight of speculative fancy, it occurs within and find resistance 
from experience.80 
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Schiller sees this resistance as demonstrative of the Aristotelian notion of ύλη, or 
potentiality.81  Nothing is given and we must, as a consequence, assume as a “methodological 
necessity” that “the world is wholly plastic, i.e. to act as though we believed this, and will yield 
us what we want, if we persevere in wanting it.”82  But, again, to act upon faith is not to so 
personalize experience as to remove it from experiment.  The principles that will guide us are 
formed through use. 
They will begin their career, that is, as demands we make upon our experience or in other 
words as postulates, and their subsequent sifting, which promotes some to be axioms and 
leads to the abandonment of others, which it turns out to be too expensive or painful to 
maintain, will depend on the experience of their working.83 
 
Against this approach to axioms, Schiller posits either “old empiricism” or “epistemological 
apriorism.”  The first is a naïve and false psychology, mistaking an interpretation of nature for 
the actual workings of nature.  Taking the regularity of particulars (the setting of the sun, the 
rising of the moon) for an indication of order, the old empiricism reduces the complexity of the 
world to a crude form of induction.84  The second is no less pernicious as it places the art of 
supposition in the place of induction.  But to assume something is universal and necessary is not 
the same thing as to demonstrate that is as such.  Moreover, a postulate can seek to obtain both 
and do so within, and not without, experience.  For what is postulated as universal extends 
beyond the past to lay claim to the present and the future, regardless of whether or not it is 
proven right or wrong.85  And what is posited as necessity is simply a demand we place upon 
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“intelligent purposive volition” and not, as with an aprioristic account, that which adheres to the 
workings of a reality of which we can only dimly conceive.86  For apriorism finally reduces to: 
(1) a refusal to admit of experience, (2) a deceptive cover under which the arbitrary assumptions 
of the author are made to look settled and final, or (3) a lumbering assemblage of antiquated 
period pieces gathered from Plato, then Hume, and finally Kant.87   
Out of time (literally), apriorism can claim no help from the psychical experiences in 
time.  Better left to James’s “Museum of Curios,” Schiller hopes to bid adieu to Kantian 
epistemology with a query: 
Oh mighty Master of both Worlds and Reasons, Thinker of Noümena, and Seer of 
Phenomena, Schematiser of Categories, Contemplator of the Pure Forms of Intuition, 
Unique Synthesizer of Apperceptions, Sustainer of all Antinomies, all-pulverising 
Annihilator of Theoretic Gods and Rational Psychologies, I conjure thee by these or by 
whatever other titles thou hast earned the undying gratitude of countless commentators, 
couldst thou not have constructed a theory of our thinking activity more lucidly and 
simply?88  
 
The temporal tonnage of so much commentary, apriorism bravely battles to make a history for 
itself only to deny itself a history yet to be made.   And it does so in the face of a troubling fact: 
Kant proposed that Practical Reason was superior to Theoretic Reason.89  How, then, to square 
the most recent master’s own suggestion with the continued resistance to his words?  Simply, 
choose.  If preference be given to the latter, “it may postulate as it pleases, as pathetically or 
ridiculously as it likes,” talking about knowing the unknown until the Real is blue in the face.90   
Or, in choosing the former, we escape from Kant by way of Kant, and assert that “it is our 
                                               
86
 Schiller, “Axioms,” 70-1. 
 
87
 Schiller, “Axioms,” 71; 73; 75. 
 
88
 Schiller, “Axioms,” 78-9. 
 
89
 Schiller, “Axioms,” 87. 
 
90
 Schiller, “Axioms,” 89. 
 
  148 
practical activity that gives the real clue to the nature of things, while the world as it appears to 
the Theoretic Reason is secondary—a view taken from an artificial, abstract and restricted 
standpoint, itself dictated by the Practical Reason and devised for the satisfaction of its ends.”91 
But there are further considerations in understanding the move from postulates to axioms.  
First, “mere postulating is not in general enough to constitute an axiom.”92  Rough and wild, 
aprioristic or empiricist, postulates of all sorts will find their way into experience.  But to obtain 
axiomatic status, they must “have obtained a position so unquestioned, useful, and 
indispensable” so as to be considered as such.93  Yet, just as quickly as they assume said status, 
they must admit of more tests which can, and often do, downgrade them.  Or, more positively, 
we use them as foundations upon which to build, picking and choosing amongst them as 
experience dictates, never enshrining them in sham categories or supposing it possible, or even 
possible, to list them all and for all time.94  Framed in this light, all manner of rigid posturing 
grows relaxed and useful.  Formal Logic, to push a bad pun, takes off its coat and decides to stay 
awhile.  The Principle of Identity, rather than some supersensible combination of Being and 
Non-Being, becomes an assumption of consciousness from which we derive the conception of 
our identity; it “is a free creation of a postulating intelligence which goes beyond its experience 
to demand the satisfaction of its desires.”95  For, without the assumption of self, no further 
possibility related to it is possible.  The abstract Self serves, then, as a frame of reference which 
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in experience we use to make distinctions between that which is and that which is not similar.96  
But this is a practical, not theoretic, abstraction.  “Identity being a practical postulate, modeled 
on the immediacy of felt self-identity,” necessarily supposed the capability of prediction.97  To 
suggest “that which is itself is itself” can go no further; to posit “that which is might also be what 
it is not” engages the faith in development and adaptation.  But predication also supposes an 
opposite.  The abstract self, even one that is capable of adaptation, necessarily admits of a 
(limited) range of features.  That which falls beyond those features—in the experiential sense, 
otherwise we retreat to apriorism—is contrary to the abstraction.  “The ‘external world’ is a 
postulate, made to extrude inharmonious elements from consciousness.”98  
So what is to be had by this approach?  First, a realization that all of this proceeds 
according to the very suggestions put forth.  What Schiller offers is a generalized history, making 
complex developments into more palatable positions for the sake of argument.  To do them 
justice, these positions must be subjected to the tests of their merits.  Second, and complicating 
the first, is the very real problem of never being able to know, exactly, the origins of some 
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postulates.  Thus, we have to be content with moving an idea forward; “the true nature of a thing 
is to be found in its validity—which, however, must be connected rather than contrasted with its 
origin.  ‘What a thing really is’ appears from what it does, and so we must study its whole 
career.”99  Finally, to admit the strengths of testing even in the face of partial history is to, all the 
same, return philosophy to its primary focus: human interest and a love of knowledge that does 
its best to move that interest forward.  “Genuine thinking must issue from and guide action, must 
remain immanent in the life in which it moves and has being.”100  The deceptions of old 
empiricism only gave way to the smug intellectualism of apriorism, both to the discredit of 
human reasoning.  If philosophy is to be more than “a trivial game which may amuse but can 
never really satisfy” it must see doubt as the starting, not stopping, inquiry.101  In Schiller’s view 
errors, like the old, die out.  A philosophy willing to admit of potential and progress is a 
philosophy of the young; “their natural sympathies are rather with a philosophy that makes the 
blood run warm than with one that congeals the natural flow of thought by the chilling vacuity of 
its abstractions.”102   
James’s review of Personal Idealism, published a year later in Mind, recalls his hesitant 
tone regarding Münsterberg.   But more than just praising and criticizing matter and method, 
which it certainly does, it is also predictive as regards Schiller.  He notes that the whole work 
suffers from a problem of articulating the nature of personal Idealism.  By “being so 
experimental, it has to be unacademic, informal and fragmentary; and this, from the point of 
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view of making converts, is a bad practical defect.”103  At the same time, James see personal 
Idealism as “a distinct new departure in contemporary thought, the combination, namely, of a 
teleological and spiritual inspiration with the same kind of conviction that the particulars of 
experience constitute the stronghold of reality as had usually characterized the materialistic type 
of mind.”104  And he groups it with a more general form of thought which he labels “Empirical 
Evolutionism.”  As to who gives a solid account—out of a list including Josiah Royce, Charles 
Peirce, and Lotze—of this fledgling evolutionism, “Mr. Schiller in his Riddles of the Sphinx, and 
more acutely still in his various essays, has given to it a more consistent form.”105  As to the one 
who could give personal Idealism a clear showing, “Mr. Schiller might compass it, if he would 
tone down a little the exuberance of his polemic wit.”106  
The larger press is divided, but also notes aspects of Schiller’s polemic criticized by 
James.  The Western Press suggests that this book “is one of the most valuable metaphysical 
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works of recent years,” written with “a lucidity which is rarely found in philosophical works.”107  
The Birmingham Post urges it for readers interested in “what young Oxford thinks.”108   The 
Daily Chronicle is of a similar mind when it notes that this work may be taken to represent “the 
coming generation of Oxford tutors.”  But it is less inclined to see this as positive when it comes 
to Schiller.  He stands as a “disquieting” representative of less than enjoyable polemics.  What 
are its features? 
Their style, for one thing, is somewhat aggressive and highly charged with a species of 
light-heartedness which is apt to breed sadness in the reader . . . with what appears to be a 
certain levity of thought and a dogmatic assurance which the dialectical power displayed 
seems scarcely to warrant.109 
 
Schiller’s essay, in particular, is “very ingenious and amusing, but it hardly satisfies.”  One is led 
to question: what would satisfy?  The conclusion suggests the answer is the object of the 
Personal Idealist’s ire: “Oxford may rely for a season . . . on that not yet wholly demolished 
work, ‘Appearance and Reality.’” 
The Oxford Magazine takes up where the Chronicle left off.  It singles out Schiller’s 
essay as “certainly the most important.”  But how quickly a compliment turns into a rub: “Here 
we have the doctrine of Pragmatism, if we may say so, in all its rude and naked glory.”  The 
review also discusses the book generally.  It is suggestive of the lively thought of those who, 
within the walls of Oxford, are both teachers and thinkers.  As such, it signals to the outside 
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world that the university is a place for action as well as thought.  But the magazine has already 
chosen sides even as it applauds the face-saving qualities of the one put forth in the volume.  As 
it states: 
The inspiration for Personal Idealism is rather to be found in the type of thinking 
represented by James’s Will to Believe or [James] Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism 
[1899]; and we venture to doubt whether this mode of thought is as philosophically 
satisfying as it appears to most of the essayists.110 
 
So Schiller, with his co-authors, is to be praised for the directions he suggests; but they are all to 
give better accounts if the teachers are to make gains on the thinkers, “on the methods that 
prevail.”  What then to throw into the philosophical mix?  What best tactic to take in advance of 
a mentor’s warnings and critical receptions still weaned on the Idealism you sought to laugh at 
and then argue with?  A clear instance of choosing sides and the manner in which you will attack 
them.  An instance of calling the opposing side’s views, in a word, worthless. 
Schiller frames his satirical 1902 essay, “‘Useless’ Knowledge: A Discourse Concerning 
Pragmatism,” as a dialogue between himself, Plato, and Aristotle in the “supernal Academe 
where the Divine Plato meditates in holy groves.” It happens as a consequence of Schiller again 
using “the idealistic art of waking oneself up out of our world of appearances and thereby 
passing into one of higher reality.”111  Here, in the upper regions Plato holds court and Aristotle, 
whom Schiller thought would appear “bumptious and conceited” but has been “reduced to his 
true proportions,” attends to his master’s needs.112 It is not his first trip either.  For upon 
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appearing to them, Schiller is asked if he has relayed Plato’s advice from his previous visit.   
Schiller replies in the affirmative, but regretfully informs Plato that “everybody to whom I spoke 
disbelieved that I had really conversed with you, and thought that I had dreamt it all, or even 
invented the whole matter.”113 Plato for his part, and here Schiller ratchets up his none too subtle 
jabs at Idealism, can’t believe that Schiller’s pupils would deny “a world so much better, more 
beautiful, coherent, and rational, and in two words, more real, that that in which they lived.”  
Schiller argues that they will not believe it because what he has “experienced is not directly part 
of their experience.”114  
Plato can hardly believe that people would turn their backs on such higher knowledge.  
But Schiller responds, and in doing so gains the assent of Aristotle, that it has never been clearly 
shown how such abstract knowledge allows men to live better even if it be granted that 
“knowledge is one and the True and the Beautiful must also be useful.” Further, it is the case 
now that “only an utterly vulgar and ill-educated mind is even interested in the practical 
consequences which theoretical consequences may chance to have.”115  Aristotle is asked his 
opinion of all this.  To which he enjoins, “I do not hold it true that speculative wisdom 
(øρόνησις) is the same as practical wisdom (σοøία), or that the latter has naturally developed out 
of the former. . . . They are quite distinct, and have nothing to do with each other.” Noticing that 
Schiller is visibly taken aback, Aristotle goes on, “I confess to an overstatement.  It is not quite 
true that σοøία and øρόνησις have nothing to do with each other.  There is a connexion, because 
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practical wisdom has to provide speculative with the material conditions of its exercise.”116 
Which is not to suggest that the supernal Aristotle concedes the speculative to the practical.  
Rather: 
The object of practical wisdom is the good for man and the transitory flow of 
appearances in the impermanent part of the universe.  But the good which is the object of 
our practical pursuit is peculiar and restricted to man.  It is different for men and for 
fishes, and although I do not deny that man’s is the higher and that therefore fishing is 
legitimate sport, I feel bound to point out that there are many things in the world far 
diviner than man.”117  
 
Schiller can barely stand this discussion, and Plato seems to fare about the same.  He weakly 
replies that his humble servant shows “that true enthusiasm which proves that you are not merely 
a logical perforating machine for windbags and other receptacles of gaseous matter.”  But Plato 
wants to push the discourse onward.  Schiller only regrets that “Ιames” is not there to lend him 
support in refuting Aristotle.  “Iames,” asks Plato.  Schiller replies, “A philosopher, Plato, of the 
Hyperatlanteans, not one of the ‘bald-headed little tinkers’ who are philosophers, not by grace of 
God but by favour of some wretched ‘thinking-shop,’ and a man (or shall I rather call him a 
god?) after your own heart.”118  
Absent his god, Schiller sets about presenting his opinion.  After first noting that Plato, 
who held to no distinction between the True and Good, and Aristotle, who placed the speculative 
as above the practical, differ, Schiller puts forth a third view; “Is it not possible to maintain with 
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you [Aristotle] the practical and the speculative reasons are different and opposed to each other, 
but that the former is superior, so that in the end we must believe and practically act on what we 
do not know to be true?”  Aristotle grants that is possible, but ridiculous.  Schiller admits that it 
is not his view, but only that of “the Great Scythian, Kant.”  Aristotle recalls the “queer little 
hunchback of a barbarian” who had once visited, “but would not stay and could not say anything 
intelligible.” So Schiller posits the Pragmatists’ view: “there is no opposition between 
speculative and practical wisdom because the former arises out of the latter and remains always 
derivative and secondary and subservient and useful.” 119   
The discussion carries on for a bit more, with Aristotle unconvinced and Plato intrigued 
by this purportedly useful philosophy.120  But Schiller abruptly states that he must return from 
slumber to his pupils.  That pleases Plato, as it will interest him to see how Schiller vanishes!   
But, before he goes, Plato wonders if Schiller can tell him what is the “practical application of 
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the ‘truths’ you have championed?”121 That is simple.  So long as what he knows of the realm 
where Plato and Aristotle live is useless to his wards, it will remain to them false!  But isn’t there 
a way, Plato protests, that Schiller can make the truth of these visits apparent to people in the real 
world? 
Certainly.  Could you not appear at a meeting of the Society for Psychical Research and 
deliver a lecture, in your beautiful Attic, on the immortality of the Soul?  That would be 
useful; it might induce some few really to concern themselves with what is to befall them 
after death, and lead them perhaps to amend their lives.  I know the Secretary of the 
Society quite well, and I think we could arrange a good meeting for you!”122 
 
Bosh, responds Plato, “it would be too degrading.”  Besides he retains little actual interest in the 
daily workings of the real world.  Perhaps, Plato offers, he could do something personally for 
Schiller that would then be convincing to others.  Of course, responds Schiller, he could tell him 
the winners to a horse race or which stocks to buy.  “Money talks, as the saying is, and none dare 
doubt but that it speaks the truth.  In this manner I might get men to credit the whole story of my 
visit to you.  For my credit would then be practically limitless.”   He must be joking, Plato 
retorts, for who would believe a being such as him to be interested in such matters?  
Surprisingly, responds Schiller, quite a few.  “They think that there is far more education in 
death than ever there was in life, and that even the greatest fool, as soon as ever he is dead, may 
be expected to be wise enough to know all things.”123   Then they are selfish fools, opines Plato.  
Yes, concludes Schiller.  But isn’t that perhaps his point.  “Whatever knowledge cannot be 
rendered somehow useful cannot be esteemed real.”124  
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Taken together, “Axioms as Postulates” and “Useless Knowledge” announce Schiller’s 
decision in favor of pragmatism (not personal Idealism) and polemics (not academic 
pleasantries).  The first refashions Schiller’s notion of hypothesis. By expanding the concept to 
encompass the Jamesian notions of empirical verification, it becomes here the principle of 
postulation.125  The second is easy to read as mere satire.  But it is more a multi-faceted argument 
as regards personality.  In the approaching figure of Protagoras, personality will be configured as 
the volition-based standard of what is useful and true.126  In the manner of Schiller, personality is 
a demonstration of rhetorical style, of the tactics that will be used to champion the advances of 
the first.  It is a stage play of targets (Bradley the ‘Oxford Sophist’) and heroes (Iames the 
‘Hyperatlantean God’).  But it is no mere nickelodeon.  It is pragmatism growing, in the space of 
a few short years, larger than pragmatism can allow.  It is pragmatism becoming an ethical and 
psychological overlay meant to encompass the whole activity of man. 
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3.4 WHAT MORE CAN PRAGMATISM BE? THE ORIGINS OF SCHILLER’S 
HUMANISM 
1903 finds Schiller facing the consequences of his actions.  In the space of a few short years, he 
has gone from questioning Lotze, to laughing at Caird, to reclaiming Protagoras.    He has 
essentially merged his ‘Idealism with a difference’ with the views espoused by James.   But he is 
still primarily seen as the caustic, overzealous, British defender of James’s pragmatism.  And he 
is in the midst of a movement that is growing in strength and number.  In April, James writes to 
Schiller that “. . . it appears now that under Dewey’s inspiration, they have at Chicago a 
flourishing school of radical empiricism of which I for one have been entirely ignorant.”127  And 
therein lies Schiller’s dilemma: how best to continue the cause while defending his own ground?  
Schiller sets upon two tactics.  First, he pushes for the adoption of a term meant to go beyond 
pragmatism.  In a letter dated 24 April 1903, one senses the delicacy of Schiller’s proclamation 
to James:  
I have been inspired . . . with THE name for the only true philosophy!  You know I never 
cared for ‘pragmatism’ . . . it is much too obscure and technical, and not a thing one can 
ever stampede mankind to.  Besides the word has misleading associations and we want 
something bigger and more extensive (inclusive). . . . why should we not call it 
HUMANISM? . . . Not that we need drop “pragmatism” on that account as a technical 
term in epistemology.  Only pragmatism will be a species of a greater genus,--humanism 
in theory of knowledge.128 
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On the one hand, he is seeking James’s endorsement.  On the other, he is attempting to stamp the 
next phase of pragmatism’s development with his personalized mark.  So, secondly, Schiller 
must engage in a sophisticated promotional game.  He must continue to attack those who 
threaten the specifics of pragmatism.  At the same time, he must work to extend the domain it 
can be seen to encompass.  Schiller attempts to cover both points in July 1903. 
In keeping with the primary object, Schiller first must lay out the range of operation for 
this as yet unnamed approach.  In “The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics,” he accuses the 
“Hegelizing ‘idealists’” of bringing on “the death of morals.  For the ideal of the Absolute Whole 
cannot be rendered compatible with the antithetical valuations which form the vital atmosphere 
of human agents.”129   As against that, philosophy should treat “Thought as a mode of conduct, 
as an integral part of active life”; reconceptualized, conduct becomes “the all-controlling 
influence in every department of life.”130  Note then that Schiller must take the pragmatic method 
of philosophy and expand it.  Instead of bowing to a pure intellect in search for an understanding 
of faith, it places faith and all other activities into the orbit of reasoning that is human.  The 
alternative, “a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a 
morbid aberration or failure of adaptation, which natural selection must sooner or later wipe 
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away.”131  Schiller thus defines pragmatism, as against Peirce’s ‘test by effects” or James’s de-
emphasis of “the essential  priority of action to thought,” as “the thorough recognition that the 
purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most remotely 
cognitive activities.”132  The Good is no longer abstracted; it is human good.  The means to reach 
our goals are no longer beyond our grasp; they are within our reach.  Philosophy, thus refined, 
bears an ethical imprint which demonstrates: (1) that the universe is not indifferent to our 
pleadings as our pleadings create what we conceive as our universe, (2) the skepticism 
engendered by a universe beyond our control is an illusion, and (3) with indifference and illusion 
cast aside, there is “stimulus to our feeling of moral responsibility” for the world we create.133  
This is a world where “each sees Life as what he has it in him to perceive, and variously 
transfigures what, without his vision, were an unseen void.”134  This is a world that, for Schiller, 
holds ample room for faith and reason, for trial and error.  But is not a world for everyone.  And, 
in keeping with the secondary object, Schiller must now take on those that would threaten such 
an ethical system.  More specifically, he must pick a target of such renown that the implications 
for the future of philosophy are clear.  Schiller chooses Bradley.  
It helps to recall that Schiller’s ire for Bradley has roots far longer than his attachments to 
pragmatism.  In the 1880s, Schiller was already scribbling against the supposed transgressions of 
the Broad Church idealists, detecting a subtle mix of hypocrisy in act and idiocy in thought.   
Jowett’s assumed aloof manners with his Balliol wards, or Green’s abstract reasons for social 
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reform, as much as they may be off putting to a young scholar, are less likely to draw the 
umbrage of a maturing philosopher.  But Bradley was different; and the extent of their 
differences were jeeringly hinted at in “‘Useless’ Knowledge.”  Largely heard but not seen, 
Bradley was the opposite of the tutor Schiller.  He taught no classes, prepared no classroom 
lectures.  Yet he told philosophers that reality can bear no contradiction and, given that, the 
contradictions in everyday life render our experienced world mere appearance.  If this be a 
simplification of Bradley’s prolific outpouring, it is the reality of what Schiller saw in him.135 
And it is the view he takes in his first engagement.  Schiller contextualizes his July 1903 
“On Preserving Appearances” within the confines of Oxford.  This is no slight matter, for 
Schiller sees Bradley’s antithesis between “appearance” and “reality” as arising out of the divide 
between the “thinking” and “doing” of philosophy.  In contrast with the philosophy which has 
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“sprung invulnerable” from the “subtle brain” of Bradley, Schiller finds himself “immersed in 
the struggle of teaching and having a certain responsibility in seeing to it that what is called 
thought involves thinking and affords proper training in mental precision and clearness . . . 
find[s] that this antithesis has become a considerable nuisance, and also, it must be confessed, a 
bit of a bore.”136  But what is his specific objection?  And here he ventures tentatively, making 
explicit note of Bradley’s preferred manner of rejoinder: 
I venture to assert with the utmost trepidation, and at the risk of being crushed, like the 
rest of Mr. Bradley’s critics, by a sarcastic footnote to his next article, that in putting 
forward his fundamental assumption that ‘ultimate reality’ is such that it does not 
contradict itself, and in erecting this into an absolute criterion, he builds in part on an 
unsound foundation which has not reached bottom rock, in part on an airy pinnacle, a sort 
of what in Alpine parlance is called a gendarme, which will not bear the weight of the 
mountains of paradox which are subsequently heaped upon it.137 
 
Schiller sees this argument against contradiction as being as much tactical as metaphysical, as a 
way for Bradley to argue the reality of his position against the appearance of another’s.  But 
when one turns to what Schiller supposes Bradley to actually mean, the result is much the same; 
“it is an abuse of language to describe our use of incompatible statements about the same reality 
as an inherent contradiction in the reality itself.”138  Not that Schiller would suggest junking 
contradiction.  It suggests itself as “unpleasant” and we work as best as possible to avoid it and 
move towards “harmony.”139  But contradiction is not our sole recourse on the road to harmony, 
any more than our current existence is only “apparent” because it contains contradictions.  And 
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this forms the second of Schiller’s objections: Bradley takes the (apparent, if only to Schiller) 
failure of his theory as a sign of the (real, if partially to Bradley) defectiveness of the world.140 
Which would leave us with what?  Bradley’s Absolute “is only used to cast an indelible 
slur on all human reality and knowledge.”141  It frames human striving as a skeptical and 
foolhardy endeavor, always feigning to find reality.  But what, then, does this say of Bradley’s 
own theory?  If, in fact, we live in appearance, does his skepticism not cast doubt on the 
suggestion of the Absolute?  Would it not be more practical to view all such schemes of the 
Ultimate or Absolute as “attempts, more or less successful, to supplement some unsatisfactory 
feature in our primary experience.”142  But this is a view of which Bradley is not likely to 
partake.143  Though full well he should.  For Schiller urges that Bradley’s reality is that of a 
pessimist, a phantom world inhabited by “the nightmares of a mind distraught.”144  Better to turn 
to philosophy that seeks to craft better reality than we currently experience, and not turn to a “pet 
antitheses” framed as a gloomy prognostication.145  For the time being, there is no response from 
Bradley.   
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But Schiller worries about another sort of response.  It is not James’s view of the initial 
attempts to expand the range of pragmatism; if anything, James’s reaction to both of these 
articles is succinct and approving: “I don’t see how truth could be more broadly and 
convincingly set down and I should think they would have great effect.  But things must also get 
into books to be effective.”146  No, Schiller is still worried about the approval which might give 
sanction to a book promoting the term proper for this new approach.  And the initial reply in this 
case isn’t favorable: “‘Humanism’ doesn’t make a very electrical connexion with my nature—
but in appellations the individual proposes + the herd adopts or drops.  I rejoice exceedingly that 
your book is so far forward, + am glad that you call it Humanism—we shall see if the name 
sticks.  All other names are bad, most certainly—especially pragmatism.”147   
With a month or less before the release of the book, Schiller seems panicked by the wait 
and see approach of James.  “What I want to know from you is how the name ‘Humanism’ now 
strikes you + whether you agree as to its relation to Pragmatism +c?”  And he is willing to do a 
bit of selling to secure approval: “Of one thing I feel fairly sure viz. that it will puzzle the enemy 
considerably.  They had only just become alive to the necessity of bringing up their big guns to 
dispose of ‘pluralism’, when it turned out that ‘pragmatism’ + ‘personal Idealism’ were the keys 
to the position they had to attack, + now behold the real citadel is Humanism + they have a 
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choice between being scholastics + barbarians!148  The approval, like the response from Bradley, 
will have to wait. 
Uncertainty not withstanding, Schiller’s praise of James adorns the dedication of 
Humanism: Philosophical Essays (1903): “To my dear friend, the Humanest of Philosophers, 
William James, without whose example and unfailing encouragement this book would never 
have been written.”  The work is largely a collection of previously published essays—such as 
“Metaphysics of the Time-Process” (1895), “Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Kantian a Priori” 
and “Lotze’s Monism” (1896), “Darwinism and Design” (1897), “‘Useless’ Knowledge” and 
“On Preserving Appearances” (1903)—that chart out Schiller’s developing viewpoints.  Not that 
this collection was Schiller’s intended result. 149  Circling back to his recent squabble with 
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Bradley, he apologizes that “the work of a college tutor lends itself more easily to the conception 
than to the composition of a systematic treatise.”150 
The initial reactions from friends give Schiller reason to be pleased, and optimistic, as 
regards his attempts at pragmatic expansion.  Howard Vincenté Knox (1886-1960) reports: 
Very many thanks for your book, which I am reading with great pleasure.  I think the 
essays decidely [sic] gain by being brought together in book form.  The title is decidedly 
good, and will, I think prove attractive.  Your preface brings out the advantages of the 
name very well.  It is also an advantage that it has a cognate verb + adjective, with 
equally favourable associations – “humanise” + “humanist.”  “Pragmatic,” on the other 
hand, is not quite a happy epithet to apply to oneself.  [Alfred] Sidgwick tells me that 
Sturt has asked him to review the book, for the January number of “Mind.”  I do not think 
that task could be in better hands.  Sidgwick is pleased with the book, and his review is 
more to be in general agreement with its aims.151 
 
Even James, despite his label leeriness, is upbeat: “. . . read your book this A.M. . . . I am 
charmed by the elegance of the whole presentment. . . . Altogether I ‘voice’ a loud ‘hurrah’—
first cries of allégresse [joy]!”152  But Schiller continues to press James with the issue of 
endorsement, asking “whether you might not say a word to draw attention to Humanism on your 
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side, whether signed or anonymously (e.g. in the Nation or the Psych. Rev.) (The Nation does 
not yet seem to have acknowledged it, so I suppose the N. Y. Macmillan Co. has not yet 
imported it).  It is of course of capital importance that you shd pronounce on the appropriation of 
‘Humanism’ as a label.”153  This is Schiller, so recently experiencing a surge in self-assurance, 
expressing a crisis of confidence.    
Endorsement or not, the shorter critical notices that ring in 1904 generally confirm his 
friend’s initial reactions.  And, even more than with Riddles, many of these notices issue from 
the daily presses. The Birmingham Post lays down the critical and cliché gauntlet regarding “one 
of the most significant books published for some years.”  It argues that “‘humanism’ is a force to 
be reckoned with in the present tendencies of philosophy.”154  Others, in whole and part, take up 
the challenge of that swelled appraisal.  The Spectator applauds the book for its “refreshing 
vigor” and its style, of which “the phraseology of modern music alone is equal to the 
appreciation of a volume such as this.”   It concludes by noting that, beyond students of 
philosophy, this book is “one which the ‘ordinary reader’ cannot fail to enjoy.”155  The 
Manchester Guardian notes that readers “will not find any essentially new doctrine in this 
volume,” but that the materials contained herein are a “lively” attempt by Schiller to get the lay 
public “to observe what fools these philosophers are.”  The “these” under consideration are all 
who, unlike Schiller, James, and Peirce, cling to absolutist doctrines of the past.  The review also 
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notes that Schiller has, taking his cue from Protagoras, finally settled on the term humanism.  In 
so doing, Schiller questions the definitions of pragmatism set forth by both James and Peirce.156     
Not that all the notices are as positive.  The Morning Post sees this volume as Schiller’s 
attempt to “Americanise the metaphysical world” by casting aside the British strains of 
philosophy so long held in awe.  But this collection of “unusually, if sometimes perversely, able 
essays . . . could not fairly be accused of avoiding either abstraction or pure thought, nor yet of 
being manifestly practical.”157  What is apparent to the Dublin Press is that this volume breaks 
with the expectations of “courteous humanism both in temper and in style,” and that it devolves 
into abstractions akin to those found in Bradley and Spencer.  Schiller is obviously not taken 
with such a viewpoint.  Scribbled on his copy of the review is this retort: “the most grotesquely 
ignorant Rev. so far . . . Cd anyone so miss the point!”158 
 A longer notice, from a normally supportive front, makes mention of additional 
problems.  F. N. Hale’s review is couched in the suggestion that, this being the organ of the SPR, 
“a metaphysical discussion in these pages would be an offence devoid alike of precedence and of 
justification.”159  So he instead establishes that Schiller’s humanism, like that of James’s 
pragmatism, is an outgrowth of Empiricism as found in Mill.  With a focus squarely on the first, 
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Hale suggests that Schiller’s “Humanism aims to be humane; and in his sedulous avoidance of 
scholastic jargon, he has been tempted to smoothe over difficulties none the less imperative for 
being scholastic.  This book must be regarded as a programme rather than a proof.  But it is 
addressed to a popular audience, and as such it must be judged.”160  And what is the judgment?  
Taking Schiller’s discussion of immortality as the test, Hale asserts that “the fundamental 
paradox of Pragmatism comes to light in a particularly glaring fashion, and challenges discussion 
in these pages.”161  The problem is this: belief in a postulate does not constitute the actuality of 
the thing postulated.  Moreover, it is the problem of pragmatism suggesting the practical need to 
believe, but providing no measure of what beliefs are or are not actual (in the present) or possible 
(in the future).  In concluding his argument, and turning Schiller’s, Hale suggests that “it seems 
plain that the hypothetical future life can no more enter into our actual experience than Mr. 
Schiller’s experience of the cogency of his argument enters into my actual experience.”162  
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After such a discouraging reply from an assumed ally, Schiller nonetheless has reason to 
feel hopeful.  The desired endorsement finally comes, though not in a public forum as had been 
hoped.  In February, James write to Schiller that “‘Humanism’ (the term) which did not at first 
much ‘speak’ to me, I now see to be just right.  Vivat et floreat [grow and flourish]!”163  But the 
praise comes with further warnings.  James suggests that some of the more critical notices seem 
to be “the pouring out of a long smothered volcano of irritation at your general tone of 
belligerency and flippancy.”  As regards Schiller’s humanist project and the methods by which 
he plies his (and James’s) belief in pragmatism, he is no less clear: 
Apropos of your reviewer’s animosity to your jokes, I confess that I am both startled and 
shocked to find lately how antipathetic they are to certain temperaments.  One man 
recently said to me “I hate him”—another: “he is intolerable and odious.”  Poor 
Schiller—so good a man!  It is well to know of these reactions which one can provoke, 
and perhaps to use the knowledge for political effect.  Now that you are the most 
responsible companion in England of what is certainly destined to be the next great 
philosophic movement, may it not be well (for the sake of the conversion effect) to 
assume a solemn dignity commensurate with the importance of your function, and so give 
the less excuse to the feeble minded for staying out of the fold?164 
 
James’s conclusion is also his hope: “Buckle down now to s’thing very solemn and systematic.  
Write your jokes by all means, but expunge them in proof, and save them for a posthumous no. 
of Mind!”  This, for all James’s previous vacillation, is his most succinct avowal of support.  It is 
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a respected philosopher suggesting, after full well attributing the birth to Peirce, the causeway to 
Schiller.  But it is also the most pointed warning.  Sensing that both he and Schiller now have 
hold of a movement, James calls for the one thing of which Schiller has less and less: restraint. 
First impressions, as Schiller regards his foes and his foes regard him, are already tending to 
calcify. 
3.5 ACTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES: SCHILLER’S PLACE WITHIN THE 
PRAGMATIST MILIEU 
Schiller’s initial attempts to extend pragmatism and give cause to humanism have achieved at 
least one objective: they have gained the assent of James.  But the larger project of propagating 
this undertaking is undercut by past wrongs, real and imagined.  Though still championed for his 
style by some, Schiller is as much dismissed on account of it by others.  The tactical approach of 
making his career is being offset by the tactics employed; attacking theoretical foes while 
building philosophical bridges is paying few dividends.  What’s more, in a still growing area of 
philosophical inquiry, Schiller finds himself depicted as the extreme variation of the philosophy 
he seeks to champion. 
Joseph Alexander Leighton (1870-1954) suggests his March 1904 “Pragmatism” is a 
general discussion. But it actually provides both a critique of Schiller and a comparison of his 
work to that of Dewey. 165  Leighton sees Schiller as “at once the most pugnacious and the most 
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facetious protagonist of pragmatism.”166  He chides Schiller for making much hay over James’s 
articulation, and his own subsequent recognition, of the theories of pragmatism.  Leighton then 
provides this commentary on Schiller and the wider application of pragmatism he espouses in 
Humanism:  
Mr. Schiller’s jaunty onslaughts on Kantian apriorism, Bradleian absolutism and all other 
forms of intellectualism are always interesting reading.  But the magniloquent and 
extravagant claims, the ‘superior’ air and the confident dogmatism pall on one.  These 
qualities of Mr. Schiller’s writing, together with his repeated and often tasteless sallies of 
wit, tend to bring into disrepute a doctrine which deserves a more thorough and serious 
treatment.  When the witticisms, jibes and other ‘literary’ flights of fancy are discounted 
there is left a residuum of philosophical argument and it is with this that I shall deal.”167 
 
But these arguments strike Leighton as pushing too hard and too far.  Leighton declares that “it is 
already evident that pragmatism with Mr. Schiller has passed the stage of a tentative method for 
                                                                                                                                                       
often disrespects; “how, then, can this belief in evolution—a belief which is a mere insistence of your pragmatism—
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the examination of philosophical concepts and has become a dogmatic metaphysic.”168   In so 
thoroughly pushing for the human, “Mr. Schiller is an extremist”; he reduces everything to a 
form of social contract and leaves no room for “an objective cosmic order in his system.”169  
Leighton, in comparing John Dewey et al.’s Studies in Logical Theory (1903) to Schiller’s 
views, finds “certain presuppositions common to this [functional] view and to pragmatism.”170  
These commonalities are twofold: (1) the emphasis on the harmonizing of experience, (2) the 
evolutionary character of reality.171  But both views, in Leighton’s estimation, “involve problems 
in regard to reality that can neither be brushed aside as ontological and antiquated or settled off-
hand by the evolution method.”172  At least one attending reader seems inclined to suggest that 
the problem is far graver than even Leighton supposes; it is a problem which amounts to not 
actually practicing philosophy at all. 
In July 1904, Bradley decides to respond more fully to the pragmatists, in print and by 
name, in Mind.  In his essay “On Truth and Practice”—the title itself a sly pun on the distinction 
so recently under attack—Bradley wants to be explicit in his criticisms and careful in his 
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praise.173  If past references to Schiller were only implied, they are more explicit here.  The first 
reference plays for ambiguity but leaves none: 
This paper was written in the early summer of 1903, and has been left much as it was.  
The renewed and repeated “manifestoes” of the protagonist of Personal Idealism (even 
Personal Idealism, it seems, was an “audacious manifesto”) do not to my mind show any 
serious endeavour to deal with their subject.  And to my mind they betray no 
consciousness of some difficulties which are so well known as even to deserve the name 
traditional.  I have however since that date made acquaintance with the interesting 
volume called Studies in Logical Theory.  There is much in the position taken here by 
Prof. Dewey and the other writers which seems to me suggestive and valuable.  On the 
other hand that position as a whole has not become clear to me.174 
 
Schiller is rendered the protagonist, and barely throughout named, of a collection of essays while 
Dewey and his peers are due praise for the value of what is not clear.  Why at least the hint of 
recognition?  Their relation, as Bradley sees it, to Bradley’s philosophy of truth and practice.  
Moreso, their purported role in the new philosophy which “loudly advertises itself as the 
destroyer of Intellectualism, and it claims to find the being and the truth of things in will and in 
practice.  And sweeping away the feeble obstacle of senile theories and teachers [a reference to a 
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comment by Schiller in “Useless Knowledge” (1902), republished in Humanism], “it promises to 
bring into the world, perhaps even outside philosophy, youth daylight and happiness.”175   
And what is the nature of this new philosophy?  Bradley believes it to be a criterion of the 
“merely practical.”176   He sees a host of problems with this standard, not the least of which is 
what this position would mean if accepted in contrast to Idealism.  For him, the “new gospel of 
personal individualism” (and note here the term use) is far too interior:  
At least if my ideas and my will, or the will and the ideas of any man or set of men, are to 
be the measure of truth, then, so far as I see, the reality cannot lie beyond the private ends 
of the individuals.  And to realize the self by self-surrender to the supreme will, must, I 
presume, be set down as at one irrational and immoral.177 
 
This interiority also influences the nature of practice.  As against the “personal idealists” and 
their rough and ready version, Bradley wishes to suggest that practice is “to consist in my 
alteration of existence.”178  And such a view essential fuses theory and practice together in a 
manner inconsistent with pragmatic suppositions.179  It, moreover, casts into doubt the pragmatic 
claim that the truth resides in the individual.  For, if one accepts the interiority hypothesis, they 
render truth a purely subjective concept; “the doctrine that the world and my nature are of such a 
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kind that all truth must be practical, appears itself, so far, to be a truth which is theoretical and 
therefore no truth.”180  Even if the pragmatists wish to circumvent this problem by defining truth 
as a “working hypothesis,” Bradley wishes to know how distinct hypotheses are related.181  His 
suggestion is that the pragmatists must either scrap their philosophical position or embrace it’s 
thoroughly subjectivist, and negative, implications. “If the follower of the new way desires to be 
consistent, he must take courage, it seems to me, to face his obvious conclusion.  Reality and 
truth are what I want and are that which at any time I choose to make them.”182   
But even Bradley won’t attribute such an “insane doctrine” to “Prof. James and his 
followers.”  Is it at this point that Schiller, the “self-elected leader of our Personal Idealists,” 
come into the picture.  And it is to him and James that a further suggestion is directed:  
The one thing I cannot doubt is that we ought to have more explanation and less self-
advertisement.  It does not really help us when we hear from Mr. Schiller a perpetual cry 
that there is no other philosopher but Prof. James and that Prof. James has a prophet. And 
it does not help to hear from Prof. James (on his part not to be outdone) that, if Mr. 
Schiller would not exhaust himself by excess of facetiousness, he would produce a 
philosophy as probably classical as it would be certainly inspired.183 
 
And it is to James that a final, pointed, warning is also issued: be careful of the company you 
keep.  For “a writer can be discredited by the extravagance and the vulgarity of his disciple, if at 
least he does not see his way to disconnect himself from it.”184   Better that both men turn to 
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philosophy that quaffs the fresh nectar of “a heightened apprehension of the ineffable mystery of 
life” than to bury themselves in the sordid mess of merely doing.185   
 James’s initial reaction to this article is an upbeat one.  Having, it seems, received an 
advanced copy he comments to Schiller in June: “Hurrah for Bradley’s attack.  I don’t know 
what it is to be an attack upon, but if it be an attack upon the Schiller-Dewey School in favor of 
the older notion of ‘truth’ as copying a standard, so by then the Lord will have delivered him into 
our hands.”  He believes, as regards “tactics,” that “the more of us there are to make reply the 
better—and independently.  But everything will depend upon what B.’s paper actually is.”186 
After the essay’s actual release, James’s response changes in what seems a fear as to Schiller’s 
reaction. Schiller notes that he has begun to draft a response to Bradley.  But James cautions, “It 
would be time wasted to polemize with him in details, so remote is he from the subject, spending 
his great subtlety on inventing one straw-caricature after another of what you may mean,  + 
refuting that, instead of spending five minutes in sympathetically imagining what you do 
mean.”187 
 Days later, he urges Schiller to send along a copy of his draft response to Bradley.  While 
James isn’t sure that Schiller will agree with everything he has written in his response, he hopes 
                                                                                                                                                       
mere activity. . . . This abstraction represents perhaps to most of us the essence of that which is false in theory and 
sordid in conduct” (Bradley, “On Truth,” 333). 
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“to have helped somewhat to a clearing of the atmosphere.”188  As regards Bradley, James makes 
little mention of him in his response, as he “seems to me almost entirely irrelevant.”  Two weeks 
pass, and it seems that Schiller has not sent an advance copy of his article.  James yet again urges 
Schiller to allow him to review Schiller’s response: “by all means send me your type-written 
copy.  I have am ‘dying with curiosity,’ etc.”   And James again claims, in what seems to be a 
plea for perspective in what he fears Schiller will unleash, the “irrelevance” of Bradley; “he has 
evidently not tried to understand the position of those he criticizes.”189  James fears seem well-
founded given the draft he receives from Schiller later in the week.  His tone is one of panic.  
While he admires the “strictly argumentative part,” and personally enjoys Schiller’s “irony and 
flights of metaphor,” he fears the rest will ruin it as an advance of disciplined “party politics.”  
James reminds Schiller how his past writings seem, to critics, “in ‘bad taste’ in the way of 
polemical jeers and general horseplay.”  He urges: 
Solemn as an owl, and tender as a dove, should be your watchword from now on if you 
are to outlive these arrears of debt to the proprieties.  Now I believe that the Oct. Mind 
will be the first artillery fire of an important general engagement, in which it behoves 
[sic] us to risk no disadvantage of any sort. . . . Bradley has put himself [inserted: 
“flagrantly”] in the wrong by his personalities + sarcasms; and the important point is that 
he should be left there high and dry. 190 
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James then goes on to list parts he wants expunged.  His tone grows more insistent.  “What I 
earnestly beseech you to do therefore is (no matter what literary cost) to suppress those pages. . . 
. Your paper’s total forensic effectiveness will be 4 times greater without than with it, and that is 
what the cause demands.”  James then decides to attempt another tactic.  Two days later, he 
writes to Stout, the editor of Mind, asking him—and repeating the comments about “beseeching” 
Schiller to set aside his “literary” pride—“to not have Schiller’s article on Bradley set up in type 
until my letter to him shall have arrived.”191  All of James’s attempts were for naught.192  Judging 
from the evidence, Schiller did not revise the article according to James’s wishes.    
Nor could the work behind the scenes stave off yet another slight to Schiller’s case.  Two 
months prior to the release of James’s and Schiller’s responses to Bradley, in August 1904, H. 
Heath Bawden (1871-1950) publishes “What is Pragmatism?” in the Journal of Philosophy.  It 
can be read as a continuation of the plaints of Leighton.  But it is more than that.  Bawden (1871-
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1950), a graduate of the Chicago School and student of Dewey, is attempting to even further 
distance Schiller from pragmatism proper—either Jamesian or Deweyian.  The argument is made 
easier for Bawden by picking upon the new term that Schiller is bandying about: humanism.  
“The word pragmatism and the mode of thought for which it stands seem to have come to stay,” 
says Bawden.  Yet “however ‘habitual’ humanism may have become with Mr. Schiller, it still 
seems to ‘sporadic and inchoate’ with most of us, even after having read his book [Humanism], 
to supplant the concise and persuasive term made current by Professor James.”193  And Bawden, 
a former student of one of those under discussion, avers that Dewey even surpasses James.   He 
is clearly a pragmatist even if he is one of a different stripe than James.  And Bawden puts the 
difference into sharp relief: Dewey attempts “to get a method which will enable us to state the 
logic of experience”; James’s approach, and the phrase seems to be an  unsympathetic code for 
metaphysics, is more of “a cosmology.”194   The thrust of Bawden’s argument is more pressing 
for its brevity: James, then Schiller, extend in a tenuous idealistic orbit away from Dewey. 
Regardless his place in the constellation of Bawden’s pragmatism, James response to 
Bradley is published two months later, in October 1904, in Mind.   He begins “Humanism and 
Truth” noting that he received an advance copy of Bradley’s previous article from the editor 
[George Fredrick Stout].  James took “this as a hint . . . to join in the controversy over 
‘Pragmatism’ which seems to have seriously begun.”195  First he makes clear his conception of 
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pragmatism.  “I myself have only used the term to indicate a method of carrying on abstract 
discussion.  The serious meaning of a concept, says Mr. Peirce, lies in the concrete difference to 
some one which its being true will make. . . . All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that 
truths should have practical consequences.”196  As against this narrow definition, James calls 
attention and consents to Schiller’s wider version, Humanism, wherein “the truth of any 
statement consists in the consequences, and particularly in there being good consequences.”197  
In essence, the broader version still makes use of the narrow one as its method.  James goes on to 
note that Schiller’s views (as expressed in Personal Idealism and elsewhere) are solely his own.  
In much the same way it is with “Dewey and his school (who never use the word pragmatism).”  
And with both it is the case that he agree generally with their contentions, but has never drawn 
out the implications found in their respective works. 
James then goes on to note that Schiller and Dewey have been subject to hostility in 
recent months, though none so close at present as the “elaborate indictment” of Mr. Bradley.  Of 
which, he states: 
Mr. Bradley in particular can be taken care of by Mr. Schiller.  He repeatedly confesses 
himself unable to comprehend Schiller’s views, he evidently has not sought to do so 
sympathetically, and I deeply regret to say that his laborious article throws, for my mind, 
absolutely no useful light upon the subject.  It seems to me on the whole an ignoratio 
elenchi [ignoring the argument], and I feel free to disregard it altogether.198  
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James would rather open up a free discussion of the subject.  And he again returns to the 
similarities found in Schiller and Dewey, in their leading to what he terms “the humanistic state 
of mind.”199  Such a habit of mind carries with it the inventions of the past even as it pushes 
towards the events of the future.  And with inclusion comes toil, as “we struggle to work in new 
nouns and adjectives while altering as little as possible the old.”200  That such an openness 
should be adopted by so many is countered by the challenge it poses to those holding the older 
views.  What, then, be their response?  If it is a relapse into the accepted, that provides no 
answer.  If it a response that “anything goes,” it is they who attach the merely to make their case 
of straw.  That the absolutist should as passionately argue their case as against the humanist only 
goes farther in proving one of the latter’s points: the truth is what we make it when we need to 
show its value; “the temper which a saying may comport is an extra-logical matter.”201  
In a move that swings most directly towards Bradley, James then takes on the question of 
what “correspondence” means.  As he states, “it is not self-evident that the sole business of our 
mind with realities should be to copy them. . . . Why may not thought’s mission be to increase 
and elevate, rather than simply to imitate and reduplicate, existence?”202  Taking the standard of 
comparison necessary in appraising a world of experience, the inferential leap is made that the 
world of experience must be compared to something outside itself.  Yet is there any warrant for 
this move beyond experience?  Humanism supplies an answer, no, and a reason: there is an 
additive component to “making” reality as well as a suggesting of fixity within the same.  To 
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“discover” things implies additions to the content of the world, to what James calls “the world of 
fact.”  But these discoveries, working pragmatically, extend rather than deduct from that world; 
“they copy nothing that pre-existed, yet they agree with what pre-existed, fit it, amplify it, relate 
and connect it, build it out.”203  Absolutism would have it the other way round: it is out there, to 
be brought to bear in here.  Which leads James to make a candid admission: “The denial of such 
a Notion by Humanism lies probably at the root of most of the dislike which it incurs.”204  
Following James in the very same October issue of Mind, Schiller offers his defense and 
his opinion.  He takes the direct references in “Truth and Practice” as a sign “that the long-
dominant sect of Absolutists are at last arousing themselves to face the new movement which is 
promising to supercede their doctrines.”205  But he has regrets.  Schiller regrets, first, that his 
comments that “the minds of ‘great authorities’ grow less elastic and less hospitable to new 
ideas” was taken as an insult; and, second, his opposition of the old with a new view which is 
made for “men of action, the ‘strong and virile,’ was taken as a further insult.”206  But clearing 
the air is not to dismiss settling a score.  For while Schiller admits that his views are in need to 
criticism (even as the “double-barrelled” name Personal Idealism should be set aside for 
“Humanism”), he pointedly remarks that “to sling ink is not necessarily to throw light, and the 
mere airing of infuriated prejudices is likely to end only in the discovery of a mares’ nest.”207  As 
such, he lights into his response to Bradley. 
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The first issue is one raised also by James: Bradley admits of not understanding what he 
then sets out to refute.  The result being that what Bradley “had refuted with much superfluous 
subtlety was a mass of misconceptions which he had developed into misrepresentations, and 
finally distorted into absurdities entirely irrelevant to my position.”208  And this misapprehension 
grows, as guide or guard, qualified appendages to move about. Bradley is discussing that which 
is merely practical, as opposed to that which might be cater to our entire nature, all to the effect 
of suggesting: 
He has, e.g., wholly ignored or dismissed as unessential such cardinal doctrines as the 
presence of limiting conditions in each experiment and the voluntary acceptance of a 
basis taken as factual, the distinction of postulate and axiom, the selection and 
verification of postulates by subsequent experience, and the psychological and social 
criticism which inevitably purifies the passing wishes of the individual.209 
 
The result of these gaps is that Bradley can never quite explain the relation of “truths” to “facts,” 
here the former are determined by the latter, there the latter approximate the former.210 
The second point concerns the relation of “truth”—Schiller accepts the slide into “theory” 
as equivalent—to “practice.”  Schiller is wont to stand alongside Bradley and agree that “every 
possible side of our life is practical”; he grows perplexed, though, when he is told “yet in a sense 
they are also not practical.”211  If the Intellectualist is going to again qualify his terms to the point 
that the original statement has no force, then Schiller is willing to step in supply the Humanist 
retort: “there can be no independence of theory (except in popular language) and no opposition 
to practice, because theory is an outgrowth of practice and incapable of ‘independent’ 
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existence.”212   This relates to another point that James addressed: pragmatism and humanism as 
“anything goes” approaches to philosophy; more specifically, Bradley raising it as “insane” and 
then acting as though it were relevant.  Schiller deals with this in summary fashion:  
In any case Mr. Bradley could do his followers a great service if, instead of so crudely 
travestying my argument, he supplied them with an alternative to it, and showed them 
how to deal with the empirical existence of the infinite variety in ends and ideas.  Or does 
he not admit this to constitute a scientific problem, and is it merely in “appearance” that 
our views diverge?213 
 
What Schiller asks for is an alternative, not an old argument against Protagoras that even Plato 
dismissed as effete.  
He lastly responds to two of Bradley’s tactical maneuvers.   He quickly dismisses 
Bradley’s concept of Will—both the depersonalized “process of passage from idea to existence” 
and “the self-realization of an idea”—as either pragmatist in intent or a version of flawed deism 
whereby that which creates is separate from that which is created.214  But Schiller will linger on 
some of Bradley’s strategic devices.  Instead of reference to the Absolute, he provides 
discussions of God.  This strikes Schiller as unfortunate, as he “always respected Mr. Bradley’s 
philosophy for never seeking to curry favor with the ‘orthodox’ by playing on ambiguous 
phrases.”215  But, if it is religion Bradley wants, it behooves him not to label those who do not 
share in his views doctrinaire infidels.  And, if Bradley continues to dress his theory up in 
religion, it would play into the very issues James discussed in Varieties of Religious Experience 
and the Will to Believe; namely, that science and religion are of value to the extent that they 
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show their value.216  But Schiller isn’t sure of the conversion.  He is confused as to why Bradley 
backtracks from his new found faith and into the “ineffable mystery of life” in his conclusion.217 
Schiller concludes by noting that Bradley is, in any case, slowly moving towards a 
recognition of the other side of things—the problems of infinity, the potential in pluralism—even 
if he still views these as challenges to overcome, rather than arguments to which he should 
respond.218 And Schiller takes this also as a sign of progress, forecasting a time “when the 
stronghold of the Absolute is once declared an open town, no longer cramped within walls, nor 
serving as a strait prison for the human soul . . . refurbished and extended for those to dwell in 
whose tastes its habitations please.”219  Bradley may be right that philosophy is hard.  But praise 
be the day when the “‘dignity’ of philosophy” need not hide behind “unintelligibilities and 
aimless world-play.”220 
Within a month, Schiller has already written to James to explain himself.  James replies 
that Schiller is “superabounding in truth, acuteness, humor, gall, wrath—+ I think delusions 
about the state of the enemy’s mind.”  He urges Schiller to recognize that, for humanism to take 
hold, a more systematic discussion must occur.  Until then, it seems likely that some responses 
are simply “innocent” misunderstandings, “although that is a thesis that requires some Will to 
Believe.”221  The evidence suggests that Schiller responds within days of receiving James’s 
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letter.  Schiller, for his part, has “a bad conscience” about the whole situation.  He suggests that, 
given his trip to Switzerland, he simply did not have the time to make the requested revisions 
(Schiller notes that Stout sent him, without comment, the postcard that James’s had sent 
attempting to put off the article).   
But Schiller also thinks the paper stands as a tactic suited to the situation.  He hopes 
Bradley will shift his tone now that Schiller has “called his bluff” as regards the “overbearing 
brutality” of Bradley’s standard argumentative approach.  Additionally, “as far as Engl. is 
concerned it is too early to be merely conciliatory, + that a decisive defeat of B. will have an 
inspiring effect on our weaker-kneed followers.”  That leaves James to “influence the sincere but 
puzzled waverers, who seem to exist on your side.”   Taken together “they may succeed where 
neither wd have done separately.”222  James, for his part, wants to be done with the whole matter.   
Seeing that Schiller is “still harping on my unfortunate attempt at diverting your lightening from 
Bradley’s head,” James comments, “would that I had never raised my voice on the matter or 
given you all this peek!” 223   But Schiller is still not done clearing the air, or a path, for 
humanism.224 
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In an April 1905 piece in Mind, “The Definition of ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Humanism,’” 
Schiller wishes “to give reasons for partially dissenting from the delimitations which Prof. James 
has proposed.”225  For it was through James that Schiller was brought to Peirce, and through both 
that he sought a way to connect the former’s insight, into “the willingness to believe,” into 
accord with the latter’s suggestion of consequence, by way of generalizing both with the 
question: “What must be the nature of mind in which practical consequences can become 
determinants of truth?”226  For, in the most restricted sense, Schiller feels that the Peircian 
definition amounts to nothing more than a truism.  In the wider sense, an unmodified Jamesian 
account remains too general.  Thus, Schiller provides seven different definitions of wider 
pragmatism, which are “equivalent” and can be generalized thus: “our attributions of ‘truth’ and 
our recognitions of ‘reality’ are established and verified by their working, and sooner or later 
brought to the definite test of experiments which succeed or fail, i.e., give or deny satisfaction to 
some human interest, and are valued accordingly.”227  Moreover, this wider definition admits of 
many philosophical systems and, save for “all but a few metaphysical phrases which have no 
genuine sphere of application,” “must gradually win its way to universal acceptance.”228   
Schiller’s definition of humanism faces, similar to Peirce’s narrow definition of 
pragmatism, the charge of being a truism.  But, given the nature of philosophy, it is in fact 
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contested whether or not “the nature of man must be presupposed in all man’s reasonings.”229  
And it is through humanism that pragmatism can be regarded “as merely a special application of 
a principle which he applies all around, to ethics, aesthetics and theology, as well as to the theory 
of knowledge.”230  Thus it is possible “to accept pragmatism as an epistemological method and 
analysis, without expanding it into a general philosophical principle.”231  And though Schiller 
suggests humanism may form then a “metaphysic,” he goes on to suggest it would not be 
metaphysical in the classic sense:  
There is no reason, therefore, to anticipate that the adoption of Humanism (or even 
Pragmatism) will at all diminish the number and variety of systems.  Personally, indeed, 
it would seem to me to argue abysmal conceit and stupendous ignorance of the history of 
thought to cherish the delusion that of all philosophies one’s own alone was destined to 
win general acceptance ipsissimis verbis [the self same words], or even to be reflected, 
undimmed and unmodified, in any second soul.232 
 
That similarities exist, as between him and James, is a given.233  That marked distinctions exist, 
as between him and Dewey, should also be noted.  In both cases, they should be heralded.  “For 
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really, if there is to be healthy progress in philosophy, we must have more tolerance, less party-
spirit, no cast-iron creeds, and (in a word) no more absolutism.”234 
Here, then, we arrive at the end of what was a long, and by turns conflicted, series of 
years.   The calling out of Bradley carried with it the calling on of his friend and mentor 
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continue to fulfil its promise.  Will it help us not only to grow tired of empty oracles, but also to make other 
movements forward?” (Alfred Sidgwick, “Mr. Bradley’s Dilemma,” Mind 14, no. 54 [April 1905]: 294). 
In addition, Schiller’s essay spurred on a rather sustained discussion with the Scottish Absolute Idealist 
Alfred Edward Taylor (1869-1945).  In July of the same year, Schiller writes “Empiricism and the Absolute.”  In 
this article Schiller praises Taylor for attempting to move beyond the standard forms of Oxford intellectualism.  But 
he argues that Taylor’s attempt (in his 1903 Elements of Metaphysics) “to convey nutritious novelties from an alien 
system into his own has only inflicted damage on both” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Empiricism and the Absolute,” Mind 14, 
no. 55 [July 1905]: 355).   In January of 1906, Taylor replies that Schiller, in his April 1905 article, is not “justified 
in censuring many of his brother-students whether on the score of the amount of controversial matter to be found in 
their productions or on that of the tone and temper in which their controversies are conducted” (A. E. Taylor, “Truth 
and Consequences,” Mind 15, no. 57 [January 1906]: 86).  And then, in an extended postscript, Taylor responds to 
Schiller’s July 1905 article.  James, answering a query from Schiller as regards Taylor’s character, has this to say: 
Taylor is “companionable enough, apparently, but hasn’t eaten of the fruit of the tree of life, a logic chopper and 
ratiocinator, as I imagine, to the end, with no perceptions of his own. . . . I hope you won’t spare him.  In spite of his 
marvelous power of straight clear writing, he seems to me really very crude” [note that Taylor was being considered 
to succeed James at Harvard] (William James, Stanford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 January 1906, Box One, Folder 
Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University 
Libraries, Stanford).   In a follow-up letter, James goes on to praise the “cleverness” of Taylor’s writing and urges 
Schiller to be as receptive as possible to what Taylor offers in the way of debate.  But, he continues, “his way of 
taking your meaning is simply silly. . . . I confess that I am staggered by the tight little contracted character of the 
rationalist mind” (William James, Stanford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 30 January 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, 
Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, 
Stanford). 
Schiller goes on to respond to Taylor’s complaints generally (“The Ambiguity of Truth,” Mind 15, no. 58 
[April 1906]: 161-76) and specifically (“Pragmatism and Pseudo-Pragmatism,” Mind 15, no. 59 [July 1906]: 375-
90).  James responds regarding the July 1906 article: “Your article in Mind on Taylor is, I think, the most 
completely effective thing you’ve written and is the first thing to put Absolutism [inserted: “squarely”] on the 
defensive, as the little subjective fad wh. it is really is, in spite of its aristocratic lineage” (William James, 
Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 July 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, 
Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see also Perry, The 
Thought, 1, 824). 
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James.235  This drawing of lines was not mere theatrics.  Knox humorously sums up his and 
Schiller’s heightened sense of the gains at stake in the upcoming years: 
Here lies F. H.  Bradley – 
I don’t mean that he’s dead! 
I merely refer 
To the things he has said.236 
 
Bradley, like Jowett and Green before him, was the cagey promoter of a sham philosophy.  And 
it was the goal of Schiller to expose the worldview he promoted for the “dialectical nightmare” 
that it was.  But this extreme sense of duty also suggests the differences in Schiller’s and James’s 
temperaments.  James, courting a variety of views, saw their gradual confluence in the methods 
of pragmatism.  Schiller, castigating those that would dismiss the call, refashioned pragmatism’s 
range so as to snatch it from the maw of Absolute Idealists.  And for the gain of James’s consent 
under the awning of humanism, Schiller was dealt the deficit of his mentor’s unheeded warnings: 
the continued insistence by critics that he did damage to the very cause he so acutely felt it his 
job to proclaim.  While he will not go it alone, Schiller will nonetheless preach pragmatism’s 
truth in the manners of his humanism. 
                                               
235
 It should be added that it also initiated a series of exchanges with Charles S. Peirce.  On 30 April 1904, 
Schiller admits that his views of Peirce’s pragmatism were based on James’s explanation of them and, given 
Peirce’s clarification, “need modification.”  Peirce responds in detail in a May 12th draft, and notes as regards James 
and him: “. . . he seems to have great difficulty in understanding me, as I have in understanding his picturesque 
language, which is not altogether unlike his father’s.  Somewhere (if my memory does not betray my confidence) he 
not long ago spoke of himself and me as taking a view opposed to yours, and I was much tempted to write to him 
that your notion of pragmatism was more in harmony with mine than his.  Perhaps I did so write.”  But in 
subsequent letters he did send, dated the 13th and the 23rd , his opinion is different.  In the first, he exclaims: “I have 
no hope of finding you nearer to me because you want your philosophy to be the quintessence of the whole man,  I 
want no such thing.”  In the second, he is a bite more direct: “I, for my part, am no humanist.  I am one of the 
despised followers of Duns Scotus. . . I share, for instance, his decided taste for terms of art which are not likely to 
be taken up by the mob of belle-lettrists.  Candied science offends my esthetic sense.  I like it nude and severe.” 
(Frederick J. Down Scott, “Peirce and Schiller and Their Correspondence,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 11, 
no. 3 [July 1973]: 369; 371; 372; 378).  Scott goes on to suggest that the draft comment is the truest, insofar as 
Peirce seems closer to Schiller in overall philosophical temperament.  Interested readers are directed to the article so 
as to make their own determination. 
 
236
 Howard Vincentè Knox, Grindelwald, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 April 1905, Correspondence, Box One, F. 
C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, 
University of California, Los Angeles. 
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4.0  THE METTLE OF HUMANISM 1906-1910 
Our only hope of understanding knowledge, our only chance of keeping philosophy alive . . .  
lies in going back from Plato to Protagoras, and ceasing to misunderstand  
the great teacher who discovered the Measure of man’s Universe.1 
 
Schiller faces, in the next four years, a range of options.  Heeding the call of James, he can give 
over his time to building on the promises of humanism.  He can retreat from active duty and seek 
to substantiate his claim that pragmatism can be remade as an epistemic template for the whole 
of human action.  Or he can take the wounds of past battles as a sign of engagement, as an 
indication that the cause is for now and the treatise is for later.  Schiller chooses neither path 
exclusively, though he errs in consequence towards the latter.  His work can be seen as an 
idiosyncratic sort of pragmatic sense-making: utilizing historical pivot points as verification for 
the present needs, as predictive of future results.  In attempting to substantiate the promises of 
humanism, Schiller installs an exemplar.  He then places venerable historical figures into a stage 
play meant to mirror the current battle between humanism and Absolute Idealism.  In attempting 
to substantiate the merits of the cause, he recycles the past debates as proof of the cause’s current 
preeminence.  And in attempting to silence those who have questioned his agenda, he returns 
again and again to the key points which he has already elaborated upon. 
In his chief works from this period, particularly Studies in Humanism (1907) and Plato or 
Protagoras? (1908), there is a clear sense that Schiller is now at home within the subjective 
swells of Jamesian pragmatism.  But it is still clear that the grooves in Schiller’s humanism trace 
back even farther, to the empirical forms of philosophy that T. H. Green had once labeled 
                                               
1
 F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism (London: Macmillan, 1907), xiv-xv. 
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“sophistry.”  In Green’s time, as in Schiller’s, this empirical and compartmentalized view of 
reality—a particular sort of faculty psychology by which the world must bend, incrementally, to 
the wills of those who postulate—strikes some as paradoxically anti-intellectual.  By being so 
submerged within the interior walls of (the) mind, there is a danger that the postulates never 
admit of contact with (their) social counterparts.  But there are social counterparts for Schiller’s 
philosophy.  In James, Schiller continues to find a source of inspiration.  In Bradley, he still finds 
the rot of an Idealism trading in abstractions.  And there are real consequences to Schiller’s 
postulates.  In ignoring James’s pleas that he goes gently and systematically about his work, he 
fails to arouse empathy equal to his soon-to-be-departed mentor.   In continually broad-siding 
Bradley, he comes to be seen as a shrill outlier in academic philosophy.  The results, both good 
and bad, are thus: the fate of Schiller’s humanism is more and more a measure of his choices.  
4.1 MEASURED STUDIES: PROTAGORAS AND THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF 
HUMANISM 
Schiller’s first task in January 1906 is to clear the argumentative ground by setting the historical 
stage.  In “Plato and His Predecessors,” a sprawling review of five different books related to 
Greek philosophy, Schiller meditates on how history accords favor even as it provides only for 
selection.  As he states, “all historical accounts, moreover, rest more or less on selection and 
combination of the available material, emphasizing what seem to the historian the essential 
features; and these often have to be supplemented by a conjectural filling-up of the gaps in our 
evidence.”2  In discussing Austrian philosopher Theodor Gomperz (and his 1905 Greek 
                                               
2
 F. C. S. Schiller, “Plato and His Predecessors,” Quarterly Review 204, no. 406 (January 1906): 63. 
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Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy), Schiller notes—and here we see clearly the sense-
making approach that Schiller is undertaking—how he seeks to point “out the contributions to 
the making of science that we owe to the Greek thinkers, and aptly to illumine their doctrines by 
modern scientific analogues.”3  Schiller goes so far as to assert that traces of Darwin’s views of 
evolution can be found in fragments of Anaximander, though suggests this type of “scientific 
promise” begins “to languish shortly after Aristotle had codified knowledge and apparently 
provided the sciences with a firm platform for more extensive operations.”4  And is at the hands 
of the Sophists that this decline was partially meted out: “The natural acuteness of the Greek 
mind and the great practical value of forensic and political speechifying no doubt tended to an 
over-development of dialectical habits of thought.”5  But this is only a partial explanation.  The 
decline was also a result of the changing political climate.  Therein, the Sophists came to be 
regarded as specialists in “bad reasoning” and their successes in “logic along with rhetoric and 
grammar” were ignored.6    
Indeed, Schiller regards the Sophists as having been potential allies of the scientists and 
having a powerful influence in the works of Protagoras, in that his oft-quoted maxim points to 
“both the subjective and objective factor in human knowledge and the problem of their 
connexion.”7  The cause of distortion, then, is too willingly accepting Plato’s stacked deck 
approach to Protagoras.  By raising dialectic to a science, Plato necessarily excised the 
components of Protagoras’ maxim that accord well with “instructive observations and 
                                               
3
 Schiller, “Plato,” 64. 
 
4
 Schiller, “Plato,” 73. 
 
5
 Schiller, “Plato,” 74. 
 
6
 Schiller, “Plato,” 75. 
 
7
 Schiller, “Plato,” 76. 
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experiments,” with “the problems and methods of scientific measurement.”8  And this, then, is 
the problem of interpretation, of taking at face value what can only be captured in snippets.  How 
are we to know what Plato meant divorced of context?  Why are we to assume a historical 
continuity where no such roadmap exists?  What we know, then, is that our use of Protagoras or 
Plato is conditioned on what we are trained to think of (what we think we know of) them.  And 
statements regarding history are thus assertions to be defended, in a word, rhetorically.  But these 
are meta-assertions in so far as Plato sought to lay out his theory of the Ideal over many years 
and through various versions; Schiller traces it from the “early theory” of “True Being” to the 
“later theory” where “Ideas are models for sensible phenomena.”9  That Schiller should suggest a 
pragmatic route to redress these changes is obvious given his disposition(s).  That Plato, as 
interpreted, would never have consented to such a choice is understandable given his. 
This review has a profound impact on James, as a matter of tactical argument and as a 
justification for the continued use of humanism.  In February James exclaims: “The Plato article 
is grossartig [akin to “great”], one of the boldest, straightest and of course most impressive as 
being ‘scholarly,’ things that you have ever written.  So simple!  I find it most instructive.” 10  As 
much as Schiller relies on the continued support of James, James continues to find guidance 
through Schiller as well.  But it is what comes next that shows how James’s temperament to seek 
                                               
8
 Schiller, “Plato,” 78. 
 
9
 Schiller, “Plato,” 82; 86. 
 
10
 William James, Stanford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 February 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and 
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.  A 
few days later, and James is still praising the review: “Your article on Plato chimes still through my head.  Keep on 
diversifying yourself in this way and you will lead everything!” (William James, Stanford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 
February 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special 
Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). 
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confluence is matched, and enhanced, by Schiller’s attempts to wage a larger, humanistic 
campaign: 
I must be very damp powder, slow to burn, and I must be terribly respectful of other 
people, for I confess that it is only after reading there [sic] things [James’s is referring to 
recent journal articles by Dewey and the Italian Giovanni Papini] (in spite of all you have 
written to the same effect, and in spite of your tone of announcing judgment to a sinful 
world) that I seem to have grasped the full import for life and regeneration, the great 
perspective of the program, and the renovating character for all things of Humanism; and 
the outwornness as of a scarecrow’s garments simulating life by flapping in the wind of 
nightfall, of all intellectualism, and the blandness and deadness of all who worship 
intellectualist idols, the Royces and the Taylors, and worse than all, their followers, who 
with no inward excuse of nature, (being too unoriginal really to prefer anything) just 
blunder on to the wrong scent, when it is so easy to catch the right one, and then Truth!11 
 
It pays to linger on the complexity of this letter.  James grants humanism it’s due.  But he grants 
it on the basis of arguments offered by persons other than Schiller.12  The question is why?  Why, 
after previously granting Schiller’s term of art the right of way would it be Papini and Dewey 
that convince James?  I believe the answer relates to the differences in James’s and Schiller’s 
temperaments.  Simply put, Schiller’s style of argument works against him even as regards 
James.  James still seeks to build a program while Schiller, as against James’s advice, seeks to 
destroy the opposition.  But scorched earth rarely yields growth.  In Dewey and Papini, James 
sees the flowering of pragmatism upon the ground Schiller razes.  This is for now a qualified 
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 William James, Del Monte, to F. C. S. Schiller, 7 April 1906, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and 
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford; see 
also James, Letters, 2, 245. 
 
12
 James clearly was treated, even by critics, as the meeting point for most (if not all) approaches to 
pragmatism.  As a consequence, he became more and more aware of the stylistically dry American Dewey, the fiery 
Italian Papini (1881-1956), and a host of others.  There also existed, in James’s larger communion with views of 
varied sorts, his discussion with the opposing side.  James had a sympathetic temperament when it came to a 
colleague and friend like Josiah Royce, the clever Alfred Edward Taylor, and even the sworn enemy of his friend, 
Bradley. 
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victory; but it is a victory.  As much as Schiller is paying the price for his insistence, he is 
gaining ground in moving the man who inspired him to his side.13   
Schiller, for his part, is flush with the confidence that humanism will continue to 
command attention and confute the opposition.  In 1907, he releases Studies in Humanism.  Like 
                                               
13
 It is perhaps this renewed respect for humanism that leads James to observe with limited comment the 
debates between John E. Russell and Schiller.  Russell is a rarity in that, in later years, he moved towards 
pragmatism.  In October 1906, however, he wishes to debate the pragmatic assessment of, ahem, being lost in the 
woods; more simply put, that pragmatists cannot will themselves to not be lost, that their ideas must correspond in 
some degree with reality if their ideas are to prove useful in experience (John E. Russell, “The Pragmatist’s Meaning 
of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 22 [25 October 1906]: 599-601).   Schiller’s rejoinder three months later 
praises Russell for using a concrete example, but still asserts that being ‘lost’ is a matter of perception related to 
purpse (F. C. S. Schiller, “A Pragmatic Babe in the Woods,” Journal of Philosophy 4,  no. 2 [17 January 1907]: 42-
4).  Russell publishes a paper two weeks later in which he elaborates on his basic complaint, commenting that 
“pragmatism saves one from doubt only if he happens to be already or happens to become a pragmatist.  Pragmatism 
is unable to make one a pragmatist, because its conception of truth is one which makes it impossible to produce a 
reasoned conviction that this doctrine is true” (John E. Russell, “Pragmatism as the Salvation from Philosophic 
Doubt,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 3 [31 January 1907]: 61).  In April, Schiller replies that Russell’s “pathetic 
appeal,” while inching ever closer to pragmatism, still remains at a distance so long as he holds to the claim that 
thought must correspond with reality (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Pragmatic Cure of Doubt,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 
9 [25 April 1907]: 235-8).  In the same issue, Russell replies that doubt is to be preferred to a philosophical method 
which removes doubt for only those that wish or want to be pragmatists (John E. Russell, “A Reply to Dr. Schiller,” 
Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 9 [25 April 1907]: 238-43).   It is at this point that James enters into the fray, albeit in 
an indirect way.  In May, he submits a series of letters between him and Russell that he feels “sharpen . . . the most 
prevelant stumbling block” as regards criticisms of pragmatism: the concept of truth.  The letters are a polite 
exchange of diverging opinions that culminate in no conversion.  They do, however, reinforce the fundamental 
differences: intellectualists claim against pragmatists that the truth is fixed whereas pragmatists claim against 
intellectualists that the meaning of an object is testable and revisable (William James; John E. Russell, “Controversy 
About Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 11 [23 May 1907]: 289; 295-6). 
Then, in what must be a philosophic rarity, Schiller/Russell/Schiller reply to each other all in the same 
August number of the journal.  Schiller fears that Russell’s willingness to refuse a cure is more pertinently an 
instance of subjectively choosing to ignore the problem of an objective stance on reality (F. C. S. Schiller, 
“Pragmatism Versus Skepticism,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 18 [29 August 1907]: 482-7).   Russell would rather 
conclude that his doubt, as to pragmatism’s wares, as to the meanings that it attaches to concepts such as “truth” and 
“verification,” is as much a matter of faith as is pragmatism’s suggestions to the contrary (John E. Russell, “A Last 
Word to Dr. Schiller,” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 18 [29 August 1907]: 487-90).  Schiller concludes by pleading 
sincerity in attempting to establish a rapport with an “intellectualist,” one who remains unaware of how much will is 
involved in doubting the benefits of pragmatism (F. C. S. Schiller, “Ultima Ratio?” Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 18 
[29 August 1907]: 490-4). 
James waits until the inkwells are spent before commenting in private to Schiller.  But then he only has 
cursory comments as regards so much pluming.  In August he exclaims: “Poor R. is honest and sincere but 
absolutely stone-blind to everything, after the he had seen that the object thought must be “as” the object.  No use! 
but some readers will take it in.  Keep it up!” (William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 31 August 1907, Box 
One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, 
Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).  Two months later he ventures a cause for the doubt: “Russell must be 
about 70, a dear good honest man, dry in teaching, and utterly stupid as to what you and I mean.  Hopeless!” 
(William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 October 1907, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators and 
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). 
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its predecessor, the book provides previously published but expanded essays: October 1904’s “In 
Defence of Humanism” has been reworked as “The Truth and Mr. Bradley”; April 1905’s “The 
Definition of ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Humanism’” has been expanded to include arguments that 
Schiller had raised in the same month in the Italian journal Leonardo; January 1906’s “Plato and 
His Predecessors” has been revised and renamed “From Plato to Protagoras.”14  And, like 
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 It is clear that both Knox, whom Schiller singles out for praise in reviewing the work, and James viewed 
advanced copies of the book.  James, in particular, is pleased to see that Schiller is using his exemplar-via-critic 
wisely: “I’m particularly rejoiced that Plato is to occupy so central a position. . . . The most effective way of turning 
the tables on our particular adversarys [sic] is to fling Plato’s Theatetus right into their teeth [Humanism contains a 
new chapter, entitled “The Papyri of Philonous,” providing two dialogues related to Protagoras]!  They treat us now 
as little street boys and ignoramuses, of which I indeed am one, but they can treat you as such no longer . . .” 
(William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 August 1907, Box One, Folder Sixteen, Educators and 
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).   
Knox, for his part, respond after having received the published work: “I am promising myself the treat of reading it 
through solidly, but so far have only been able to dip into it.  These dips, however, decidedly give me the impression 
that the essays read even better in book form than in proof.  I really think you have written a great book. . . . It is 
most exhilarating to be living in this time of philosophical regeneration, and assuredly the as-yet-unregenerated are 
falling on evil days. . .” (Howard Vincentè Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 10 February 1907, Correspondence, 
Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research 
Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
As a means of comparison it is interesting to note how Dewey makes use of Protagoras and Plato.  First 
published a year after Studies in Humanism, Dewey’s and Tufts’s Ethics references both persons in its introduction.  
Note the term use: 
Conduct or the moral life has two obvious aspects.  On the one hand it is a life of purpose.  It implies 
thought and feeling, ideals and motives, valuation and choice.   These are processes satisfied by 
psychological methods.  On the other hand, conduct has its outward side.  It has relations to nature, and 
especially to human society.  As Protagoras put it, in mythical form, the gods gave men a sense of justice 
and of reverence, in order to enable them to unite for mutual preservation. 
(John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, revised ed. [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1908; reprint, 1932], 
4).  What is interesting is that the “mythical form” Dewey and Tufts reference is provided by Plato in his Protagoras.  
And in later discussions within Ethics (notably, “The Moral Development of the Greeks”) it is this emphasis on 
Plato that remains, primarily as a counterpoint to Dewey’s and Tufts’s views of ethics. 
Later discussions, by Dewey alone, continue the use of Plato as Dewey’s and thus pragmatism’s foil.  But, 
in contrast to Schiller, they contain few references to Protagoras.  They do, however, draw out strikingly similar 
implications to the ones that Schiller was advancing as early as 1902’s “Useless Knowledge.”   In Reconstruction in 
Philosophy (1920), Dewey makes this observation: “. . . is it not possible to say of Aristotle’s Forms just what he 
said of Plato’s Ideas?  What are they, these Forms and Essences which so profoundly influenced for centuries the 
course of science and theology, save the objects of ordinary experience with their blemishes removed, their 
imperfections eliminated, their lacks rounded out, their suggestions and hints fulfilled?” (John Dewey, 
Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged ed. [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920; reprint, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1948], 105-6).  Or compare Dewey’s 1929 Gifford Lectures, published as The Quest for Certainty, 
particularly the chapter on “The Play of Ideas,” with Schiller’s 1896 “Non-Euclidean Geometry and the Kantian a 
Priori.”  Therein, Dewey notes: “Mathematical conceptions as expressions of pure thought have also seemed to 
provide the open gateway to a realm of essence that is independent of existence . . . the Euclidean geometry was 
undoubtedly the pattern for the development of a formally rational logic; it was also a marked factor in leading Plato 
to his doctrine of a world of supersensible and superphysical ideal objects” (John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty 
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Humanism, Schiller apologizes for any lack of systemization, noting “that the conditions under 
which I had to work greatly hamper and delay the composition of a continuous treatise.”15  But, 
in explaining the scope of the book, it seems that Schiller remains cognizant of the qualified 
endorsement that James had offered the year previous.  He notes that the book’s topic proper, 
Truth, and the range of its interests—particularly, freedom and religion—have been necessitated 
by two concomitant developments.  The first is the “converging novelties” of writers such as 
Peirce, Knox, Sidgwick, Dewey, and James.  The second is chiefly that which gave rise to such 
novelties: Absolutism.  As a result of “the intensity of intellectualist prejudices” these novel 
thinkers have been compelled “to attack in self-defence, to press on our counter-statements in 
order to engage the enemy along his whole front.”16  The nature of the Humanistic cause seems 
paradoxically, in Schiller’s view, to originate in the critic’s perceptions of the cause they 
criticize. 
As before, the popular press takes notice.  The Westminster Gazette labels Schiller “a 
Modern Protagoras.”  It argues that the philosophical content of the volume “may prove to be 
one of the most interesting and important in the history of British thought.”17  The Sheffield 
Daily Telegraph is just as convinced of its worth, no less of the author’s merit.  “Dr. Schiller is 
clear in statement, admirable in illustration, witty in style, and bold in attack.”  The attack of 
                                                                                                                                                       
[New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1960], 140-1).  The overall point is thus: Dewey carried forth the implications of 
the Sophistical line plumbed by Schiller without need for continued reference to the particular Sophist. 
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 F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism (London: Macmillan, 1907), vii. 
 
16
 Schiller, Studies, ix-x. 
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 Review of Studies in Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Westminster Gazette, 10 August 1907, Newspaper 
and Magazine Clippings, 1907, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special 
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.  A clue as to the enthusiasm 
of the review may be found in the marginalia.  The only comment is this: “H. Sturt.”  Sturt, to recall, is the editor of 
the volume Personal Idealism.   One good turn, as they say, deserves another. 
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long held assumptions “in the hands of this master of expression, [are] extremely stimulating and 
enjoyable.”18  The Nation is less enthusiastic.  It complains that the present volume is unlikely to 
make converts to the pragmatic cause.  Further, some of the essays contained therein “are 
unworthy of so permanent a place.”  But, criticisms aside, it concludes that Schiller’s 
“suggestive” arguments will engage “readers of every variety or philosophical opinion.”19  The 
Edinburgh Evening Post is less than guarded in its stylistic criticisms.  It urges the writer to 
“walk somewhat more warily,” lest “those who combat dogmatism” become that which they 
attack.20  The Baptist Times and Freeman, while full well in accord with Schiller’s views, helps 
to explain the varied receptions of Schiller’s position:  
He may at times be arbitrary, capricious and sublimely self-confident, but he is racy, 
brilliant, full of dash and go, breaking on us, as we pursue the even tenour of our thought, 
with sallies of wit and flashes of humour, so that to those who will take the trouble to 
master subjects which necessarily demand rigourous and prolonged thought the perusal 
of his essays will be a source, not of instruction only, but of delight.21 
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Reception is a matter of perception.  What for one is admirable is for the next unworthy.  And 
the longer philosophical notices bear this perceptual divide out.  
A. K. Roger’s June 1907 review in the Journal of Philosophy is equally focused on 
Schiller’s style and method.  Though he tips his pen towards Schiller’s “suggestiveness” of the 
“fruitful and stimulating” power of pragmatism, he is inclined also to raised his brow: Schiller 
adopts “polemical mannerisms” and “can hardly be called sympathetic at any time towards his 
opponents,” all the while advancing “the genuine importance to the constitution of reality of our 
human action, and of the thinking which makes it possible and effective.”22  But in advancing 
this cause, Schiller raises questions as to the nature of pragmatism.  Is it to be considered a 
metaphysic?  If not, or perhaps because, Schiller “has so strong a leaning towards marking the 
psychological explanation all-inclusive,” he threatens to make it as such by implication.23  But of 
what value?  Roger’s suggests that Schiller adopts a view more telling than might initially be 
presumed.  On the one hand, Schiller treats metaphysics as “merely personal; one may amuse 
himself after this fashion if he sees fit, or, if he please, may eschew it altogether.”24  On the 
other, though, it may be the case “that Mr. Schiller’s previous disparagement of metaphysics 
may have been due to a sense of the slight practical value really attaching to the particular 
metaphysics which he individually affects.”25  So Schiller is caught in the bind of either 
advancing a metaphysic without knowing it, or of knowing that which he advances is of little 
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worth.  For Roger’s part, either answer is suggestive of pragmatism’s defect: by putting aside a 
question of why it came to be, one is little satisfied in arguments about how to make it better.26  
G. F. Stout’s review in the October 1907 Mind calls attention to the ambiguity inherent in 
Schiller’s project.  His initial focus is on the distinctive quality of Schiller’s humanism; namely, 
“his view of the part played by subjective activity in the development of Knowledge.”27  As 
such, belief is constituted via both the factual and the fictional, not in the process of jettisoning 
the latter as one proceeds to more and more of the former.  Such beliefs, if “considered in 
abstraction from subjective interest and activity, are all equally coherent or incoherent.”28  
Context thus provides the arena in which what is true is derived from the degree to which it 
satisfies some need.29  But such a view of truth, in Schiller’s hand, carries with it both bias and 
ambiguity.  The bias is “against all theories which seem to him irrelevant or hostile to the 
progressive satisfaction of human needs.”30  Without progression there is no way to test, to 
further refine, initial tendencies.  But there is a concomitant vagueness in the relation of progress 
to reality.  How, Stout asks, is it possible for “primary reality” to be at once, and as experienced, 
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both true and false?31  Not finding a satisfactory answer to this question, Stocks argues that 
Schiller’s view might lead to blindered self-interest trafficking in the illusion of a social theory.32   
In the Philosophical Review the following Spring, Henry Barker’s review initially 
focuses on Schiller’s style.  He hazards an opinion regarding Schiller’s polemic approach to 
pragmatism and humanism:  
Mr. Schiller’s method is largely controversial, and he can hardly be blamed for adopting 
what is, as he says, the natural method for the exponents of a new doctrine to use in 
bringing out the advantages of their doctrine over the old one.  At the same time such a 
method has serious drawbacks; not the least serious of which is, that it leads to an undue 
exaggeration of the novelty of the new doctrine, and a corresponding failure to do justice 
to the real, and perhaps important, truth contained in the old.33  
 
Another potential blind spot in the controversial approach is that it not only downplays past 
theories, but that it also renders contemporary adversaries as if of straw; “Mr. Schiller’s 
‘intellectualist’ seems to me quite as mythical as he would doubtless affirm Mr. Bradley’s 
pragmatist to be.”34  The resulting are salvos launched across the bows of largely unreal 
philosophical frigates.   
But Barker also questions the theoretical implications borne on the lips of controversy.  
For, even if one takes Schiller at his word as regards the pragmatist’s and humanist’s dismissal 
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of metaphysics, one cannot ignore the metaphysical problem that arises from those two fraternal 
camps.  “Nothing, I think, could more clearly indicate Mr. Schiller’s failure to grasp the real 
meaning of the metaphysical problem which his theory of knowledge, like any other, has to 
answer, than the persistence with which he confuses reality with our knowledge of it.”35  For 
there is to Barker a clear distinction between what we know and how we know it, the fusing of 
the two being seemingly more aligned with the Intellectualists that Schiller despises than with 
the methods he espouses.  Given the 1908 date of Barker’s criticism, he might be reading these 
criticisms back into Schiller’s Studies in Humanism.  He might, in fact, be focusing on the latest 
arsenal of arguments by which Schiller, and others, tests Bradley’s views of reality.  
4.2  ‘THE HEIGHT OF THE EMPRESS OF CHINA’: THE CRITICISMS OF 
PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 
In April 1907 Bradley returns to the pages of Mind with the article “On Truth and Copying.”  It 
picks up where Schiller’s challenge for “no more absolutism” left off.  In contrast to several of 
his earlier essays, this one puts forth a fairly concise argument: the act of copying is but an 
abstraction of “one aspect out of the concrete known whole”; “both truth and reality go beyond 
the perceived facts” which are but inferences as to the composition of that whole.”36  So how 
then to reconcile the relation of the true, the factual, and the real?  The answer lies in the 
differences between what we take to be real, the perceived, and what is actually the truth, the 
ideal.   Truth, as perceived, is not reality in that it is rendered defective, inferential, all the while 
                                               
35
 Barker, review, 329. 
 
36
 F. H. Bradley, “On Truth and Copying,” Mind 16, no. 62 (April 1907): 166-7. 
 
  206 
striving to become that which is the ideal form, the real.  Thus the defect lies in what we take as 
factual.  This defect in turn suggests the problem with a pragmatic approach to truth: it constricts 
both the true and the real within the realm of the individual and his satisfaction. But real truth 
must extend beyond the immediate; it must extend to encompass “the Universe and all reality.”37 
While the thesis of this essay is clear cut, his intended reader remains ambiguous.  At first 
glance, this is seemingly directed to James.  In a footnote, Bradley is found to be referencing his 
previous July 1904 article “On Truth and Practice.” And he pleads against the notion that that 
article be taken “as a statement of my view as to the ultimate nature of truth.”38  Then, in a 
section entitled “Note on page 168”—the page where he began discussing those theories which 
“subserve something else [other than ‘the Universe and all reality]”—he begins a four page 
discussion of the “points really or apparently at issue between Prof. James and myself.”39  They 
agree that truth does not consist in “mere practical results”; moreover, “that all truth has practical 
and again aesthetic consequences.”  But they disagree as to the criterion for and range of truth.  
For Bradley, a “truth that makes no difference to truth . . . is therefore not true at all.”40  This 
truth-as-relates-to-truth equation most clearly demonstrates two components of Bradley’s 
philosophy: (1) the push to non-contradiction, and the resulting move toward (2) judgments as to 
truth in the intellectual/theoretical, as opposed to useful/practical realm. 
Then Bradley makes an interesting concession: there is a prejudice that “tends 
everywhere to result in one-sided attempts at consistency.”  Although this would initially appear 
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to be a qualification of his rule of non-contradiction, it works to more clearly divide the 
theoretical and practical.  For he goes on to assert that, “unless ultimate theoretical truth itself 
may be inconsistent, it is better for practice not to identify our working ideas with ultimate 
truth.”41  But the question to be asked, again, is whether or not this is really addressed to James?  
In the pages that follow, Bradley engages in two interesting strategies which seem to suggest that 
he is speaking to James while addressing Schiller.  First, he asks James to clarify key points in 
his previous article [“Humanism and Truth”].  But, second, Bradley suggests that James should 
be aware that he inspired attacks on his behalf.   And it was those attacks—he labels them 
“periodical manifestoes” and “prophetic outcries”42—which brought forth the criticism.    
His critics are waiting to supply criticism in kind.  And the difference in temperaments is 
highlighted in the comments from Knox and James.   Knox notes that Schiller is planning a 
response to Bradley.  But Knox goes on to comment that, as regards the difficulties with 
Bradley’s “correspondence” view of reality, he is sure Schiller will “rub that in.”43  Only a week 
later, and after having received suggestions from Schiller, Knox refers to Bradley as “a lying 
braggart.”44  James’s approach is much less strident, appealing to Schiller to let the whole matter 
alone: 
You ask if what I am going to ‘reply’ to Bradley.  But why need one reply to everything 
and everybody?  B’s article is constructive rather than polemic, is evidently sincere, 
softens much of his old outline, is difficult to read, and ought, I should think, to be left to 
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its own destiny. . . . I confess I think that your goadium certainimis injures your 
influence. . . . I feel absolutely certain of the supercessive power of pragmato-humanism, 
if persuasively enough put forth.  So let poor sick Bradley be, for Heaven’s sake!45 
 
It would seem, in an odd case of transference, that Schiller takes James’s advice . . . and gives it 
to Knox!  For it is Knox who replies to Schiller at the end of the month: “Many thanks for your 
suggestions re Bradley note.  I . . . will probably adopt your suggestions as to softening down the 
actual wording of the note, though it is difficult to conceal one’s opinion of that shifty beggar.”46  
Knox’s reply takes up little more than a paragraph;47 but another is ready to supply a lengthy 
rejoinder to Bradley.  
That interlocutor is John Dewey.  And his July 1907 article, “Reality and the Criterion for 
the Truth of Ideas,” is, at least initially, polite.  It purports to deal with Appearance and Reality 
(1893); but it makes clear references to the recent arguments by Bradley.  Dewey counts Bradley 
as one of preeminent philosophers to have pushed forward the “disintegration of intellectualism 
of the epistemological type, and towards the substitution of a philosophy of experience.”48  But 
once he has brightened philosophy’s room with courtesy, Dewey sets about darkening Bradley’s 
                                               
45
 William James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 19 April 1907, Box One, Folder Seventeen, Educators 
and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. 
The reason for this response is as likely to be James’s continued plea for understanding as it is his focus on another 
matter: the impending June 1907 publication of his Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.  
Though the book is based on Lowell Lectures (at Columbia University) in December 1906 and January 1907, the 
preface was being prepared at the time of James’s April letter to Schiller.  That being said, only three days later 
James is found trying to assuage Bradley as regards his intentions: “Schiller writes me that he is ‘replying’ to you.  
‘Why reply?’ say I, either of us, any more to each other?  The world is wide enough for both types of formulation, 
and they are so difficult to transpose into each other’s key, their terms are so incongruent, that the gain isn’t worth 
the trouble” (Kenna, “I.  Ten,” 324). 
 
46
 Howard Vincentè Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 April 1907, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. 
Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University 
of California, Los Angeles. 
 
47
 Indeed, Knox’s response is little more than a continued (from his April 1905 “Mr. Bradley’s ‘Absolute 
Criterion’”) insistence that Bradley explain where he has been shown to be wrong about the defects in Bradley’s 
theory (Howard Vincentè Knox, “Some Remarks on a Recent Footnote by Mr. Bradley,” Mind 16, no. 63 [July 
1907]: 475-6). 
 
48
 John Dewey, “Reality and the Criterion for the Truth of Ideas,” Mind 16, no. 63 (July 1907): 317. 
 
  209 
doorstep with criticism.  He goes on to ask how it is that this same philosopher can also argue 
that the “philosophical conception of reality must be wholly based on an exclusively intellectual 
criterion.”49  The answer begs for a comparison.  Bradley is to Dewey what Lotze was to 
Schiller.  He exists as a midway point more negatively called “uncritical pragmatism,”50 but here 
described thus: 
Mr. Bradley’s Absolute Experience, resting ultimately upon a rationalistic conception of 
the criterion of truth, is a temporary half-way house into which travelers from the 
territory of Kantian epistemology may temporarily turn aside in their journey towards the 
land of a philosophy of every-day experience.51  
 
This leads to all sorts of problems in the hostel (world) of Bradley.  The first of which is the 
necessity of contradiction in forming a wedge between appearance and reality.  But to create this 
chasm, Bradley must necessarily admit that our knowledge of reality is rife with contradictions.52  
So what then is to judge the appearance from the reality if the former is defective?  It is an 
Intellect, divorced from theory and out of reach of practice; “the unquestioned assumption of Mr. 
Bradley is that thinking is such a wholly separate activity (the ‘intellect alone’ which has become 
satisfied), that to say it has autonomy is that that it, and its criterion, have nothing to do with 
other activities.”53   
This isolation also accounts for another problem.  Bradley’s theory cannot conceive of an 
ultimate criterion of use (what Dewey calls “operation”) that is really relative and instrumental.  
Here he raises a suggestion voiced earlier by Schiller: “it may be that the contradictions which, 
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according to Mr. Bradley, inhere in thought, do not belong to its proper character . . . but are 
found because it has been looked at wrongly.”54  Which is to suggest that what Bradley has 
called merely practical may turn out to be more theoretically robust than what he offers.  But 
what if we turn to the matter of consistency, to that which is premised as making reality distinct 
from appearance?  Here again, Dewey finds Bradley at a loss.  For practical activity is often 
predicated upon “removing the undesirably inconsistent, and in securing fulfillment.”55  So it 
would seem to align with Bradley’s reality rather than his appearance.    But what if the 
“practical man,” for his part, decides to deny any eternal notion of self-consistency?  What effect 
would that have in him resolving his problem?  Dewey’s humorous response is, in part, this: “I 
fail to see what difference this doubtless wholly amiable trait of reality has to do with what I am 
here and now concerned with.  You might as well quote any other irrelevant fact, such as the 
height of the Empress of China.”56  Dewey ends by suggesting that application is the key to 
understanding truth.  Because truth is seen in “those ideas which are actively employed in the 
mastery of new fields, in the organization of new materials.  This is the essential difference 
between truth and dogma; between the living and the dead and the decaying.”57  But recall that 
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Bradley’s is a half-way house, a stopping point, between the two.  Not fully at home in either, it 
serves none of its wards well. 
In the very same issue as Dewey, Schiller chooses to discuss “Mr. Bradley’s Theory of 
Truth.”  He writes of what a “philosophic Rip Van Winkle” might make of Bradley’s last article: 
He would find that all the positions taken up in Prof. James’s Will to Believe, which were 
almost universally execrated in 1897, were almost universally conceded in 1907. . . . He 
might interpret many passages therein as meaning that Mr. Bradley was only waiting for 
Prof. James to give him a little encouragement and to disavow his disreputable entourage 
in order to capitulate gracefully and to declare that he himself had been a pragmatist, and 
even a humanist, all of his life, and had only dissembled his affection for those modes of 
thinking from deference to the sacred memory of Hegel.58 
 
As a member of said entourage, Schiller feels it best to make sense of this generous offering 
from Bradley, “to distinguish between appearance and reality.”59 
What follows is a cross-referencing cavalcade of contempt.60  First, Schiller notes that 
Bradley “treats with scorn” the idea that truth copies reality, but grants ways in which truth 
might be said to correspond with it if taken “from a lower point of view.”61  Schiller argues, 
however, that this concession is largely moot, as “the only ‘copying’ or ‘corresponding’ objected 
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to is that in which one of the terms claims to transcend human experience.”62  Second, Bradley 
clarifies his view of the Absolute as neither “philosophic God” or “all-absorbing, all-paralyzing 
metaphysical monster,” but rather “the perfectly harmless conception of a ‘totality of fine 
mind.’”63   But the process is still not finished.  Schiller is wont to suggest that even if it is now a 
lower-case absolute, relegated as phrased to “finite” existence, there is a unity “still presupposed 
as pre-existent.”64  Third, he rejects naïve or intuitive realism “for the reason that it breaks down 
over the existence of Error.”65  On account of this admitted breakdown, Schiller remains silent.  
Fourth, Bradley puts forth what to Schiller is a truism amounting to “whatever ‘is irrelevant to 
and interferes with the process of truthseeking’ must be suppressed.”66   From a humanist 
perspective, it is more a question of if such things are always irrelevant or, more still, what 
would occur if ever “truth-seeking is forwarded by them.”67 Finally, he once again reasserts that 
in the end truth has “practical and aesthetic consequences” and might be deemed in some sense 
true by working.68  To which Schiller replies that these arguments are only “grudgingly” 
concluded and not “admitted emphatically at the outset.”69 
It seems that, for every qualification offered, Schiller finds a further qualification.  
What’s more, Schiller notes that Bradley, when read against Bradley, commits himself to as 
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many frank admissions still against pragmatism.  He still suggests that pragmatists view truth as 
an “external means” in violation of the eternal, never clarifying what exactly external means; 
alternately, Bradley suggests that they claim that truth, and knowledge, and reality are “external 
to the one real end.”70  Both issues suggest, at least to Schiller, Bradley’s continued need to force 
into dichotomies things properly explained in relation to each other and then, as need suits, 
“claim the right of reducing them to each other.”71  More seriously, Bradley fails to entertain any 
notion of verification, any notion of which severely undercuts: (1) referencing pragmatism’s 
merely practical test, and (2) expanding it beyond proportion into a metaphysic only to burst its 
purported hubris.72  All of which lead Schiller to conclude that, for all his concession, Bradley 
still hovers in the airy realm of the Absolute.  This makes it far less shocking when Bradley 
retreats back into a depersonalized space where absolute (meaning, abstract) truth corresponds 
with reality.73   But it in no way explains how all of this is reconciled with Bradley’s concessions 
to a world below abstract (meaning, absolute) truth, how those ideas that work and are useful  are 
related to an ideal which “manifestly transcends our experience.”74  To brush such problems 
aside as a “difficulty” is not enough.  And, for this member of James’s entourage, it only lessens 
his will to believe in Bradley’s truth.75 
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James had not been standing idly by.  While Dewey and Schiller were busy tackling 
Bradley, James too had been attempting to shore up the cause against renewed attack.  Beginning 
in March and continuing through August 1907, James engages in a quarrel with James Bissett 
Pratt in the Journal of Philosophy regarding the pragmatist conception of truth; specifically, 
regarding the notion of verification. 76   James also releases Pragmatism: A New Name for Some 
Old Ways of Thinking in June 1907. The book is based on a series of lectures that James 
delivered at the end of 1906 at the Lowell Institute in Boston and start of 1907 at Columbia 
University in New York.  James sets it up as a defense of the “tough-minded” pragmatist way of 
thinking as against the “tender-minded” thinking ascribed to rationalistic systems.  This 
confrontational arch allows James easy, and largely generous, references to Schiller.  He treats 
the desire to “spank” Schiller as a suggestion of the divide between the pragmatic and 
rationalistic tempers of mind, of the desire for a world of experience as against the retreat into 
abstractions.77  He also comes to Schiller’s defense, explaining that Schiller’s call for a world 
that is “plastic” is in accord with the pragmatic, as against rationalistic view, that reality “is still 
in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future.”78  
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The year to this point has seen a flurry of activity.  Several debates with eager opponents 
and the release of two books meant to spur on the cause.  The resulting mood is initially one of 
optimism for both James and Schiller.  James champions the two line approach—the one first 
posited by Schiller years earlier—commenting: “I’m glad you relish my book so well.  You go 
on playing the Boreas [the Greek wind god who brought the cold north air], I shedding the 
sunbeams, and between us we’ll get the cloak of the philosophic traveler! . . . All our positions, 
real time, a growing world, asserted magisterially, and the beast of intellectualism killed 
absolutely dead!”79  But, as of October, in response to the negative reviews Schiller Studies has 
received, James is less sanguine.  “I think, Schiller, that such reviews, of which you can’t 
complain on the score of manners, show the advantage of more conciliatory tactics.  They are 
absolutely uninstructive, and add to the confusion lamentably, but would justify themselves, if 
asked to, by alleging the need of castigating your swagger and ‘side.’”80    
                                                                                                                                                       
misunderstanding, at least, let me say that there is no logical connexion between pragmatism, as I understand it, and 
a doctrine which I have recently set forth as ‘radical empiricism.’  The latter stands on its own feet.  One may 
entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist” (James, Pragmatism, ix).  Even then, it is a mild rebuke amongst otherwise 
supportive (even protective) discussions of Schiller. 
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And, as 1908 draws closer, the tough-minded James is treated to a dose of the tonic 
offered to Schiller. The first reviews of James’s Pragmatism are out in the periodic literature.  
They are a mixed lot.  Schiller tempers the blows by leading the way.  While quibbling with 
specific points, he nonetheless confesses that “the readers of Mind will hardly expect from the 
present reviewer anything else than whole-hearted appreciation of one who is avowedly his 
leader.”81  In November, Charles Montague Bakewell (1867-1957), former student at Harvard 
and then professor of philosophy at Yale, is less appreciative.  He questions the value, indeed 
consistency, of the pragmatic method.  And he lobs at James a criticism James had placed upon 
Schiller: “I think it lacks body.  It needs the support of some more systematic philosophy than 
that which is here but roughly sketched.”82  In January 1908, McTaggart criticizes James’s 
writing, suggesting that “though always picturesque, [it] is far from lucid.”  Then, after asserting 
that James holds that Truth “is a quality of nothing but beliefs”—while ignoring wholesale the 
issue of verification which had been emphasized as recently as his 1907 debate with Pratt—he 
accuses James of asserting his conclusions without meeting the arguments of the other side.83  In 
the same month, J. R. Angell initially offers a respite from the criticism.  As a former student of 
James, recent past president of the American Psychological Association, and then professor of 
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psychology at the University of Chicago, Angell is clearly conversant with the gradations of 
pragmatism.  He notes that one is hard pressed to find a recent “intellectual movement which has 
so stimulated the philosophic blood in the veins of English and American philosophers.”  But, 
like Bakewell, Angell questions the youthful insistence of this new philosophy.  He hopes that, 
with time, it will give up those traits—“impatience, precipitancy, and a certain raw enthusiasm—
which dash its “good sense” against the frustrations of theoretical “paradox.”84  
Nor do the general commentaries provide cause for celebration.  Also in early 1908, 
Arthur Lovejoy (1873-1962) publishes an article which purports “to discriminate all the more 
important doctrines going under the name pragmatism which can be shown to be not only 
distinct, but also logically independent inter se.”85   Of these, ten through thirteen are relevant to 
this discussion:86 
 (10) That ‘axioms are postulates’ as valid as any human judgment can ever be, 
resulting in the (a) negative judgment that no truth is necessary, and (b) positive 
judgment that our presuppositions are true to the extent that we use them towards 
future ends;  
(11) That “axioms are necessities” by which voluntary choice is fixed;  
(12)  The “equal legitimacy of postulates” both (a) physical and (b) psychical; and 
(13) That objects are what we propose them to be. 
 
Lovejoy places these within two thematic schemes: ten through twelve are “pragmatist theories 
of knowledge” whereas thirteen represents “the pragmatist theory of meaning.”87   
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He cautions that thirteen—a variation of the argument that “something cannot be lost 
unless a person perceives of something which must be found”—blurs the lines between truth and 
reality.88  Lovejoy suggests that some of Schiller’s writing run the risk of this interpretation.  But 
he sees more value in the other view attributable to Schiller, ten, and suggests that it has “real 
epistemological bearing.”  Then, in a rare instance of privileging Schiller over James, Lovejoy 
adds that ten is more “thoroughgoing” than the view, eleven, he attributes to James.89  And 
Lovejoy also offers both men some advice.  Twelve, which can be seen as a blending of 
Schiller’s and James’s views in ten and eleven, might provide the best form by which 
pragmatism can advance:  
In its more cautious and critical forms, the argument from the practical inevitableness of 
certain scientific to the legitimacy of certain ethico-religious postulates must be regarded 
as a distinct type of pragmatist epistemology, and perhaps the one which—if pragmatism 
out to have practical bearing—best deserves the name. 90 
 
In light of his criticism, Lovejoy’s parting argument is that what pragmatism needs most is 
“clarification of its formulas and a discrimination of certain sound and important ideas.”91  In the 
continuing battle to gain ground, outsiders still look in and, from far different and conflicting 
perspectives, offer criticisms dressed as advice.  James now knows what it feels like to be treated 
like Schiller.  
In 1906, James needed Dewey and Papini to see the light.  But Schiller’s example fires 
James’s ire at the start of 1908.  James takes the advice as no complimentary call for mere 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
88
 Lovejoy, “The Thirteen,” 36. 
 
89
 Lovejoy, “The Thirteen,” 34-5. 
 
90
 Lovejoy, “The Thirteen,” 36. 
 
91
 Lovejoy, “The Thirteen,” 38-9. 
 
  219 
clarification.  On 17 January, he exclaims: “I find myself at last growing impatient with the 
critics of ‘Pragm’, and beginning to share your temper towards the reigning Oxford influences.” 
He then gets specific, “McT., e.g. in this months Mind means to be perfectly annihilating, but 
some of his interpretations wd. be discreditable to my terrier dog.  Ditto Lovejoy in the J. of P.  
I’m getting tired of being treated as 1/2 idiot, 1/2 scoundrel . . .”92  James seems possessed by the 
polemic spirit of Schiller, whereas only months previous he was waffling between endorsing 
“conciliatory” practices and suggesting the merits of a two-pronged approach.  He continues in a 
letter a week later: “I agree with you in full that our enemies of the absolutist school deserve 
neither respect nor mercy.  Their stupidity is only equaled by their dishonesty.” 93   If the call is 
for more argument, James is clear as to how he will conduct it.  “Don’t think, my dear Schiller, 
that I don’t see as if in a blaze of light, the all embracing scope of your humanism, and how it 
sucks my pragmatism up into itself.  I doubt I shall trouble myself to write anything more about 
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pragmm.  If anything more about truth, it will be on the wider humanistic lines.”94  But it is a 
narrower view of James’s work which will occupy Schiller’s pen. 
In April 1908, James sails for Europe to deliver a series of eight Hibbert Lectures at 
Manchester College, Oxford, in the following month (these lectures will be published in 1909 as 
A Pluralistic Universe).  At the same time, Bradley publishes two essays in the same issue of 
Mind.  In the first, “On Memory and Judgment,” he wants to “throw light on the ultimate value 
of memory as a test of truth.”95  A central feature of this complex essay is the relation of memory 
to doubt, and doubt as it relates to judgment; phrased simply, memory must be taken as 
secondary in making judgments lest he who judges should lapse into doubt.  Bradley’s thinking 
on this issue becomes clear when he applies this thesis to the nature of “memory-judgments.”   
These still operate as present judgment, though of past judgments in memory, and remain 
independent of the influence of memory.96  To be clear, Bradley is not here asserting that a 
present judgment is infallible.  It should be followed up, and modified, by subsequent judgments.  
Until that point, however, it is treated as infallible.  Doubt in judgment can only be involved in 
instances where that doubt belongs to the process of a judgment of “some wider ideal whole.”97  
For a whole judgment must maintain its independence, its character as “an ideal determination of 
reality.”98   This ideal feature of true judgments relates to Bradley’s continued insistence on the 
divide between the practical and the theoretical.    While practical judgments are subject to 
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transient psychical complexities, the theoretical are not.  A true judgment, as an ideal, “is 
unchanged however much places and times alter.”99    
Bradley begins his second article by noting that he has been of late reading the works of 
Messrs. James and Dewey.  In an instance of both appealing for understanding and pleading 
ignorance of what he has written, Bradley then goes on to state: “I may mention here that Dr. 
Schiller’s unceasing manifestoes have for some time past failed to attract my attention.  In what 
follows I am concerned therefore solely with Profs. Dewey and James.”100  As regards latter, 
Bradley asserts “that Prof. James’s Pragmatism is essentially ambiguous, and that he throughout 
is unconsciously led to take advantage of its ambiguity.  It can at discretion be preached as a new 
Gospel which is to bring light into the world, or recommended as that old teaching of common 
sense which few but fools have rejected.”101  In response to criticism, James cannot offer 
anything “beyond one-sided prejudices, and a blind appeal to theoretical consistency, and an 
uncritical faith in the ultimate reality of some undiscussed Law of Contradiction.”102  Instead of 
these flaccid appeals, Bradley offers this option:  
His alternative, I submit, is to develop his theory of first principles.  Assuredly I am not 
alone in the desire that he would turn his back for a time on sporadic articles and on 
popular lectures, with their incoherence and half-heartedness and more or less plausible 
ambiguities, and would work in the way in which a man who seriously aims at a new 
philosophy is condemned to work, and with a result which I at least feel sure would repay 
his honor.103 
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Like Bakewell and Lovejoy before him, Bradley has provided James with a bit of his own 
advice. 
As regards Dewey, he is no less opinionated.  Dewey may focus on the practical over the 
theoretical, insist that “theory is only an instrument.”  But he “has no right to teach that 
something is only a means, unless one is prepared to state the end to which it conduces and by 
which it is measured.”104  Against this, Bradley posits that “theory implies a theoretical want and 
its satisfaction” and, absent this, Dewey’s “entire argument from origin appears to me to be 
worthless.”105  Bradley can agree with a judgment being true based on its results, but note where 
those results are placed: “the truth of an idea is inseparable from its theoretical results.”106  Here 
again, then, arises Bradley’s distinction of the practical from the theoretical, or more recently, the 
psychical from the true.  For though there is a “general tendency” to regard the true idea as “the 
idea which works best even externally,” one cannot as a result “arrive at the ultimate knowledge 
of the main tendency of things.”107  Is it any wonder then that Bradley should end by placing his 
burdens upon Dewey: “Pragmatism is true, if at all, because it can successfully deal with all 
ultimate issues.”108  Or is there anything more to the fact of a footnote, referencing James though 
in the discussion mainly of Dewey, which states: “This point [the distinction between the actual 
and the possible or future] has been dealt with by me many years ago.  I have ventured to remark 
that the uncritical identification of the real and the possible is a leading characteristic of English 
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empiricism.  I would now venture in addition to invite the attention of Prof. James to this 
point.”109 
James, true to his word, is done dealing with Bradley in the pages of journals.  But 
Schiller is more than willing to take up these two articles in the July 1908 Mind.  And he finds it 
odd that Bradley should hold forth on pragmatism, yet hold back in directly addressing him.  
Noting that his credentials suggest his relevance, he nonetheless agrees that “in philosophy, as 
elsewhere, personalities do not always harmonize.  Prof. James seems to find discussion with Mr. 
Bradley as little to his taste as Mr. Bradley does discussion with him.”110  Further, Schiller takes 
Bradley on his word that “he has long ceased reading anything I write—ever since 1902, judging 
from the internal evidence,” documenting at least nine charges that Bradley has never directly 
answered.111  Be that as it may, Schiller delights in the exclusion.  For he can, in a seeming 
reference to the “Useless Knowledge” essay of years past, now “think of Mr. Bradley as an 
influence like Plato or Aristotle, no longer subject to human frailty and impassive to mere human 
criticism.  One can write so much more freely.”112 
Schiller begins by asking three question about Bradley: (1) has he always been a 
pragmatist, (2) is he now a pragmatist, or (3) is he becoming a pragmatist?  The first can be 
dropped without comment, as the decade of discussion suggests it to be false.  The second 
question stands about the same.  But, as regards the third, there are conflicting reports within the 
selfsame document, “Memory and Judgment.”  As Schiller notes: 
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For in controversy writers often say both more and less than they mean.  Nor is it a 
serious objection to this course that Mr. Bradley has taken pain to assure us was written 
four or five years ago (p. 153 n.).  If so, it must have been composed just about the same 
time as his famous caricature of humanism [“On Truth and Practice”] in N.S. No., 51, in 
which he professed to be quite unable to see the point of the new doctrines.  It is 
significant, therefore, that he should have withheld it from publication then, and doubly 
so that he should propound it now.113 
 
What do its contents reveal?  In support of his fledgling pragmatism, Bradley now: (1) discusses 
psychological and psychical issues germane to both pragmatism and humanism, (2) further 
distances himself from the abstraction of the Absolute, (3) admits of interest as it relates to 
judgment, and (4) even suggests that satisfaction is of some relation to truth.114  In refutation of 
the new Bradley, though, are several other items.  While he does downplay the Absolute in 
practice, “the absoluteness of Truth is maintained in all its theoretic rigor.”115   
 But it a shadow of its former self, reduced to the moment of judgment.  If this is all that 
remains of Bradley’s theoretic realm, “the infallibility becomes irresistibly comic, when it is 
such a little one, so overweighted with its name, so ludicrously ephemeral.”116  And note what 
actually happens when one carries out Bradley’s argument.  First, a statement is treated as true.  
But, second, that truth is then treated by Bradley to the test of reflection upon its satisfaction.  
This places Bradley in a bind.  “If this be taken strictly, it identifies ‘truth’ with validity.  For it 
implies that there is no ‘truth’ until there has been ‘reflection.’”117  The truth of the statement (1) 
is abstracted from any actual context, whereas the test (2) is treated as grounded in experience.  
So where would that leave one tempted by a Bradleian state of mind?  Forever doubting.  If it is 
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recalled that Bradley took memory to work “generally” in experience, that leads towards the 
second interpretation of truth.  But if one seeks ultimate truth, memory fails us in that it cannot 
lead to that which is infallible.  This suggests to Schiller “that the skeptical ‘moment’ in Mr. 
Bradley had been gaining at the expense of the absolutistic, and prepares his readers for the 
astounding licence of his ‘practical’ creed.”118 
Schiller next turns to Bradley’s arguments as to why pragmatism is ambiguous.  He finds 
Bradley in a cautious yet boastful mood, “careful as ever to avoid contesting the primary 
affirmations of Pragmatism, and eager as ever to content that if there is any truth in Pragmatism, 
he has said it all years ago.”119  Schiller notes that many of Bradley’s current comments are, at 
worst, irrelevant, and, at best, suggestive of continued misunderstanding.  The former are best 
seen in light of Bradley’s curiosity as to the relation of pragmatism to ethics and aesthetics.  
Schiller answers simply: there is none; “the mystery is to understand why any one should think 
that the adoption of a pragmatic theory of knowledge should alter his tastes and affect any man’s 
enjoyment of aesthetic and ethical values.”120  The latter are more varied, though the difference 
between his and the pragmatic use of theory is telling.  Bradley’s interpretation suggests 
abstraction, “a belief in a purely theoretic, independent and useless knowledge, which is 
conceived to be ‘higher’ than the useful variety, and can be easily made to glide over into an 
assertion of a transcendent truth.”121  Set against this is a pragmatic definition of theory as 
psychical and biological, the act of knowing as it applies to interests of the knower.   
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The problem that arises for Bradley is trying to move the pragmatic into accord with the 
abstraction.  “Mr. Bradley seems to think that even though the cognitive functions must be 
admitted to have arisen out of practical necessities, they may yet have become ‘independent’.  
How, he never explains, and nothing would conduce more to making intellectualism intelligible 
that that some one should undertake to fill up this gap.”122  But the irrelevant and the 
misconceived are both indicative of Bradley’s problem in changing his stripes: 
Mr. Bradley, after a long course of privateering under the Absolute’s Flag, at last hoists 
the Jolly Roger, and avows himself a sceptic.  The ‘theoretic truth’ which is unattainable 
by man is retained simply and solely in order to discredit theoretically the ‘practical 
creed’ men are forced to live by.  And as it is assumed that the latter is hopelessly 
inconsistent, we are further told it does not matter how blatantly contradictory are the 
ideas we choose to live by.  Any old nonsense will do—with a sardonic sneer at religion.  
Thus the doctrine is not only (1) skeptical but also (2) intellectually demoralizing.123 
 
So Bradley is isolated, stuck in a bind of his own making.  In junking the Absolute, he none the 
less needs its abstractions to posit a truth.  In grasping at pragmatism, he can manage the mere 
practices of those consigned to appearance.  But, in moving to scepticism, there is not, and need 
not be, any appearance of resolution.124   
One senses, at this juncture, that Schiller is moving forward with the tactics he first 
endorsed in 1903 and expanded upon in 1906.  Having gained James’s agreement on the 
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overarching term humanism, Schiller moves on to expand its range while challenging 
pragmatism’s critics. And now, with even James’s acknowledging that Schiller’s tactics have 
their place, Schiller is ready to redouble his efforts on both counts.  But one also senses James’s 
retreat to the background with Knox’s energetic and indulgent emergence as the young supporter 
to the older Schiller.  James continues to offers conflicting advice.  But his notable increase in 
frustration suggests he is tiring of the “academic” battle and the tactics of “sunbeams” and 
“lightning.”  Knox, over twenty years Schiller’s junior, has both a positive and negative effect on 
Schiller.  On the one hand, Knox urges him to push through the project while continuing to 
amplify its merits.  On the other, this endorsement plays into some of Schiller’s worst habits of 
exposition.  In the end, however, it is the specter of loss that casts its pale over Schiller’s latest 
attempts to gain his way. 
4.3 CONJURING UP PROTAGORAS, SETTING UPON BRADLEY: THE 
HISTORICAL RANGE OF HUMANISM 
On the heels of his recent engagement with Bradley, Schiller chooses to amplify the range of 
humanism by returning to the exemplar he had been discussing as early as 1902, Protagoras.125  
And, in a variation on recent squabbles, the players are historical even as the implications are 
clearly contemporary.  On 15 March 1907 Schiller delivers a lecture to the Oxford Philological 
Society.  An expanded version of this lecture, entitled Plato or Protagoras?, is then published in 
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pamphlet form in early 1908.  The work reads as an example of textual criticism.  But there, 
lurking in his explication of what the time-honored Theaetetus actually suggests, we catch a 
glimpse into the reasons James’s felt as recently as 1907 that this exemplar was well-suited to be 
flung into the faces of their critics.126   And we also see to what a large extent this archetype is 
meant only to serve as Schiller in the guise of antiquity.  In laying bear Protagoras, Schiller 
comes to suggest more about himself. 
The preface to this work is an interesting example of Schiller asserting one thing and 
arguing another.  He suggests that the essay poses a primarily “literary question” though it seeks 
to develop “some interesting and novel issues of both a literary and of a philosophic 
character.”127  Next, Schiller makes what seems to be a rather straightforward statement of thesis, 
though he again shifts back to the philosophical import of the discussion: 
For the philosophical significance of the Theaetetus has been very strangely 
misconstrued.  It contains no tenable account of knowledge.  It contains no refutation of 
Humanism.  It refutes nothing but an extreme, and probably exaggerated or 
misapprehended, form of sensationalism.  Nothing of all this has, apparently, been 
perceived.128  
 
He uses these statements, placing Protagoras in the seat of humanism, to then level an accusation 
at Theoretic Reason placed in the guise of Plato.  What’s more, he makes an interesting 
qualification so as to indulge a rather large generalization: “Whether or not, therefore, it is 
possible to exhume from it the lost teachings of Protagoras, it is clear that in the study of Plato’s 
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great dialogues, and particularly in the Theaetetus, lies the master key to the understanding of the 
whole intellectualist position in philosophy.”129  The work is, thus, literary and philosophical.  It 
is a trusted account of Plato but only an incomplete picture of Protagoras in the mouth of 
Socrates.  It offers, in short, a literary salvo against a philosophic position, taking the former as 
an Idealist and the latter as humanism’s touchstone. 
 Schiller sees fifth century Greece as a hotbed of philosophical discoveries and as the site 
of the first sustained clash between the intellectualist and humanist traditions.  The first group 
represents “a learned caste whose academic spirit is always largely occupied with ritual 
observances for giving his due (and not infrequently a good deal more) to the Demon of 
Pedantry”; the second group reacts against this trend in realizing “that he is the Spectator of all, 
that the whole world’s infinite complexity exists in relation to him.”130  But what is known of 
second is largely diffused through the warping lens of the first.  The Protagoras and Socrates we 
get are the ones that Plato intends.  But Schiller’s treatment of Plato seems equally intentional.  
He dismisses the “conventional view” that the Protagoras Speech is a wholly fabricated exercise 
meant to either (1) “represent current developments of Protagoreanism made by his disciples” or 
(2) “to embody his own reflections on the problem of putting a reasonable interpretation on an 
obscure dictum.”131   
In their place, Schiller puts forth an alternative: “It credits Plato with an honest desire to 
state his opponent’s case and assumes merely that he has not fully grasped an alien point of view 
for the appreciation of which his whole type of mind unfitted him, and which even so he has 
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grasped much better than the generality of intellectualists have done down to the present day.”132  
Reference to the preface is here again essential.  The alternative once again pushes beyond the 
dialogues proper to jab at current forms of intellectualism.  But more telling is the extent to 
which Schiller is willing to suggest a revision to his initial qualification.  Here, Plato is taken to 
have an accurate understanding of Protagoras’s works, advancing by his refutation both the 
merits of humanism and the problems of intellectualist interpretation thereupon.  The literary 
device of begging the question, of the extent to which we can trust our knowledge of Protagoras 
based on Plato, even the further suggestion that our understanding of him is subject to the “one-
sided” uses of Plato, is put to the side . . . all in the space of only five pages.  Reframed as such, 
Schiller concludes that the Protagoras Speech provides a surprising novelty: an accurate defense 
of Protagoras’s teachings found in the misinterpretation of them voiced by Socrates.  Further, it 
contains “the solution of the problem with which Plato wrestles vainly in the same dialogue, that 
of Truth and Error.”133  
Schiller suggests the conventional interpretation is flawed on at least two counts.  It is 
flawed in that it creates for Protagoras followers he didn’t have.  It also distorts the historical 
timeline so as to obscure an important fact: as Aristotle would come to contend with his master 
Plato, so too would Plato have had to grapple with the contentions of Socrates.134  Schiller then 
sets about explaining how we should take Plato’s gift of “genuine Protagoreanism.”  Here, again, 
Schiller makes do with a bit of his view of philosophy, as rashly interpreted by critics, so as to 
make quick work of objections to Protagoras’s “Homo Measura dictum”: “it is not an 
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irresponsible freak of subjectivism.”135  And why not?  Because the subjective is, by nature, a 
reflective process of working through a problem, whereas “objectivisms and optimisms always 
are initially unreflective, and frequently remain so to the end.”136  But this seems to be an extra-
textual interpretation and one relying heavily on an argument from opposites.  And it provides a 
rather rough transition into Schiller’s next point: that the subjective nature extant in Protagoras’s 
dictum proves that the arguments provided in the Protagoras Speech by Plato are, in fact, those 
Protagoras offered in support of his dictum.  How?   First, to Schiller it is impossible that Plato, a 
student of Socrates, would have had no training in the arguments of Protagoras.  Second, it 
would make no sense for Plato, so knowing, not to advance the real arguments in support of the 
dictum.  Third, if Plato had chosen to breach decorum and create sham arguments, he would not 
have advanced counter arguments in the guise of Socrates that so utterly fail to respond to 
Protagoras.137  
All of this rests, again, on a rather shifty interpretation of Plato’s aims.  The logic of the 
argument is stated thus: 
If, therefore, there can be found in the Speech arguments which the Theaetetus does not 
refute, we may be sure that they were not of Plato’s invention.  And if Plato thinks he has 
refuted them and it can be shown that he is wrong, this confidence will be strengthened; 
there will remain no reasonable doubt but that he has tried in his Speech to represent a 
real opponent’s views, that he has failed to understand him, and therefore failed to 
dispose of him, as he supposes.138 
 
Consider that the conventional view is flawed in that it assumes a bogus, or at least non-
authoritative, version of Protagoreanism.  But here the alternative utilizes an argument against it 
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that suggests the conventional view fails because it is unconvincingly bogus.  Plato, like a 
Bradley of antiquity, can neither advance nor retreat once set upon by Schiller. All three parts of 
the speech—166A-C, 166D-167D, 167D-168B—confirm for Schiller his assumptions: “The 
anti-intellectualism, the emphasis on the practical side, the defence of pay for intellectual work . . 
. these are all characteristics we might expect to find in the veteran teacher whose mission it was 
to guide the education of a democratic age.”139  More basically, they confirm for Schiller that a 
formal claim of truth is in reality simply one proving itself to be more valuable.  But isn’t this 
then moving beyond Protagoras to again advance Schiller’s argument?  Admittedly, yes.  
Schiller notes that Protagoras only calls that which is more valuable “better,” not “truer.”   And 
he brushes aside this point by suggesting that Protagoras “did not yet perceive that all ‘truths’ are 
‘values’” and, besides, “the difference between Protagorean and modern Humanism concerns 
only a subordinate point of terminology.”140 
 What, then, does Plato make of Protagoras’s distinctions?  Schiller is terse: nothing.  
Instead of respecting the arguments which he gives (back) to Protagoras, Plato uses a “master-
stroke of dialectical manipulation” when he suggests he will only discuss the dictum and not the 
arguments made in support of it.141  When attempting to voice through Socrates (in 171E-172C) 
an argument against Protagoras, Plato allows Socrates to misinterpret the argument that was so 
recently advanced by Socrates as being Protagorean.142  But these are, to Schiller, points of 
philosophic not literary import, points which lead him to again qualify the extent to which he 
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either (1) trusts Plato or (2) necessarily needs Protagoras.  For all of this raises support, prior to 
the fact, for a Humanist interpretation of truth.    As he goes on: 
Whether Protagoras would have replied in this way [that the pragmatic testing of truth is 
by its consequences] if the point had been brought to his notice, we are not, of course, in 
a position to say; but enough has probably been said to show that if we read the 
Theaetetus critically and do not credulously swallow every claim that Plato closes to 
make without verifying it, there can be no question of a refutation of the argument of the 
Protagoras Speech by the subsequent criticism.143 
 
Here Schiller places himself in the position of agreeing with Plato only to the extent that the 
alternative view makes sense.  And to do so he must then return to the issues of Truth and Error.  
But Plato is then found to be placing upon Protagoras conditions which he cannot himself meet.  
“Whether or not Protagoras had really denied the possibility of Error, Plato’s theory of 
knowledge must irremediably collapse, if it cannot account for the existence of Error.”144  The 
next move Schiller makes is also strategically important.  He moves beyond Protagoras so as to 
argue against Plato himself.  Because Plato views error as an objective quality, he cannot 
conceive of a philosophy in which one can truly know error because an object is either true or it 
is false.145   
Against Plato, Schiller argues that Error is actually: (1) not an abstraction, but a condition 
relative to purpose, and (2) derives not from an objective state, but from a psychological aim.146  
More simply, that which claims towards truth falls into error when in consequence it does not 
achieve the desired result.  It is “only a mind so thoroughly corrupted with dialectic and corroded 
with skepticism [which] will base on its existence a charge that to recognize these facts is to 
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abolish the conception of Truth.”147  By argument’s end it seems that we have moved beyond 
even Plato and are now advancing against Bradley.  The argument is an Encomium to Protagoras 
and the spirit which Schiller finds in his dictum.  But it is as much a deliberative exercise in 
taking down a notch those in whose company Schiller sees the vestiges of Plato being 
contemporaneously kept.148 
Others hold suspicions of a different sort.  In a July 1908 review of Schiller’s pamphlet in 
Mind, Greek scholar John Burnet (1863-1928) is as succinct with his assessment as Schiller is 
creative with his interpretation: “this seems to me to show that he did not fully understand it.”149  
Burnet suggests that Schiller confuses the literary form of the dialogue with his own demand that 
it provide philosophical refutation.  Second, Schiller can’t get his facts straight or conveniently 
misuses them to make his case for Protagoras’s persecution.  “Schiller becomes pathetic over this 
instance of successful persecution, but the story is in a high degree of doubt.”150  Third, Schiller 
ignores extant information which suggests the key items supposed to be lacking—actual texts of 
Protagoras—were in fact available at the time when Plato wrote the dialogue. Most tellingly for 
Burnet, Schiller’s insistence on picking an intellectualist target is off the mark.  “If we ask why 
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Plato should have written the passage at all, the answer is probably that he thought Protagoras 
really meant something of the kind.  On the face of it, he had merely intended to attack the 
mathematical and astronomical science of his day.”151  Here, then, Schiller seems lacking in a 
clear sense of what “humanism” meant then even if he is willing to suggest what it means now.  
Burnet posits that it was the Humanists of Plato’s time who were flatlanders, and that Plato may 
have more readily agreed with Protagoras in revolt against, not support, of them.  In that sense, 
Burnet concludes, it “may be that Plato himself was more of a ‘humanist’ than Mr. Schiller 
seems to suppose.”152   
Schiller’s reply in the next issue of Mind begins by highlighting the most positive thing 
Burnet had to say about his argument—that there is no refutation of the Protagoras Speech 
offered by Plato—as signaling agreement with him “as to the main philosophical contention of 
the pamphlet.”153  His next argument is a continuation of the dodging technique Schiller utilized 
in the pamphlet itself.  He argues that the unsettled nature of Greek history renders any 
judgments of veracity only plausible at best and suggests, contra the Plato scholar, that he will 
continue to prefer his interpretation over Burnet’s. 
Schiller then moves on to address the substance of Burnet’s criticism.  Noting Burnet’s 
insistence that the persecution story of Protagoras is now roundly doubted, Schiller counters that, 
where veracity is in question, one good fiction can counter another.  Specifically, the historical 
record provides arguments for the persecution and subsequent destruction of Protagoras’s texts 
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and also arguments that suggest the work lived on long past its author’s demise.154  That Schiller 
prefers the former while chastising Burnet for utilizing the latter reduces to a mere matter of 
opposites.  He almost admits as much when he defends his preference by stating, “Now, while I 
would not deny the bare possibility of the after-dinner story [a supposed retelling by Eusebius of 
a work by Porphyry referencing Protagoras], and am willing to admit that ‘Diogenes Laertius’ [a 
retelling of Protagoras’s persecution that is also relayed by Sextus Empiricus and Timon of 
Philus] is very uncritical and vastly inferior to more recent histories of philosophy, I cannot but 
think that yarn for yarn his is far more credible and better attested that any of this third-hand stuff 
of Eusebius.”155  He then turns these dueling yarns to another of Burnet’s criticisms, that Schiller 
mistook Plato’s view of the argument of Protagoras.  Schiller argues that, rather than an attack on 
the science of the times, Protagoras’s argument was probably—like those of fellow Sophist cum 
teacher Gorgias—launched as “an annihilating skit upon Eleatic metaphysics.”156  Schiller then 
grants in humor what he won’t in substance.  Even if he were to take Burnet’s argument, derived 
as it is from the questionable work of Eusebius, at face value, it would still end up advancing 
Schiller’s cause.  For Burnet argued that Plato was more in agreement with Protagoras than 
Schiller knew.  If so, Schiller would be inclined to “extract not a little satisfaction for the idea 
that Protagoras also had been among the teachers of Plato.”157 
Schiller next addresses Burnet’s claim that he forced apart for the sake of argument 
persons who were taken as similar in the written history; specifically, that Plato’s rival Isocrates 
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called even Plato a Sophist.  Schiller responds that Burnet “does not mention that curiously 
enough Isocrates is called a pupil of Protagoras, and that therefore the admitted rivalry between 
him and Plato would supply a special motive for Plato’s attack on Protagoras.”158  Moreover, it is 
clear why persons such as Plato and Aristotle would take umbrage at the terms and teachings of 
Sophists.  Sophists sought to upset the Theoretic in favor of the Practical.  As Schiller states:  
They aspired only to be purveyors of a practical education for actual life, which was 
largely concerned with rhetoric, and (like our Oxford ‘Greats’ School) aimed only at a 
gentlemanly acquaintance with fashionable philosophic puzzles that should suffice to 
enable men to give them a wide berth in after life.159  
 
That such a view should be an affront to Plato seems beyond question to Schiller.  That Plato, at 
the same time, should have been slow to grasp the nuances of that education seems no less clear.  
 In tracking out Plato’s developing arguments about and against Protagoras—assuming a 
timeline that is confirmed in the most recent Loeb editions of H. N. Fowler and W. R. M. 
Lamb—Schiller argues that “Plato realized the philosophic importance of Protagoras slowly and 
progressively and comparatively late in life.”160  Schiller goes so far as to assert that in the time 
between writing the Cratylus and the Theaetetus something novel happened.  Absent an extant 
copy of Protagoras’s work, Plato produced a clear caricature in the former.  Chastised by the 
followers of Protagoras, Plato seeks to amend his sketch and answer in substance what the 
previous argument lacked.161  This response to Burnet’s criticisms is a subtle blending of the 
conventional and alternative arguments found in the pamphlet under discussion.  In that 
argument, the conventional was at least partially based on the sham creation of “disciples of 
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Protagoras” whereas the alternative was that Plato gave, through Socrates, voice to “genuine 
Protagoreanism.”  Here “the doctrine survived in the memory of a few friends” to which Plato is 
obliged to respond in a latter work for his negligence in a previous one.162 
Schiller ends his discussion by addressing the conclusion of Burnet.  He consents in spirit 
to Burnet’s “counter-theory,” that Plato came to understand but too late the inability of 
Intellectualism to deal with matters of Error.  He even assents to the idea that such late stage 
Platonic theory has been obscured by subsequent generations of Platonists “because they were 
themselves interpreted in the illusive light of his discarded doctrine.”163  But Schiller cannot, on 
historical grounds he suggests, go all the way in agreeing with Burnet.  In a funny example of a 
respond in kind and not reply, the Plato scholar—who started his review of Schiller by stating 
that Schiller had not understood the argument he examined—needs to provide more evidence to 
Schiller.  Then he might be willing to ask not, which of the two great Greeks is to be preferred, 
but, rather, acquiesce to both being accepted. 
This quibble over interpretations is novel for several reasons.  First, it suggests that 
Schiller is willing to adopt a measure of plasticity in his historical constructions that he seems 
rarely willing to give to opponents in contemporary arguments.  Next, Schiller is found, 
especially in light of the arguments of Burnet, to be applying his pragmatic dictum in a manner 
that is both consistent and shocking.  Consistent in that it allows him to measure the truth of tale 
according to what he finds most useful.  Shocking in that, when faced with compelling counters, 
Schiller chooses to avoid them or merge them into his own arguments.  Against the Platonic 
scholar he can advance no specific detail, provide no clear piece of evidence, so he defers to the 
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position of doubt only to advance an argument of optimism.164  The question is eerily similar to 
one which was raised regarding Bradley: to whom is Schiller speaking?  If pragmatism and 
humanism were component parts in development long before the addition of Protagoras to the 
printed record in 1902, what need this nail in the historical coffin?  It would only be conjecture 
to suggest that Schiller was creating his Hegel or Plato, a match point in a battle that has only 
increased in the number of people taking and settling scores.  The question is answered in his 
continued engagements with Bradley.  But is aided by the James staying true to his word in two 
clear instances. 
The first case occurs in April 1909.  After having returned from Europe, and having again 
delivered the Oxford lectures on 6-30 November 1908 at Harvard, James publishes A Pluralistic 
Universe.   It is a discussion which rarely references Schiller’s humanism.  But it adheres to 
James’s January 1908 promise that if he were to write “anything more about truth, it will be on 
the wider humanistic lines.”165  And those wider lines contain, in strangely hard to find places, a 
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renewed interest in the import of radical empiricism.166  They are adjustments to, if not revisions 
of, James’s comments in Pragmatism where he suggested that pragmatism and radical 
empiricism had “no logical connexion.”167  In “The Thing and Its Relations,” James notes that 
Schiller, among others, has successfully met the challenge of refuting Bradley.168  But this 
comment serves not to then discuss pragmatism.  It is meant to more thoroughly discuss the 
implications of radical empiricism’s theory of knowledge as against Bradley’s “odious” 
“polemic writing.”169  Likewise, “The Experience of Activity” tackles Bradley’s views and 
places pragmatism and radical empiricism closer as a consequence.170  The sum assessment may 
seem meager: four year old essays, collected in a new work, meant to modify ambiguous 
comments in a two year old book.  But it contains less a focus on Schiller and more the 
components within James’s philosophy which mattered to Schiller.  Lest we forget, the lectures 
were delivered at Oxford, and were ushered forth with a suggestion to Oxford. That suggestion?  
From “the seedbed” of Idealism, “ancient English empiricism” may be finding more a robust 
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voice “in a controversy over what is known as pluralism or humanism.”171  Three months later, 
the most eminent of Oxonian gardeners seems even farther afield.   
In July 1909, Bradley begins by asserting “that in the case of facts of perception and 
memory the test which we apply, and which we must apply, is that of system.”  Yet, even with a 
system, “there are no judgments of sense which are in principle infallible.”172  Bradley once 
again emphasizes the potential of memory, and in this case perception, to be faulty as applied to 
judgments.173  But Bradley also suggests a revision to his previous arguments: “that there are 
given facts of perception which are independent and ultimate and above criticism, is not to my 
mind a true conclusion.  On the contrary, such facts are to my mind a vicious abstraction.”174  
The key word here, however, is perception.   What I perceive, though fallible, must be melded 
into a consistent system so as to organize what I call “my world.”  That we may treat it as 
infallible only implies that to do otherwise would entail “the loss of my personal identity.”175    
Yet, again, this seems to be a further distancing from his previous positions positing the 
distinction between appearance and reality.   
Two qualifications, however, suggest the struggle that Bradley is having in amending his 
views to a fallible world view.  First, Bradley responds, in a footnote no less, to the objection that 
what he is presenting is a system which is merely “practical.”  He states that it can only be taken 
as such “if you take ‘practice’ so widely as to remove the distinction between practice and 
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theory.”176  Second, the issue of perception is again important.  For although “all sense-
judgments are fallible . . . our immediate experience is not fallible.”  So we seem to be separated 
by our perceptions from that which we experience.  But “my real personal self which orders my 
world is in truth inseparably one with the Universe.”177  Phrased differently, the world which I 
perceive is defective, thus I strive to make it consistent.  But the Universe of which I am part is 
not defective, and so our striving for consistency suggests our connection to that unity.   
The theory and practice remain apart; but, by all accounts, they have moved much closer.  
Even Knox can’t believe the change: 
Most interesting, too, about F.H.B.  The change of front in this last art. of his quite takes 
one’s breath away; for he has definitely given Infallibility the chuck discourteous.  This is 
so patent that my wife, who lays no claim to technical philosophy, on glancing at the art. 
before I had looked at it myself, said “Why, you might have written this!”  His assertion 
at the end that he is “at bottom” “one thing in substance and in power” with the Absolute 
is too obviously shoved in for the sake of saving his face. . . .178 
 
If those revisions surprise Schiller and Knox, the October follow up is no less amazing.  Bradley 
first suggests that “the criterion of truth, I should say, as of everything else is in the end the 
satisfaction of a want in our desire.”179  This, in itself, is no real modification; it is simply a 
reiteration of the truth of “the general working of ideas” as practical, and as opposed to the 
philosophical end of satisfying “the intellect.”180  But Bradley also admits “that all sides of our 
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nature press for satisfaction, and, if left unsatisfied, will manifest themselves so in idea.”181  
However, in asserting the necessity of satisfaction in idea, Bradley asserts that not all types of 
satisfaction can be described as true.  As the aim of the intellect is truth, it remains within the old 
domain of theory just as working remains aligned with practice.  Thus the struggle for 
consistency and coherence obtain as we get closer to the ideal, what he here calls the “Immanent 
Reality.”  Perceptions, as to experience and reality, remain defective. But “the immanent Reality, 
both harmonious and all-comprehending, demands the union of both its characters in the 
object.”182  This, then, is the goal of a system: to advance by more and more consistent forms of 
judgment so as to come closer and closer to the consistency found in Immanent Reality.    
What comes next is rather striking.  It reads as a personal defense of consistency in the 
face of contradiction.  Initially he lashes out, and the term seems accurate, at those who claim 
qualification as a part of philosophy.  The flavor of this point is contained here: 
And, when you revolt against the conclusion that ‘this’ appears to be a mere unspecified 
universal, when you insist that your object was something other than such illogical 
trifling and child’s play—our answer is obvious.  What are you doing, we ask, here on 
this road?  You were told plainly that on this road what is sought is ideas, and that 
nothing else here is current.  You were warned that, if you enter here, you are committed 
to this principle.  If you did not understand, whose is the fault?183  
 
He goes on to suggest that precision is instead the rule; “for worse or for better the man who 
stands on particular feeling must remain outside of philosophy.”184  Bradley even notes that what 
he offers as philosophy, that his attempts to provide support for an ultimate theoretical principle, 
are defective.  “But to remedy that defect by importing bodily into philosophy the ‘this’ and 
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‘mine,’ as they are felt, to my mind brings destruction on the spot.”185  He can’t, as much as his 
arguments suggest otherwise, discard the belief that theoretic truth must be consistent.  
Philosophy must be unified, not pluralized; alternatives suggest a lower stage admitting of a 
higher resolution.  But he wavers, noting that this view “may be called an attempt, possibly in the 
end an unsuccessful attempt, to escape from the fallacy of false alternative.”186  Yet such 
alternatives dog him even as he seeks to explain, one could say will, into being this “higher unity 
which is supra-relational.”187  So he must qualify that which sustains him by noting, “that any 
particular truth of ours, as we conceive them, should be unconditioned and absolute, seems 
hardly probable.”188  For all his claims against “feeling,” the paradox of believing in an 
improbability can hardly be called consistent.189   
One who remains consistent is James.  Having left the battle in frustration, he ventured 
into the warring camp to discuss his pluralistic universe.  James’s second contribution to the fray 
is October 1909’s The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism.  It contains previously 
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published essays.  But, like A Pluralistic Universe, it puts materials old and new to good use 
along the wider lines James promised to explore.  It is a renewed insistence on solidarity.  It is a 
refusal to take the opponents’ bait and force distinctions between himself, Dewey, and 
Schiller.190  It also provides tributes to the primacy of Schiller’s philosophical approach.  The 
first instance is by implication.  He takes Schiller’s old family friend McTaggart to task.  James 
sees him as representative of how authors use the cover of abstraction to distort opposing claims.  
James states: 
A polemic author ought not merely to destroy his victim.  He ought to try a bit to make 
him feel his error—perhaps enough to convert him, but enough to give him a bad 
conscience and to weaken the energy of his defense. . . . violent caricatures of men’s 
beliefs arouse only contempt for the incapacity of their authors to see the situations out of 
which the problems grow.191 
 
The second instance is by tribute of form: the book ends with a dialogue between an anti-
pragmatist and a pragmatist.  The antagonist recoils at the “abominable hair-splitting and 
sophistry” of the pragmatist.  The protagonist ends with a wistful look to future generations. He 
hopes that they can see clear to stay clear of the antagonist’s hysteria, “wedded by education and 
tradition to the abstractionist manner of thought.”192 
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In the January 1910 Mind, James’s “polemic author” replies to Bradley’s two essays.  
Schiller sees them as representative of the confusion that exists in the realm(s) of Idealism, 
though he fears they may not be as well consumed as they once were.  And he can’t help but 
notice the changes to Bradley’s philosophy.  But he also can’t help suggesting that they, in the 
first moving towards pragmatism, sound an assured retreat back into Idealism. Schiller still feels 
that this creates an unstable mix of the pragmatic, the sceptical, and the absolute. And he sums 
up the problem thus: 
In the privacy of Mr. Bradley’s soul these discrepant elements doubtless all live happily 
and harmoniously together, but as the outside observer cannot place himself in the central 
point of vision where the kaleidoscopic patterns delight the eye, and can see only the 
clashing bits of glass, their public performances present as pretty and instructive a 
problem in the detection of their coherence as nay philosophic analyst could desire.193  
 
He chooses, however, to first focus on the latter article, as it provides the most “illuminating” 
indications of Bradley’s “candour, clarity, and contrition.”194  He notes that Bradley explains 
away the truth/satisfaction problem by positing truth as a special kind of satisfaction, finding its 
fruition in the intellect.  But Schiller notes that this still posits the intellect as at a distance from 
use.  And he argues that “a philosophy which prides itself on making this abstraction at once 
becomes a vain beating of the air in order to bottle the ghost of the living intellect in the empty 
forms of potential thought.”195  Schiller next notes the difference between the two articles, how 
in the first Bradley seemed willing to forgo a search for absolutes as futile but, in the second, 
manifests “a relapse into the old absolutism” even more strident that some of his earlier works.196  
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More than strident, the views expressed see Bradley at his skeptical worst; “all judgment is 
condemned to the Sisyphean and self-contradictory task of trying to include all reality in a single 
affirmation (which if successful would be a tautology), and yet knowing that its very distinction 
of a subject and predicate compels it dissever the unity of reality it is suicidally try to express.”197  
Here, then, is the most fundamental difference between the two articles: in the first he attempted 
to explain knowledge as applied, in the second knowledge as abstracted.  Taken in the former, 
that which coheres and that which is comprehensive are judged based upon what is relevant and 
what is necessary for the resolution of a problem.198  Taken in the latter, however, they collapse 
into contradiction.  What is comprehensive will not be that which coheres, thought the first must 
by its nature be inclusive of the second.199   
 What, then, the cause of this dilemma?  Schiller argues that it is, at base, a psychological 
misunderstanding on the part of Bradley: 
A sheer misconception of the essential function of cognition.  A failure to perceive that it 
is not our business in thinking to dissipate ourselves in the vain attempt to embrace 
everything at once, but that we should aim rather at concentrating ourselves upon the 
relevant and at abstracting from whatever can distract us from our immediate purpose.200  
 
Such a flaw, though certainly not exclusive to Bradley, is what leads him to the frustrations of 
his latter article.   Schiller refers to Bradley’s assault as “the substitution of a compulsory 
inconvertible paper currency for the gold of living truth in intellectual exchanges.”201  In its 
place, Schiller posits a humanistic account which affirms that “a principle is merely an empty 
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form, if it is taken apart from its application and its use.”202  But such application and use is 
forever absent in an account such as Bradley’s.  In such a philosophy those who apply and use 
function as imperfect filters for the Absolute; “personality is cast for the rôle of the devil, and 
must be regarded as the principle which ‘distorts and vitiates’ our truth.”203  Schiller ends, not by 
raising the bar, but by suggesting the result of what has been a long and arduous battle of wills.   
All Bradley’s qualifications and concessions have done is to further isolate him, and his 
philosophy, from the rest of the world he has ceded to pragmatism.  
This response, though quick with illustrative turns of phrase, is short on the type of rapid 
fire assault that James’s had so often, and so insistently, warned Schiller about.  By Schiller’s 
standards, even those found in his response to Burnet, this is a subdued affair.  And it suits James 
even if it stands as out of character for Schiller.  James proclaims: “The article on Bradley is one 
of the finest things you have ever written, a calm . . . tone, without jibes, that I think becomes 
you so well.”204   True to form, James urges him on: “Keep it up Schiller; your clearness and 
smoothness in these articles are wonderful.”205  With Protagoras in tow and Bradley in recession, 
now would seem the time to advance yet again the cause of humanism.  But there are other 
matters with which to attend. 
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4.4 BRITTLE METTLE: THE PERSONAL TOLLS OF HUMANISM’S BATTLES 
In the span of little more than a decade, with all his sparring and proselytizing, Schiller had 
remained a tutor.   It is that fact which he made reference to in apologizing for the lack of 
systemization in both Humanism and Studies in Humanism.  Schiller remained locked into a 
routine of teaching to small groups of undergraduates at Corpus Christi.  It is a situation which 
Slosson vividly describes: 
If Mr. Schiller had remained in America he would now be lecturing to one or two 
hundred students at the time, largely teachers who had come from all parts of the country 
expressly to hear his ideas and who would in turn transmit them to their students.  But in 
that room there were only these fifteen boys, many of whom doubtless had no special 
interest in logic or in Schiller’s views of logic and who took his lectures simply because 
they were required for examination, after which they could be forgotten.206  
 
 The key out was a professorship, which came with a decrease or release from teaching, and 
often with an endowed chair at one of the many Oxford colleges.  And so it was, in the same 
month that Schiller struck the somber note as regards Bradley, that he began his eager quest for 
Magdalen College’s Waynflete Professorship of Metaphysical Philosophy, the oldest of 
Magdalen’s four like-named professorships (the others being in Physiology, Chemistry and 
Physics). 
The rest of the month was witness to lots of activity, as Schiller solicited letters, and built 
up his application materials.207  By February, and after reviewing the list of recommendations, 
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James is found to exclaim: “A tip-top list of printed testimonials do you send me!  I hope you 
can get mine from the Vice-Chancellor [likely the one James sent as regarded Schiller’s move 
from Cornell back to Oxford] and print that. . . . The list of rival names you sent me is a strong 
one—but God will (or ought to) know his own!”208  It is not clear who all of these rivals were.  
That said, the testimonials Schiller secured were likely just as strong.  Names by now familiar to 
readers—James, Dewey, Knox, Sidgwick, even J. Russell—mix with a substantial list of other 
renowned academics—Bertrand Russell, Leonard T. Hobhouse, Henri Bergson—of the time.  
But, even at this point, something must be (or seem) amiss.  James responds late in the month 
that he “cannot believe that the Committee of electors will consider the details of our 
recommendations so curiously. . . . I pray every night for your election.  Heaven speed it!”209  
Whether by heaven or not, Schiller’s application arrives in the electors’ hands by the end of the 
month, just as James is leaving for a trip to Europe. 
In his letter of application, Schiller champions his involvement in the development of 
pragmatism.  And he does not sidestep the antagonism that it has wrought, though he posits that 
“this stage of its history may however be regarded as past, because it has now, after a severe 
struggle, made good its footing.”  As regards pragmatism’s chief merits, he asserts: “Perhaps it 
may be most profoundly conceived as a refusal to adopt the abstraction from personality on 
which Logic has hitherto proceeded, and as a demand for the reversal of the consequences which 
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have flowed from this fundamental assumption.”  Such revision, rather than suggesting radical 
revision to the State or the state of philosophy, exerts a conservative influence in reducing “the 
alienation of academic life from national life.”210  Suggesting that such a project befits Oxford, 
he submits these materials for their consideration. 
In April of 1910 James, having arrived in Europe, wants to know if “the electors have 
spoken and to what effect?”  And he adds contexts to his fears of a month earlier when, in a 
moment of praise he raises an oft-repeated word of caution: “after reading your testimonials and 
knowing that neither he [James references A. E. Taylor, one of the candidates and the person 
who James feared was in line to replace him at Harvard in 1906] nor any other could muster 
anything half as imposing, I fell to believing that with every allowance made for ill will on acct 
of punning, polemic virulence, anti-absolutism and your whole criminal record, they simply 
would not dare to choose an inferior man.  Heaven grant they may have been cowards!”211  As 
late as the third week, Schiller strikes a conflicted stance.  In a letter to Thaw, he offers: 
They may elect any day tho’ I don’t expect them to do so until after the term has begun, 
or even before the middle of May.  It seems to be the general opinion (at least among my 
friends) that my testls give me a very strong claim + that to pass me over wd be a 
‘scandal’ + so as James wrote to me in a delightfully boyish letter + justify a belief that 
“with every allowance for ill will on account of punning, polemic virulence, anti-
absolutism + your whole criminal record, they simply wd not dare to choose an inferior 
man.”  None venons [let us come], but it will be a gain to have produced even a 
‘scandal’, as things go, + anyhow I shall get the next professorship after that.212 
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Then scandal it shall be.  Sometime in the next few days, the electors’ hand down their decision.  
The Waynflete Professor will be John Alexander Smith.213  James expresses outrage and writes 
in a letter to Schiller: “I shake Oxford + its ways from the soles of my shoes—whatever one may 
say of America, such an election would have been out of the question in any of its institutions of 
learning.  A real scandal!”214  Schiller, for his part, seems angered yet resigned to the event.215  
As with most situations, there are other things with which to occupy one’s time.  In Schiller’s 
case, they are both expected and unexpected. 
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for this very reason.  The trouble in Oxford is that we are for most purposes ruled by quite a small ring of 
politicians who have very little academic distinction themselves + dislike it in others. 
Of course I am not personally any worse off (except for the time spent in collecting testimonials last term), 
+ I shall go on with my work as planned, seeing the new edition of Riddles through the press + pushing on 
with the new book on Logic as much as possible this summer. 
(F. C. S. Schiller, Corpus Christi, to Florence Thaw, [April/May?] 1910, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. 
Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University 
of California, Los Angeles). 
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The predictable takes the form of another essay from Bradley in the April 1910 Mind.  
“Appearance, Contradiction, and Error” is a watered down affair, vacillating between a desire to 
be understood and a defense against those who do not understand.216  James, fighting back illness 
in England, just lets it go: “Incidentally I tried to read Bradley’s article, but whether the fault be 
his or mine, I couldn’t follow its subtleties with any comprehension, and postponed it to a later 
day.”  And he again cautions, in light of recent events, for Schiller to do the same: 
Miller wrote years ago of Bradley that ‘he pinches and cuffs his reader like a nasty-
tempered child.’  Don’t you keep-a-doing something of the same sort to Bradley?  And 
isn’t that apparent ‘hatefulness’ of temper in you (in addition to that punning vice!) 
perhaps the real ground for J. A. S.’s election in stead of F. C. S. S.’s? . . . You have the 
best of him in point of truth; he is, I fear, a dying man; why then not let your tone be 
brotherly and kindly? [Such a tone in this article might also heap coals of fire on the 
electors, if any of them were influenced by the reasons I have suggested.] 217  
 
And Schiller does let Bradley go, for now.  He is too busy with moving the humanist cause 
forward to let the setbacks of April, or roadblocks of Bradley, stop him.  He is preparing a new 
edition of his Riddles and working on a long in development treaty on logic.  It is the former, a 
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 The sentence is not meant to be a pun.  Bradley pleads that he feels his views “still seem partly 
misunderstood” (F. H. Bradley, “On Appearance, Error, and Contradiction,” Mind 19, no. 74 [April 1910]: 153).  
But he adds, in a manner suggesting a heretofore unseen sense of weariness: “I am not seeking here to argue with 
any one who wishes to criticize rather than to understand.  I address myself to those whose interest in these topics is 
impersonal, to those who desire to make their own way, however imperfect, in which these matters are 
apprehended” (Bradley, “On Appearance,” 153). 
Nor is the lack of coverage meant as a slight.  Its only novelty is the introduction of the “intellectual middle 
space” whereby the practical and the theoretical come closer together, though still as yet do not meet (Bradley, “On 
Appearance,” 171).  And this space allows Bradley a realm wherein to dream the dream of totality.  It is the place 
where the notion of contradiction exists.  Though we posit the self-contradictory as unreal, Bradley goes on to 
suggest it must in some sense exist since we talk about conceptually.  And, in the middle space, the nature of 
contradiction is clear.  Like error and truth, it is conditioned by the existence of defect; “and contradiction, we may 
add, is erroneous only because it is deficient, because the condition on which the contraries were conjoined is in part 
suppressed, and because the condition of their higher unity has not been supplied” (Bradley, “On Appearance,” 
173).   As with the nature of truth, error, and contradiction, so to with appearance.  We can speak of it merely, but 
infer its resolution in the Real and Absolute; what we feel suggests the partiality of that which contains it.  Further, 
the paradox of speaking of that which is not known, or known only partially, implies a resolution that only the unity 
of the Ultimate Reality can furnish.  “There is a point where the ‘how’ of things passes beyond the nature of our 
vision, and where our knowledge, because defective, is condemned to be erroneous” (Bradley, “On Appearance,” 
174). 
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systematic treatise that will silence his critics, that James hopes for: “The thing for you now is to 
heap coals on the electors by getting out your logic at the earliest possible date.  Stop all 
occasional and polemical writing for that purpose! I wish I could say, ‘stop new editions of 
Riddles,’ but that would be too much.” 218  Even then, James seems pleased with Schiller’s most 
recent articles (for the year to this point, Schiller has only published three journal articles and 
only a couple of reviews).219   A failure behind him, and with James’s continuing support, 
Schiller is set to recover his ground.  
 But the unpredictable intervenes.  And it is difficult to estimate how these cursory details 
can do justice to the events that occur in the months of May through August 1910.  James, 
already feeling frail departs from England on a trip to Germany to recuperate.  But the trip seems 
only to weaken him further.  So he ventures only so far as England with his wife.  In July, his 
wife Alice posts to Schiller from Sussex: 
 William is here, very ill and weak.  He can neither write or converse.  His nights 
are dreadful and the hours one long fortitude.  The Nauheim experiment has been all 
disaster and every move seems to diminish his [word unclear] strength.  Dr. Mackenzie, 
his doctor, has been a very angel of helpfulness and wisdom.  He regards William’s 
condition as one of acute neurasthenia complicated and intensified by his poor heart.  We 
are to sail on Aug 12th from Liverpool on the Express of Britain.  Henry goes with us. 
 William bids me give you his blessing and tell you that you will have the brunt of 
the good fight henceforth. 
 I “keep hope to the future” for him for he never was more vital in spirit, or wiser 
in thought than now.  Help me, our dear friend, to believe that his work here is not yet 
done.220 
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 William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 April 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and 
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. 
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 Aside from Schiller’s review of The Meaning of Truth, it is clear that James was reading Schiller’s work 
at this point.  One instance is of note.  In April, Schiller published an article entitled “National Self-Selection” in the 
Eugenics Review.  James responds favorably: “I relished your Eugenic paper greatly, and am glad you are extending 
thus the area which your wing’s cover” (William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 4 May 1910, Box One, Folder 
Eighteen, Educators and Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University 
Libraries, Stanford). 
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Schiller’s reply is likely to have been almost instantaneous: a desire to go and visit with James.  
But James’s reply back is insistent:  
Dearest Schiller -- Your offer to come to London to see us is lovely, but my condition 
had better go without a meeting.  Five minutes would mean little; + anything more 
serious would add too much to the fatigue of my journey, rather hazardous at any rate, to 
L’pool. . . . I leave the ‘Cause’ in your hands, yours and Goldstein’s in Germany—I don’t 
feel sure about Kallen yet, tho he’s a noble fellow.  Good bye + God bless you!  Keep 
your health, your splendid health!  It’s better than all the ‘truths’ under the firmament.  
Ever thy221 
 
A little more than two weeks later, on 26 August 1910, James died at his home in Chocorua, 
New Hampshire.  Alice wrote after his death to Schiller, thanking him for his kind words of 
condolence in August.  She explains the delay in responding saying, “I was . . . grateful when 
your beautiful August letter reached me, but I was also dumb and inarticulate, dwelling in some 
silent land of grief.  Speech or language seemed impossible . . . I only speak of myself more that 
you may understand why I have given no sign to one as near and dear to William as yourself – 
dear to me too as his friend.”  She goes on to say, “No one could imagine – but you – (and 
because you do I tell you!) the heartfelt sorrow of many, many letters from far and near, from all 
sorts . . . of men and women, who wrote to me because they loved him.”222  That Schiller 
understood this sentiment, indeed felt it much the same if perhaps more deeply, requires no 
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 William James, Rye, to F. C. S. Schiller, 8 August 1910, Box One, Folder Eighteen, Educators and 
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford.  A 
note should be made as regards the quotation.  Perry provides a variation on the quotation above, one which was 
used by Winetrout, and referenced by me in the opening chapter of this dissertation (see Perry, The Thought, 2, 513; 
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conjecture.  The man who had given verification to his ideas, who had supplied criticism to 
match his personality, was gone.  All that was to come for Schiller would now come after 
James.223   
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 It might seem a minor footnote that Schiller’s engages in one last exchange with Bradley in Mind in 
October 1910.  But it is a telling one.  For Schiller argues that, in Bradley’s last essay, both he and James are finally 
vindicated.  But in raising the flag, it seems that Schiller is suffering his loss.  It is a response that seems weighted 
down by the sadness, and yes anger, of James’s death.  In so far as Bradley suggests that his is a way out of 
skepticism, Schiller remains unconvinced.  Schiller unleashes, in the guise of some rationalist offered Bradley’s 
bargain, an avalanche of criticism: 
It seems to me a skepticism aggravated by a dialectical nightmare.  I certainly do not want a metaphysic 
which starts with an initial confession that its fundamental presupposition is inexplicable, which plunges 
from paradox to paradox at every step, which glories in a notion of truth that makes every truth (including 
presumably its own assertions!) a sort of error and every reality a sort of illusion that can equally well be 
denied, which has to leave the concrete facts of existence unexplained and to abandon them and the 
sciences and practical life and indeed everything except what it is pleased to call ‘philosophy’ to ‘practical 
makeshifts’ and ‘working conceptions’ of the worst pragmatic sort, and in the end, after all these outrages 
on reason, has to ‘agree fully that difficulties are left which, if you like to say so, must be swallowed’, to 
doubt whether the most consistent man is he ‘who on the whole attains to greatest truth’, and in short is 
habitually subject to fits when it seems ‘clear that the Universe is too much everywhere for our 
understanding.’ 
(F. C. S. Schiller, “Absolutism in Extremis?”  Mind 19, no. 76 (October 1910): 534-5).  That’s not all.  Mr. Bradley 
is then found to shift the burden of this babble onto the backs of his brethren.  Trapped in a corner, Bradley in the 
end can only offer appeals to tradition and the selfsame ignorance of others.  So Schiller, in full gallop, pronounces 
the terms of Absolutism’s surrender: “It means a revolution in the methods of metaphysical debate.  It means an 
explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the personal equation in metaphysics.  In means equal rights to a hearing for 
all views that find believers.  It means an end to philosophic bigotry, arrogance, and intolerance” (Schiller, 
“Absolutism,” 536).  In its place, Schiller pronounces that humanism will be the new way: “So philosophic 
controversy must henceforth enter on a new era, in which doctrines will prevail, not by coerciveness, but by 
attractiveness, satisfactoriness and convenience” (Schiller, “Absolutism,” 537).  In the place of abstract reasoning, 
there will be psychological motivations.  In the place of universal, there will be recognition of the particular.  And, 
in a nod to Dewey, there will be an understanding that “it is the situation which generates the judgment, and not the 
judgment which ordains the situation” (Schiller, “Absolutism,” 540).   Taking Bradley’s weariness for weakness, 
and with an anger rarely seen before or since, Schiller rams the mettle of humanism into Bradley’s brittle bastion of 
bias. 
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5.0  THE LONG SHADOW 1911-1919 
A revelation that carries with it no spiritual enlightenment,  
that forms no stimulus to spiritual progress, but merely fixes a status quo,  
is a futility and in no credible sense a revelation at all.1 
 
At the start of the century, distance had placed Schiller beyond the reach of pragmatism’s 
development in America.  But he nonetheless remains a visible presence as the decade closes and 
a new one begins.  Schiller continues to wear upon, some might say wear down, the Idealist 
Bradley.  He extends James’s psychological conceptions with postulates of his own making.    
He even, from his outpost amongst hostile idealists, reformulates the grounds for the debate 
itself.  With James’s blessing, and Protagoras as his historical touchstone, Schiller continues to 
broaden pragmatism’s reach.  His humanism, acting as pragmatism writ large, bridges the gaps 
between method and action, speaking to the whole of man’s activities.  But the loss of James, a 
sympathetic and critical peer, robs Schiller of a crucial guide in refining his own method.  And 
the actions of the world around him, soon to see the collapse of Empires and the division of 
Dominions, less and less resonate with his optimistic philosophy predicated on man’s ability to 
create a better world.   
In this new decade there are clearly advances.  In Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social 
Problem (1912), Schiller offers sustained criticisms of formal logic divorced from actual context.  
In “Philosophy, Science, and Psychical Research” (1914), he continues to test the edges of what 
constitutes reality.  In “Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof” (1917), Schiller promotes a 
progressive understanding of the ends of the scientific method.   But there is also a growing 
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 F. C. S. Schiller, Formal Logic (London: Macmillan and Co., 1912), 403. 
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semblance of fissures in the magnificent edifice he is constructing.  His march continues 
unabated as support begins to ebb.  Coupled still with the continuing invective of their 
promotion, his proclamations struggle to gain converts even as he loses no allies.  And Schiller’s 
growing interest in eugenics, though a novel extension, indicates that not all humanity measures 
up to humanism’s maxim: “man is the measure.”  The consequences, particularly to his career 
and his reputation, suggest that Schiller’s theoretical insights continue to be tempered by, indeed 
tethered to, the practices that he chooses.  
5.1 REVISED RIDDLES: RETOUCHING HUMANISM’S EARLY TEMPLATE 
This decade begins, not with the new, but with the ideas of Schiller’s youth.   Though the revised 
edition of Riddles comes out in November 1910, it only starts to generate critical interest after 
the turn of the year.2  This is the version of the text where the Riddle’s keys are turned from 
evolution to, as the subtitle posits, “A study of the philosophy of Humanism.”  But, even after 
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 Not that trusted friends wait to respond.  Knox jots off a poem to Schiller only days after the book is 
released: In his Riddles of the Sphinx 
Schiller tells us what he thinks 
About this most imperfect World, 
And he straightens out the kinks. 
He tells of Evolution 
With its many missing links, 
He treats of Friendship and of Love 
And the Meaning of the Minx; 
He leads us to gaze into Hell 
From precipices’ brinks, 
Yet bids us to take heart of grace 
From the last results of “Stinks”. 
“Heed not the cavern’s mirk,” he cries, 
“See Heaven through the chinks!” 
Don’t think to catch him nodding! 
But perchance – perchance he winks. 
(Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 7 November 1910, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. 
Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University 
of California, Los Angeles). 
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updating the book, one senses that Schiller feels at a distance from the work.   The two new 
appendices aren’t actually new; rather, they are works that Schiller had presented in 1908 
(“Science and Religion”) and published in 1909 (“Choice”) respectively.  The preface, though, is 
instructive in how it frames this distance.  Schiller does not regret the concepts of nearly twenty 
years past.  Rather, Schiller pleads that he no longer has the need to craft an idealistic 
philosophy.  As a consequence of pragmatism and humanism, his views have undergone 
“enormous development and expansion”; his approach has become one of “greater modesty.”3  
Certainly not modesty as regards style; rather, it is diffidence as regards any project which would 
claim to obtain the traditional fruits of a so-called metaphysic.  If anything, and with a nod to the 
exuberance of his youth, the new edition attests “the stability of the author’s personality.”4 
The reactions to the book in the shorter popular notices are interesting.  They recall the 
degree to which reception is a matter of perception when it comes to philosophical positions 
right out the gate or long on their course.  The Manchester Review notes that the earlier version 
“abundantly proved his remarkable critical ability, his originality, and his mastery of an 
attractive style.”5   That spark is still found by another reviewer in the present version where, “in 
spite of his many changes, the clear, buoyant quality of the original work is preserved, together 
with its essential doctrines.”6  Others note the change in tone, that “the alterations made consist 
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 F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study of the Philosophy of Humanism, 3d ed. (London: Swan 
Sonnenschein, 1910), vi. 
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 Schiller, Riddles, ix. 
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 Review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, 
Manchester Review, 19 January 1911, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1911, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller 
Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of 
California, Los Angeles. 
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 Review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, n.a., 11 
May 1911, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1911, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. 
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in a general toning down of the more ambitious and daring portions.”7  Yet others contend that 
the alterations point to the failings of Schiller’s mature position: “his work, while of considerable 
value on the negative or destructive side, fails, or is at least inadequate, on the positive or 
constructive side.”8  The Quest is more cautiously interested in how the book reads as “the 
Humanist attempt to solve the Riddles of the Sphinx.”9     
The longer philosophic reviews continue the mixed popular reactions.  In the May 1911 
Journal of Philosophy, Columbia University Professor Walter Pitkin (1878-1953) willingly 
grants the newness of this edition so as to better question its content.  In contrast with those who 
assume Schiller to be “a flighty radical, fresh as May dew and no less evanescent,” Pitkin argues 
that his “philosophy reveals a mind respectful of the past and unshakable in its faith that the great 
questions were correctly put and answered centuries ago.”10  And this philosophy of Humanism 
is most certainly not Pragmatism.  Where pragmatists localize events and hold off synthesis, 
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 Review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. Schiller, Quest, 
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responses to his philosophical views.  Towards the start, the review quotes Schiller as stating Pragmatism “has 
rendered more or less out of date every earlier work on metaphysics.”  Schiller adds the notation “^” directly after 
this and then, in the margins, writes: “and R of S I.”  Towards the middle of the review there is this passage: “The 
next Riddle to be considered is the dualism of the Spirit and Matter; this Dr. Schiller solves by assuming that they 
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comments: “muddled.”  But then, a few lines down, the review claims that this viewpoint reduces the “Deity to the 
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 Walter B. Pitkin, review of Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism, by F. C. S. 
Schiller, Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 11 (May 1911): 299. His comments, as later chapters will demonstrate, are 
strikingly prescient. 
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humanists hope to reconcile philosophy, science, and religion.  Where pragmatists see meaning 
in the particulars, humanists hope to draw meaning out of life as a whole.  Pitkin cannot escape a 
curious conclusion: “the resulting philosophy is perverse intellectualism if everything in the 
world is either reduced to that idea or else so interpreted through it that whatever proves 
unintelligible in terms of it is pronounced unreal.”11  Schiller, the progressive pragmatist, is for 
Pitkin the “conservative intellectual,” fretting over a descent into pessimism.12  The new Riddle 
is thus a cautionary one.  In much the same way as Schiller lambasted Bradley for his descent 
into pessimism, others now see Schiller as the irritated gatekeeper wanting to stave off its 
influence. 
Author Sydney [Philip Perigral] Waterlow (1878-1944) is no less critical.  In October of 
the same year, he reviews the revised edition for the International Journal of Ethics.  He takes 
aim at Schiller’s claim that the views expressed show a stability of thought all the while claiming 
that an attempt at metaphysics has been abandoned; specifically, the difference between what is 
taken as phenomenally and ultimately real, between what appears to us as contradiction and what 
we seek to obtain ideally.13 Moreover, he finds Schiller’s manner distasteful.  As a popularlizer 
of philosophy, he abandons precise terms and resorts to wording that “is uniformly flabby and 
pretentious, and constantly disfigured by cheap flowers of sentimental rhetoric.”14  And 
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Schiller, International Journal of Ethics 22, no. 1 (October 1911): 108-9. 
 
14
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Waterlow justifies his criticisms of Schiller’s “self-conscious swagger” on the grounds that it is 
Schiller who now suggests that all metaphysics claim to a personal rather than universal origin.15  
In January 1912, Perry also questions the metaphysical modifications to Schiller’s work 
in the Philosophical Review.  And he, like Waterlow and unlike Pitkin, also acknowledges the 
limitations by which Schiller introduces the new version: “Since [1894, the date of the previous 
2nd edition] the author has been engaged in defending and propagating his ‘humanistic’ version 
of Pragmatism.  The speculative metaphysics of the Riddles, has thus stood outside the main 
current of his thought, and is now re-published with some misgivings.”16  After carefully noting 
the changes in the current edition, Perry suggests two characteristics of the book.  First, Schiller 
“writes himself down among the apostles of a metaphysical spiritualism or activism.  He 
belongs, in other words, to the school of Bergson, [Rudolph] Eucken, [Theodor] Lipps, [Alain] 
LeRoy [Locke] and Papini, rather than to the school of James and Dewey.”17  Second, Schiller 
shows “an inclination to adopt that syncretistic [a combination of different forms of belief or 
practice] version of metaphysics that is so popular with contemporary German idealists of 
romantic proclivities.”18  It is as regards the second of these that Perry notes what sounds like 
disillusion:  “And it may not be out of place to remark that the discrediting of philosophical faith 
reflects the bias of middle-age, as truly as that faith itself reflects the bias of youth.”19  While 
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Waterlow took a change in metaphysics to be a personification of philosophy, Perry attaches a 
decline of spiritual sympathy to Schiller’s loss of metaphysical moorings.   
None of these longer notices were likely pleasing to Schiller.  Yet he chooses, given the 
record, to personally respond to Waterlow.  We do not have the original letter.  But it can be 
inferred that Schiller’s response to this review did nothing to reduce Waterlow’s suspicions 
about his personality.  It did, however, obtain some measure of correction.  In a letter dated 22 
March 1912, Waterlow grants that there are “3 misprints which unfortunately occur” and for 
which he “sincerely” apologizes.  These mistakes are matters of word choice and order.  
Waterlow, however, goes onto say: “As to the other alleged ‘glaring inaccuracies’ on which you 
say that my criticism is based, I fear I can not meet your complaint in any way that would satisfy 
you.  Writers whose language is, like yours, habitually vague + misleading are always surprised 
when the critic attributes to them some definite position.”20   
This, obviously, does little to quell Schiller’s indignation, especially considering that it is 
Waterlow who is now accusing him of being vague and misleading.  Five days later, Schiller 
replies: 
Your apology for the misquotations in your review hardly seems adequate: it amounts to 
saying that you were careless, not in quoting, but in proof-reading.  I am glad however to 
hear that you consider them ‘unfortunate’, though you do not seem to realize either how 
‘unfortunate’ they are in view of the tone of your review, or that you appear, still more 
unfortunately, to base arguments on the worst of them.21   
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Schiller then lays down the demands: “Go into the evidence for my ‘inconsistencies’ + 
‘contradictions’ to [sic] fully + publicly in the pages of Mind, + prove them up to the hilt, if you 
can.”  Schiller promises to meet any such challenge in kind.  To not do so, he avers, would be to 
cede his initial argument; “you shd feel yourself in duty bound to substantiate your charges, + not 
content yourself with merely abusing the plaintiff’s attorney, or (what indicates a still more 
desperate plight) lapse into silence (or anonymity) as soon as you are challenged.”  The end to 
the matter came in a correction posted to the next International Journal of Ethics.  In it, the editor 
dutifully publishes the errors for which Waterlow initially apologized.  But the editor goes on to 
note that “Schiller declines to accept” Waterlow’s explanation that his larger grievances fall with 
these errors.22  No matter.  The riddles reborn are now meant to withstand the targets of 
humanism’s domain.  There are errors of a logical, not metaphysical, sort looming on the 
horizon. 
5.2 DESTRUCTIVE DEFENSES: HUMANISM’S CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC 
Originally called [The] Problem of Formal Logic, this work stands as perhaps his most 
galvanizing work. 23  It can be read as a more insistent development of the themes brought forth 
in “Axioms as Postulates.”24   To wit, truth-claims studied in practice render thinking more, but 
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 “A Correction,” International Journal of Ethics 22, no. 4 (July 1912): 501. 
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 The original, or working, title of the book is evidenced by contract letters sent to Schiller from 
Macmillan in May 1911 (Macmillan & Co. , Ltd., London, to F. C. S. Schiller, May 1911, Legal and Financial 
Papers, Box Sixteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young 
Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
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 The similarities, and extensions, found herein are easy to read in compliment to “Axioms as Postulates.”  
As but one example, the discussion of Causation (F. C. S. Schiller, “Axioms as Postulates,” in Personal Idealism, ed. 
Henry Sturt [London: Macmillan and Co., 1902], 108) is here given a whole chapter; see Schiller, “Causation,” 
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not absolutely, certain than in abstraction.  Or, as Schiller pleads: “It is NOT possible to abstract 
from the actual use of the logical material and to consider ‘forms of thought’ in themselves, 
without incurring thereby a total loss, not only of truth but also of meaning.”25  And it is also a 
project irritated by the same source of apologetics found in Humanism and Studies: his actual 
teaching of formal logic.  Such practice in service to long-held theory leads Schiller to conclude 
that “it is a very difficult subject to teach without loss of self-respect.”26  Moreover, Schiller sees 
                                                                                                                                                       
Formal, 272-309.   Additional concepts discussed in “Axioms”—such as Excluded Middle and Contradiction—are 
similarly expanded.  Other concepts, most notably the Syllogism and Fallacies, undergo similar inspection.  It 
should be made clear, however, that Schiller was not alone, nor claimed as such, in the development of arguments 
for an informal as against formal logic.  Particularly in the case of the syllogism, Schiller notes here and elsewhere 
his debt to Alfred Sidgwick’s “epoch-making criticisms”—arguments which predate Schiller’s Formal Logic but 
would compass reference while writing  “Axioms”—in books such as Alfred Sidgick’s 1901 The Use of Words in 
Reasoning (Schiller, Formal, 198; see also, for a more general critique of formal logic referenced in the previous 
chapter, Alfred Sidgwick, “Applied Axioms,” Mind 14, no. 53 [January 1905]: 42-57). 
And Sidgwick’s work along these lines goes back farther still, to books such as Fallacies: A View of Logic 
from the Practical Side (1883).  Therein, he states: “Nothing could well be more confusing than an attempt to apply 
the cumbrous machinery of the Syllogism to arguments met with in real life.  And whoever has tampered with his 
mother-wit by substituting a clumsy Logic depending on elaborate mnemonics, must no doubt pay the penalty in 
loss of power, so long as the mischief remains” (Alfred Sidgwick, Fallacies: A View of Logic from the Practical 
Side [London: K. Paul, Trench, 1883; reprint, New York: D. Appleton, 1884], 289).  Or, more generally put forth in 
Distinction and Criticism of Belief (1892), he urges: “the validity of any distinction is relative to the purpose for 
which it is used at the time, or that the question whether a given distinction is valid can be decided only by reference 
to the purpose for which it is used on a special occasion” (Alfred Sidgwick, Distinction and Criticism of Belief 
[London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892], 142).  Like Schiller, Sidgwick has received limited attention, even from 
those attentive to Schiller’s contributions to the critique of formal logic.  As Peter Radcliff has noted, “[Reuben] 
Abel’s book on Schiller ignores Schiller’s acknowledgement of indebtedness and the numerous references to 
Sidgwick.  On one occasion, Abel mentions a criticism that Sidgwick makes of Schiller.  The other reference is 
particular unfortunate [in that it implies Sidgwick, along with Knox, joined Schiller’s already started battle]” (Peter 
Radcliff, “Alfred Sidgwick on Meaning,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 4, no. 3 [July 1966]: 230).  More 
recent works on Sidgwick’s contributions are: Steen Flemming Nielson, “Alfred Sidgwick’s ‘Rogative’ Approach to 
Argumentation,” in Argumentation at the Century’s Turn, eds. Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen, and Sacha 
Raposo, CD-ROM, 1999 (also available at: www.trentu.ca/ossa/p39.htm); Douglas Walton, “Alfred Sidgwick: A 
Little Known Precursor of Informal Logic and Argumentation,” Argumentation 14 (2000): 175-9. 
A few short years later, another of Schiller’s associates, one directly associated with “Axioms as 
Postulates,” also offers up a complimentary take on formal logic.  Sturt, in his The Principles of Understanding: An 
Introduction to Logic from the Standpoint of Personal Idealism (1915), encompasses the spirit of both Schiller and 
Sidgwick when he protests: “The whole notion of a priori laws of thought is an anachronism, the ghost of formal 
logic haunting our schools long after its real life has ended. . . . The conservative logicians of the present day still 
hold to it that there must be a priori laws of thought; though, having lost faith in the syllogism, he cannot tells what 
they are” (Henry Sturt, The Principles of Understanding: An Introduction to Logic from the Standpoint of Personal 
Idealism [Cambridge: University Press, 1915], 3-4). 
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the continued reverence for formal logic as spilling out into the social realm, and the results are 
shockingly severe: “Its fruits are dogmatism, intolerance, pedantry and contentiousness, timidity 
of thought, and a cowardly avoidance of risks.”27  While some of the combined results—
dogmatic timidity any one?—seem to clash, Schiller urges that “Society . . . needs to encourage 
activity and boldness, instead of holding up to the human mind the irrelevant model of a static 
truth from which all risk has been expunged.”28  What form this encouragement to “not abstract 
from actual use” is to take remains undefined.  
Several personal correspondences suggest the positive impression that Schiller’s 
challenge cast upon his friends and acquaintances.29  But it is a book clearly meant to 
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 Simon Nelson Patten thanks Schiller “heartily for the book.”  He goes on to add, “I hope your book will 
break some of the old traditions that have made logic useless” (Simon Nelson Patten, Philadelphia, to F. C. S. 
Schiller, 6 March 1912, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special 
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).  Patten (1852-1922) 
received graduate training in Germany before returning to the States (he was born and educated in Chicago) to head 
the Wharton School.  A philosopher and economist, his work intersected with the Progressive Movement and 
eugenic reform.  In his letter, Patten refers to a book he is writing as being more “social” than Schiller’s in focus.  It 
is likely, given the date of the letter, that he is referring to The Social Basis of Religion (1911). 
Alfred William Benn declares, “The general result was to convince me that it is impossible to be a 
logician” (Alfred William Benn, to F. C. S. Schiller, 17 October 1912, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller 
Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of 
California, Los Angeles).  Benn (1843-1915), a British philosopher, actually goes on to engage in what is a nuanced 
discussion of the ramifications of discarding formal logic: “But this conclusion puts me in great difficulties.  For its 
reached be a series of abstract reasonings resting on certain implications; and one fails to see why these why these 
should not be extricated and built up into something like a system of proofs + of what practically comes to the same 
thing – of disproof.  Now your objection to Formal logic on practical grounds seems to be its claim to prove and 
disprove, which claim you make responsible for theological persecutions.  This last is a suggestive topic.  It seems 
an extraordinary paradox that intellectualists, who of all men are approved to trust most to pure reason . . . should 
rely on compulsion as the ultimate means of conviction.  One might rather expect the believers in Survival-value 
(which I have always understood to be the Pragmatist’s test of truth) forcibly to eliminate their opponents, thereby 
depriving adverse opinions of survival-value in the most effective manner.  Besides experience shows that it is 
people like the Determinist [sic] who preach persecution, not the Aristotles.  Again you would have to 
discountenance the teaching of arithmetic no less than that of formal logic; for by setting up a type of abstract truth 
the same for all mankind it grievously [?] discourages Personalism.  And what are we to say about the practice of 
our criminal courts (criminal indeed!) which even deprive people of life or liberty on the miserable plea that their so-
called guilt has been proved?  Well might those baleful intellectualists the Athenians have created logic on the type 
of their legal proceedings!” 
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demonstrate the warmness of another friendship.   The book is inscribed thusly: “To the Memory 
of the Last Great Liberator of the Human Spirit, William James.”   And it is a letter from Alice 
James that we should linger upon.  She states: 
Your Formal Logic came yesterday and I laid it on William’s desk with the thought of 
how eagerly he would have welcomed it, torn off the cover and settled himself to a first 
quick survey.  This morning where I could be alone I opened the book and found the oh, 
so beautiful dedication . . . I can do nothing else till I have tried to express to you my 
deep gratitude, not only for this dedication but for all the understanding and agreement 
and comradeship and last of all for the comfort he took in feeling that the work he loved 
was in good hands.  Once that last summer where he made some reference to his 
unfinished work he added “But there is Schiller.”30 
 
She goes on to say that, given what she can understand of the work, she “can seem to see how it 
dovetails with pragmatism or humanism and liberates afresh the human spirit.”   Such a loving 
tribute from the wife of Schiller’s mentor surely serves to boost Schiller’s resolve that the course 
chosen is the right one.31  But such a reaction can hardly be expected to be typical given the 
course to this point. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Schiller’s opinion can be gleaned from a letter he wrote several weeks prior to psychologist and 
philosopher George Stuart Fullerton (1859-1925).  In it, Schiller states: “. . . may I point out to you that tho’ I do not, 
perhaps, bring forward any new arguments for Humanism (such not being within the scope of the work) I do bring 
some new directions to against the traditional logic, which go to show that it is intellectually untenable bankrupt.  
This creates a new situation to this extent that until they are met neither Pragmatism nor antiprag can appeal to the 
‘rules of logic’ as e.g. settling anything (cf p. 250).  If the syllogism is a petitio + the laws of thought are nonsense, it 
is not rationalism but irrationalism to rely on them, + they wd only discredit common sense + science if the latter 
really relied on them” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to George Stuart Fullerton, 7 October 1912, Correspondence, Box 
One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research 
Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
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 Alice James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 7 March 1912, Box One, Folder Twelve, Educators and 
Librarians Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford. 
 
31
 Moreover, that it is a path agreeable to and compatible with the view expressed in James’s recent 
posthumous collections: Some Problems of Philosophy (1911) and Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912).  Schiller, 
curiously, does not review the latter work.  But in his review of the former, he ends with what amounts to the 
understandable imposition of his present interests onto the writings of James.  After noting that James also disagreed 
with any notion of “fixed” truths, Schiller adds: “. . . he also realized that, to state the facts adequately, there would 
need to be a new logic that would start by recognizing every thought as an act of responsible choice. . . . To what 
now passes as ‘logic’ James felt so strong a repugnance that he did not always shrink from describing himself as 
‘almost blind logically’ (p. 183).  But his blindness was that of the true philosopher who after enjoying the vision of 
true reality has to descend again into the Cave and content with monstrous shadows in the gloom” (F. C. S. Schiller, 
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The shorter notices, from both the popular and academic press, veer from suggesting the 
book’s importance to questioning its value.  Book Monthly puts it a bit mildly when it states that 
“the positions taken up in Formal Logic will arouse much discussion.”32  Some, such as the 
Academy, take Schiller as a particular, and positive, special case: “the special importance and 
interest of Dr. Schiller’s treatise lies in the fact that it is the work of a professional teacher, who 
admits that he has passed through the fog of disillusion to the light of discovery.”33  The Dublin 
Daily Press can’t understand why Schiller expends so much time arguing against already 
outdated versions of Formal Logic; clearly, it seems, his “pragmatism has run away with him.”34  
The Nation attempts to explain the reason why Schiller is still tackling supposedly dead topics.  
It argues that “Dr. Schiller, in common with all (or nearly all) teachers of formal logic at Oxford, 
and the vast majority elsewhere, is ignorant of the work that has been done on the subject during 
the last sixty-eight years.”35  The Tablet argues that Schiller’s “protests are Much Ado about 
                                                                                                                                                       
review of Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy, by William James, Mind 
20, no. 80 [October 1911]: 573). 
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 Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Book Monthly, April 
1912, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1912, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department 
of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. 
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 Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Academy, n.d., 
Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, [1912], Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of 
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. 
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 Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Dublin Daily Press, n.d., 
Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, [1912], Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of 
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.  The tone 
throughout is one of incredulousness.  They find it a “pity” Schiller “should think it necessary to expend so much 
literary energy in flogging a lot of dead horses.” Schiller replies with what appears to be the comment “2 live asses.”  
After questioning Schiller’s belief that the work of Alfred Sidgwick—particularly his criticism of syllogisms—is in 
any way earth-shaking, the review says that “criticism may be left to the reader.”  Schiller replies “therefore / writer 
is incapable of it!” 
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 Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Nation, 18 May 1912, 
Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1912, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of 
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.  The review 
suggests that Schiller complains that “all formal logic is worthless.”  Schiller underlines worthless and writes above 
it “meaningless.”  The review then suggests that it likely a critic of formal logic will not state its “case better than it 
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Nothing and much bad reasoning.”36  Science Progress aims to pose a more constructive 
challenge.  It notes that Schiller’s style is “vigorous” and that his claims are “relevant.” But it 
questions why, “in so large and bulky a volume, that there has not been an attempt at definite and 
positive construction.  Or is pragmatism merely a revolt from the current academic 
intellectualism?”37 
In August 1912, the longer notices from his academic peers begin to flow in.  Max 
Eastman offers, in the Journal of Philosophy, a critical (in more than one sense) review similar in 
substance to that found in Science Progress.   The thrust of Eastman’s critique is thus: while it is 
a book that will give instructors who wade through the difficulties of the subject “the same 
comfort that profanity would,” Schiller “so little succeeds in exemplifying” the pragmatic (or 
value) theory of knowledge that is his cause.38  As Eastman sees it, Formal Logic is flawed 
because it is based on an unsound premise: to do something new, one must destroy that which is 
old.  Such a stance is as intellectualist as the worst of those Schiller has criticized in the past.  He 
asks, rhetorically, if this is “not the typical academic assumption that fills our libraries with 
rubbish and gas?”39  Far better, claims Eastman, if Schiller had identified how the new could 
improve the old, how the latter still exerted useful influences upon a search for the former.  
                                                                                                                                                       
has been stated by its advocates.”  Schiller underlines this passage, places an asterisk next to it, and then writes 
along the bottom of the page: “Wd it not be presumptuous to try to outdo 50 generations of logicians!” 
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 Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Tablet, 18 May 1912, 
Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1912, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of 
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles.  Underneath the 
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 Review of Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Science Progress, 
January 1914, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1914, Box Fifteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles. 
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In December, Schiller responds in the same journal.40  His most basic issues of contention 
are ones of term; what, in Eastman’s view, is formal logic, as he views it or as he sees it 
misconstrued by Schiller?41   No answer is to be found.  Absent a response, Schiller asserts that it 
is formal logic’s attempts at consistency, independent of any practical application, that render it 
an ideal best suited to be done away with if one wants to get at actual reasoning.42  He sees 
Eastman, like B. Russell, as an intellectualist who would depict those who oppose formal logic 
on its own inconsistency as adopting the “anything handy as true” approach.43   Schiller also 
struggles to understand how it is that Eastman can claim to be defending a position similar to his, 
when Eastman so obviously is setting out arguments that play into an anti-pragmatic attitude.  He 
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 There is an intriguing comment at the start of this article; though one that deserves—given the focus of 
this project—only this contextual elaboration.  Schiller states: “Professor Howison is said once to have remarked to 
William James, ‘James, philosophers always say they want ‘recognition’; but what they really want it praise.’  I find, 
however, that I myself am too perverse, hardened, or unphilosophic to want either, and so am a little disappointed 
with Mr. Eastman’s review of my ‘Formal Logic’” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Problem of Formal Logic,” Journal of 
Philosophy 9, no. 25 [5 December 1912]: 687).  George Holmes Howison (1834-1916) was an American 
philosopher who taught briefly at Harvard in the late 1880s but spent the majority of his career (and founded the 
philosophy department) at the University of California, Berkeley.  On several occasions, he traveled to Europe: to do 
advanced study in Berlin in the early 1880s and to visit England in the early 1900s.  It is during this latter visit that 
he made an acquaintance with Schiller.  Howison wrote to a friend of his experiences at a meeting which he 
attended: “there was a ‘Symposium’ on question whether a metaphysical System is possible, by a Mr. Leigh (who 
read a flippant anti paper), Mr. Fairbrother (who read a somewhat wooden one in the affirm.), & our friend Schiller 
(who was brightly on the fence)” (qtd. in John Wright Buckham and George Malcolm Stratton, George Holmes 
Howison: Philosopher and Teacher [Berkeley: University of California, 1934], 114).   
This friendship played a key part in James delivering his “practical consequences lectures” there in 1898.  
It was likely integral, as Chapter Seven will discuss, to Schiller’s several lecture engagements at Berkeley. It also 
signals the extent to which Schiller was seen as a companion to like-minded philosophers in America.  But there is 
more; it suggests the degreee to which Schiller supposed the support of the right idea would, as with James’s views, 
win out in the end.  As Buckham and Stratton continue: “And, wit as he is, even in a dreadfully solemn periodical, 
he begins his own paper discussing logic with the following anecdote of Howison which Schiller had received direct 
from James: ‘I hope it happened as related,’ Schiller writes privately to Howison” (Buckham and Stratton, George, 
115).  The book also contains, in select passages, further proof that James’s influence on Schiller, and on others in 
England, was in view to persons such as Howison. 
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made reference to an alternative approach to that of Schiller: John Dewey’s 1910 How We Think (for reference, see 
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suspects a traitor in his midst, one who is “really an intellectualist masquerading as a pragmatist 
in order to reduce pragmatism to absurdity and to sow dissensions in its camp.”44   
Traitor or not, Eastman can not forgo a reply in the very same issue on the very next 
page.   And his tone is strident: “I studied his book and made an earnest effort to tell the truth 
about it. . . . As I did my best, however, I am not going to try again.”45  What Eastman does do is 
tackle two points raised by Schiller.  First, Eastman argues that Schiller’s conception of his 
understanding of formal logic was predicated on, not the topic itself, but the criticism of the 
book.  Second, Eastman suggests that both he and Schiller are in agreement on the priority of 
value over truth, even if the latter is inclined to see them as divided on the subject.  In the main, 
though, Eastman is as displeased with Schiller’s reply as Schiller was with Eastman’s criticism.  
Implying that Schiller engages in fallacious reasoning (ad hominem being the likely label), 
Eastman suggests such extraneous reasoning is what leads people “back into the text-book where 
we could classify it, and call it by a Latin name, and get all those other medieval satisfactions out 
of it.”46 
A possible explanation for why one, seemingly from the pragmatist camp, would choose 
to criticize a work supporting Pragmatism is found in another review this year.  In September 
1912, Bulgarian born philosopher Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff (1887-1976) reviews the book for 
the Philosophical Review.  He finds time to both implicitly praise and explicitly question what 
has been called by others Schiller’s “destructive scheme” to lay waste to formal logic.  As to the 
former, he notes how Schiller suggests that syllogisms can be used to study doubtful points and 
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that the distinctions between Inductive and Deductive logic are of little practical use.47  But he 
also suggests “that a body of thought pragmatically so worthless should for twenty centuries 
have dominated the human mind, is surely a paradox, which Dr. Schiller does not recognize as 
he should.”48  The book, overall, “does full justice to his keenness and directness of attack, but it 
lacks the sympathy of reinterpretation which his subject demands; and its frequent lack of 
fairness to the older discussions of Logic which do not adopt the pragmatic formula, go far 
towards destroying the seriousness and usefulness of the undertaking.”49 Tsanoff, straddling the 
positives and negatives found in Schiller’s work, nonetheless arrives at a similar conclusion to 
that of Eastman: insistence, even that which advances insights, can be overwhelmed by the tone 
of one’s distinctions.50  Taken together, Eastman and Tsanoff posit the limits of Schiller’s 
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 Four months later, R. F. Alfred Hoernle offers a further glimpse into how people view Schiller’s text.  
First, Hoernle contextualizes Schiller’s attack from within Britain, noting that “it is taught to larger numbers of 
students than any other philosophical subject, and that to many of these students it is the only glimpse of philosophy 
they ever get.”  And he grants Eastman’s claims to the positive functions of logic while nodding to Tsanoff’s 
arguments against Schiller’s polemic insistence.  The problem, as he sees it, is one of results.  “For Pragmatism has, 
perhaps, so far been too lavish of promises and too chary of fulfillment—spendthrift in criticism, niggardly in 
reconstruction.  It has lived in an atmosphere of perpetual polemics.  That is probably why, for the last two or three 
years, the movement has not advanced much” (R. F. Alfred Hoernle, review of Formal Logical: A Scientific and 
Social Problem, by F. C. S. Schiller, Mind 22, no. 85 [January 1913]: 102; 110).  It should be noted that this lag in 
progress corresponds with the time of James’s death. 
And feeling that sort of pressure, whether real or imagined, to carry on the mantle of Pragmatism, Schiller 
suggests no retreat on the points—Formal Logic’s fundamental uselessness, the psychological as against social 
approach to the reform of the same—under debate.  In February 1913 letter he suggests to another critic: “my way of 
dealing with the doctrine that ‘Logic’ is concerned with the ‘products’ of the processes of reasonings is to show that 
these are just words, + forms for meaning + not meanings.  From this it follows that ‘logic’ . . . is not in fact 
concerned with, or relevant to, actual thinking.  If you had persevered to the end of my book you wd have learnt also 
that why ‘logic’ cannot concern itself with actual meaning, + seen that your supposition that it is merely ‘natural 
logic fortified’ is groundless” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to [Paul V. M.] Benecke, 16 February 1913, 
Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. 
Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
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conception of producing a systematic work.  By working to destroy, rather than to rebuild, 
Schiller is seen as giving up the most basic of Pragmatism’s contentions: that which is held as 
true proves useful.  A smoldering pile of debris may be fodder for some of the popular press; but 
it is refuse to be pushed aside by philosophers, pragmatist or otherwise.  
If anything, Schiller’s additional public output at this time only furthers the sense of the 
divide between the popular and philosophic press.  Towards the end of 1912 he brings out new 
editions of Humanism and Studies in Humanism.51  Both are well received in the general notices.  
So well received that it seems as if the scholarly debates were occurring in a vacuum.  Noting 
that the reprints of Humanism and Studies in Humanism come on the heels of Schiller’s “purely 
destructive criticism” in Formal Logic, the Athenaeum sees them as constructive signs of the 
contemporary “demand for philosophic literature of the highest class.”  It notes that they both, in 
their way, continue to lead the charge against those idealists who tend “to ignore minds in the 
plural.”  In light of Schiller’s continued salvos against these idealists, the review concludes thus: 
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 During 1912, Schiller also contributes introductions to two books.   The first continues his attack on 
logic.  In discussing the positive qualities of Harold P. Cooke’s Maurice the Philosopher, a Dialogue, or, Happiness, 
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Dialogue, or, Happiness, Love, and the Good, by Harold P. Cooke [Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1912], viii). 
The second continues the attack on Oxford’s intellectualist training even as it raises the issue of James’s 
legacy.   In praising Murray for being a “young” devotee who is receptive to novelties, he suggests a commonality 
that they share: “Mr. Murray has (like myself) enjoyed the advantage of a severely intellectualistic training in the 
classical philosophy of Oxford University . . . The aim of this training is to instill into the best minds the country 
produces an adamantine conviction that philosophy has made no progress since Aristotle.  It costs about ₤50,000 a 
year, but on the whole it is singularly successful.” (viii)  But he goes on to suggest why a youthful approach in 
Pragmatism is also necessary to augment the groundwork laid by his mentor. “William James’s Pragmatism, great as 
it is a work of genius, brilliant as it is as a contribution to literature, was intended mainly for the man on the streets.  
It is so lacking in the familiar philosophic catchwords that it may be doubted whether any professor has quite 
understood it.  And moreover, it was written some years ago, and no longer covers the whole ground” (F. C. S. 
Schiller, introduction to Pragmatism, by D. L. Murray [New York: Dodge Publishing, 1912], vii; ix).  Murray 
(1888-1962), a person seemingly well-versed in the works of James and Schiller, went on to a prolific career as a 
fiction writer and literary reviewer for the Times Literary Supplement.  Readers interested in an overview of his 
philosophical work are directed to John R. Shook, ed., introduction to Pragmatism (1912): David L. Murray & 
Response and Reviews, Early Defenders of Pragmatism Series, vol. 3 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vii-xvii. 
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“We wish the critics good luck, though we fear that they will find Dr. Schiller hard to tackle in 
the field of metaphysics.”52   The Dial sees the work as establishing Schiller as the British leader 
(with Dewey the American) of the pragmatic movement, full of “that happy sense of humor and 
of human values which characterized James, and which causes his books to attract a large lay 
public.”53  The Expository Times sees Schiller as not merely a leader, but also a prophet: “All 
that Schiller prophesied for Humanism—even for that word as a better title for the philosophical 
movement than Pragmatism—has come to pass.  The future is with this movement, and with this 
as its name.”54  The reactions of the critics at large point to two possible stances.  They could 
simply be unaware of the criticisms of Schiller’s peers.  Or, perhaps, the popular press’s glowing 
notes of praise are indicative of a general perception, a perception that the criticisms of Schiller’s 
works are representative of how philosophy is generally practiced.55  
Regardless, Schiller’s arguments with his peers in the next two years do little to remedy 
the divide in reception.  He pushes his humanist agenda forward by continuing to raze logic 
while attempting to protect the legacy of James.  In 1911, Schiller publishes “Error” in the 
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.  In it, he seeks “to distinguish between Truth and 
Error.”56  Schiller suggests that “all correction of error is self-correction.  There is no undisputed 
error, until it is admitted by the mind that made it.  Until then there is only conflict of opinion, 
and to describe either view as an error is a partisan begging the question.”57  This view, 
obviously, contradicts any notion of formal validity and places the criterion of judgment squarely 
within the psychological realm of humanistic logic.  Philosopher Lizzie Susan Stebbing takes 
exception to this article in the July 1912 Mind.  To wit, she argues that his explanation: (1) fails 
to distinguish between truth and error, and (2) fails to provide a clear explanation of how 
“working” secures that distinction.58  If it is not the case that pragmatist’s truth criterion takes 
“working” to imply that which is “truth,” and/or if it cannot demonstrated in any clear way what 
they mean by their criterion, then these deficits renders Pragmatism “useless or irrelevant, or at 
best a truism.”59 
Schiller responds in October.  He takes aim at Lizzie Susan Stebbing for promoting the 
conversion of the pragmatic maxim “all truths work” into “all that works is true,” thereby 
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positing that Pragmatism cannot account for a difference between truth and error.60  Noting that 
Stebbing seems to be appropriating the falsehood promulgated by the Cambridge philosopher G. 
E. Moore as early as 1902, and ignoring his own disclaimer as to its validity in 1903, Schiller 
goes on to suggest that the possibility of a disinterested, and hence useless, form of truth has 
never existed.  Moreover, Stebbing is guilty of selective appropriation.  Schiller’s own work 
never asserted that “a desire to have a thing true sufficed to make it true.”61   And Stebbing 
further obscures the pragmatic doctrine by either ignoring or misapplying James’s arguments, 
even as she in at least one instance ascribes to James (wrongly) an opinion belonging to Schiller 
that is misinterpreted.62   Schiller is at least willing to assent to Stebbing’s claims if she is 
suggesting that “Pragmatism does not know of any formal criterion which will distinguish 
absolutely between truth and error.”63  However, if she wishes to assert that such a standard 
exists, Stebbing finds herself in the company of none, as no one has yet to find a standard which 
can set the distinctions between truth and error definitively. 
Not liking the company that Schiller leaves to her, Stebbing asserts in the April 1913 
Mind that her aim was “to call attention to the fact that unless the dictum were simply 
convertible it failed to provide a criterion.”64  After noting that the essentials of Schiller’s 
critique are of no matter to her criticism, Stebbing takes him at his word.  Noting that Schiller 
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argues that a desire to have something be true does not necessarily make it so, Stebbing posits 
that the assumption of the truth of his statements on Pragmatism are demonstrative of the desire 
he rules out of hand.  But, without a criterion to prove their validity, Schiller has no way to 
respond.65  The larger point is that this line of analysis renders his argument “inconsistent.”  If 
something is true because it works, but some things that work can be in error, there is no means 
by which to consistently apply the standards of Pragmatism.66   
In October, Schiller begins by noting that Stebbing is a “formidable antagonist.” But 
Schiller sees Stebbing as “nonsensical” in her blending of different arguments from different 
authors meant to serve her ends.67  To accept her assertions is to accept positions he finds 
untenable.  First, for Schiller, “working” assumes degrees of meaning and contextual difference 
as it is applied to one or another situation.  Hence any “‘truths’ remain (preferred) truth-claims, 
and retain an infinite appetite for assimilating further ‘confirmation.’”68   But, second, Schiller 
thinks that, in searching for a “criterion,” Stebbing conflates true and absolute.  This is the larger 
failing of her argument.  If intellectualists have failed to provide, and pragmatists only assert the 
move towards, a criterion of truth, it does not follow that both are a priori designations.  In 
contrast to the works of idealists like Bradley or newer logicians like Stebbing, pragmatism does 
away with the need for any ultimate standard for truth and error.  Instead, pragmatism moves 
forward by “comparing the values of different truth-claims, and discarding the less valuable as 
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‘false.’”69   Schiller’s conclusion, then, is to note that Stebbing has foisted her view of truth onto 
the very doctrine that seeks to repudiate that view.  In doing so, she forgoes affording those of 
her ilk a “notion of truth they can use.”70 
Earlier in 1913, Schiller pens a review in Mind of Ralph Barton Perry’s dauntingly titled 
book, Present Philosophical Tendencies: A Critical Survey of Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism 
and Realism, Together With A Synopsis of the Philosophy of William James (1912).   He prefers 
to junk naturalism and focus on the latter three topics, “as these seem to be also the three main 
interests of the author himself.”71  Schiller is surprised that Perry, a self-described New Realist, 
is so close to hitting Pragmatism’s most fundamental marks, yet falls back on—perhaps on 
account of his relative youth—the position, once proffered by “the terrible cant,” that there is a 
“strictly theoretic value of ideas.”72  But such a pure valuation does not exist in Pragmatism and 
it certainly isn’t found in the works of James.73  It is in vain, therefore, that Perry seeks to find 
metaphysical distinctions in the tenets of Pragmatism.  And Pragmatism seeks—through James, 
Schiller, and Dewey—to repudiate “the antagonistic dogmatisms” of Realism and Idealism that 
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such a metaphysical apparatus would impose.74  Schiller supposes all these “flaws” are the result 
of Perry attempting to prove his realism by the “proof of the failure of Idealism.”75 
Perry’s begins by noting that his October 1913 reply in Mind almost never occurred.  
Noting that at first he felt it “not probable that there will be any profit in replying” to Schiller, 
Perry wisely reconsiders on account of his “feeling of discontent” regarding the review.76  This 
malaise is the result of Schiller misreading his work.  More specifically, the review obscures how 
Perry’s arguments about realism and Idealism set the stage for his New Realism.77  But Perry 
also objects to Schiller’s reading of his reading of James.  The issue is not whether or not 
Schiller and James are in accord with each other generally; it is, rather, the degree to which their 
views are realist-ic (James) and in line with Perry’s arguments or subjectivist-ic (Schiller) and 
out of step with both Perry and James in a metaphysical sense.78    For a response that almost 
wasn’t, this proves a spirited start to a debate that isn’t over.   
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But it is the end to what has been a busy two years.  In that time Schiller has advanced 
humanism as much by repetition as by anything else.  New editions of three books came out, 
editions which only intensified the fissures between Schiller and his critics and, in some cases, 
his fellow pragmatists.  The sole original work, Formal Logic, the treatise that James had urged 
him to complete, failed as a systematic statement of humanism even as it succeeded in pushing 
the battle for humanism into new directions.  And it is on that point that one should perhaps 
linger.  For, in the upcoming years, Schiller will both double back and move forward.  He will 
reclaim an interest in psychical research.  But he will also more fully engage the newest avenues 
which breathe life into his philosophy: the necessity ofeEugenics, the waywardness of Logic, and 
the memory of James.   Though there is little new to say, there are newer reasons to say it.    
5.3 ADVANCE ON ALL FRONTS: EUGENICS, LOGIC, AND PSYCHICAL 
RESEARCH 
The start of 1914 finds Schiller turning to eugenics.  To be clear, this isn’t Schiller’s first foray 
into eugenics.  Starting in the previous decade, Schiller addresses a range of eugenic arguments, 
ones not always in evidence in contemporaneous discussions of the term.  Indeed, if not for the 
use of said term and the clear classist and racist reference points, some of these discussions 
                                                                                                                                                       
epistemological contradiction” (John E. Boodin, “Pragmatic Realism—The Five Attributes,” Mind 22, no. 88 
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would seem within the range of contemporary concerns.  In 1908, in the Oxford and Cambridge 
Review, Schiller takes on the cause of reforming the scholarship system at Oxford.  He 
challenges the notion that the school is engaged in the “wasting of scholarships upon those 
whose fathers can well afford to send their sons to college.”79 As Schiller conceives it, making 
scholarships a rarified thing—attractive to the many, but available to the few—spurs on two 
positive results: (1) they raise “the standards of intellectual aspiration and achievement” amongst 
all who seek them, and (2) they offset the slide into charity that has befallen the Continent, the 
unchecked effect of which would be “that in a couple of hundred years’ time not only the 
Japanese and the Chinaman but also the Negro may be the superior in sheer intellect of the 
enervated European.”80   
Two years later, in the Eugenics Review, he applies the concept more widely, supposing 
that nations should be reformed along eugenical lines.81  For Schiller, this societal application is 
consistent with pragmatism-as-method.  As he states:  
The Eugenical State, being aware of its liability to err, will guard against error in advance 
by incorporating into its structure provisions for detecting and correcting errors it may 
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commit.  It will value individuality highly enough to grant its members freedom of 
discussion and experiment upon all questions which are felt to be not yet settled.82 
 
This liability to error leads him to slightly alter his educational concerns of 1908.   In the 
pamphlet “Practicable Eugenics in Education” (1912), published by the London-based Eugenics 
Education Society, his focus is not other races.  Schiller worries about problems internal to 
Britain (and, one assumes, Europe).   While scholarships should still supply “the highest classes 
with an ideal and a personal incentive to self-improvement,” the sole focus cannot be on 
financial rewards for the elite.  Eugenics must be expanded to cover the entirety of a liberal 
education.  It must address the whole person, physical as well as mental, to craft persons who 
earn rather than presume the status of being elite.  Such an expansion is meant to offset the 
problems of the “present sham nobility,” with its laxity and corruption borne of “unhallowed 
unions of wealth and politics.”83   
Clearly, then, Schiller’s concerns predate the publication in January 1914 of “Eugenics 
and Politics” in the Hibbert Journal.  This essay, however, is the spike point in what becomes an 
increasing preoccupation.84  Until now, Schiller’s overriding focus, the above forays into 
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pragmatism.  However, like past commentators’ treatments of Riddles of the Sphinx or his interest in psychical 
research, this area of Schiller’s life is taken as decidedly non-philosophical.  Given the extent of coverage Schiller 
gave to eugenics, it is interesting to note how his biographer, Abel, chose to handle the topic.  In 1955, Abel offers 
these accounts of Schiller’s eugenic views.  First Abel notes that “His interest in eugenics, while no one disagreed 
with him in theory, was likewise considered rather extreme, and at least on the borderline of properly philosophic 
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eugenics notwithstanding, has been on advancing pragmatism as the methodological arm of 
humanism and as against Absolute Idealism.  But this signals a chapter in his life where he seeks 
to broaden humanism’s reach by applying it socially.  If formal logic enhances social evils, it is 
eugenics which stands as a possible measure of repair and progress.  Schiller’s turn to eugenics 
as a practical outlet for pragmatism is not as off-putting as it might seem.  To begin with, 
eugenics is experiencing some of its highest standing at this point in the century.    It is a 
movement that seeks to reconcile, as Schiller had tried previously with Science and Religion, 
strains of the new and old:  
In their own eyes the eugenicists were both radicals and guardians of tradition; radicals 
because they considered themselves to be attacking many hallowed doctrines that had 
been shown to be wrong by modern science, and guardians of tradition because their aim 
was to keep Britain mentally and physically ahead of the rest of the world.85 
                                                                                                                                                       
pursuits” (Reuben Abel, The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller [New York: King’s Crown Press, 1955], 6).  
But in a later portion of the same book, Abel suggests that Schiller’s “social and political views impress a reader of 
his other books as a wild and irrational vagary that has no connection, either logical or psychological, with the 
humanist core of his work” (147).  In 1966, while introducing a collection of Schiller’s works on Pragmatism, Abel 
says only that “Schiller was interested in such academically dubious topics as eugenics and psychical research” 
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(Kenneth Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism [Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1967], 7).  Arthur Henry provides another distinct, though brief and decidedly pro-eugenics, discussion of Schiller’s 
interest in the connections between eugenics and politics ("The Social Attitudes of F. C. S. Schiller," Personalist 25 
[1944]: 256-59). 
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provided a focus for a series of more general moral, social and demographic anxieties” (Mathew Thomson, The 
Problem of Mental Deficiency: Eugenics, Democracy, and Social Policy in Britain c. 1870-1959 [Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988], 20-1). 
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And 1914 is a particularly opportune, and troubling, time to attempt such a merger.  The political 
scene in Europe is in disarray.86  Such uncertainty proves a useable catalyst for the eugenicists.  
They suggest that the destructive tendencies at play are those which eugenics, at its most high-
minded, might remedy.87  Before the year is out war will be declared and Britain’s so-called 
                                                                                                                                                       
While the scientific evidence was assumed, ala polymath Francis Galton (1822-1911), to be in evidence 
and served to generate implied warrant for eugenic reform, many of those who spoke on behalf of eugenics 
proceeded along social and political lines, ala Schiller.  Galton’s development of the theory of eugenics (he coined 
the term in his 1865 Hereditary Genius) served as a rallying cry which many prominent thinkers, both in England 
and abroad, saw as convincingly demonstrated in the social circumstance of a world encountering great industrial 
and political shifts.  For an overview of Galton’s own views readers are directed to Francis Galton, Essays in 
Eugenics (London: Eugenics Education Society, 1909).  For a surprisingly wide-ranging discussion (given the 
source) of the history of eugenics, readers are directed to Robert A. Peel, ed., Essays in the History of Eugenics 
(London: The Galton Institute, 1998).  It should be noted that there is a significant difference in involvement in 
eugenics generally and membership in a specific eugenics organization.  As even those sympathetic to eugenics are 
wont to note, membership in the Eugenics Education Society never breached the 800 member mark.  Such 
divergence between official and popular support can create problems for scholars assessing the influence of 
eugenics.  An interest case in point is to be found in the works of Celeste Condit and Marouf Hasian.  Hasian, 
Condit’s advisee, published a work about eugenics that unequivocally states “[Francis] Galton’s ideas of artificially 
regulating human heredity gained popular acceptance after the turn of the century, finding large followings in the 
United States, Britain, German, and other countries” (Marouf A Hasian, The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-
American Thought [Athens, Ga. University of Georgia Press, 1996], 21).  But Condit, in a work only three years 
later, states that “Eugenics was a prominent and visible, if not widely popular, discourse during the first three 
decades of this century [in the United States]” (Celeste Michelle Condit, The Meaning of the Gene [Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1999], 27).   Though “popular acceptance” and “widely popular” do not match up 
perfectly, a caveat seems necessary: the extent to which readings of the rhetorical history—Condit’s was a 
qualitative and quantitative study and Hasian’s was a qualitative “ideographic” one—differ imposes limits on how 
one assesses an object of study. 
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dominion over Europe will be thrown into doubt.  It is from within this unstable context that 
Schiller offers these eugenical arguments. 
Schiller explains that eugenics can “be conceived as the application of biology to social 
life, as a sort of social hygiene on a large scale; and so it seems destined to make trouble in a 
world which has long grown used to unhygienic, dirty ways.”88  Its value lies in disabusing 
people of the notion that betterment is the rule and progress is assured. With the increase of “an 
industrial system which exploits men as if they were machines,” with the antagonisms inherent 
in “the relations of capital and labour,” eugenics affords a pragmatic tonic to those lulled into 
complacency; it, like Malthusianism before it, might help society to see the danger and “enable 
our forethought to avert it.”89  
What is this danger?  In one sense, it is to champion quantity at the expense of quality, to 
ignore what science and nature so full well demonstrate: 
For some bodies are intrinsically better than others, stronger, fairer, healthier; and some 
minds are strong, ampler, and happier than others.  It is better to be born an Achilles than 
a Thersites, and a Plato than an idiot.  Is it not worth while, therefore, to get for oneself 
one of these superior equipments for the purposes of living, or otherwise to learn how to 
make the best and the most out of the bodily and mental qualities one is endowed with?90 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
surrender of the Boers, more than 100,000 troops were injured and more than 22,000 troops died—with many of 
both groups being laid low by disease rather than actual conflict—at a financial cost of over £217 million.  And the 
Afrikaners, through a series of negotiations, were allowed to still claim a political presence in South Africa; the 
realization, then, was that “the British, for all their sacrifices, had not really secured their total predominance in 
South Africa” (G. R. Searle, “The Boer War,” A New England?  Peace and War: 1886-1918 [Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2004], 283). 
 
88
 F. C. S. Schiller, “Eugenics and Politics,” Hibbert Journal 12, no. 1 (January 1914): 241. 
 
89
 Schiller, “Eugenics,” 242-3.  The reference here is to those theories associated with the work of Thomas 
Robert Malthus (1766-1834), the economist who posited in the 1798 An Essay on the Principle of Population that, 
left unchecked, the population—meaning, in his conception, the poorer classes—would become disproportionate to 
the foodstuff necessary to sustain it. 
 
90
 Schiller, “Eugenics,” 244. 
 
  286 
On the other hand, the danger is to mistake pity for progress.  Schiller rails against propping up 
the “weaklings, wasters, fools, criminals, lunatics” who drain society.  But this is exactly what 
societies, as presently organized, have done.  “They have made no systematic and intelligent 
efforts at improving the human race or preventing its degeneration.”91  They engage is anti-
eugenical practices such as war and slavery.  The first cuts down those members of society 
which society should protect; the second allows “the inferior race to survive under the rules of 
conquerors” who themselves will not produce at a rate equal to their conscripts.92  Nor can 
societies appeal to any instinctual, biological, sense of progress.  There must, Schiller contends, 
have been a time when that was the case, when the survival of the fittest—the fleetest of foot, the 
farthest of gaze—was the condition by which civilization advanced.  
 But that time has since past.  “In the main, then, sociological development has superseded 
physiological as the foundation of social progress, and this has doubtless, on the whole, been a 
gain, though it has brought into being the phenomenon of social contra-selection and the 
elimination of the fit.”93  But it is a mistake to simply assume the higher strata of society supplies 
the question and the lower strata supplies the answer to the dysgenic tendencies of today.  
Schiller contends the real culprit is “the whole trend of social legislation.”94  Placing a burden 
upon the middle class, in the form of taxes, to pay for social reform schemes, society ends up 
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diminishing that class and furthering the gap between the upper and lower classes.  By such ill-
advised plans, society works “to tax the middle classes out of existence.”95    
The eugenic problem, then, is essentially a social problem.  And, for Schiller, no progress 
will be made in advance upon that problem until a fundamental change occurs in how people 
conceive of society: “the biological unit of human life is neither the individual nor the State, but 
the family.”96  But the promotion of the family is beset from all sides.  Individualism 
misunderstands the function of the individual.  “His proper place, whether for the male or the 
female, is that of a vehicle, a functionary entrusted with the transmission (or otherwise) of the 
hereditary qualities (good or bad) of his germ plasm.”97  Socialism errs in one of two directions, 
either in failing to meet the expectations of the individual, or in pummeling into submission 
those individuals necessary to the continuance of society.  Political Philosophy, borrowing 
uncritically from the lessons of the Greeks, ignores the familial unit in favor of individual.98  
Feminism involves itself in contradiction; “it does not appear to have considered that if the 
emancipation of women means (incidentally) a refusal to bear children, only those societies will 
survive which do not emancipate their women.”99   
Along none of those paths is progress to be found.  It is found, instead, in 
reconceptualizing the relation of politics to society: 
There is no saying, therefore, how powerful an instrument of good the family may not 
become, if the ultimate aim of statesmanship is conceived, not as the meaningless 
triumph of abstractions like ‘the State’ and ‘the’ individual, but as such an ordering of 
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society as will tend to the survival of the better families, that is, stocks, rather than of the 
worse, and to elimination, as smoothly and painlessly as can be arranged, of those which 
are diseased or defective or tainted.100  
 
But for any such improvement to begin, those championing eugenics must look elsewhere for 
models, as Europe and “democracies especially” seem ill-suited to take hold of reforms 
disruptive of “inertia of habit and stupidity.”101   No, it is China and Japan that offer 
contemporary champions of the family unit, and provide social schemes receptive to the best that 
“Western science” offers.  And even if it is impossible for Schiller to predict “the spiritual effects 
of Europeanisation on the fabric of their beliefs and institutions,” they stand in far better a 
position than their European counterparts.102   Indeed, if Western societies are to be saved, they 
should seek, in a like-minded fashion, to cultivate the best of ideas from wherever they come.  
To do otherwise or, rather, more of the same is to exhibit “all the marks of senile dementia and 
progressive paranoia.”103  
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In January 1914, Schiller also marshals his arguments against the usual philosophical 
evils.   Schiller’s eighteen page essay in Mind, “Aristotle’s Refutation of ‘Aristotelian’ Logic,” 
argues that Oxford has rendered a disservice to Aristotle’s conception of logic by focusing too 
narrowly on the Posterior Analytics, thus tending to “narrow the scope of ‘logic’ to the sterile 
and impotent contemplation of an impossible ‘ideal,’ which is utterly irrelevant to the realities of 
human knowing and insuperably obstructive to all progress of logical theory.”104  Schiller argues, 
after an extended discussion of fallacies or paralogisms (which he takes Aristotle to argue as 
being, paradoxically, general conditions violated in particular cases or particular cases violated 
generally), that these demonstrate that formal rules when applied to concrete cases lose their 
absolute qualities.105   He extends these distinctions to Aristotle’s discussion of contradiction in 
Nicomachean Ethics:  
But it is clear that Aristotle is conscious of no contradiction, or even paradox.  His 
doctrine in all these passages is the same, and it seems to him plainly true.  The general 
validity of a principle does NOT in itself guarantee its application to any specific case.  
What is true in general may be falsified in the case.106 
 
Though these seeming breaks from formal logic may shock some, Schiller suggests that they 
actually indicate strength in Aristotle’s theory: in the abstract realm of pure science universals 
may be held as true but, in the actual world of practice, it is unworkable to hold to any such 
standard.  Even in “the Snark-hunting” realm of pure mathematics, it is impossible to suggest 
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that “qualifications are [not] needed.”107  Schiller is led to conclude that the theoretical Aristotle 
was tested by the practical Aristotle: “it is clear as his subject becomes more and more concrete 
it forces him farther and farther away from his formal doctrine, until he comes into direct 
opposition to it.”108  Schiller concludes that, even when an Aristotelian law works in abstract, it 
resists working in practice, being theoretically sound but in application barren.   
This insistence on testing theory by way of practice is given even greater expression in 
Schiller’s July address upon being elected the President of the Society for Psychical Research.  
He begins by noting the seeming contradiction of having a philosopher lead a scientific 
organization:  
For the philosophic temper seems to be contemptuous of the minute details which count 
for so much in science, and impatient of the slow but unceasing advances which 
constitute the normal progression of science.  They contrast too much with the procedure 
of the speculative method, with its spectacular flights, gorgeous guesses, and hazardous 
predictions, which it flatters itself can be guaranteed by reasoning a priori.109 
 
But he calms himself with the knowledge that many of the Society for Psychical Research’s past 
presidents—Henry Sidgwick, William James, Henri Bergson—have taken to the demands of the 
job and promoted the inquiry into psychical phenomena.  And since the society has not suffered 
by its association with philosophy, the question then becomes which philosophical temperament 
is best suited to the future of psychical research?  There are at least three: (1) the Owl, which 
“loves obscurity, gets on the wing when the day’s work is done, and pursues its prey in the 
dark”; (2) the Lark, seeking “preliminary exploration, which heralds man’s conquest of new 
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realms of knowledge”; and (3) the Pelican, “which does not selfishly seclude itself in the 
contemplation of the eternal and immutable and indifferent, but tries to be useful and beneficial 
to men.”110  Schiller concludes that it is best to pursue in the spirit of the Pelican, but in the wake 
of the ground clearing of the Lark. 
Having noted what temper is required, Schiller proceeds to analyze the methods by which 
the work of the society can be carried forth.  He notes, in reference to Bergson, that the path is 
not in the main logical: “The evidence of psychic phenomena, which we collect, is primarily 
historical, and has to be ascertained according to the canons used by the historian and lawyer, 
rather than by the methods of the laboratory experimenter.”111  The lessons of history, psychical 
and otherwise, are singular; they resist attempts to “multiply evidence” or assail critics with the 
“accumulating weight” of experience.112  And the passage of historical time contradicts the 
progressive nature of science.  “In other words we must recognize it as an intrinsic limitation of 
historical evidence that it can hardly ever be, and can never remain, scientifically adequate, and 
that therefore our evidence also can never be made scientifically cogent, so long as it remains 
historical.”113   
What can be done to cross this seeming impasse?  The first thing is to recognize that 
almost all knowledge is, in fact and origin, historical.  Even if events do not repeat themselves, 
events occur so as to either establish a higher degree of probability that a law is (more probably) 
true or in need of revision; in short, historical events can lend themselves to better attempts at 
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prediction.  But psychical research is beset by an additional problem, one that distinguishes it 
from other sciences.  Scientists can limit the need to appeal to the predictive function of history 
by engaging in controlled experiments.114  It behooves psychical researchers, then, to “aim, not 
so much at establishing any particular ‘supernormal’ event, say a message from the departed, did 
veritably happen at a particular time, but at getting such a grasp on the conditions of such events 
that they can become predictable and ‘normal.’”115  In this way, Schiller aims to make psychical 
research, like all science, more probable and, like all theories held suspect, more palatable to 
those critics who demand proof.  But Schiller urges for more.  He seeks to make Psychical 
Research pragmatic, insofar as it contributes to all “genuine knowledge” by increasing “our 
power over the course of events.”116   
But there are obstacles to this call.  They are largely of a psychological sort.117  Schiller 
argues that the paucity of psychological methods suited to psychical research exposes “the 
general inadequacy of the conceptions with which we have to operate in analyzing phenomena 
that are offered to us.”118  Chief among these are notions of “the soul.”  As Schiller sees it, “the 
soul” is a wholly elastic as a term of art: 
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It embraces or expresses, in varying proportions, the notions of a principle to explain life, 
consciousness, spontaneous mobility, breathing, sleeping, dreaming, and possibly others.  
It is conceived as material or immaterial, as simple, multiple, or both at once, as the real 
man, or as a shadow reflect, as separable from its body and capable of inhabiting others, 
usually surviving death and often pre-existing birth.119  
 
Of all these varied meanings, Schiller conceives the worst to have been ascribing to “the soul” a 
sense of substance, of immutability.  Such a conception flies in the face of “the course of inner 
experience.”120  We learn about and experience things in process and to make the soul thing-like 
is to respond to the difficulties of conceiving a soul by making it into something it is not.   
Similar challenges beset our understanding of “reality.”  It can be seen to mean the 
formal aspects of an “object of discourse,” the psychological sense in which “anything is ‘real’ 
that is experienced,” or the pragmatic notion that “the ‘real’ is the important.”121  But psychical 
research, like all that aspires to be scientific, deals with reality that is at once spread across all 
these definitions.  And, Schiller posits, psychical research more honestly takes the challenges of 
science to heart.  In working over “the rubbish heaps of all the sciences for residual products of 
value,” it asks whether “the distinction between the ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’ is as rigid and absolute 
as we commonly assume.”122  By such provocations, psychical research might deal a blow to 
“the accounts of ultimate reality given by the various philosophies and religions.”123  A view 
incapable of historical verification, let alone present-day improvement, is a curio made curious 
by its lack of usefulness.   
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By its attempts to refine and improve its methods, psychical research might also remind 
the sciences of their essentially pragmatic character.  Each new discovery has been an advance 
on one front as much as it has been a defeat for another.  “For the sciences must all conceive 
themselves as progressive.  Hence they cannot regard their ‘truths’ as final, but must continually 
labour to improve their statement and to extend their sway.”124  Taken together, these promising 
paths suggest that psychical research is not “trivial, hackneyed, or devoid of the most varied 
connections with life, science, and philosophy.”125  Though the challenges aforementioned stand 
in the way of success, they in no way suggest this as a task not worthy of being taken up. 
That is, essentially, the rationale behind each of these three articles: risk is no excuse not 
to try.  A continent on the decline might suffer a larger measure of pessimism.126  But is it not 
better to seek out potential avenues for an optimistic rebirth?  Logic may seem a historical riddle 
resolved in the complex ledgers of Oxonian thinkers.  Yet will it not admit of alternative answers 
tendered on the back of actual practice?  Science’s propitious predictions more and more throw 
down against older and less secure narratives of religion.  But need the increased fortunes of 
science signal the death knell for spiritual curiosity?  And in each case—in his support for 
eugenical, logical, and psychical reforms—Schiller brackets the more speculative question of 
“what if” with the more headstrong “why not?”  With man as the measure there is nothing out of 
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bounds, nothing that admits of retreat.  But there are, lurking amongst his glorious guesses, 
persons still willing to hold his speculations in check. 
5.4 BATTLE LINES: CREATING NEW ENEMIES, REFUSING OLD FOES 
In recent years, Schiller’s pragmatic humanism has taken in a widening range of interests.  Such 
a project cannot, as Schiller must well know, be without consequence.   And, in July 1914, there 
are two instances of philosophic quid pro quo: a response to Schiller’s approach to Aristotle, and 
a reply from Schiller to Perry.127  In Mind, George Robert Thomson Ross argues that Schiller’s 
Aristotelian math suspect.  Ross believes Schiller’s whole argument is a dodge; he asserts that 
Schiller misinterpreted Aristotle to misrepresent Formal Logic.  In discussing “general truths” 
and particular cases, Ross argues that the conditions of the latter imply why the former are 
general and not universal; Aristotle “no doubt would have admitted that when the god honoured 
was a ‘fiendish’ god and the rites by which he were honoured were ‘beastly’ it was not right to 
                                               
127
 Three months prior, Schiller also had cause for reflection.  He reviewed Caldwell’s 1914 book Idealism 
and Pragmatism.  As was noted in Chapter Three, Schiller notes Caldwell’s credit for introducing pragmatism to the 
British in his article “Pragmatism” (October 1900, Mind).   But he questions Caldwell’s mixture of Idealism and 
Pragmatism.  What’s more, Schiller criticizes his willingness to too quickly assign an American stamp to the latter: 
“But for the accident that the greatest genius America has ever produced happened to become a professor, there 
would have been as little academic Pragmatism in America as anywhere else.  The American temper would (like the 
British) simply have continued to be flouted in academic circles, to find (intellectualist) ‘philosophy’ unpalatable 
and unintelligible, and to leave it severely alone.  Which is, after all, the attitude of most minds to the subject 
everywhere, and of most of the best minds in the Anglo-Saxon world.  As a matter of fact, therefore, its supposed 
conformity with the national temper has been the greatest obstacle, not only to the spread, but even to the intelligent 
appreciation, of Pragmatism.  It made Pragmatism such an object of dread and detestation everywhere to all who 
shared the professorial bias that they completely lost their heads over it.”  That being said, he is willing to grant that 
American remains the most receptive to Pragmatism, whatever its form, as it is there that philosophy as taught—not 
merely thought—is made to demonstrate relevance to everyday life (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Pragmatism and 
Idealism, by William Caldwell, Hibbert Journal 12, no. 3 [April 1914]: 705). 
 
  296 
honour such a god.”128  In much the same way, a syllogism is initiated by a major premise; but, 
Ross contends, “the major premise of a syllogism then is not a statement made without the 
qualifications that are necessary to a belief in its truth.”129  Ross fears none of this will matter 
much to Schiller, as he is willing to privilege the risks of thinking without bothering to consider 
the consequences of testing.  Applying the nautical metaphor, Ross suggests it is the tests 
Schiller finds so dubious that makes the boats seaworthy and “may let us visit strange scenes and 
give us quite as much excitement as we want.  Apparently, however, according to Mr. Schiller, 
when we do real thinking we go to sea in a sieve.”130 
In contrast, the sinking feeling to which Schiller attends, in the same number of Mind, is 
Perry’s regard for his opinions.  He regrets not getting Perry’s “approval,” and he further states 
that his stance was meant to be sympathetic to realism, as it—and this reflects back on his 
comments in the review—also works to combat the problems of Idealism.131  Dismissing Perry’s 
anxious need to distinguish Idealism from Realism as unnecessary, Schiller is still more 
concerned to understand what it is that Perry takes these two terms to mean.  Moreover, by 
attaching both highly ambiguous terms to the lumbering frame of a metaphysic or a method, one 
renders both terms of equal value, valueless, and the same sort of meaning, meaningless.132  And 
he still fears the source of all this trouble is Perry’s belief, as advanced if not admitted, that “by 
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clearing away this idealistic argument he has somehow strengthened the position of realism.”133  
Yet, if each is equally suspect in their ambiguity, what is the victory in championing one vague 
view over another?  As regards Perry’s pet project, the relation of object to its observation, 
Schiller also is suspicious.  It is one thing to argue that a thing exists independently 
(‘independence of the immanent’), quite another to define what is meant by that ‘independence’, 
and quite another to suggest this then proves the opposite state, dependence, and allows for one 
to generate the conditions en toto that produce or describe the one or the other.134   
Schiller’s last two arguments are focused on, first, the definition of pragmatism and, 
second, the conceptual understanding of James’s philosophy.  Had Perry noted that the pragmatic 
criticism of traditional philosophy “is essentially a denial of the finality of the distinction 
between the ‘theoretic’ and the ‘practical’ interests,” and that its force lies in the psychological 
(and we could add biological) causes for action rather than metaphysical fictions, his argument 
may have developed “a unity and connexion” which it currently lacks.135  As regards Perry’s 
“exegesis” of James, Schiller posits that Perry distinguishes James so as “to only read his own 
realism into, and out of, James’s works.”136  Central to that misdiagnosis-cum-revelation is 
Perry’s own inability to note the true novelty of James’s work: the notion that many of the a 
priori notions of previous philosophy were “fiction, and futile fiction, to be swept away.”137  It is 
only in the works of Henri Bergson, Schiller concludes, that Perry may find a person capable of 
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translating James’s vision into a metaphysic worthy of Pragmatism.138   To distort James’s 
theories otherwise is “to reduce it to mere banality.”139 
In October 1914, Schiller responds to Ross’s “logical” distortions in the pages of Mind.  
Schiller’s first general argument is that his “universal” rules and “unconditional” truths are as 
dubious as what Ross called “abstract.”  More to the point, none seem safe from falling apart 
upon application.  As Schiller notes: 
All actual cases of ‘truth,’ whatever the principles they appeal to, are individual and fully 
equipped with a specific context, i.e., consist of assertions made under special 
circumstances, and as the abstract formula or rule is merely a potential reservation . . . no 
principle or law can be presumed a priori to be valid in any particular application.140   
 
Given this, Schiller is in complete agreement with Ross that a major premise of a syllogism is 
conditional and wonders whether Ross is mistaking him for those whose “traditional 
interpretations have erroneously assumed” the unconditional nature of the premise.141  It is bad 
form, then, for Ross to argue that Schiller holds all Formal Logic to be gibberish, as all 
pragmatists are willing to assume a better stance once one is given to them.  It is to that end that 
Schiller hopes Ross, after having found no “formal difference” between truth and falsehood—
recalling here Schiller’s complaints against Stebbing—would be willing to undertake the search 
for some “real” distinction between the two.142   
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And while Ross remains silent on this point, Perry wants to continue his discussion with 
Schiller in the April 1915 Mind.  While Perry wants to reclaim the initial dispute’s three main 
issues—realism, Pragmatism, and William James—it is the issue of James’s that stands 
primary.143  Perry posits that Schiller’s joy at the broad range of James’s thought has not been 
supplemented by any existing overview of his diverse writings.  After referencing extensively 
from the works of James, Perry notes: “James is not to be summed up in this or in any other 
paragraph, nor does his philosophical work consist in any aperçu [an immediate impression; a 
brief survey or sketch] which Bergson has caused to ‘blossom in the metaphysical sphere.’”144  
Perry concludes that James’s popularity is ill-served as long as “some at least of his ‘followers’ 
have much to learn before they appropriate him as their own.”145 
In October of the same year, and feeling the sting of being accused of misunderstanding 
James, Schiller returns the volley with a parry and thrust.146  Schiller chastises Perry for asserting 
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that he called for “a completely elaborated alternative to James’s work.”147 A challenge to 
interpretation was, thus, turned into a call for lifelong study.  But here Schiller engages in a form 
of argument similar to the one he used in discussing Protagoras.  He sets up a straw man, 
asserting that Perry should be judged by a peer, and devolves his argument into an attack on 
asides (of his), not on content (of Perry).  Ending with a digression, Schiller grants the positive 
parts of Perry’s views of James, while noting that his own equation of James to Bergson should 
not be faulted for the “technicalities” of suggesting their connection.148    
This retreat into personal attacks is unseemly.  But it is more understandable if one 
considers it alongside an argument from the July 1915 Mind.  The topic is not the new realist, but 
the old idealist, Bradley.  In this case, Schiller pounces on a less vital, though still living, 
philosophical opponent.  And it suggests that a transference of tactics is occurring, a changing of 
guard.  One foe is retreating and is now less a potential hindrance to Schiller’s cause.  Another 
foe is emerging and challenging not only the cause but the Godhead for its tenets.  Support for 
this interpretation is found in Schiller’s letters.  As early as 1914, Schiller is again scrutinizing 
Bradley’s latest views.  But little, to his mind, in the way of novelty is found.  After sending 
along a copy to a recent acquaintance, Tobias Ballot Muller, he receives this response: 
As for Bradley’s book, it is very convenient to have his ‘Mind’ articles handy in 
convenient form.  Besides, the new matter in it interests me greatly.  How little he has 
grasped the fundamental contentions of your pragmatic logic is almost pitiable to see.  If 
only he would stop pulverizing a conception of ‘practice’, which no one accepts, + devote 
some attention to the problem of meaning, he would be spared much futile polemic 
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against what he takes to be pragmatism.  [along the side of the page he adds: “Bradley’s 
scrupulous avoidance of any reference to your person highly amused me!”] On p. 1 he 
still defines truth as “that which satisfies intellect” -- + it is a satisfn of “a special kind.”  
As you say, he makes striking concessions when he gets down to details; while his 
interesting personal beliefs certainly have a humanist look about them.149 
 
If this is change, it is change so incremental as to be merely bothersome.  Perry and logic, 
eugenics and psychical research, are of more concern in a world that has as of late tipped into 
war.  It is as if Schiller had finally gained the sense that James had arrived at years earlier: 
Bradley is an ill man, stuck in a philosophy which he won’t abandon, and should be left to the 
judgment of history.  But Schiller still can’t resist commenting on this latest variation in what is 
by now a repetitive storyline. 
And the five years since Schiller’s last sustained joust with Bradley have not been kind, if 
reviews of his latest book, Essays on Truth and Reality, are any indication.  And the answer to a 
question Schiller posed in July 1908—“Is Mr. Bradley becoming a Pragmatist?”—seems all but 
(not quite) affirmative in July of 1915.   Schiller lays out a couple of caveats regarding his latest 
essay, caveats which an interested reader might first assume are old jabs now lobbed as casual 
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observation.  He notes that “the badness of philosophic criticism,” which is in part due to “the 
common habit of critics to perform their responsible functions by reading the preface and then 
proceeding to discourse about familiar doctrine’s in the author’s last book, instead of reviewing 
the new one.”150  As a result, Schiller comes to Bradley’s defense, stating that many of the 
negative reviews may in fact be due to this trait.  But he goes on to explain that his defense is 
also based in the fact that he owes Bradley a debt.  Not in the sense of misstating his arguments 
against Bradley, nor in the sense that he was unwilling to point to areas where Bradley’s idealism 
wandered towards pragmatism.  Rather, Schiller wasn’t capable of seeing just how far Bradley 
would come in vacating the defenses he mounted against pragmatism only five short years ago, 
nor of seeing just how much of this pragmatic spirit underlay Bradley’s philosophy as far back as 
1883.151  In fact, it was the perceptive James who saw fit in the teens to let Bradley work this out 
himself: “it was much better to leave Mr. Bradley to puzzle things out for himself, as he would 
then in the end convert himself to something remarkably like pragmatism, though very likely he 
would never forgive those who had forced this development upon him against his will.”152 
Thus Schiller won’t rehash those old quarrels, as they remain in this collection largely 
unaltered and still show “that what is attacked is not any pragmatism any one has ever held, and 
also that each successive outburst is the precursor of further concessions to the genuine 
article.”153  Instead, Schiller wishes to examine the components of the book which are new, the 
preface and concluding chapters, and which might lead to a reappraisal of Bradley’s philosophy.  
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And original ideas abound, in both topics covered and old positions seemingly abandoned, that 
would initially suggest a sloughing off of some of Bradley’s most prized distinctions.  Here, 
though, Schiller cautions: “Not that Mr. Bradley formally withdraws what he said before; in view 
of the infinite elasticity of his Absolute in accommodating any amount of incongruities in their 
‘relative truth,’ that would be quite unnecessary.  He simply adds some surprising novelties.”154  
 This grafting leads to some interesting conclusions.  Bradley makes a distinction between 
the Absolute and God, in that the former cannot be worshipped while the latter remains an 
imperfect vestige of religious consciousness, the first still remaining infinite and the second 
essentially functioning as a practical (read: varied) concept put to various purposes.  But Schiller 
questions the extent to which this reasoning can be seen as pragmatic: 
It not only seems to make mere emotional satisfactoriness the primary source of religious 
‘truths,’ and makes no mention of any empirical testing, but sanctions the completest  
autonomy of every sort of truth-claim and a complete disregard of the duty of 
synthesizing the various sorts of ‘truths.’  So long as they do not claim to be absolute, 
‘truths’ have a licence to be as inconsistent as they please.”155 
 
As Schiller sees it, Bradley is dogged by his apparent need to make practical use out of the 
appearances he once set so skeptically against reality.  But he can’t get past the divide and so 
must instead: (1) ascribe a useful function to “fictions” pragmatists merely declaim as truth-
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claims; and (2) further distance himself from the reality of the Absolute by advocating 
“theoretical skepticism” against the progressive pursuit of experimentation.156   
 So where does this leave Bradley?  Schiller can’t help but suggest that these seeming 
points of agreement can only be coincidence; “for have we not Mr. Bradley’s word for it that he 
does not read what I write?”157  Nor can they be seen as full-blooded pragmatism “so long as a 
thinker continues to cast a slur on human knowledge as being ‘practical makeshift’ or 
‘fiction.’”158  What there is, then, is the fractured world of New and Old Bradley co-existing 
together with clarity falling prey to inconsistency.  On the one hand, truths are useful, selective, 
and personal, attending to and being made by the active man.  On the other, the Absolute, so 
qualified and curtailed as to no longer seem a monster, still yet to be found in any way useful.159  
In a rare note of what can be read as sympathetic dismissal, Schiller ends:  
The epistemological value of the Absolute therefore is no longer negative.  It has risen to 
zero.  The Absolute no longer vetoes every intelligible account of human knowledge.  
Hence the pragmatist strike against the Absolute must be solemnly cut off. . . . And to 
quarrel with a prodigal father about an issue of this kind seems to be worse than 
irreverence, an irrelevance.  Rather let us agree that the Essays in Truth and Reality are as 
fine a sepulchral monument as the Absolute deserves, even though it be of necessity a 
cenotaph.”160 
 
Rather than seek an advance upon a position lacking one, Schiller no longer dogs what has 
become a sleeping lie.  There are other topics with which to attend.  But, whereas the 
philosophical came to dominate the social in the past year, it is the world at war which 
increasingly crowds Schiller’s humanism in the upcoming years.  
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5.5 UNCERTAIN FUTURE AND CLEARER METHODS: REFINING SCIENCE 
AMIDST A WORLD AT WAR 
Stuart Wallace notes that Schiller saw the war as demonstrating “the philosophical bankruptcy” 
of Idealism, as “meaningless” in abstract as the war was appearing to be in reality.161  He also 
notes that Schiller “although critical of British policy . . . never openly campaigned against the 
war” for fear of the consequences it may have had for his career.162  Both points are certainly 
true.  But they are true only as far as they go.  It is more accurate to suggest that the war was but 
one more instance that showed Idealism to be wanting.  It is more precise to assert that Schiller 
did not openly criticize the war because his feelings regarding it fell outside an easily put right or 
wrong dichotomy.  His writings at the time, both public and private, demonstrate a continued 
attempt to broaden the social avenues of humanism.  And, to do so, he must rely on explanations 
of his philosophical beliefs that are contextually anchored to a world in the grip of an 
“unnecessary” war. 
The first clear indications of Schiller’s opinions of the war came in both a review and a 
letter.  The April review of John Dewey’s German Philosophy and Politics (1916) in Mind 
initially strengthens the first of Wallace’s contentions; that is, it supports a view that abstract 
philosophy is of little value when put to a test such as war.  Wallace makes mention of the 
passage where Schiller suggests that other factors are always at play—“appeals to honour, glory, 
loyalty, religion, plunder, and (now) ‘nationality’”—in sending countries into conflict.163  What 
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Wallace doesn’t note is how the discussion surrounding this comment clarifies Schiller’s 
argument.  Schiller praises Dewey’s dissection of the bankruptcy of German Idealist philosophy.  
But he also criticizes Dewey’s emphasis on that philosophical strain being a primary cause of 
Germany entering the war.  Any notion, philosophy included, that is taken too far can lapse into 
the deficits it seeks to correct.  As he explains in preferencing Pragmatism over Rationalism: 
For the world we are trying to inhabit and control is too vast, too variable and too subtle 
to be caught within the bounds of any rigid system, and every step we advanced was to be 
won only by the unceasing correction of the human fictions that were discarded as 
‘errors’ so soon as a more serviceable substitute for them could be devised.  Yet these 
‘errors’ reigned in their day as ‘truths,’ and our reigning truths are fabricated out of the 
same stuff by the same hands; is it necessary then, or wise, to delude ourselves by 
conceding absoluteness to our present dynasties?164 
 
If Pragmatism is to be true to itself it should be suspicious of any and all claims to truth.  It 
should, in short, act as method and advance as such.   
A letter in the same month adds to the sense that Schiller is suspicious, not so much of 
German motives, but of governments’ thirst for and appeals to war.  He begins by saying “. . . the 
whole duty of man has come to be to be sacrificed by ‘the State’ in a variety of horrible ways.  I 
fervently hope that America may remain at peace + a refuge for civilization [American entered 
the war exactly a year later, on 6 April 1917], whence it may again spread over the world when 
the general madness has spent itself.”  Of this, though, Schiller has doubts.  And he is somewhat 
prescient in his fears.  “But I am afraid it will not be in my time, + I can see no guarantee in the 
nature of things why men should not turn earth into a hell if they please – as at present they do.  
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In fact I expect things will get worse before they get better – the civil wars + revolutions are still 
to come . . .”165   
As the Civil War was for Americans of the stripe of James, so this war now is for 
Schiller.  Later in April, the conflict is the focus of a letter he writes to Thaw.  He suggests that 
“this life is a poor thing + this world incurably diseased unless they can be taken in a wider 
contest.”  The appeals which he mentioned in his review of Dewey, even as they trump supposed 
philosophical justifications, are equally lacking, revealing themselves “as not only essentially 
immoral but also as equally irreligious.”  He then suggests the larger turmoil at the base of his 
complaints: 
Conceive e.g. a dialogue between two intelligent spirits who, as soldiers, have just been 
successfully massacring each other? [sic]  How can they explain to each other or to 
themselves what it was all about + what was the good of it? [sentence crossed out] Will 
they not realize that what they have done + suffered has inevitably hindered their spiritual 
development, + that neither in this world nor in any other can the spirit be freed by 
cultivating hatred by insuring (?) itself to lies, brutalities + deceits + making itself an 
agent of destruction?  The zeal therefore with which men are fighting everywhere seems 
to me irrefragable proof that they have no religion + have lost even the half belief in a 
better world which they professed.  It follows that they will make this world 
progressively worse.  This war has put civilization back 2000 years, + shown that at heart 
+ in their moral nature the generality of men are still on the level of savages. (NB I 
always suspected this, + held that the apparent moral progress in modern times was due 
to the construction of artificial checks which in this war have been sedulously broken 
down by the rules).  The next war, which will probably be the Semi-Finals in the World 
Dominion Stakes, will be come pretty soon + be as much worse as this as this [sic] war 
than those of the 19th century.  In the Finally [sic] (between whom?) civilization will go 
under altogether + be blasted even out of the deepest ‘dug-outs’ to which the new 
troglodytes will have been driven by high explosives + air bombardments.  If it shd 
chance that by this time some disastrous discovery has given man control over the 
immense stores of inter-atomic energy, he will probably contrive to blow up the earth 
altogether, to substitute for it a swarm of planetoids inhabited by microbes!  A good 
riddance perhaps, but not what was intended by the lunatics who brought it about!166  
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For Schiller, this war is a test, a challenge to the optimism he so long has preached.  It is a 
crushing amalgam of spiritual despondence and human senselessness.  For these reasons, it is 
perhaps understandable that Schiller turns, first, to those who would profit by its wreckage and, 
second, to those methods which have till now offered him the most hope. 
In June, Schiller warns the readers of the Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 
that the terrible strain of war is giving rise to the prognostications of prophets.  It is an equal 
opportunity affliction, with both sides touting prophesies supposing to explain in whole or in part 
the war.  But Schiller remains skeptical.  He believes that “war-prophesies belong to the same 
stratum of beliefs and make their appeal to the same condition of war-neurosis, and the ordinary 
sociologist would not hesitate to dismiss them as unworthy of scientific attention.”  “But,” he 
continues, “our Society exists for the express purpose of raking over the rubbish-heaps of 
                                                                                                                                                       
California, Los Angeles.    There seems to have been some dispute as regards Thaw’s opinion of the war, as a letter 
November begins with Schiller responding: “. . . I am very glad to learn that you are not in favor of war in general 
but only of this war, which is a much more arguable position.”   But he goes on to again suggest that “one of the 
horrible things this war seems to have proved is that mankind loves a fight; + that the neutrals look on much like the 
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insane.  And this is the worst augury for the future of peace!” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 30 
November 1916, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special 
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
In a letter dated from January 1917, the same general malaise, and quarrelsome tone, is present.  But, with 
American having asked the Allies to state their intentions for peace, there is also hope.  Schiller notes that Wilson 
“sees a good deal further than the public does anywhere, + he sees the deadly peril of in which the technical 
developments of modern warfare have placed all civilization, + the necessity of reorganizing international relations 
radically, in order to avert the danger.  If so, he is the only great man in the political world at present, + it is 
extremely humorous that I shd have to direct your [postal stamps suggest she is again in the United States, in New 
York] attention to this possibility!” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 28 January 1917, Correspondence, 
Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research 
Library, University of California, Los Angeles).      Later in the year, in March, Schiller is more convinced in the 
power of Wilson, even if now somewhat naively optimistic as well.  As he states, “Wilson . . . will have more power 
than any man ever had in the world’s history + can determine the future of mankind, for ages to come.  If he decides 
for a ‘just’ i.e. moderate settlement with general disarmament, cutting off the claws of all the govts, freedom of the 
seas (including prohibition of submarines) + a restoration of the rights of neutrals, he can make the propts of warfare 
look so nugatory that peace will prevail by common consent” (F. C. S. Schiller, Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 23 
March 1917, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special 
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
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orthodox science, and must not shrink from the search for truth in unlikely places.”167  His task is 
to go over the piecemeal documentation given to him by the SPR.  Even with little to go on, “it 
must be confessed that the evidence was so bad that it did not seem to warrant further 
investigation.”168  Most of the materials, even those deemed “the more verifiable cases,” were so 
riddled with inconsistencies of date and fact that even a brief check of their information was 
enough to conclude them false.169  A typical example of Schiller’s attitude to the written record 
is as follows: 
Now the facts about ‘Mme de Thebes’ (as gathered from an examination of her 
Almaknacks for 1912, 1914, and 1915) appear to be these.  Like all ‘prophets’ she is fond 
of predicting wars and catastrophes, and after the 1911 crisis [a military territorial dispute 
in Morocco between France and Germany precipitated by the arrival of a German 
gunboat] it would have been remarkable if she had refrained from doing so, especially as 
political circles in Paris, with which she appears to be more or less in touch (probably on 
their feminine side), seem to have been far more conscious of the critical condition of 
European peace than those in London.  Her prophesies, however, are mostly couched in 
vague general terms, and she often ‘hedges.’  Moreover, the claim to a ‘fulfilment’ of her 
previous predictions which she annually makes are frequently very ‘thin.’  She also 
makes a considerable number of egregious blunders.170 
 
Schiller’s conclusion, based on the prescience of people such as this, is succinct: “In view of this 
material it certainly does not become easier to believe that the human race is growing in 
enlightenment and increasing in critical intelligence.”171    
A month later, the 1868 prophesy of a Serbian peasant named Mata is brought to 
Schiller’s attention.   The man, standing and screaming in the middle of a village street, is 
purported to have accurately predicted the savage murder of the Prince of Serbia [likely King 
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Alexander I of the House of Obrenovich who, after his murder in June 1903, was replaced King 
Peter I of the House of Karageorgievich].  After being arrested and put in jail, Mata had other 
visions which he put down on paper.  By none too clear a route, the story ended up being relayed 
by a M. Chedo-mille Mijatovich, in both a 1903 contribution to the SPR and a 1906 book.172  But 
these prophesies, focusing largely on a person who will rise from amongst the people to save and 
unite Serbia against foreign conquest and terror, meet with the same sorts of problems as those 
listed in the previous article.  Schiller admits that the prediction of invasion would have seemed 
likely in 1868, but chalks up the tale of a hero arising from the people to a mere expression of 
“commonplaces of patriotic aspiration everywhere.”173  Both stories add up to more of the same: 
easily discounted and publicly ridiculed examples of psychical research in action.  But they are 
turned to the promotion of belief in a time of war.  That Schiller should be dismissive of their 
message only suggests that appeals to the war spirit are no less possible in the study of spiritual 
matters. 
In 1917, Schiller is tired of puncturing the prophets of prediction.  He returns to 
something that does not defy logic: his belief that logic is in need of reform.  And, in “Scientific 
Discovery and Logical Proof,” his contribution to Charles Singer’s Studies in the History and 
Method of Science, Schiller again sounds what has become his most insistent criticism: “Among 
the obstacles to scientific progress a high place must certainly be assigned to the analysis of 
scientific procedure which Logic has provided.”174  What follows is a sprawling, sixty-five page, 
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treatise that can be read as an extension of his discussions in Formal Logic.175  The question is 
why?  Why would Schiller repeat his complaints now?  The answer lies in the fact that Schiller is 
seeking a reform to logic that does justice to the demands of science.  If Absolute Idealists 
preach empty forms and war has engendered senseless acts, it is more understandable that 
Schiller would now appeal for a logic which answers “the need for inquiry into meaning and into 
the conditions of its communication.”176  The paper proper thus sets about the task of examining 
how better to explain the actual relation of logic to the sciences, so as to better accord interplay 
between both. 
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To Schiller, the first and most obvious issue is that the traditional theory of proof does 
not correspond to the actual process of scientific discovery.  Rather, it mirrors the procedures set 
forth by the Greeks for the purposes of dialectical debate.177  The problems implicit in grafting 
these dialectical rules onto applied subjects are manifold.  For one, they assumes a rigidity of 
terms irrespective of shifts from one frame of reference to another.  Now, in everyday situations, 
Schiller full well recognizes that we will accept the “valid ‘fiction’” of set terms.  But a 
progressive science is not the same; “the meaning of terms often develops so rapidly that such 
verbal reasoning does not suffice.  Hence the mere occurrence of verbal contradiction in a 
scientific reasoning is no proof that the argument is unsound.  It may show merely that its terms 
are growing.”178   But traditional logic denied said growth by way of a novel trick.  It assumed 
the absolute certainty of the initial principles whereupon “no possibility of a growth of assurance 
in the progress of reasoning could be entertained.”179  In sum, the limitations of its range became, 
for traditional logic, the proof of its design.   
Traditional logic also works against an accord with science by an equally ingenious route.  
Logicians state that the act of discovery is so obviously psychological that it simply cannot be 
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dealt with logically.  But this rests on a confusion of two distinct aspect of discovery: “the actual 
procedure of the individual discoverer, and the generalized description of the attitude of mind 
and procedures of discoverers, as they appear to subsequent logical reflection.”180  The first case 
is, as a matter of history, obviously fraught with difficulties.  The temptation is to tout the tale at 
the expense of the actual happenings.  The further back the story recedes in time, the more likely 
the gloss on the relevant details.  The second case, however, demands no such specificity of 
detail.  For, Schiller contends, it is possible to develop a working account of the “procedure of 
discoverers, which may serve as a guide and model to subsequent discovers.”181  That this 
account will not be certain, that it will be subject to revision, only suggests a practical desire to 
junk the search for certainty in order to develop plans for subsequent acts of discovery.182  This 
would thus establish a revised, and agreeable, relationship between logic and science. 
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Implicit in this revised view are those resources which “form the scientific capital which 
is necessarily risked in research if it is to yield interest.  It comprises (a) approved principles, (b) 
known facts, and (c) established meanings of words.”183  The first can only be taken in a 
hypothetical, not absolute sense.  The second, like the issue of what works, is relative to context.  
Like principles, facts are subject to the demands of the work being done and remain plastic; “the 
‘facts’ will not only look different but may really be different from different points of view, and 
for different purposes.”184  The third returns us to the notion of “the everyday.”  In most cases 
“one cannot of course overlook the obvious fact that the employment of words is primarily 
determined by their established meanings, and that these greatly limit our freedom to use them as 
we please.”185  But as actual meanings shift, so too do the limitations on the words.   In other 
words—itself a phrase resistant to traditional logic—formal logic has no method of dealing with 
the phrase “a squared circle.”  But in context of boxing, and in light of that usage, the phrase can 
be explained. 
By placing the absolute into the dustbin, a revised logic places the responsibility on the 
discoverer to push forward science.  “If he fails, he can no longer plead that it is not his fault, 
seeing that he has kept every letter of the law and broken no logical rule . . . in whatever way he 
fails, his personal failure is pro tanto [as far as it goes] a failure of science to progress.”186  But 
the risk of failure is the price of novelty, and the success of novelty is progress: 
We simply must have a science that can handle human life and meet human needs, and 
does not degenerate into a game with arbitrary and fantastic rules which depart from the 
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actual conditions of life in any direction and to any distance unrestrained imagination 
carries them, and our logic must deign to study such a science.  If to do so it has to 
‘scrap’ its antique ‘ideals’, to abandon its pose of an inhuman, impassible, infallible 
aloofness, and to interest itself in the doubting, questioning, guessing, trying, risking, 
blundering, correcting, achieving that makes up the sum of human knowledge, it will 
receive an ample reward in the gratitude of man for a logic that has entered his service, 
and in the salutary influence which it will exercise upon his actions.”187 
 
Transformed, Schiller sees philosophy as attending to the necessities of life, and science as the 
method by which we attain answers for life.188   
But “the actual conditions of life,” once grasped, recede into the background, into history.  
So, in an April 1917 review of Francis Sydney Marvin’s Progress and History (1916) in the 
Hibbert Journal, Schiller engages in a discussion of history-as-selection.  Noting that the text, as 
a collection of essays, struggles to find an appropriate definition of the first term, Schiller settles 
first on the historical one proffered by R. R. Marett: “‘change, in some sense, for the better’.”189  
Such a definition might strike some as entirely too optimistic.  So Schiller posits a moral 
description of the same, one offered by L. P. Jacks: “‘that process by which a thing advances 
from a less to a more complete state of itself.  Now whether this process is a desirable one or not 
depends on the nature of the thing which is progressing.’”190  We can take the two to represent, 
as is implied, Schiller’s view of history.  Combined, then, a pragmatic perspective would takes 
the evolutionary definition and subject it to the valuating one, in that what is better is that which 
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advances towards a desirable end.  But, and this relates to “Scientific Discovery and Logical 
Proof,” a desirable end is not found in divorcing the context from its application.  As such, 
Schiller criticizes approaches which are too heavily tilted to pure science and divorced from “the 
effects of applied science in transforming the conditions of life.”191  Such conditions qualify 
Schiller’s progress-as-positive thesis.  As he noted, any attempt to test, to verify, carries with it 
the risk that there will be failure.  Thus it is foolhardy to cast out the opposite of progress; as “it 
is not only vain, but positively perilous, to search out verbal spells that promise to bridge over 
the stupendous abysses of the natural world and to insure man against unavoidable risk of 
returning, as a prodigal son, to his parents, Chaos and Black Night.”192  Though a step forward is 
a productive one, it does not magically remove the possibility of a step in the opposite direction. 
Such regressive nightfall is surely a reflection of the continuing rumblings of war.  And 
its effect on Schiller—his continued push for a logic as used and for social habits improved—is 
bracketed by the voices of his friends.  In May 1917, on a cheap looking piece of parchment, 
Knox jots this note to his friend at Oxford, while he himself is at war: 
. . . there is very little time for writing (and still less for reading) in my present existence.  
However, in spite of the strenuous life, and the small opportunities for exercise, I am 
wonderfully well; and I wouldn’t exchange my present lot for anything on earth.  I have 
been very needy (?) at times, but only once (before the real work began) had to lie up.  
Notwithstanding all which, the only thing I live for, so far as my private feelings are 
concerned, is the thought of getting out of it all, and bringing my remaining years to a 
peaceful close in quiet domesticity.  In retrospect my experience of the psychology of the 
War will doubtless be quite interesting.  The thing that has surprised me most is to find 
that everything from the outset has appeared to me perfectly natural – including the fact 
that other people are doing their best to kill you.  (When I say “you” I mean “me”, which 
contradiction surely goes to prove that human individuality is mere appearance).  As I 
write for instance, I find myself taking a mild interest in distinguishing between the 
crackling of bursting shrapnel, and the “Kerrump” of the more aggressive High 
Explosive, both of which, again, are very distinct from the sound of our own batteries 
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with which the enemy appear to be arguing; and I can hardly believe there was a time 
when I imagined that these things were not merely interesting but exciting. . .193 
 
Here again we find Schiller at a distance.  As with James and the rise of pragmatism in America, 
Schiller is once more placed beyond the scope of the events upon which he ruminates.  His duty 
to career and country is, in contrast to Knox, being worked out in galley proofs and against 
formal ones.  Schiller’s stake in individuality is not tested by the “interesting” experiences of 
Knox.  So he continues to attend to that issue which is, figuratively and literally, closer to home: 
eugenics.  This cause is to Schiller what battles and bombardments are to Knox; its consequences 
might reshape the appearance of the landscape which is Schiller’s purview. 
In the July 1917 issue of the Eugenics Review, Norah March claims that “the War has 
just precipitated, not inaugurated, this national effort for the better preservation of child life.”194  
In another article in the same issue, Mrs. Scharlieb argues that the suggestion of quality at the 
expense of quantity as regards birth and death rates is an erroneous one.195  As regards the first, 
Schiller’s question is not about preservation; rather, he wants to know what is eugenic about such 
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schemes for preservation.  On that point, he finds March’s argument lacking.  Schiller notes “that 
one of the chief obstacles to improvement of human race, and a possible source even of its 
degeneration, is the wide prevalence of a deficient, or at any rate greatly diminished, rate of 
reproduction in the upper strata of human societies, as compared with the lower.”196  To the 
extent that Baby Week programs only seek to foster the unselective improvement of children’s 
lives, they in no way seek to incur eugenical benefits.  As regards the second, Schiller sees the 
argument as being a question of selection.  If the birth-rate is low, “there cannot be much 
selection”; if both the birth- and death-rates are high, “there may be a considerable amount of 
selection.”197  None of this is to suggest that Baby Week is to be condemned.  But Schiller 
cautions: 
The Eugenics Education Society should beware of lavishing upon the schemes of 
politicians an unreserved critical approval.  The world has suffered more than enough 
from the effects of well meaning ignorance.  And our function is surely to study the 
enormous complexities of the problems of social biology, and to warn politicians and 
enthusiasts that they should look before they leap.198 
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correspondence suggests that it was at Slosson’s urging that Dewey wrote a review of Schiller’s 1912 Formal Logic 
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C. D. Whetham responds to Schiller’s cautions, having been involved in three gatherings 
of varied type and composition.  He goes on to note: 
The children of the upper classes who were present had obviously a greater advantage, 
whether by inheritance or nurture, in freedom from such defects as adenoids, decayed 
teeth, etc.  They were also larger, heavier, and better nourished.  It was also clear that in 
each class, where children of labourers were concerned, awards tended to go to the 
youngest, probably because there had been less time and opportunity for the special 
defects of unguarded childhood to develop.199 
 
Whetham’s comments seem to square with both Schiller’s questioning of the unselective nature 
of such events and March’s suggestion of fostering general improvement.  As Whetham 
concludes, “the local committee in each case held in [sic] it in their hands to make the 
celebration of permanent eugenics advantage or not, but that in nearly every case the mothers 
were encouraged in their efforts to bring up their children to be as healthy as circumstances 
permit.”200 
 The arguments above again suggest that Schiller is, at this stage, a committed eugenicist.  
But they also suggest that he is a pragmatic eugenicist.  It pays to recall that his arguments here 
dovetail with the ones he offered in “Eugenics and Politics” and are also consistent with his 
approach in “Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof.”  Relative truths do not simply imply that 
anything goes.  Approximate steps carry with them both the risk of failure and the chance of 
success.  And context varies content.  If something has failed it behooves interested parties to 
look for a better path.  In Schiller’s constricted social milieu, with nary the “Kerrump” of High 
Explosives, baby pageants are a test case for the promotion of progressive social biology.  In his 
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insistent philosophical approach, to not seek out a better alternative is to feign confidence in 
practices which have not been tested.   Schiller’s social and philosophical approaches accord 
most cleanly the more both seek to improve the conditions—as he sees them—of actual life. 
 This confluence of the social and philosophical can be read into Schiller’s first academic 
work of 1918, “Cassandra’s Apologia,” in Mind.  Framed as a dialogue between Apollo and 
Cassandra, a figure he will utilize in a later writing, it amounts to a simple and satirical defense 
of the premise that undergirds his social and philosophical arguments: the superiority of relative 
(practical) as opposed to fixed (theoretical) truth.  It is no surprise that Apollo advances the latter 
position in admonishing Cassandra: “You had better betake yourself to a wholly contemplative 
life, and devote yourself to the prevision of eternal truth which you are privileged to behold.”201  
Such a stance troubles Cassandra, as it places her above the pains of mere mortals.  So much the 
better by Apollo’s account.  He is offering to make her “prescience painless and [her] life 
endurable by imitating” him.202   
But Cassandra won’t bow to this argument, or to Apollo’s curse that no one will believe 
her even though what she foretells will come true.  Her reasoning?  Experience influences the 
outcome of events and thus knowledge is only “a confident belief that is not doubted.”203  Apollo 
bristles at this suggestion for, independent of what anyone thinks, “the true is true and the false is 
false.”204  Cassandra counters that “the truth does seem to be affected by what men believe about 
it.  The belief that something will happen seems to make it happen, or else to make people take 
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measure to frustrate it.”205  Such nonsense, retorts Apollo, doesn’t change the fact that no one 
will believe her.  What then, Cassandra replies, if she acts in support of the false so only to get 
people to endorse the true?  This upsets and confuses Apollo, as it “would set at naught” all the 
punishment he intended to inflict upon her and lead him to doubt that she believes what she says.  
And why, wonders Cassandra, would he doubt her?  “Because you act so differently.  And I 
suspect that your acts are better witnesses to your beliefs than your words.  For it is easier to 
deceive by words than by deeds.”206  This pleases Cassandra.  “It seems to me, Apollo, that you 
are now speaking like a pragmatist.”207   
 Apollo is unfamiliar with the term.   Understandably so, as it won’t be understood for at 
least “another 3,000 years” and, even then, “men will say that it is nothing new and that they 
have always been pragmatists.”208  Which doesn’t faze Apollo, as the past and the present are 
only of concern to mere mortals.  So Cassandra asks if there would be any harm in predicting 
Apollo’s future.  So be it, rejoins Apollo, if only for her amusement.  “Well then I prophesy that 
you too will be changed—into a butterfly, Apollo, but will still remain a Parnassian.”209  Even if 
it were true, reasons Apollo, at least he would still be beautiful and still be a god. 
“There will be no gods left on Olympus and the rest will fare worse than you.” 
“I must say, Cassandra, that though of course I know your prophesies are jokes, they are 
in the worst possible taste.  Go home to my temple and devote yourself to your priestly 
functions.  I am sure my sacred image has not been dusted for a week.”210 
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A play on words that signals a potential change in actions, Schiller transposes dusty idolatry with 
natural beauty.211  Where beliefs are concerned, no one, even Gods, can be sure of their fate.  But 
better to be uncertain and to try than to be sure and rendered thus dustily discarded. 
And uncertainty is certainly the mood in the months that follow.  Of particular interest are 
the letters he receives from Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare (1856-1924).  Conybeare, a well-
recognized British religious scholar and former professor at Oxford, began as a war supporter.  
But, as the war progressed, his views changed, changed so much so that he eventually came to 
feel that Britain had been tricked into war and was now being held in lockstep to the demands of 
France and Russia.  His frank expression of these views led him to be castigated by his peers.  
And they are views, that on account of at least one telling, Schiller himself held.212  With 
America having entered the war only a few months earlier (in April 1917) and battles along the 
Western front still being fought, these letters are instructive.  In January, Conybeare writes to 
Schiller:  
Imbeciles is the only word wh. suits our statesmen. . . . So far Wilson has only made war 
on the 30 millions odd of his fellow cits who are ag. the war & follow [Robert] LaFollette 
[1855-1925, then Wisconsin Republican senator who voted against the war and the future 
Treaty of Versailles, future founder of and candidate for president of the Progressive 
Party], whom I suspect to succeed Wilson at next presid.l election.  Meanwhile the 
congress to be elected I believe this next autumn will be much morr [sic] divided that the 
present one.  They seem literally to have thousands of professors, schoolteachers, labour 
leaders, journalists in jail, and have arrested Italians & other nationalities 2 & 300 at a 
time.213   
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Two months later, the Central Forces—representing Germany, Austro-Hungary, and others—
sign the Brest-Litovosk Treaty with Soviet Russia.  Coneybeare’s views are no less insistent, as 
he points to the details of recent campaigns and political upheavals still in development.214  Even 
with the consolidation of Allied command in April, Conybeare continues his pessimism.215   
 All of this reads, though, as Conybeare’s lament without any sense of Schiller’s opinion.  
What is striking is the one place where Conybeare does make reference to a point of agreement 
between them.  It is a point that has nothing to do with war at all:   
I have lately read a lot of metaphcs.  Your own Humanism + Studies, [Bernard] 
Bosanquet’s aesthetics . . . Bosanquet’s phrase that at a certain phase of organic evoln 
consciousness is granted by the Absolute is old Theoly in disguise.  The only tenable 
position in him is that one must judge nature by what she has achieved so far.  There is 
evidently a small margin of brand new reality in each successive stage of consciousness . 
. . I see no gain in supposing that what comes to us piecemeal is a rehashing up of what a 
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priori exists in an absolute.  There I agree w. you.  It is ignotum per ignotius [to explain a 
thing not understood by one still less understood].216   
 
Why so conspicuous?  In one of the longest uninterrupted sets of correspondence that Schiller 
has during the war, it is the only comment related to philosophy.  And what does it suggest?  For 
all the mystery, uncertainty, and gloom, Schiller still clings to the developing, changeable nature 
of the world around him.   
But there is a catch.  What Schiller longs to believe is less in less in evidence.   Two 
months after the general armistice is signed, in February 1919, Schiller writes to Thaw:  “So you 
did not get my letter!  No doubt the Censor was to blame who is so anxious not that America shd 
keep in good spirits that he lets nothing depressed or depressing reach you!  No wonder then that 
you can discern the birth of a new heaven + a new earth, while to us it looks as though European 
civilization were tottering on the brink of the bottomless pit.”217  Not that the censor could keep 
out doubt.  Later in the year, less than a month after the signing of the Treat of Versailles, he 
exclaims to Thaw: “If I cd think of any corner of the earth which looks likely to be [sic] remain at 
peace + free from revolutions for the next 15 years, I wd retire to it at once.  But I don’t believe 
that any such place exists!”218    
Not that Oxford seems the place.  Sometime in the next several months Schiller, now 
fifty-five years old, applied for the Wykeham Professorship of Logic.  The majority of the 
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materials in his application file are only cosmetically altered.  Indeed, many of the 
recommendations posted therein are the same as from the Waynflete file, with Schiller having 
jotted down revisions and extensions to the texts prior to submitting the final copy.  But Schiller 
has amended the appeal, towards the end, regarding the role of philosophy:  
At present we are only just beginning to realize how fatal the alienation of academic life 
from national life is to both, and how necessary it is to provide for the progress of a 
science, as well as for the continuity of its tradition.  In Oxford we are never likely to 
forget the latter; but it is because I believe myself capable of contributing to the former 
that I venture to offer myself for the Chair of Logic.219 
 
In August, with little fanfare, Schiller is denied the position.220    
A war to end all wars has finally ended.  But the pale it casts over the social landscape 
will have a profound influence on Schiller’s subsequent writing.  A career path that has resisted, 
and been made resistant to, promotion is still on hold.   The life of teaching, frustrating Schiller’s 
attempts to state his case plainly, will continue to bear down upon him. The only path open to 
Schiller which still rumbles forward is the philosophy of humanism and the causes which it 
champions.  What remains to be seen, however, is if humanism—his pragmatism—is capable of 
withstanding the consequences of this past decade.  More bluntly, is Schiller still willing to 
believe things can be made better?  As the 1920s dawn, Schiller redoubles his efforts to refine 
philosophy and apply it socially.  The risk is that neither will benefit the novelty of their 
interplay.   
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6.0  THE RISKS OF DOUBT 1920-1926 
. . . Civilization has become an instrument, 
 not of the progressive improvement of the human race, but of its deterioration.1  
 
Two plus decades of insistence have worn grooves into Schiller’s worldview.  A philosophy 
once so enamored of fluidity and change is gradually calcifying into repeated complaints and 
depressed predictions.   The more tangible ramifications of Schiller’s repetitive recalcitrance are 
both professional and personal.  His career, despite a range of honors and reviews which praise 
his fearless style, remains in a holding pattern.  He still labors as a tutor attending to his charges, 
as much if not more than he does as a philosopher refining his theories.  His publications, though 
still offered up at a rapid pace, fail at systematic elaboration.  Even as his statements continue to 
achieve some measure of popular acclaim, they are more and more resisted by peers who regard 
him as an impertinent interloper drawing outside the lines.  And his health declines alongside, if 
not in consequence of, these developments.   
His philosophic target remains the logic of abstractions.  In essays such as “The Meaning 
of ‘Meaning’” (1920) and “Hypothesis” (1921), and “Psychology and Logic” (1924), Schiller 
continues to press hard against conceptions of science and logic that resist the demands of the 
everyday experiment which is practice; the book Problems of Belief (1924) even manages to find 
support in the popular and critical presses.  But as his adversaries and their methods change, 
rarely do his responses.  The results are gaffes in his arguments and gaps in his philosophy. 
Schiller finds himself, in essays such as “Mr. Russell’s Psychology” (1922) and “Our Natural 
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Relativity” (1924), stumbling as he attempts to take in advances in the views around him.  His 
social philosophy, so recently shocked by a savage and devastating war, still seeks to obtain a 
better and more just world.  But in books like Tantalus; or, the Future of Man, Cassandra; or, the 
Future of the British Empire, and Eugenics and Politics (1924) his queries carry the growing 
tinge of despair.  Moreover, the solutions Schiller offers take on a warped edge: they speak to the 
whole man, but not to all mankind.  Schiller still argues that the novelty of humanism carries 
with it a measure of doubt, the risk of failure.  And everywhere he sees this manifest: in the 
beliefs we take to be true, in the world we struggle to understand, in the future we seek to create.   
But it is in the descent of a vocation Schiller struggled so long to craft that the perils of 
humanism are perhaps most poignantly seen.   
6.1 REPEATING WHAT IS TRUE: THE CANONS OF HUMANISM AND 
‘PERSONALITY’ OF JAMES 
It is hard to envision a better world when one is still responding to oft repeated criticisms 
regarding humanism and pragmatism.  But, as 1919 draws to a close, Schiller is found preaching 
to an indifferent choir.  The task is especially vexing when one considers that some criticisms 
contain off-handed and unintended compliments.  Schiller’s work to this point has, at least in 
some instances, placed humanism alongside if not above pragmatism as the operative term for 
the philosophy of practice.    Now, however, some are willing to accept the predominance of 
humanism so as to only cast aspersions on pragmatism generally and Schiller specifically.  A 
case in point: Schiller’s essay in the September Journal of Philosophy, “Methodological 
Teleology.”  The specific target?  In April, John Martyn Warbeke (1879-1950) accused 
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pragmatism of being medieval; specifically, Warbeke argued “that Pragmatism is a descendent 
of a medieval Church doctrine and that its antecedents consorted with those thinkers who tried to 
make gold from sulfur and believed in the seven days of creation.”2  Not that Warbeke is 
completely opposed to epistemological alchemy.  He supposed pragmatism may, like the work of 
the sophists, prove of value.  He even assented to humanism as pragmatism’s fundamental term, 
with the human being the central concept, and ascribes this label and view to both James and 
Schiller.3  But his complaint regarding Schiller, and we can already see the response before we 
see the comment, is that this approach relegated all knowing, all truth, to use.  If what is useful is 
true, and what is true is good, then all manner of valuations are permitted (nay, created ex 
nihilo), being as they are anchored not to a standard but to those who issue the claim of use. 
Schiller begins his response with an interesting admission: pragmatism may not have 
yielded any great discoveries.  But he is sure that Warbeke’s comments constitute only the latest 
in a line of “new errors” regarding “the Pragmatic Method.”4  Securing a point often raised in 
defense of pragmatism—that it operates as a theory rather than an epistemological revelation—
he goes on to deride any suggestion that said method offers or suggests “a teleological 
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constitution which guarantees satisfaction to human desires.”5  Central to this argument is 
another that Schiller had offered elsewhere and far earlier, that any axiom provides, not truth, but 
provisional postulates, subject to further confirmation and revision.6  This type of posture is 
foreign to Warbeke and assures that his argument follows out of step with the theory he critiques.  
For, given pragmatism’s assumption of interaction between that which is comprehended and 
those who comprehend it, reality can only suffice to be understood when it is “supposed that the 
two are to some extent and in some sense commensurable.”7   
Schiller further notes that a supposition of truth carries with it a rather clear assumption: 
“every claim to know logically implies that the truth-claim enunciated is better than any 
alternative that could have been alleged.”8  Thus, what is claimed to be true, to be known, is an 
assertion of what one feels to work best given the conditions they have evaluated.  That a person 
might, from this position, then assert that something is good or bad only demonstrates that from a 
truth-claim follows a necessary value-claim.  That persons should hope for, and strive towards, a 
harmony of these value-claims only further demonstrates that the condition of truth (as fact, not 
claim) is not yet achieved.  It is on this point, concludes Schiller, that Warbeke grounds his errors 
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into, so to speak, the ground-less foundation of Euclidean logic.9  To him, this is a Protagorean 
fiction of the “most tyrannical sort.”10 
Warbeke’s retort, in the February 1920 Journal of Philosophy, is as grand as Schiller’s 
critique is damning.  Noting the advance of the varied sciences in laying bare the mysteries of the 
world, Warbeke asserts that what is interpreted must be, of fact, an assessment of the “a priori in 
the sense of committing ourselves for the time being to a whole system of interpretation.”11  As 
such, pragmatism is as metaphysical as the next philosophical theory, is as interested in “a 
systematic effort to coordinate our most general assumptions into logical coherence.”12  What 
follows is a point-by-point turning of Schiller’s arguments against him in pursuit of this point.  
Of specific interest are the value-claims that Schiller makes (in the previous essay and others) 
about the truth-claims.  The point being, Warbeke sees in Schiller an attempt to reach the 
Protagorean truth, an attempt that avoids any suggestion that an error can be pragmatic in nature. 
In August 1920, Schiller feels the need to respond one last time in the Journal of 
Philosophy. The simplest way to frame his reply is to say that Warbeke begs the question while 
failing to see his point.  The more contemporary view might suggest that Schiller attempts ‘to 
school’ Warbeke in the history of the arguments he uses.  Starting with Plato and Aristotle, and 
working through three points and several sub-points, Schiller argues that metaphysics entertains 
the possibility of: science that is completely dependent on it, science that secures metaphysics in 
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its results, and science which serves metaphysics via both subject matter and method.13  The 
attempts to work through the implications of these metaphysical issues—how do we know what 
we know—place us in front of Kant’s nimble stylus.  But this position complicates any 
discussion of metaphysics.  By nature of entertaining a priori questions one inevitably has to ask 
“what is real?” before they can proceed to ascertain that it, the real, is, in fact, real.14     
The resulting historical confusion—questioning what is beyond question—only led, in 
Schiller’s view, to ascribing to valuations the qualities of truth.  But, without experience, such 
valuations could not occur as no context could be drawn which would fuse the question to the 
answer.  Again, the Kantian problem arises.  If there is an epistemic basis for truth, it had to be 
the case that “the only one would stand.”15  Further, this ‘only one’ could not be empirical and 
would have to reside in he who discerned it: Kant.  Isolated and true, it appears as but one of 
Schiller’s (axioms as) postulates; fused to experience, however, it is tested by those that might 
value it as truth.  It is in this give and take role that metaphysics operates as “an integral function 
of life.”16  Thus the object proper is: “all experience, personal as well as scientific, and the 
method is to evaluate the latter in the light of the former, until the conflicting purposes and 
principles of the sciences are interpreted into a harmony.”17  Regardless the expanse of this 
proposed enterprise, Schiller has interpreted Warbeke out of debating.  
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But he is not done attempting to explain how what is true and what is valued are 
selfsame.  Two months later, in October, Schiller takes part in a symposium in Mind.  He is 
joined by Bertrand Russell and Harold H. Joachim, the man who had the year previous secured 
the Wykeham Professorship.18  Schiller authors the initial essay entitled “The Meaning of 
‘Meaning.’”  In it, he suggests three possible definitions of meaning: “(1) as an intrinsic property 
inherent in objects, (2) as a relation, (3) as a contribution to reality made by the subject.”19  
Noting that the first is likely to err on the side of projecting meaning onto objects only after “they 
are used” and that the second relies too heavily on the Platonic idea of the subject as “merely a 
spectator,”20 Schiller opines that the third may provide the answer: “What if meaning  . . . [is] 
essentially an activity or attitude taken up towards the object by a subject and energetically 
projected into them like an a particle, until they, too, grow active and begin to radiate with 
‘meaning’?”21  In this way, the spectator of the second definition is now transformed into an 
agent, one whose gaze presupposes that “whatever our interest lights upon shall have a 
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 Actually, the thrust of these papers was first presented at the Oxford Philosophical Congress on 26 
September 1920.  The details of the presentation—at which Russell was not present— and other panels are detailed 
in: W. P. Montague, “The Oxford Congress of Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 5 (3 March 1921): 118-
29.  William Pepperell Montague (1873-1953), Harvard graduate and Columbia professor of Philosophy, was an 
advocate of what is termed the New Realism movement involving Perry and others. 
Russell (1872-1970) was at this point without an official position, having been dismissed from Trinity 
College, Cambridge, for his anti-war views in 1916.  But the following year sees the release of his The Analysis of 
Mind (1921).  Therein, Russell is found to dabble in a curt caricature of empiricism: “There is a psychological 
school called ‘Behaviourists,’ of whom the protagonist is Professor John B. Watson, formerly of John Hopkins 
University.  To them also, on the whole, belongs Professor John Dewey, who, with James and Dr. Schiller, was one 
of the three founders of pragmatism.  The view of the ‘beaviourists’ is that nothing can be known except by external 
observation” (Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind [New York: Macmillan, 1921; reprint, 1949], 26).  Joachim, 
as was noted in Chapter Four, held the Wykeham Chair of Logic at Oxford for which Schiller had also applied. 
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 F. C. S. Schiller, “The Meaning of `Meaning': A Symposium,” Mind 29, no. 116 (October 1920): 386. 
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meaning.”22  Such meaning “is essentially personal” and renders objects unstable insofar as “it is 
not possible to fix this meaning absolutely and irrespective of their use.”23  Thus any value 
placed on an object is conditioned by the meaning that it has been imbued with by an agent.  And 
value, like meaning, gains more semblance of inherence, of objectivity, the more 
“communication is achieved and agreement is reached.”24  
Russell begins by agreeing with Schiller on several points: meaning is not inherent in 
objects, meaning is personal and dependent on the agent, meaning is not entirely intellectual.  
But he questions how Schiller can disagree with “the view that the meaning of words is derived 
from that of images.”25  This is particularly troubling to Russell as it is Schiller who argues that 
things can be known that are not objects; “All of the words in which Dr. Schiller endeavours to 
describe his unobservable objects imply that after all he can observe them.”26  Saying that these 
things are “’experienced from within’” does little good either, as it seems impossible for any 
thing to be “experienced without being an object.”27  At this point, Russell ventures to describe 
images as signs which guide persons to action: “The whole essence of the practical efficacy of 
‘thought’ consists in sensitiveness to signs: the sensible (or imaginal) presence of A, which is a 
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 Schiller, “The Meaning,” 397.  This stands as one of the few instances where Schiller: (1) uses the term 
“communication,” and (2) makes arguments that suggest his—however partial—agreement with an interactive 
component of humanism.  The degree to which Schiller also considered this objective is less clear; though it will not 
remain as such once Schiller undertakes a consideration of “hypothesis.” 
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 Bertrand Russell, “The Meaning of `Meaning': A Symposium,” Mind 29, no. 116 (October 1920): 398. 
Here Russell is taking on an assertion raised in the previous essay by Schiller.  Therein, he states: “Mental images 
then are very obliging; you can mean with them pretty nearly what you like.  Which no doubt is one reason why we 
are so ready to employ them.  There is one thing, however, which it is impossible, or at least improper, to do with 
them.  We cannot make them pivotal from our theory of Meaning” (Schiller, “The Meaning,” 393). 
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sign of the present or future existence of B, enables us to act in a manner appropriate to B.”28    
In this way, the imaginal stands in for or approximates an object, conditioning a specific—“the 
image or word ‘means’ that object”—or general—“the meaning of the word or image in 
general”— action regarding that for which the image specifically or generally stands.29  
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 Russell, “The Meaning,” 403. 
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 Russell, “The Meaning,” 404.  Joachim is relegated to a footnote on account of the fact that he, for 
whatever reason, chooses to ignore Schiller’s arguments and focuses on Russell exclusively.  In his response, 
Joachim argues that he will “stand aside” the general debate, if only to focus on the questions Russell’s arguments 
raise for him; namely, that “if I accept the framework within which his account is developed and consider his actual 
statements, I find him asserting what nobody, least of all a man of his ‘habit in the use of words,’ can possibly think” 
(Harold H. Joachim, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’: A Symposium,” Mind  29, no. 116 [October 1920]: 404-5).  The 
first point of contention is Russell’s focus on the process of visualizing, and division of it into the act, “calling up,” 
and the result, “the visual picture” (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 406).  This division suggests that the result is a 
tangible product of the mind, a real object as opposed to an imagined occurrence.  Joachim argues this confuses the 
more common notion that “meanings” are “‘signs’ and ‘symbols’ with little or no resemblance to what they 
symbolize” (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 409).  The second point of conflict relates to the issue of belief.    If what one 
believes is a proposition, “an actual fact,” consisting of either words or images, it should be possible to “call up an 
‘imagination image’ in the hearer or reader” (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 410-1).  But how does one translate the 
phrase “Anthony loved Cleopatra” into this matrix?   Joachim argues that the resulting impression upon the hearer or 
reader of the message would be “an Image loved an Image” as the terms ‘Anthony’ and ‘Cleopatra’ exists as images 
in the mind of the person hoping to impress them upon the mind of another (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 411-2).  In 
attempting to carve out “a theory which claims to reject ‘everything mythological,’” Russell only ends up with the 
“products of indefensible abstraction, of loose thinking and uncritical acceptance of the catchwords of popular 
Psychology” (Joachim, “The Meaning,” 414; 405). 
The fallout from this intellectual triad took the form of a series of exchanges between Schiller and C. A. 
Strong.  The response was no doubt inspired by Schiller’s rejoinder to the symposium itself in April 1921.  Noting 
that the symposium “reads like a triangular duel, in which each participant aims at something different, and, 
according to the other, misses it, and hits a phantom” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Meaning of `Meaning,’”  Mind  30, no. 
118 [April 1921]: 185).   In the response, he takes aim at several of Russell’s points of agreement with him and 
makes several arguments that could be read as partially supportive of Joachim.   Strong objects on the side of 
Russell, noting that the arguments of Schiller and Joachim can be discounted by expanding the “sensationalist-
behaviourist theory.”  In the experience of a sensory event, it literally becomes part of us, “occurring at that point of 
the person’s central nervous system” (C. A. Strong, “The Meaning of `Meaning,’” Mind 30, no. 119 [July 1921]: 
313; 316).  Schiller questions Strong’s nerve in proposing his answer as “the” answer to Schiller’s objections, as it is 
“plainly one out of several that are about equally capable of assimilating the experienced facts.”  Moreover, Schiller 
argues that Strong’s argument reduces experience to mechanical physicality.  To ignore the meaning that a person 
assigns to an event is either to suggest it is an “illusion” or to “gratify a traditional bias,” which in either case is to 
dodge a “pitfall in the path of all intellectualism” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” Mind  30, no. 120 
[October1921]: 444; 447). 
Strong discounts this dismissal.  He argues, “In perceiving, that is, a sensuous state (of sound, taste, smell, 
vision) is used as a sign of the object; it conveys the object only in the form of ‘meaning’; and it does so because we 
adopt the motor attitude appropriate to the object.”  Strong also uses James to discount Schiller, arguing that what is 
meant by an idea corresponds, either rightly or wrongly, to what is sensed by the person conceiving of the idea, by 
the personal experience of “the knowing relation”  (C. A. Strong, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’”  Mind 31, no. 121 
[January 1922]: 70).  Schiller him-self is troubled by Strong’s account of the-Self.  Schiller wants to from where are 
(our) senses derived.  And he suggests that Strong establishes a false dichotomy of the soul; it “is either a product of 
‘sensations,’ or a metaphysical ‘substance.’”  If it is a sensation, from where does it derive?  If it is from a person, 
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Several questions arise from Schiller’s and Russell’s philosophical positioning.  The most 
salient of which has direct bearing on Schiller’s humanism: to what extent is meaning a creation 
of mind?  And, so as to avoid a descent into the depths of image-as-object particulars raised by 
Russell, the question can be further narrowed: to what extent are valuations personal?  While 
Schiller argues that the goal of harmony is admitted on all sides, he takes—and here we can refer 
back to the Warbeke discussion—the given goal as something continuously in dispute and 
subject to revision.  The assumption of a fixed (a priori) standard or a known (teleological) end 
point is to trust in what we can’t know and presume what we can’t guarantee.  Only the active, 
and continuous, participation in supplying, refuting, and revising meaning can be said to 
constitute the Warbekean alchemy of transforming the object-as-conceived into the object-as-
valued.  But how then is this highly personal act transformed into a social one?   
Schiller supplies the answer less than a year later in “Hypothesis,” his contribution to the 
war-delayed second volume of Singer’s Studies in the History and Method of Science (1921).  
For Schiller the answer is still postulation, even if now he reverts to the more Jamesian 
hypothesis; the method is still pragmatic, even as he now ascribes to it a voluntaristic label.  He 
begins by noting that man’s way in the world is circumscribed by both the fear and courage it 
engenders.  By the former, exemplified in traditional approaches to logic, man is held back “by 
the fabricated order of the social life, and kept drugged by the traditions, conventions, creeds, 
and mechanisms of a social routine”; by the latter, as found in the voluntarist approach, man is 
impelled to recognize that “he must react, must show initiative, must attack the problems of his 
                                                                                                                                                       
how can the person not be aware of its existence?   Schiller argues that Strong wants us to infer its existence.  But if 
we infer a state of being for an object, we necessarily suggest that the object is inferred by the “I” that examines it.   
Thus the object observed is not independent of its observation; it is a subject of “the reflective return of an active 
being on his track” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Meaning of ‘Self,’” Mind 31, no. 122 [April 1922]: 185; 188). 
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life, must experiment boldly, and manipulate and alter conditions, ‘speculating’ and running 
risks.”30  These contested tempers, one within the lines and the other transcending their borders, 
are seen to clash in no area “more copiously and instructively than in the treatment of 
Hypothesis.”31  By their comparison, Schiller suggests, one clearly sees where there is adventure 
and, conversely, nothing gained. 
Of the intellectualist, or orthodox, views of Hypothesis, Schiller takes the examples of 
Bosanquet (and recall here Conybeare’s comments of a few years past).  Bosanquet’s definition, 
“any conception by which the mind establishes relations between data of testimony, of 
perception or of sense, so long as that connection is one among alternative possibilities, and is 
not referred to reality as a fact,”32 strikes Schiller as oddly inanimate.  It refers to the thing under 
consideration (context) but not the act of consideration (attitude), and it forces the distinction 
between that which is considered (hypothesis) and that which somehow exists beyond it (fact).33  
But one might well consider that the divide between object and attitude, hypothesis and fact, is a 
tenuous one: 
The history of scientific conceptions is full of illustrations, though none, perhaps as 
instructive and romantic in its vicissitudes as the history of the ‘atom’, a metaphysical 
invention in its initial stage, long rejected by the best scientific opinion as unprofitable, 
then revived and turned into a good working-hypothesis of chemistry, criticized anon as 
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 F. C. S. Schiller, “Hypothesis,” in Studies in the History and Method of Science, vol. 2, ed. Charles 
Singer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921), 414.  Schiller argues that these tendencies ebb and flow through the 
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always on firm ground” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 415). 
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unverifiable and barely holding ground, as a convenient fiction against its ‘energetic 
critics; until finally by a dramatic revolution the hypothesis of atomic dissociation 
explained the facts of radio-activity, and incidentally, turned the atom into a fact in the 
very act of exploding it and depriving it of the ultimateness and indivisibility its very 
name had implied for ages.34 
 
How strange the power of a fiction to remove from the ledgers of science it’s equally, at least at 
one time, tenuous brothers the ‘electron’ and ‘quanta.’  How seemingly haphazard the transfer 
from one context to another, gaining and losing ground, on the suppositions of science.35   
As against the orthodoxy, Schiller indicates the direction in which hypothesis should 
humanistically develop.36  For him, Hypothesis is “a mental attitude or distinctive activity.”37  It 
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 Given these counts against Bosanquet, Schiller finds J. S. Mill’s definition a touch better: “any 
supposition which we make (either without actual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient) in order to 
endeavour to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real; under the idea that if 
the conclusions to which the hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, or at least is 
likely to be true” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 418) .  But Mill’s focus on the act of supposing also carries problems.  In 
restricting the forms that hypothesis can take, his is more an explanation of use than a description of process.  And 
this use aligns it, as with Bosanquet, with the rigidity of traditional conceptions of logic.   For if his ‘facts which are 
known to be real’ can be reached via a hypothesis, there is then no necessity for those facts in the first place.  
Further, if a hypothesis is taken to be, or is likely to be, true (in a strictly logical sense), that implies that it was 
chosen from amongst other options. But in what sense true and to what end those other alternatives?  In short, Mill’s 
restrictions on use create contradictions in use; “alternative hypotheses therefore must always be admitted to be 
possible in principle, even where there are none actually contending for acceptance” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 419-
21).  Mill’s problems are not entirely his though.  They spill over from Newton’s conception of vera causa.  And 
Mill recognizes that something is suspect when he argues that: (1) there must be some purpose underlying the choice 
of one experiment over another, (2) alternative hypotheses must be allowed (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 423-4). But 
Mill, Schiller urges, fails to take the implications of these arguments as heralding requisite revisions of his theory. 
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 Not that Schiller claims novelty for these views.  In advance of this revised mindset, he points to persons 
such as scientific polymath William Whewell (1794-1866), logician John Venn (1834-1923), and philosopher C. 
Read.  And it is Whewell who pushes beyond the orthodoxy “in emphasizing the ‘colligation of facts’ by a new 
conception as the really creative act in scientific induction” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 425).  Here the emphasis is on 
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“Hypothesis,” 427).  And it is Read who recognizes the function of verification of which previous theorists only 
dimly guessed: no hypothesis “is of any use that does not admit of verification (proof or disproof) by comparing the 
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is this attitude which works against the intellectualist bent to take facts where they lie.38  That 
this attitude should not inspire the rank and file of logicians is no surprise: 
It is not a thing to be easily caught and tamed by rules and regulations.  It is not a 
procedure that lends itself to formal description.  Its reasoning cannot possibly be made 
to seem ‘valid’.  Nor can it be made ‘safe’.  It inevitably takes risks, and so must be 
condemned as ‘dangerous’.  Of course, it is dangerous, with all the danger inherent in life 
and action.  But does this justify its condemnation?  Only, surely, if there exists a safer 
and better way for logic to pursue.  But logic can hardly any long cling to two of its 
favourite delusions which prompted it to condemn Hypothesis.  The first is that formally 
valid reasonings are possible; the second that they are safe.39 
 
This is a form of logic resistant to the most deeply held strains of the same.  At the same time, “it 
reveals the essential creativeness of human intelligence.  It pervades all mental life and 
penetrates every logical notion.”40  By forgoing a retreat to true premises, it searches for 
meanings which become truer over time.  In abandoning the clichéd search for a root cause, 
hypothesis becomes a principled player “in an inquiry relevant to some doubt or dispute.”41 It 
takes Plato at his word and views “hypotheses (= things laid down, supports to stand on), i.e. as 
‘stepping-stones and starting-points.’”42  But it does away with his methods.  Rather than 
“assuming that they can be converted into full truths only by metaphysical deduction,” Schiller 
argues that they can “be established empirically, by the success of their working.”43 
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 As he explains in further distancing the voluntaristic view from the traditional, hypothesis “feels free to 
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 Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 435.  No longer held up by extravagances, every science is freed to find 
“conceptions that would give it a real grip of its subject-matter and enable it to analyze it and to deduce 
consequences which could be verified in fact” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 436).  As examples, he references both 
physics and psychology.  For years, physics has tripped over its articulation of radiation.  Not for want of trying, but 
for lack of explanations adequate to square with new advances.  With a refreshed view, physics is free to find new 
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This new spirit of Hypothesis, this desire “to think the new,” might “conduce to greater 
sympathy with the non-scientific forms thereof, as well as to leniency in regulating those which 
are employed in scientific enterprise.”44  For what separates the nature of supposing, the 
willingness to test, save the methods at hand and the purposes in view?  Regardless the 
application beyond science, its nature remains the same: “the sole essential of a scientific 
hypothesis is that it should work—relevantly of course to the problems of science.”45 Hypotheses 
should provide: (1) meanings that can be applied, (2) tested, and (3) chosen because they work 
best in a given context.  And inquiry carried along these lines should regard facts as: (1) the 
materials which are used, (2) relative to the hypothesis undertaken, and (3) often flexible enough 
to transcend any one given inquiry.  Schiller realizes this approach to science, stressing “the 
attitude of doubt, the entertaining of hypotheses, the holding of judgments in suspense, is 
irksome, and even intensely repugnant, to many minds.”46  It preaches action but often seems to 
prefer thought.  For him, that is the danger of mistaking blind motion for intelligent action.  Man 
must be courageous, but he also must be “circumspect.”47  He must not fear failure and realize he 
can plan against it.  “And a spirit of fortitude, which, though it does not revel in risks, see the 
                                                                                                                                                       
terms to explain new phenomena and return to old explanations to see if they shed new light on new discoveries.  In 
psychology, the case is worse.  There are warring camps with differing views and terms.  A renewed interest in 
finding “something new and suitable,” a steadying view of the problems a unified science has gone through, and a 
willingness not to be led by “antecedent prejudices” might lead to a psychology that is practical because it can be 
applied” (Schiller, “Hypothesis,” 440-2). 
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necessity of running them, and is willing to accept them, should not be beyond the compass of a 
reasonable logic.”48   
This, then, is the terminus of the philosophical justifications sought in light of a world 
war fought.49  It reads as much—and in pace with the Warbeke and Russell pieces—as a 
justification as it does an explanation.  But it is a justification in keeping with the procedures 
Schiller has been outlining, and testing, ever since James’s passing: fortitude in the face of risk, 
novelty in the place of absolutes, and a theory of practice rather than a practice of ideal 
theorizing.  But is it an advance?  Does it move beyond, say, the works in Humanism, or the 
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 The argument that these ruminations are based in large part on the effects of the war is not idle 
speculation.  Conybeare’s continued correspondence with Schiller attests to this.  In May 1921, with the 
repercussions of German war guilt still being determined, Conybeare writes:  “. . . He is anxious that Germany shd 
refuse the latest conditions, because if they do, the French will have got their money, have eased their financial 
position – and they are fast spinning down the . . . grooves of change into bankruptcy – + having got it will still 
invade the Ruhr [this seems a reference to the decision in January, as part of the ‘war guilt’ clause of the Treaty of 
Versailles, to set official German reparations at a sum of 269 billion gold marks, a sum later reduced to 132].  On the 
other hand if Germany merely fold her hands now, it will cost them 2 million a yr to occupy the Ruhr with their 
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But the larger stake that the Britain has in maintaining its relative interests throughout the world are also at 
issue: “I have read the Milner Report on Egypt [seeking to re-establish British-Egypt relations, by Alfred Milner, 
First Viscount Milner (1854-1925).  During the war Milner was also a member of George’s War Cabinet.  Milner 
was also an advocate of eugenics and a renewed dominance of Britain in world affairs].  It presents British policy 
clearly.  We want Egypt for the same reason the Gs wanted Alsace lorraine [territory bordering Germany and France 
that reverted to France at the end of the war] . . . as a strategical springboard, as a military ét aρe on the road to 
India, + we are to have an air road across Europe + the Meditn + Middle East to India + thro’ India on to Australia.  
It is a grandiose project, but air communicatns are fragile + carry little weight, however useful for intimidation of 
Orientals.  Moreover Orientals can learn the art of aviation from Japan and the spectacle of our planes passing to and 
fro, + occasionally dropping bombs on their cities will not tend to make asiatics friendly to Gr Britain.    The terms 
of the new alliance between Turkey + Afghanistan are menacing, & Egypt will join in that alliance + probably 
Persian + the Arabs as well.  To the north of our line of communns will lie a Germany + Russia united in enmity to 
us, and Japan will complete the cordon at its far Eastern end.” 
Nor less the instability of Britain’s relationship with North America: “I am not surprised therefore at the 
reluctance being now shown by the Canadians to entangle their future in our schemes for the defense of an East 
India, remote + having no interest for them, whether they be French or Anglo-Saxon.  Still less will the S. Africans 
& Bohrs be disposed to aid us in the far East.  Australia alone from fear of Japan may consent to join us in an 
oriental imperialist policy, but wld the English democracy ever go to war with Japan in defence of an empty 
Australia?  The Yanks care as little for our security in India + Asia as they do for Europe, + our attempts to cajole 
them into buttressing our position in the Middle East by taking an [] mandate was promptly seen thro in Washington 
+ rejected. . . .” (Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare, Ventnor [Isle of Wright], to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 May 1921, 
Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. 
Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
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salient if biting criticisms of Bradley?   As was said prior, Schiller is here covering the same 
ground even if his context and his reasons have changed.  He is still willing to test the mettle of 
humanism.  Yet he never finds it lacking.  His reasonable logic, even as it now turns to present 
fears and a past friend, is as good as his personal fortitude requires it to be. 
Schiller publishes “Eugenics versus Civilization” in the July 1921 Eugenics Review. 
Recalling his comments to Thaw in 1919, Schiller argues here that revolutions, more so than 
war, pose a grave threat to civilization.  “For, as we see it operating to-day in Russia and 
elsewhere, it simply wipes out the classes which produced the intelligences that controlled the 
intricate web of mechanisms called Civilization.”50  The question, then, is to explain the 
relationship between eugenics and civilization, and how the one might serve to improve the other 
in light of threats it faces.  First, Schiller wants to do away with the “caricatures” peddled about 
regarding eugenics: 
Neither as a science nor as an art is Eugenics committed to a ‘low’ view of human nature.  
It is not a form of materialism.  It is not blind to whatever is not physical.  It is not 
pledged to treat man as merely an animal.  It is not a crude and silly attempt to intrude the 
methods of the stock-breeder into realms where they must ludicrously fail.  Its past 
reveals that it was first conceived by the most idealistic and ascetic of philosophers, 
Plato, and its future points to a higher and nobler scheme of morals than is now in 
operation anywhere.51 
 
And it is the eugenic goal of “improving the conditions of the human race” that is offered in aid 
to civilization, so as to advance “a state of mankind which is superior to, and exclusive of, 
‘barbarism’ and ‘savagery.’”52  But recognition of it is not born within a person.  “It has to be 
impressed upon him by education and social training to which he is subjected, and if he likes it, it 
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is an acquired taste. . . . At any rate I would bid you recognize that the transmission of 
Civilization is effected, in very complex ways, by education, in a social order.”53  Should said 
transmission be stunted, civilization is threatened.   
But what end Civilization?  Schiller is succinct: the Good life or, more pessimistically, a 
fear that a life other than the one we lead—say, savagery or barbarism—would be worse.   This 
leads to a further question: what is the Good to which Civilization puts itself?  Here, Schiller 
maintains that the good, however defined, is a matter of social agreement; further, eugenics and 
civilization are fused in a search for that contested end: 
Both are rooted in the notion of the good, but neither of them knows what the good is, 
and both are vitally affected by the doubts and disputes that beset the good.  If we cannot 
tell what the good is, we can neither know how to better the human race, nor decide 
whether Civilization is or is not a good thing. . . . For a little reflection will show that, just 
because Eugenics and Civilization are in the same boat, whatever conception of good is 
involved in the one will be involved in the other; so that the two views, whether 
ultimately right or wrong, will always be comparable.54 
 
But, for Schiller, history affords instance after instance which suggests that societies have been 
dsygenically organized to the detriment of Civilization.  While many societies have promoted an 
ideal to which they aspire, their social circumstances are so organized as to contradict, if not 
outright work against, that ideal.  Through acts of war and the discrepancy of birth rates between 
higher and lower classes, societies turn against those progressive ideas which they suppose to be 
the Good.  “In other words Civilization has been become an instrument, not of the progressive 
improvement of the human race, but of its deterioration.”55 
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What, then, will steer Civilization towards a better course?  First, Schiller argues we 
should not despair the fact that history is littered with examples of societies fostering their own 
deterioration.  For the historical record also suggests the opposite, suggests historical societies in 
no way stood to protect, preserve, or promote weaker stock.  And, if only by conjecture, we seek 
to determine the difference between the historical and the modern society, it would be this: “a 
society which has the power over nature that we have can corrupt its way upon the earth to an 
indefinite extent,” but it also has the intelligence at its disposal to correct its way.56  Urged on by 
the lessons of experience, Civilization is beginning “to know what it is doing, whereas until now 
it was unconscious of its eugenical ineptitude, and did not ascribe the maladies from which its 
suffered to its own action.”57  To know, for Schiller, means to test society’s conceptions of the 
good against what this experience suggests in much “the way of deciding whether a certain 
foodstuff, say a new fungus, is good to eat.”58  In short, society must proceed tentatively.  It must 
experiment “with opinions about the good-for-man,” so as to foster the likelihood “that Eugenics 
and Civilization should reach an agreement about the principles on which the former should 
reform the latter.”59 
Three months later, in a review in the October 1921 Quarterly Review, Schiller turns 
away from the future to reflect on the mentor from his past.  To call his reaction to James’s son 
Henry (Harry) James’s The Letters of William James, a new edition of The Principles of 
Psychology, and the new Collected Essays and Reviews a review is to only partially explain its 
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importance.60  While it does cover the substance of these writings, it does more to convey 
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 Schiller’s interest in the publication of James’s letters was, not surprisingly, long-standing.  The letters to 
Schiller from James’s son attest to this.  As early as 1911 James is found to be requesting materials from Schiller: 
“If you would send on such letters of my father’s as you may have at your convenience, addressing them to me here, 
I shall be much obliged.  [Horace] Kallen showed me some which you sent him, and wanted to return them.  I did 
not write you about them then for we were not then ready to make use of them.  But now I’m beginning to collect 
my father’s letters and shall be glad to have them.  How long it will take – how long I shall want to keep them I 
cannot say, and if there is anything that you want to have returned for any reason at any particular time, I hope 
therefore you will let me know.  The ‘Biography’ as you call it will be chiefly a collection of letters, and the form of 
it, depending partly on whether my uncle gets well enough to carry out a hope of the family’s and his, is uncertain” 
(Henry James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 June 1911, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors Collection, 
Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). 
A year later, James comments on his progress retrieving correspondences: “People do not all send them as 
promptly as you did, and there are still people to whom I have not yet applied, though I don’t think the list of them is 
important.  Their names occur or are suggested as I go through the materials that’s been received.  I’ve published a 
general request for letters and am doing it once again; but I do this simply to leave no stone unturned, not because I 
expect valuable returns from printed notices.  As the letters come in I’m sorting and classifying them in a 
preliminary way and having more or less copying done; but the real question of just what use to make of the 
materials still remains to be dealt with.”  He also mentions that his work will not deal with the larger history of his 
family as it is his uncle, Henry, who is working on such a project.  As regards this, James notes: “At Uncle Henry’s 
request we have not said anything about this, for he doesn’t want to be questioned concerning it, and a year ago 
there were moments when it seemed doubtful whether he would be able to put the thing through at all.  He has a 
right to ask this, and in telling you I trust to your discretion.  Your interest is such that my mother and I want you to 
know just what is going on.  Only half a dozen other people do!” (Henry James, Cambridge, to F. C. S. Schiller, 24 
April 1912, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, 
Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). 
It seems, though, that the war puts off the publication until 1920.  In December of that year James 
comments on W. R. Thayer’s reaction to the volume: “There are a few people of whose judgment on the book I 
stand in awe and you are one of them.  If you belabored it I should quail.  When you praise it, including my part, so 
generously, I feel much elated.  To tell the truth I’ve never had any misgivings about the letters themselves.  It 
would have been hard to destroy their value.”  And he goes on to offer his own take on those who take to much time 
trying to compare his father to his uncle: “. . .  comparisons between my father and uncle are often unfortunate for 
these reasons, first, that almost nobody can be a sympathetic critic of both, and next because the differences between 
them were so endless as to make their brotherhood of blood an accident that is irrelevant to most things in their lives 
and works, an inadequate occasion for dwelling on contrasts that can seldom be expressed without making of one 
brother a pretext for strictures on the other.  They cared a great deal for each other.  On the other hand I believe the 
public will see them most clearly if it doesn’t bother to think of them together.  The effort to do that seems usually to 
result in exaggerating the qualities by which they differ – e.g. my father’s ‘Americanism’, my uncles ‘detachment’” 
(Henry James, New York, to W. R. Thayer, 4 December 1920, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors 
Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford).  Little more 
than two weeks later, James writes to Schiller to note the book is done and that Schiller’s letters will be returned to 
him unless he wishes to keep them in James’s care at Cambridge.  At the same time, he notes the flurry of works 
which go on to form the substance of Schiller’s review a year later: “The two volumes which I have edited, ought to 
be delivered to you at about this time, and I hope you will like them.  At the same time, Longmans are publishing a 
volume of miscellaneous papers that Perry has put together, and a bibliography which he has annotated.  My hope is 
that the three books which thus come out this month, will prove to make my Father’s whole work accessible to 
readers.  In time there may be critical or analytical studies which will call for re-examination of the material that I 
have been dealing with, but such reviewing of it will be a different sort of thing from the task which it seemed best 
for me to set myself” (Henry James, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 22 December 1920, Box Three, Folder Five, 
American Authors Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, 
Stanford).    The person referenced above is likely William Roscoe Thayer (1859-1923), historian and former 
President of the American Historical Association. 
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Schiller’s appreciation for James and the reasons for that respect.  What first strikes Schiller is 
how the letters reveal James’s personality.  In contrast to other methods of examination, James’s 
letters rank amongst those where authors “dare to be themselves, and reveal themselves.  They 
are the most interesting and delightful of persons; for, after all, there is nothing men relish more 
than personality.  They come out in their letters better than in autobiographies, which always 
tempt to a pose, or in biographies, which nearly always tone down personality, and blur its 
outlines.”61   And as selected and arranged James’s son, this sample exemplifies “the vital fact 
that the best sort of letter is literally a ‘correspondence,’ and reveals, not only the writer, but also 
his endeavour to attune himself to the demands and interests of another, and so, indirectly, the 
person written to.”62  
For Schiller, the personality revealed is as much the same as it was in other venues; 
“there is no noticeable difference between his books and his letters,” nor “in speech.”63  In each, 
he was “always original, racy, vitalizing, virile, utterly devoid of any sort of hauteur, humbug, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Early in the next year, James writes to both thank Schiller for his work in reviewing the book and to 
respond to what seems a query regarding the nature of some letters not published in the two volumes: 
I have just received your letter, and am extremely grateful to you for writing as you do, and can only say 
that the trouble you have taken about your notices is a great service to the Book.  I am only sorry that your 
own contribution to the Quarterly Review must wait until July [it was actually pushed back to October].  I 
am very eager to read it.  You speak very kindly about my parting the two volumes.  As for the ‘more’, 
that’s indeed a problem.  I could easily publish more of the same sort that is in these two volumes, but it 
would merely amplify and add quantity. 
With respect to purely polemic letters of which there are a few, but not very many, I don’t feel confident of 
my ability to handle them, and I’ve also been inclined to think that these will have to be dealt with in some 
way that will take account of what remains of the other side of the polemic correspondence—letters of men 
much younger than my father, in many cases.  I may be wrong, but it seemed to me that there will probably 
be a better opportunity to do that sort of work a few years hence than there is now. 
(Henry James, New York, to F. C. S. Schiller, 16 February 1921, Box Three, Folder Five, American Authors 
Collection, Courtesy of Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford). 
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and pretence, and genuinely interested in any human soul that crossed his path.”64  This 
accidental philosopher, asked to be more serious by his students and more systematic by his 
peers, was celebrated and savaged for his use of language.  He displayed a talent for taking a 
critic’s terminology and turning “it into a vehicle of his own meaning.”65  At the same time, his 
use of language was an affront to those critics, “a sacrilegious attempt to break through the 
academic ring, and to appeal to the people.”66  But what lay more closely at the center of both 
celebration and suspicion of James was his recognition of the human, the personal, in all matters 
of philosophical inquiry.  As Schiller states: 
Moreover, the value of the personal cannot be denied without denying value altogether.  
And this is a prospect no philosophy can really face.  For values permeate reality so 
vitally that wholly to cancel them would be the ruin of the cosmos.  Yet they spring from 
personality, and enter the world with it.  It is supremely valuable itself, and demonstrably 
the source of all the values that are recognized.  The Good, the True, the Beautiful, nay 
even the Real, for us at least, are more or less obviously creations of our discriminating 
and valuing personality; and to expunge them all seems a hopeless enterprise.67 
 
James saw this and it led him where his interests dictated, often beyond the borders of polite 
philosophy or sanctioned topics.  “He was a life-long psychical researcher, who neither gave up 
hope nor lapsed into credulity; thus showing (like Henry Sidgwick) that it is possible to live in 
close proximity to pitch and not be defiled, that interest in the abnormal need not degenerate into 
morbidity.”68  Santayana would rob James of his individual genius and label him “one of those 
somewhat obscure sages whom early America produced”; but Schiller would retort alongside 
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James that such a myopic tale ignores “so incalculable a confluence of qualities that no one can 
predict it or take the credit for it.”69 
Grasping at new outlooks can be taxing especially when those vistas, once so startling 
new, begin to recede from view.  Schiller notes that James, plagued by doubt and thoughts of 
suicide, came to confront the advancing march of a new generation with a new banner.  “The 
essential trouble with James, as with so many of his generation, was the withering of the spiritual 
values, of God, freedom, and immortality, under the devastating onset of Naturalism.”70  The 
spirit of free play with the objects of man’s design was in danger of being wiped out by “the 
meaningless evolutions of matter determined by a mindless mechanism.”71  But James rallied to 
respond and to take strength from the very lessons of Naturalism.  “An intelligent and living 
being is not merely an automatic victim of natural selection,” so James’s argument went, “it is 
not merely selected, but itself selects.”72  This response remains incomplete, though it remains 
for Schiller—whether under the title pragmatism or humanism—the best response to Naturalism 
thus far.  Though partial, “it will continue to appeal to all who really feel the pressure of religious 
problems, in a way that neither theological dogmatism, nor the verbal dialectics of a priori 
metaphysics, nor mere emotional revolt, can emulate.”73 
Even at this point, and with the spread of many pages to blur the connections, it is 
striking how closely this appreciation of James dovetails with the views, both publicly pushed 
and privately proffered, of Schiller.  All the elements praised—the confrontation with 
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philosophical absolutes and mechanical naturalism, the umbrage taken at unsanctioned prose—
read as if they were a sympathetic appreciation of Schiller himself.  It assumes the place of a 
figurative snapshot of the James that Schiller knew.  It also operates as a framing device meant to 
suggest who Schiller is at this point.  On the one hand, he is the destroyer of the Platonic 
tradition in logic, cleaving the a priori under with the dulling edge of his humanistic hypotheses.  
On the other, Schiller is the builder of a new world, a new man, comfortable enough to assert a 
Platonic ideal so little in evidence.   And, in facing a new world of obstacles, it is still more; the 
James that Schiller celebrates is the philosopher Schiller hopes to be.  Those hopes are to be 
tested in the following years.  Not in how well they approximate James; but in how well they 
serve Schiller in keeping the causes of humanism and pragmatism alive. 
6.2 CLARIFICATIONS, CAVEATS, AND CONSEQUENCES: THE LIMITS OF 
SCHILLER’S PHILOSOPHY 
In the next few years Schiller’s continues promoting the merits of humanism, first, by 
questioning some of those most well known to critique its merits and, second, by once again 
extending its range in a series of set pieces.   At the same time he questions, in the form of two 
books, the ways in which both philosophy and society will (or can) be moved forward.  The 
results, like the tactics, bear a resemblance to attempts of the past.  While there is some novelty, 
and some success, it is more the case that Schiller risks nothing in these newest presentations of 
his philosophical system.   It is, to be sure, an increasingly paradoxical stance: the champion of 
the attempts to explicate the “buzzing confusion” of a Jamesian universe is more and more stable 
in his style, his views, and his arguments. 
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If past arguments tackled the merger of pragmatism and humanism to science (“Scientific 
Discovery and Logical Proof,” etc.) and history (review of Progress and History) separately, his 
latest argument attempts to discuss them together.  In the October1922 Mind, Schiller takes part 
in the symposium “Are History and Science Different Types of Knowledge?” with British 
philosophers R. G. Collingwood and A. E. Taylor.  It is Collingwood who offers his opinion 
first.  And Collingwood, arguing from a “point of view of the theory of knowledge or logic,” 
asserts that the distinction is “illusory.”74  Noting that the Aristotelian distinction of history, as a 
view of the particular, and science, as a view of the universal, holds much sway, Collingwood 
nonetheless is inclined to see it as a duality irreparably thrown into doubt by Plato.  As such, and 
against the more recent developments in philosophy, he questions the view that “science is not 
knowledge at all but action, not true but useful, an object of discussion not to epistemology but 
to ethics.”75  Instead, Collingwood sees science as an interpretative framework; “to live the life 
of a scientist consists in the understanding of the world around one in terms of one’s science.”76  
It is much the same with historians; “their work is interpretation of individual fact, the 
reconstruction of historical narrative.”77  The former is often assumed to be a work in progress 
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whereas the latter is thought to be a collected and finished study; but the duality falls apart once 
“both are regarded as actual inquiries.”78 
Taylor weighs in next, arguing that the two are different.  The difference resides in the 
fact that each, when dealt with in pure form, point to different ends: science, towards nothing but 
the affirmation of “a formal logical implication” between premises and their conclusion; history, 
towards affirmation of “the truth of a categorical proposition.”79  Whereas one does not judge the 
scientist by his conclusions (literally) after the fact, one is disposed to questions the historian’s 
facts in confirmation of his conclusions.  Hence one finds Taylor dividing the output of science 
into knowledge and the results of history into information.  And history is not disinterested, it 
discerns the moral of the story and therein finds “the universality of the particular”; but science 
is, and it discovers in its domain, “the particularity of the universal.”80    The latter, then, in 
Taylor’s view holds to a Cartesian expression of “clear and distinct ideas.”81  The former, in its 
turn, seeks out the psychology of “the doers of historical deeds” so as to better recognize those 
features in our current state.82  It is on this point where history trumps science, where disinterest 
is disadvantage.  Taylor argues that a “man may be a thoroughly ‘scientific’ psychologist with all 
the latest theories and laboratory facts at his fingers’ ends, and yet he might be quite incapable of 
telling a story of human actions.”83  Further, the historians’ work is no dabbling in literary prose.  
It is a documentation of facts brought to bear in the current situation, a “success in making us 
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‘understand’” conditions of the past in the present “which cannot be got by any devotion to 
‘scientific method.’”84    
The final word is Schiller’s.  He resists the Hegelian notion that result of “the three-
member Symposium is supposed to be that the first string develops his Thesis, the second harps 
upon the Antithesis, while upon the third performer devolves the onerous duty of finding (if one 
can) the Higher Synthesis which resolves their discords.”85  He suggests that, while he favors 
more of what Collingwood had to say, his major contention is that “both reveal that they do not 
quite understand pragmatism.”86  His purpose is thus defined: “In order to really understand the 
nature and function of Science and of History, we must discover why they become objects of 
human interest and to what ends they minister, and then define them accordingly.”87   
While any and all predilections may lead persons to study one thing over the other, none 
are sufficient to warrant their study.  Hence, science is a matter of “prediction and control” and 
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history’s purpose is to provide “the power over things that comes from knowledge of the past”; 
thus both “minister to our need of controlling a reality that kills us if we don’t.”88  Both, then, 
must cooperate with each other in understanding the past and working to predict the future.  It is 
here that Schiller takes Collingwood to task.  For if science is to have a basis, it must be in its 
historical record: “For the ‘pure’ principles must be used, and the ‘pure’ science must be 
applied.”89  But it is no less true that the past is not pure.  “Its history is only a hypothetical 
reconstruction, often highly imaginative, out of utterly inadequate materials.”90  But Schiller 
sides with science in the end.  In searching towards a definitive, it grasps the threads of the 
historical past and does what history cannot: experiments.  “Hence verification is a much more 
potent weapon in Science than in history” though no verification is to be taken as absolutely 
true.91  For Schiller, then, science and history are partial reconstructions; the former just happens 
to be on firmer ground than the latter. 
This stance, especially if one keeps in mind that science was meant to include both logic 
(for Taylor, not Schiller) and psychology (for Schiller, not Taylor), is made clearer by reference 
to a debate started six months prior.  In the May 1922 Journal of Philosophy, and likely with The 
Analysis of Mind (1921) fresh on his, Schiller deigns to discuss “Mr. Russell’s Psychology.”92  
                                               
88
 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 462. 
 
89
 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 464. 
 
90
 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 465. 
 
91
 Collingwood, Taylor, and Schiller, “Are,” 466. 
 
92
 As with many of Schiller’s polemics, this one certainly had some basis in his relationship with James.  
Russell, as has been stated previously, was no advocate of pragmatism.  But, as should also be noted, he showed a 
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In a rare nod to expertise, Schiller notes that he disagrees with Russell specifically but also 
agrees with him generally: philosophy should be experimental, experience is to be learned from, 
philosophers should not hide what they mean to say, and psychology is a subject which it would 
serve all philosophers to learn.93  Given that, his complaints are equally well laid out:  a 
suspicion of Russell’s psychological pluralism, and a doubt about observation that purports to be 
outside that which it observes.94  As to the first, Schiller worries that what is taken as a whole is 
actually predicated on a specific observational mode Russell champions, analysis.  And analysis 
suffers from the deficit that “an external observer is not well placed to appreciate the biological 
significance of intelligent action.”95  As to the second, he worries that what is chosen for 
observation suffers from what the observer chooses to observe.  The resulting problem is one of 
confusion; “what is datum for one method will be result for the other, and the continuity, which 
the one labors vainly to attain, the other can take for granted.”96   He ends by suggesting that 
perception, contra Russell, is not a fictive event, but an actual experience.97  These challenges 
suggest, not a dismissal, but a scrutiny of the “fundamentals” of Russell’s suggestions.98 
                                                                                                                                                       
neither knows nor respects the subject, and of course writes offensive rot. . . . I don’t really dislike Schiller.  I am the 
only human being who doesn’t—because though he is a bounder and a vulgarizer of everything he touches, he is 
alive, adventurous and good-natured” (Russell B. Goodman, Wittgenstein and William James [Cambridge: 
University Press, 2002], 12). 
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In his November response, “Dr. Schiller's Analysis of the Analysis of Mind,” Russell 
takes the bait willingly and graciously.  Noting that the differences in opinion constitute a retreat 
from logical argument (each side holds to different rules and, hence, argues via different 
methods), Russell suggests that his reply will “be of the nature of rhetoric rather than logic.”99  
But he is not to be withheld by courtesy even if he is willing to grant a point to make a different 
one.  Arguing that pragmatism, like futurism, relapses into an age worthy of forgetting, Russell 
asserts that “self-knowledge [is] very precarious and deceptive.”100  He questions how we know 
what we know and label it as such, asserting that analysis is the only way to arrive at an assent to 
analysis as the best method.101  Russell is willing to take on Schiller’s claim that the objects of 
study resist the methods of analysis.  As he sees it, that which is termed a “wall” creates separate 
parts but is understood by reference to what those parts comprise.102  However, experience writ 
large resists specific understanding(s).  No matter what we take to be experience, “in regards to 
most occurrences of our lives, we are as unconscious as Newton’s apple.”103   More generally, 
Russell is arguing against a progressive or evolutionary understanding of experience in favor of a 
more basic one; “there will be no beginning of a genuine science of psychology so long as 
people are obsessed by such complex facts as growth and progress.”104  His ending is more 
pointed.  Russell notes that Schiller’s focus on the value-claim nature of experience obscures for 
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him, unlike his former teacher, the fact that he is also a subject of the choices he makes; this 
leaves the British Schiller out of the fold of “James’s American successors” who more obviously 
influenced Russell’s work.105 
In April 1923, Schiller lobs a return volley in “Analysis and Self-Analysis.”  This reply is 
notable on several counts.  First, it is again clear that Schiller respects Russell’s intellect.  But, 
second, Schiller seems to bristle at Russell’s version of pluralism as much as he does the 
suggestion that his reading of James places him outside the development of psychology.  And 
notice how this irritation leads him to counter Russell by retreat to an oft-repeated accusation: he 
sees no reason to “refrain from continuing so exemplary a controversy, even though it should 
continue to elicit . . . ‘only rhetoric rather than logic.’”106   By this turn of phrase, Schiller is able 
(or attempts) to focus the rhetorical exchange on the problems with Russell’s use of logic.  This 
is a clear retreat to safer ground, a seeming attempt to gain in a debate that has, till now, focused 
on issues of analysis and psychology, on what constitutes pluralism, on what counts as knowing. 
Schiller suggests that logic corresponds to either experiential knowing or to formalism.   
The former provides for a removal of formal logic, whereas the other is “of verbal meaning, 
which is not, strictly, actual meaning at all.107   Schiller believes Russell obfuscates pragmatism’s 
experiential knowing with mere emotional leaning.  Regardless of this misplaced bias against 
pragmatism, he wishes to assure Russell that analysis is fine so long as it works in practice.108  
But if Russell’s analyses do work, and can get at those “simple” and “elemental” meanings that 
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have thus far remained elusive, it must establish the reasons for such a privileged status; “before, 
therefore, we surrender to the charms of Mr. Russell’s analyses, we are entitled to demand from 
him reasons for thinking that they are better than the others, and indeed the best.”109  This leads 
Schiller to question one of the central tenets of Russell’s psychological views: self-analysis.   
Here Schiller invokes the historical difficulties that philosophy has had in explaining how the 
object of contemplation can be the subject himself.   Schiller’s suggestion, that “a genuine 
personal self must be both subject and object with no insuperable gulf between them,” is ill-
suited to Russell’s analytic framework.110   His conclusion is that Russell’s views fail by their 
exclusion of what pragmatism readily notes: the effects that experience has on the 
conceptualization of what one does.111  A self which is not privy to those feelings born out in 
practice is an abstraction only valuable to the abstractions of theory.  But this conclusion raises 
as many questions as it answers: how can a self not known to self be (per Russell) a self that 
creates reality?    For this, Schiller finds no answer; to him, Russell chooses not to respond. 
The comment regarding the abstraction of personality stands as an obvious, and oft-
repeated, commonplace in the Schiller canon.  The larger issue is the manner in which he shifts 
the ground so as to raise that issue.  Regardless of what one makes of Schiller’s philosophy, his 
response to Russell—as opposed to his discussion with Taylor and Collingwood—is a caveat in 
the most unfortunate sense.  It limits the extent to which Schiller is willing to push his 
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pragmatism and humanism.  Moreover, it qualifies Schiller’s ability to move his philosophical 
arguments beyond the general range of issues he has spent the past decades discussing.  This is 
not a witty dissection of the emptiness of the syllogism.  This is not a pithy dismissal of the value 
of an Unknown Mover.   And consider how the ease of Schiller’s previous discussion leads him 
to conclusions which would seem to warrant more generosity to Russell.  Consider that in 
discussing science and history, he is very clear as to what recommends science: it experiments.  
Why, then, should Schiller be so put off by self-analysis?  Whatever the problems, self-analysis 
is clear not reducible to the formal logic to which Schiller attempts to saddle Russell.  It is 
experiential, not abstract.  It is pluralistic, not monistic.  It resists accepted answers, rather than 
embraces them.  The cause of such a gaffe seems shockingly clear.  The problem with Russell’s 
analysis of mind is, simply, that it is not in accord with Schiller’s philosophical worldview.   
Not that there weren’t other potentially mitigating, not eliminating, factors at play.  
Towards the end of 1922, Schiller applies for the Deputy Professorship of Moral Philosophy.  
And, unlike the previous attempts, one senses Schiller’s frustration.  Now, at the age of fifty-
eight and in failing health,112 he is growing tired of a routine of tutoring that stretches back to 
1897.  His comments at the end of his letter of application sound a weary note.  Schiller urges 
that he has “never had the leisure, or the occasion, to elaborate my ideas on moral philosophy in 
the way I should have liked.”  He continues by saying that, at his age, this professorship would 
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allow him the time to do so “if I should be so fortunate as to be appointed it.”113  But the result is 
the same: Schiller is denied the position.  This third failed attempt likely strikes Schiller as a final 
insult.  In the months leading up to the decision, Schiller had expressed optimism that it would 
come to pass this time.114  He had been particularly intent to put his best face forward to the 
Electors who had rebuked him before.   
But one exchange is telling.  H. Wildon Carr, while preparing a letter of recommendation, 
writes to Schiller:  
I want the testimonial to be perfect and entirely satisfactory to you.  If you do not mind 
penciling in what you would like me to say, you need not fear any hesitation on my part 
to sign it.  I will then rewrite it for you.  What I constantly hear remarked is that you 
cannot be serious, as I know how serious you are the paragraph about the genial humour 
was put in to say so, but strike it out altogether if you think it will be a disservice.  Also if 
I seem to have omitted any special qualifications to which I could testify insert them.115 
 
Schiller, even when actively grooming his persona in the pages of others, cannot escape the 
double-edged sword his polemic has become.  And, as late as May 1923, Schiller is despairing 
the institution to which he had provided service for over two decades. He decries the denial as 
the work of “the Hegelian Ring” that has sought to keep Idealism in and outsiders out “for the 
past 25 years.”   Schiller exclaims: “It is evidently time that I retired -- + took to writing.”116  
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What comes next is not retirement even as there is more writing.  At first, Schiller retreats to deal 
with those topics—humanism, logic, and psychology—with which he is most comfortable.  Then 
Schiller advances to reform the world he finds around him, only to stumble again on ideas which 
seem to elude him.  
6.3 ALL TOO HUMAN: THE FLUCTUATING RELEVANCE OF HUMANISM 
In 1924, John Henry Muirhead (1855-1940) publishes Contemporary British Philosophy: 
Personal Statements.  Schiller finds himself included amongst some of the country’s leading 
thinkers.  Several of the contributors, such as Bosanquet and Russell, have been of recent interest 
to Schiller.  Others, such as McTaggart and Read, are long-standing acquaintances.   Still others, 
such as Hobhouse (1864-1929), have come to Schiller’s aid in his past attempts to gain a 
professorship.117   It is a tight fit for Schiller.  The editor Muirhead has little regard for 
pragmatism.  Little wonder, given his seeming approval of Idealism’s central thesis: “the logical 
priority in human experience (theoretical, moral, aesthetic and religious) of the idea of an order 
or perfection that goes beyond and supplements the fragmentariness of its time appearances . . .”  
                                                                                                                                                       
nominalism by it, for otherwise lots of people wd have applied.  In a sense the Ring deserved its success as for the 
last 25 years (ever since Caird was defeated for the same chair in 1897) it has worked unremittingly + in a very far-
sighted + insidious manner.  The opposition wd neither [phrased inserted unclear] organize nor see the inwardness of 
the the [sic] moves in the game.  At the present moment they are trying to get enacted a recommendation they have 
smuggled into the Report of the Commission which wd force Colleges to appoint as Tutors only such persons as 
were approved of by the majority in the Faculty + with the intention, in subjects like theology + phily, of 
stereotyping the teaching for all time.  It is evidently time that I retired -- + took to writing” (F. C. S. Schiller, 
Oxford, to Florence Thaw, 6 May 1923, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
 
117
 The second part of the series, published a year later, also contains an impressive roster of philosophers: 
James Ward, A. E. Taylor, G. E. Moore, and R. F. Alfred Hoernlé being among them. 
 
  360 
His summary judgment of pragmatism’s response?  That pragmatists, like Neo-Realists, are 
actually a part of that which they rally against: 
[I]t is doubtful whether the men who led the attack from either side really understood the 
position they were assailing, while it would not be difficult to show that these theories 
themselves, so far as they aimed at offering alternative philosophies were in reality 
assuming the existence of just such an ‘objective control’ coming from the ideal of a 
consistent world of thought and experience as they sought to disown.118 
 
In an unlikely case of guilt by theoretic association, Schiller and Perry are seen as brethren in 
confusion.  
It is perhaps understandable, given editorial asides and the circumstances of the past 
several years, that Schiller’s contribution takes the form of a question: “Why Humanism?”  But 
his answer resists his personal travails so as to continue the arguments most recently offered. 
Schiller sees humanism as providing the answer to an all too common problem: the retreat from 
the human in matters of philosophical inquiry.  For philosophers are “ashamed” to deal in the 
vulgar matters of their humanity.  And it should surprise no one that “the philosopher’s nature 
should shrink from encountering the real, unequipped, unfortified, and undisguised: he feels it to 
be ‘all too human’ to be exposed to the encounter.”119  So instead they withdraw into a realm that 
is more than human, an absolute realm where the minor matters of men matter not.   
But it is a ruse.  Not in philosophy or science, in logic or psychology, is it possible to 
remove human agency from discussions of truth.  But that is exactly what is attempted under the 
latter two titles.  Under the awning of empirical science Psychology—and seemingly in reference 
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to Russell—sought to explain away the ones doing the explaining.  “Psychological descriptions 
were to catalogue the contents of the mind in terms derived from external observation, and as if 
they were objects in the external world.  The fact that they weren’t, and behaved quite 
differently, was to be ignored.”120  Philosophy was even more egregious in sloughing off 
humanity.  “It was called upon in the sacred name of Logic to disavow its origins after the flesh, 
all its human relations and attachments, and all earthly aims.”121  Such attempts are not simply 
beyond human comprehension; they are beyond usefulness in human acts of comprehension.  
Human knowing and thinking, if asserted to be factual, can be treated scientifically and studied 
without the taint cast upon them by abstract and idealistic systems.122 
Humanism thus arrives as a “systematic protest against the artificial elimination of the 
human aspects of knowing in the intellectualist versions of logic and psychology.”123  As a 
voluntaristic (read also: activistic) method, humanism “prefers to take ‘reason’ as it empirically 
finds it, and to study it in life, active and free, and not in vitro, dead, bottled up, and preserved in 
spirits.”124  It stands in marked contrast to both Rationalism and Empiricism.  Humanism 
counters the former’s assertion that, since all knowing has yet to be ascribed to experience, its 
truer cause must exist a priori. It challenges the latter’s notion that humans, standing at a distance 
from nature, must necessarily or passively receive impressions from said nature.  To both, 
humanism raises up the possibility that ‘final’ knowledge never quite is; that “it will be the 
product of the continual interplay and interaction of the knower and his world, and will owe its 
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character to both.”125  Such a view takes strength from the methods of science, from the warding 
off of finality by way of postulation and experimentation.  When viewed this way, and not 
warped to fit the useless rules of the logician, the scientific method posits truths that are 
“essentially improvable and progressive.”126  Insofar as humanism maintains advantage by its 
simplicity and inclusiveness, and by its affinity for science, it wards off alternatives marred by 
complexity and rigidity.127 
But what of this guidance?  What is meant by terms such as truth, usefulness, and 
working?  The easy, and incorrect, complaint of the critics is that humanism collapses into the 
lax maxim that “anything useful or anything that works (say a lie!) is true.”128  But a truth-claim 
is not simply a truth, any more than a lie or a barb is not a truth-claim, and the usefulness of each 
is a matter of context.  “Any means to any end is useful for that end.  What is of use, therefore, is 
primarily a question of psychical fact.  It depends on the end adopted and the means chosen.”129  
In much the same way, what works varies dependent upon: (1) the context in which working is to 
be viewed, tested, and revised, and (2) the temperaments of those who are to view, test, and 
revise in light of their context.  To Schiller, this variation in context and temperament brings up 
an important metaphysical point as regards humanism: “the decisive rôle of human activity” 
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admits of a view of “the real” that is “ambiguous, and obliging, and submissive to our 
interpretations.”130   
Humanism is, then, less a dogmatic definition of reality and more a “method of solving 
the problems of human knowing.”131  It admits of a plurality of views regarding the plasticity of 
the world that “tends to individualism.”132  In this last regard, humanism is much like other 
philosophical attempts to describe reality. But rather than conjure up something beyond him, or 
divine some source outside his experience, Schiller’s humanism admits of that which his 
interests allow.  He concludes:  
Hence metaphysics seem doomed to remain personal guesses at ultimate reality, and to 
remain inferior in objective value to the sciences, which are essentially ‘common’ 
methods for dealing with phenomena.  Nevertheless Humanism, though it cannot forget 
that it is itself a method, will regard the efforts of metaphysicians with tolerance and 
respect, and will not deny them at least aesthetic value, where their constructions show 
artistic merit. 133 
 
Schiller, pointing towards the benefits of the scientific method, nonetheless suggests affinities to 
the metaphysics with which his method shares contested philosophical space. 
If the former essay provided the question and the answer, the next one provides the 
scope.  Also in 1924, Schiller contributes “Psychology and Logic” to William Brown’s 
Psychology and the Sciences.  Schiller begins by noting the goal of improving “the relations 
between the sciences” comes up against the divides they raise against each other:  
Instead of co-operating they are too often raiding each other’s territory, instead of 
agreeing they are dissenting in a babel of discordant tongues, and even in their internal 
politics they display little unanimity.  Many of them, and notably, theology, ethics and 
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psychology, seem to be essentially medleys of discrepant schools and points of view that 
carry on their intestine conflicts from age to age.134  
 
In psychology, in fact, there are no less than nine different schools of thought.  Of these, Schiller 
prefers two: (1) the pragmatic one that does not “abstract from the purposive or teleological 
character of the mental life we actually live,” and (2) the psychical one that does not “reject a 
priori all the evidence which points to possible extensions of every-day experience in the 
direction of the supernormal and transcendent.”135  His preferences aside, should all the different 
approaches to psychology—from the Mechanist to the Psycho-analytical—signal the end of 
psychologies claims to science, to the goal of some unity amongst the sciences?  Simply put, no.  
“For a science is a method not a dogma, an exploring expedition into the unknown not a sessile 
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tyranny, a market-place stocked with goods for the service of mankind, not a battlefield on which 
human values are destroyed.”136 
As a test case, Schiller seeks to resolve the divide that exists between Psychology and 
Logic.  The path is not easy, as the “ordinary logician, for reasons best known to himself, is very 
suspicious of Psychology” whereas the psychologist “is apt to shrink from a conflict, and prefers 
to cultivate those sides of his subject which are most remote from Logic and least accessible to 
attack.”137  Is the standoff a result of incompatible goals?  While psychology claims to 
descriptive, it cannot in actual practice ignore “the occurrence of values, or more precisely of 
value-claims” which adhere as “psychical” facts like any others.138  Some logicians claim to go 
beyond the descriptive to become normative, evaluating facts and “differentiating the good from 
the bad, and appreciating them accordingly.”139  If, however, you remove the evaluative 
component of logic, it ceases to be normative and comes to be as descriptive as psychology.   In 
that way, Schiller urges, logic asserts itself as “merely a psychological description of cognitive 
process.”140  But here, again, logic comes up against a problem: “non-cognitive processes seem 
to intervene at every step in our thinking.”141  How one thinks is as much a matter of when one 
thinks; it is not a process occurring absent the conditions which surround it.   
It is at this point that some logicians devise at least two desperate strategies to disentangle 
logical processes from their psychical constraints/conditions.  Schiller takes, ahem, the example 
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of Bradley as symptomatic of the first of such maneuvers.  There is no way for Bradley to deny a 
psychical component to questions of logic.  “So he first admits of the entanglements in the 
handsomest terms.”142  But then these constraints are taken to be “merely irrelevancies, 
corruptions of the purity of thought, and frustrations of its aim.”143  In just such a way the 
psychological, that is the non-cognitive, is taken to task for corrupting the logical, the cognitive.  
But notice what the sum result is?   Logic is no longer taken, at best, to be human.  It is reduced 
to “an inhuman metaphysic, which is conversant only with a ‘reality’ which passes all 
understanding.”144   Yet Bradley’s pessimism is precisely the problem with the formulation of 
logic he provides.  The abstractions he takes to be a taint upon Logic are taken up, formed, and 
argued by him as facts subject to his psychical insistence; they are derived from within, not 
divined from without.  The second maneuver is to conceive Logic as “a science of words (λόγοι) 
. . . as an outgrowth of Grammar.”145  
Here, at least initially, there is firmer footing.  Taking its cue from the Greeks, “Logic 
emerged from the rules that regulated dialectical debated.”146  And, Schiller admits, in debate it 
helps to have meanings settled prior to debating them.  But, in psychology, that assumption runs 
into problems; “terms, as we use them in our actual knowing, can change, or develop, their 
meaning.”147  Thus logic faces a choice.  It can warm itself in the splendor of abstract Truths and 
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fixed meanings and render itself “a strictly meaningless science.”148  Or it can choose to embrace 
its descriptive counterpart, psychology, and “inquire what men really mean by what they say, 
how they try to convey their meaning, and how far they succeed, whether they attain truth, and 
what sort of truth they achieve.”149  In accepting the latter, logic and the logicians who espouse it 
must make a concession; they must “give psychological fact authority over verbal 
convention.”150  But they stand to gain ground in the realm of all sciences which seeks to 
promote progress over against puzzling postures.  Such questions of ambiguity, and the ability to 
overcome it, are taken further in two slim books released in the Spring of 1924.   
The first, Problems of Beliefs, provides a continuance of the philosophical discussion.  
And it is a discussion that is introduced with a social lament as regards the diminutive size of the 
work: “it is no longer possible to write . . . big books on philosophic subjects.  The deplorable 
decline of European civilization . . . together with the ‘dry rot’ which nearly everywhere infests 
the high places of the academic world, are rapidly bring about a situation in which there is no 
audience for anything that cannot be ‘filmed’ or ‘broadcasted.’”151  But the topic proper, the 
nature of belief, is given a definition that is at once old and new.  Using James’s The Principles 
of Psychology as his guide, Schiller determines that a belief is “a psychic attitude towards a 
proposition” which forms, for him, “an ultimate and characteristic fact of human nature.”152  It is 
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then Schiller’s task to note the variances in what constitutes a belief so as to better understand 
their import.153   
In the second half of the book he suggests that the test of a belief is its use in action.  But 
he goes further in suggesting that the value of an action is validated to the extent that it either 
promotes or reduces survival.  What’s more, beliefs themselves are subject to a form of socio-
natural selection.  They are either championed or discarded as regards their value in promoting 
survival.  Within such a matrix, humans become part of the evolutionary process of forming the 
world.  In a comment that harkens back to the “world-process” of Schiller’s Riddles-era 
prognostications, Schiller urges: “our preferences and our acts are contributing to the shaping of 
the world, and sharing in the unceasing process of creation, which . . . is continuously manifested 
in the all-pervasive creativeness which engenders more or less momentous novelties in every 
region of the universe . . .”154  How we fare in this world, to borrow from another earlier text, is a 
matter of both Darwin and Design. 
And the book fares fairly well.  Schiller’s friend Alfred Sidgwick claims that “Chap X 
[entitled ‘Belief and Action’] is the best treatment of that difficult subject I have ever seen, + of 
course the book all through is full of good things.”155  And the popular press responds in kind for 
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the most part.  The Inquirer calls it “an excellent psychological study which all can understand.”  
Though not as revolutionary as a work of Kant, “on its own plan it serves its purposes 
excellently, and is full of homespun truth and practical insight.”156  The Egyptian Gazette gushes 
that “the whole subject is treated by a master-mind with a lucidity of reasoning and a sureness, 
but lightness, of touch that compel attention.”157  C. J. C., in the Halifax Laurel, claims that it “is 
worthy of a place in any student’s list of books.”158  The Church Times, however, is of a 
decidedly negative opinion.  Noting dismissively that Schiller has all the talent necessary for a 
popular audience, the review goes on to explain the reasons for the book’s likely acclaim: 
He has a bright attractive way of stating platitudes as if they were the latest discoveries 
reserved to Dr. Schiller by way of copyright.  His naïve belief in scientists, his 
invulnerable prejudices against logic, his airy contempt for all philosophers who are not 
pragmatists, and his dogmatic manner, will not make him unpopular with the British 
public. 
 
If only that vulgar appeal provided something substantial.  The review concludes that the “book 
lacks unity . . . [the chapters] fail to lead the reader anywhere.”159 
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The critical reviews initially concur with the Church!  G. Lowes Dickinson, in the 
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, applauds the work for a searching account of 
how persons formulate conclusions.  But, as regards its pragmatic thrust, Dickinson argues that 
the book “has nothing new to report” in its “further attack on those forms of Idealism against 
which Mr. Schiller has so long been tilting.”160  But other critical reviews offer a clear measure 
of appreciation, the likes of which Schiller has not recently received.  In Mind, G. Galloway 
suggests that Schiller “unduly magnifies the subjective factor in belief at the expense of the 
objective.”  That said, Galloway urges that the book “deserves to be widely read, and that not 
merely by philosophers but by the intelligent public.”161  In the Journal of Philosophy, Sterling P. 
Lamprecht is even more glowing.  Noting that the book is really a continuation of themes 
Schiller has been developing for year, he urges that the “compact and eloquent development” of 
the enterprise is “the clearest and most satisfactory statement of the issues involved in the 
humanistic contentions.”162 
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If the first book is criticized for philosophical digression and subjective myopia, 
Tantalus; or, the Future of Man makes clear that it aims to remedy a purportedly objective social 
dilemma.  And what a dilemma.   Though Schiller bristles at being called a pessimist,163 it would 
be easy to conclude it a fitting label.  Simply put, the world has ceased to be progressive.  
Biologically, “it is no longer essential for a member of a society that collectively controls the 
conditions of existence to develop any high degree of personal capacity.”164  Morally, “humanity 
is still Yahoo-manity.  Alike in mentality and in moral, modern man is still substantially identical 
with his palæolithic ancestors.”165  And civilization does nothing to stop the downward spiral; 
“as it is presently constituted, [it] is very definitely a deteriorating agency, conducing to the 
degeneration of mankind.”166  The alternative is to “exercise the danger by an adequate reform of 
human nature and of human institutions.”167   
And the choice among alternatives must be made carefully.  Attempting reform by 
bringing religion to the masses is doomed to failure.  The “Yahoo has been dosed with Christian 
ethics for two thousand years, and they have never either impressed or improved him.”168  No, 
the reform will be brought about through eugenical reform, reform which must first obtain “a 
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powerful, enthusiastic, and intelligent public sentiment.”169  Its watchwords will be toleration 
and improvement, not intolerance and perfection.  It will move slowly, “guided by the results of 
experiment and the fruits of experience.”170  It will secure, “by the elimination of defectives at 
the bottom of the social scale, and by the increase of ability at the top,”171 a possible way out of 
the mire that is the condition of Tantalus. 
Tantalus receives mixed reviews.  In Light, C. V. W. Tarr provides what amounts to a 
spiritualist overview, rarely stopping to condemn or praise Schiller on any one point.  He notes 
that Schiller holds “that there is no biological basis for human progress” so man must amend his 
situation by means of eugenic reform. And he suggests that this approach could be supplemented 
by use of a “new psychology” which promises further proof of miracles and immortality.172    
The Daily News is more positively inclined.  It summarizes:  
Dr. Schiller’s brief essay, with its delicately tonic and astringent flavour, is immensely 
more valuable and infinitely more readable than most of the massive efforts at prophetic 
politics that have lately dropped heavily from the Press.  His thesis, put briefly, is this: 
Man’s evolution has ceased; but, considered socially, it is busily going on.  Unfortunately 
it is going swiftly and determinedly in the direction of certain destruction. 
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His solution does give some measure of pause.  With its eugenic hope for salvation, the review 
finds in this reform tract “a rather startling blend of Christ and Nietzsche.”173  The Westminster 
Gazette doesn’t see the blend but, rather, a choice between “Christianity and Eugenics.”  While 
admitting that it would be wrong to call Schiller a pessimist for simply diagnosing the decline of 
civilization, it goes on to suggest that his call for eugenic reform is no better as a solution.  The 
condemnation is humorously pointed: “. . . for this part of the discussion his critical faculty 
appears to have been abandoned in the left-luggage bureau.”174  The Spectator, for its part, is the 
most dismissive of Schiller’s calls for reform or doom.  They call his appeal to eugenics “a rather 
ill-backed ‘white-hope’” formulated in a manner that “is not convincing.”175 
We find Schiller, in these articles and books, doubling back over topics—here logic and 
science, there eugenics and belief—as if trying to gain some ground in what has become, as of 
late, a repetitive exercise.  His books and his essays now seem to merge seamlessly into and out 
of the social and the philosophical, moving here to attack yet again the barrenness of logic and 
there to assert the novelty of pragmatism and humanism.  The reviews, to fuse criticisms 
together, suggest the flux his reception undergoes: Schiller is an eloquent dabbler in white hopes, 
a popularizer lacking evidence for his popular philosophy.  And, as the year draws to a close, we 
find him yet again circling back.  This time, it is to the literary exemplar who once suggested the 
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promise of his enterprise: Protagoras.   The argument offered, though, suggests the instability of 
Schiller’s philosophy, a seemingly half-hearted attempt to meld the novelties of his humanism to 
more complex realities that lie beyond its reach.  
In October 1924, Schiller pens the short essay “Our Natural Relativity” for the University 
of Southern California-based Personalist.  He argues that Protagoras’s maxim still offers the 
basis for a larger attitude toward the world.  In its time it was “denounced as anarchic, skeptical, 
subjectivist, destructive of cosmic order and the unity of the universe.”176   The philosophy that 
rose up in its place was its exact opposite: real considerations took a back seat to abstractions, 
universal conceits obscured practical matters.  But the science of today offers to reinstate 
Protagoras’s maxim by way of its practices; “it is a characteristic merit of Science that when it 
makes a mistake, it always goes on to correct it.”177  In noting that variations exist, science now 
holds to a more relative standard of verification.   
So far so much the same.178  The difference comes in attempting to marry Protagoras to a 
far newer revelation.  In noting that (his) philosophy is matched to modern scientific conceptions 
such as “Einsteinian relativity,” Schiller stumbles.  And he does so in suggesting how such the 
“revolutions” in physics and science should arouse little concern.   First, he argues that “most of 
the relativity which sciences now recognize makes little or no difference for practical 
purposes.”179  Second, where relativity is of import today, it has already been integrated into our 
lives.  In either regard, relativity “and the theoretical triumphs that it has won in modern science 
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have simply brought our theory into agreement with our practice—to the benefit of both.”180  But 
do his views to this point bear out either one or two?  This decidedly optimistic report is in line 
with the joys of novelty, but seems to sidestep the questions of risk.181  In repeating his views 
over and over, Schiller seems to downplay what he has warned others about.   In not doubting his 
own optimism, he errs in not testing his own understanding.    
6.4 OF CERTAIN ENDS: BRADLEY, EUGENICS, AND THE DEPARTURE FROM 
ENGLAND  
Schiller had often challenged others for not questioning their assumptions.  And late in 1924 an 
intriguing staging ground is set when a figure Schiller so often confronted was finally silenced.  
It is a test of the one now gone as much as it is a test for the one still living.  Only weeks prior to 
Schiller’s article on relativity, on 18 September, Francis Herbert Bradley died of blood 
poisoning.  The death of such a fiercely galvanizing figure was met with an enormous amount of 
commentary.  But these commentaries, as much as they discuss the merits of Bradley’s views, 
serve a more important function as relates to Schiller.  Three of the learned scholars who discuss 
Bradley’s philosophy provide criticisms, criticisms that sound strangely similar to ones that 
Schiller had voiced for well over a decade.  That these philosophers are not pragmatists or 
humanists only adds to the suggestiveness of their reflections.  And that they, like Bradley, rarely 
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reference Schiller seems demonstrative of the paradox of his career at this point.  Schiller’s 
critiques prove useful when assessing a dead philosopher; but it is more practical to cast aside the 
antagonist who first uttered them while Bradley was alive. 
  In January 1925, A. E. Taylor provides an encomium in Mind.  The Bradley depicted 
here is one who, in private letters and published materials, strove to express his convictions 
clearly and examine the views of others fairly.  Taylor, though, is well aware that there is 
something of an alternative picture of Bradley:  
Among those who knew Bradley only by his books, I have found the curious impression 
that he was by temperament a recluse, avoiding the society of his fellow men, wrapped in 
his solitary studies, and devoid of any wide knowledge of life and affairs, in fact a 
philosopher of the type satirized in [philosopher Christian Johann Heinrich] Heine’s well 
known lines [likely: “Experience is a good school, but the fees are high”].  Nothing could 
be further from the truth.182 
 
Nor was he that flimsy depiction of a metaphysician, who passes “his time in day-dreaming 
about unreal abstractions and knows nothing of the actual world of life and men.”183  He proved 
an asset to his college by virtue of his lengthy tenure and willingness, in spite of his health, to act 
on its behalf.  Bradley, then, was one of the “few philosophers who have less deserved the 
reflections which are constantly being made by writers of the Pragmatist type against the so-
called cold-blooded ‘intellectualism’ of the Idealist.”184  Taylor concludes by noting the mystical 
element in Bradley’s view of religion, a view that could just as well sum up what so attracted and 
repelled persons examining his philosophy: “At best we are trying to see per speculum in 
ænigmate [in a glass darkly]; our analogies from human nature at its best are the best guides we 
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can have, but they are analogies and nothing more, and they will always fail us if we press them 
too closely.”185  
The next three essays in Mind seek to question, not praise, Bradley.  In doing so they 
substantiate an assumption that Schiller repeatedly had tested: the flaws in Bradley’s conception 
of philosophy.   James Ward touches on “Bradley’s Doctrine of Experience.”  Note how his 
criticisms mirror those offered by Schiller.  Regarding the divide between the felt defect and the 
demand for unity: “There is no denying the originality and ingenuity of all this.  But in truth it is 
just the originality and lack of simplicity which makes one suspicious.  What if Bradley’s 
impasse exists only for him?”186  Or as regards Bradley’s attempt to explain how the defects of 
immediate experience are related to the need for a higher unity: “It has to do with it for Bradley 
only because of his unsubstantiated assumption that experience involves two inexplicable 
‘aspects,’ as he calls them, which can only be speculatively combined.”187  Ward traces all of this 
to Hegel, to a need for a Reality that is experienced rubbing against the defective nature of our 
ability to articulate it.188  This need leaves Bradley “afflicted or gifted with a double personality.  
At any rate he strikes us as a man of two moods, and speaking therefore in two voices.  We may 
say generally that his epistemology is skeptical and his ontology mystical, as [psychologist 
Harald] Höffding [1843-1931] has already remarked.”189   
G. F. Stout deals with “Bradley on Truth and Falsity.”  And he both implicitly raises and 
explicitly praises Schiller’s criticisms on these counts.  On the one hand, he notes that Bradley’s 
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primary contention is flawed: “if a metaphysical proposition is untrue at all it must be absolutely 
false without any admixture of truth.  Truth about the absolute as such must be absolute truth and 
error about the absolute must be absolute error.”190   The result is that “his central doctrine 
[regarding truth and falsity] is not that there is always the chance of our being more or less 
wrong; we have no possible chance of being entirely right or entirely wrong.”191  On the other 
hand, he notes that “Mr. Schiller seems to me to be quite right in insisting on relevance to the 
special interest of the subject in making or hearing a statement.”192  But Bradley ignores this.  
The result is that any relative idea is found lacking.  For Bradley, and in a disruption of the 
partially true and partially false, the matter is resolved by absorbing A and B into a unity that 
exists, as Ward discussed regarding experience, within a “supra-relational unity” at once above 
and below them.193  Such a unity, in the real world of practice and the actual conduct of science, 
simply does not exist. 
G. Dawes Hicks (1862-1941) discusses “Mr. Bradley’s Treatment of Nature.”  He notes 
that Bradley spent little time speculating about the physical universe, supposing the domains of 
science and philosophy to be for the most part exclusive of each other.  But Bradley did assume a 
view of nature; simply and problematically, that it was a psychical condition.  Here Bradley 
again runs into the problem of totality; that is, of creating an inclusive category into which all 
can be shown to exist.  Hicks questions this assumption.  And he does so, in line with Schiller, 
because it renders the physical world “not, as such, real, but an appearance within reality, a 
                                               
190
 G. F. Stout, “Bradley on Truth and Falsity,” Mind 34, no. 133 (January 1925): 39. 
 
191
 Stout, “Bradley,” 40. 
 
192
 Stout, “Bradley,” 41. 
 
193
 Stout, “Bradley,” 49-50. 
 
  379 
partial and imperfect way in which the Absolute is manifest.”194  But such a stance creates a 
contradiction within his own theory.  As Bradley noted, appearance is taken to mean 
imperfection and defect.  But, on the other hand, he “is no less persistent in his contention that 
‘Reality itself is nothing at all apart from appearances.’”195  This leads Hicks to question the very 
same plea as Stout.  If it may be, what then leads us to say it must or, moreover, is?  Bradley’s 
theory, as a result of these problems, would render science “theoretically barren and nugatory, 
and the use that metaphysicians could make of its results would be negligible.”196  
In April 1925, Muirhead responds to the previous discussions in Mind with “Bradley’s 
Place in Philosophy.”  Given his recent siding with the idealistic side of philosophy, it is not 
shocking that he finds the previous criticisms unseemly.   While Taylor’s piece must have 
“deeply moved” many, and the criticisms were “valuable as bring out different sides of his 
philosophy,” there was something missing.  In short, the three writers’ criticisms “would have 
gained something if they had tried to set them in the broader light of Bradley’s philosophy as a 
whole.”197  He sees that context as being the development of a line of thought developing in 
Hegel, carried through by Green and Caird, and reaching fruition in Bradley.  Muirhead argues: 
Neglecting differences of emphasis what was central in the teaching of these men was the 
implication in self-conscious knowledge and action of the idea of a whole or oraganised 
system, as the criterion of what we must hold to be true and good.  Implicit in all man’s 
thought and conduct is the reference to a world of completely harmonized experience, to 
be one with which is the end imposed upon him by his nature as a rational being.198 
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In providing the latest manifestation of this approach, Bradley incurred concomitant risks.  
Muirhead sees this as the paradox of his genius.  On the one hand, he wrestled with the very 
nature of reality itself, attempting to draw more nuanced arguments into a discussion of first 
principles.  On the other, he lent credence to attacks which claimed that his views reduced to: 
“not only is nothing as it seems but nothing is more than seeming.”199  Muirhead understands this 
reading, though he feels it an unfair one.  In reference to Ward, though certainly applicable to 
Schiller as well, Muirhead provides a private comment from Bradley regarding a critic who took 
the above view: “When we say ‘Not only that but so much more: that you must not merely say 
that,’ he seems to take this as a denial of ‘that,’ whenever it suits him.”200  The point is a 
powerful one, in that it suggests more a hope and less a plea that the universe is in some way 
understandable.   
It is lastly Schiller’s chance to respond.  In the same April 1925 issue and regarding the 
same criticisms as Muirhead, he discusses “The Origin of Bradley’s Scepticism.”  He notes that 
the set of papers, authored by philosophers at Cambridge, “tactfully abstain from dwelling on the 
final embarrassments of Bradleyan philosophy,” though all must be aware of “the imminence of 
skepticism with which Bradley not infrequently regaled his correspondents.”201  This skepticism 
leads Bradley to contend “that whatever the ostensible subject of a judgment may be, its real 
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subject is always, in the end, the Absolute.”202  Such a view renders all human judgment in error 
in as far as it approximates the Absolute and, confusingly, all the same to the extent that they 
point to “the totality of reality.”203  Schiller argues that Bradley’s mistake is easily traceable.  
“This confusion may be shown to be a subtle case of the confusion between the judgment and the 
proposition.”204  In other words, by abstracting a judgment from the conditions which render it 
true or false, it is no longer an actual judgment.  Thus abstracted, it is merely a verbal form, a 
proposition, which refers to nothing other than an isolated case removed from context.  As 
Schiller suggests: 
For the judgment means that in view of all the circumstances present to its maker’s mind 
and judged relevant by him, he has judged it best to make his judgment.  It claims truth as 
being the best reaction to the circumstances which evoked it and as the truest response to 
the conditions under which it was pronounced.205  
 
But this does not mean, in reference to the issues raised by Stout, that the judgment is partly 
false; rather it is true within the context of its operation.  And given a specific context, where 
things are judged to be more or less relevant, there is involved the matter of selection.   
Schiller urges that Bradley recognized this.  The problem, though, is that he develops two 
inconsistent views of the process of selection.  Early on, selection is a “‘mutilation’ and a source 
of error” which makes inferences impossible; in later works, selection becomes “quite essential” 
to both judgments and inference.206  If it is the first, how is a view of the totality possible?   If it 
is the second, it admits of only a partial view of the totality “and cannot be accused of failing to 
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include the whole of reality, seeing that this is precisely what it is conscious of trying not to do, 
but to avoid.207  The bind of either of these options is clear.  By Bradley’s own showing the first 
will never provide the full view.  The second will never attempt that view.  But on both counts, 
“the logical roots of Bradley’s scepticism are without exception rotten.”208  By preferencing 
abstractions over experience, he in the end can distinguish nor explain either.   While worded 
more forcefully than the comments of Ward, Stout or Hicks—and displaying none of the 
sensitivity of Taylor or Muirhead—it is interesting company to keep.    Finally, after years of 
criticism for criticizing Bradley, Schiller is given some small measure of due by those who 
waited until there would be no response from the one criticized.   
It is only conjecture to suggest that Schiller felt frustrated by such off-handed 
confirmation.  But, aside from suggestions as late as 1925 that his health was still on the mend,209 
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there is the matter of his scholarly record.  Indeed, his philosophical output at this time has 
slowed to a trickle.   So, sensing perhaps that better fields lay literally and figuratively beyond 
the scope of philosophy proper in England, Schiller continued to press the social issues taken up 
previously in Problems and Tantalus.210  The first attempt, Cassandra; or, The Future of the 
British Empire (1926), is part of the same series as Tantalus.  And it is no less gloomy in outlook 
or pensive in forecast.  But it is also suggestive of Schiller’s tendency as of late to plumb his 
back catalog for relevant comparison and insight.  He notes that, where Riddles was a youthful 
attempt to change the world, Cassandra is the attempt of an older man; an old man who “who has 
tried his hand at remoulding the scheme of things, and done his best and done his work, and 
failed, as intelligence mostly fails, in the unequal struggle with stupidity.”211  As he has failed, so 
too has Britain in its quest to maintain its prominence.  In the past, they maintained supremacy at 
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sea and superiority on the Continent “with an attitude of aloofness from the squabbles of 
European Powers.”212  But, as a consequence of war, colonial and labour disputes, industrial and 
financial loss, England stands defeated in the international sphere of influence.  The only 
solution is an integrative one.  Rather than reclaim preeminence, Britain must seek to promote a 
World State along the lines of the American plan of influence; “American power is a product, 
not of violence and conquest, but, in the main, of industry and peace.”213  By no means assured, 
it is at least a plan which could stave off England’s slide into irrelevance. 
Schiller’s acquaintances greet the book appreciatively.214  Carveth Read responds in 
glowing fashion.  “Many thanks for Cassandra: I agree with it all completely.  It’s the most 
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directly practical thing you have done – a fine fruit of the Pragmatist Philosophy.”215  His friend 
Thaw is more to the conspiratorial point:  
The little book arrived safely some time ago but I am only now able to write to thank 
you.  It seems to us most wise + true.  Of course I know nothing at all about such matters 
-(but Blair knows everything)- it all seems reasonable to me.  I appreciate the dangers + 
tho it hurts at first to think of the world entirely as founded on money + the Bankers – it 
certainly seems as if it were the only way.”216   
 
Jane (MacDowell), Fredrick Conybeare’s wife, also offers praise.  But it is of a depressed sort: “. 
. . Cassandra arrived on Thursday . . . by the time I reached page 62 I was reduced to a state of 
abject misery I was obliged to put it away for the day.  Everything you said seemed to me so 
detestably true.”217  
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Friends are one thing.  The same cannot be said for the popular press’s reactions.  It 
receives less than glowing notices from a popular press that had, to this point, been largely in his 
court.  In that way, Cassandra stands out in the history of Schiller’s popular reception. The Times 
suggests that Schiller is prone to drawing “hard and fast lines” while leaving “it open how far he 
takes himself quite seriously.”218  The Sheffield Telegraph feels that many of Schiller’s 
prophesies are unnecessarily gloomy and pessimistic; that being said, they go on to suggest that 
“this is hard reasoned pessimism that provokes discomposing reflections.”219   The Scotsman 
hopes that Schiller proves a “false prophet” and questions how his supposed remedies—notably, 
a World State—are to actually be brought about.220  The Spectator notes that Schiller is “a first 
rate modern philosopher [who] still deigns to take an interest in the affairs of men.”221  Whether 
meant as a compliment or not, it questions the plausibility of Schiller’s predictions.  The Daily 
Sketch provides the most positive slant.  Regardless of whether the reader agrees with Schiller, 
“it is impossible not to be impressed by the very clear exposition of the Empire’s present 
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situation.”222  This is, again, a clear case of perception influencing reception.  While friends take 
the bad news on faith, the reviewers seem depressed by what they hope is a pessimistic joke. 
The second attempt is more a reiteration than a new line of attack.  Eugenics and Politics, 
coming soon after Cassandra, is offered as “lighter literature,” a “by-product of a busy academic 
life.”223  The book is dedicated to Leonard Darwin (1850-1943), son of Charles and then 
president of the British Eugenics Society.  It contains, save one early draft and an addendum, 
reprints of articles that Schiller had published—such as “Eugenics and Politics” (1914) and 
“Eugenics versus Civilization” (1921)—in the Eugenics Review and the Hibbert Journal.  His 
stated goal is a comprehensive reform of the whole of society.  But it is no blast to the structure 
of society; it must be conservative and gradual.  Schiller argues that “the evolution of eugenical 
sentiments, eugenical institutions, and eugenical men will be gradual and slow, perhaps too slow 
to save the human race; it will not be due to any tour de force of Platonic superman.”224 
Yet again, friends are quick to supply affirmations.  Darwin, after receiving the book, 
thanked Schiller for the honor: “I am here for a short rest, and I wish I could make you 
understand how much the receipt of your book, with its charming dedication, cheered me up.  It 
was like a hot drink on a journey, warming the heart and sending one on with renewed 
vigour.”225  Alfred Sidgwick responds: “Many thanks for the “Eugenics”, which I have found 
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interesting + persuasive.  I gather that there is nothing to be actually done till sufficient money 
can be somehow raised for purposes of endowment, + that this is unlikely to be done by any 
government in our time.”226  The American architect Henry Rutgers Marshall (1852-1927) 
replies: “It is delightful to note the general tone of optimism that pervades your Eugenics and 
Politics which I have just read with very great pleasure.”227  There is even unexpected approval 
from a former combatant on psychical matters, St. George Lane-Fox.  Judging from the tone, the 
debates of several decades past are settled: “I have also received your latest book on Eugenics’ 
for which very many thanks.  It is a book about which I can only make the superfluous comment 
‘My thoughts exactly, but how I wish I could express them as well.’”228   
Eugenics and Politics also receives a goodly amount of attention from the press; still 
mixed but slightly more agreeable than with the previous prognostication. From the midst of the 
proponents at the Eugenics Review, Read is again in a chipper mood.  He positively comments 
on the manner and method of exposition:  
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We are glad to find that the Master’s style has not greatly deteriorated . . . whilst his 
sense of fair-play in dialectic (perhaps from having learned cricket) and, above all, his 
common sense have vastly improved.  Hence his proposals are modest . . . but his advice 
(Plato hints) is academic; and that, alas! Has little momentum outside the academy.229 
 
The Pioneer praises the essays contained as “a delight,” as a clear-headed expose that destroys “a 
number of popular bugbears” propped up against eugenics.230  The Sheffield Telegraph, while 
suggesting the absence of any consideration of economic factors, nonetheless finds Schiller’s 
tract “fairly and moderately stated . . . without pedantry and with extreme caution.”231  The 
Journal of Education suggests that the book is written in “what we may be pardoned for calling a 
marked and unmistakable Oxford manner.”  Yet it supposes that “there are no doubt many 
readers who will find a good use for these clever intimations of the eugenic point of view.”232  
The Tablet finds the Schiller’s overall tone pessimistic.  But the “clearly and gracefully written 
book” finds some accord with the religious minded, insofar as Schiller does argue for the 
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positive roles that spirituality and the family play in eugenical reform.233  The International 
Journal of Ethics is also ambivalent.  It argues that “the pragmatism or humanism which is 
naturally connected with Dr. Schiller’s name is not apparent in these essays: for they are as 
absolute in tone as any Idealism”; but “the Essays are amusingly written and full of ‘hits’ at 
contemporary foibles and prejudices.” 234  The Times of India provides the most critical, and 
suggestive, of the divided reviews.  It too views Schiller’s retorts to eugenic criticisms as lucid 
and brimming with “common sense.”  But in pushing for a eugenic state Schiller is open to a 
complaint: “The essays are full of evidence that the author has missed by the very nature of his 
career, immediate contact with many of the realities of life.”235  Such a comment will prove 
prescient.   
 But it is likely to have struck Schiller as impertinent if accurate.  That said, it is likely that 
Schiller missed the irony in the Times’ conclusion: a philosophy predicated on experience, on 
practice, on use, is derided for lacking the requisite measure of each.  In such a way, this 
complaint mirrors the objections raised regarding the Problems of Belief.   Thus, as 1926 draws 
to a close, his social and philosophical views remain, in the eyes of interested critics, open-
ended.  Again, this is likely to have struck Schiller as being as it should.  For how can a world in 
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the making ever be made whole, complete?  But this is also ironic insofar as the Jamesian 
“buzzing confusion” Schiller has hoped to solve is, in the eyes of critics, actually the solution 
suggested. 
There are also consequences less speculative than philosophical theory and social reform. 
These consequences, however, are based in how Schiller had conducted such philosophical and 
social inquiries.  His goals of systematic treatises, goals urged on by James nearly two decades 
past, were repeatedly put on hold as a result of his tutoring.  The resulting Formal Logic was 
systematic, but destructive.  The subsequent Problems of Belief was productive, but meager.  
And his hopes for a professorship, and the freedom it would have allowed developing his ideas, 
were dashed by the manner in which he promoted both.  So, with no endowed chair in his future, 
and with his health having declined, it perhaps understandable that Schiller should exclaim in 
1926: “. . . I shd like to retire this year, but there are considerable advantages in hanging in 
another year or two, + the matter will finally depend on how college politics develop.”236   
Schiller is either being a touch disingenuous (recall his volleying for a position at either Harvard 
or Corpus Christi in the 1890s) or things develop more rapidly, and for the worse, than he 
expected.  For, in May, the Corpus Christi College Minutes provide this comment:  
It was agreed with regard to the possible retirement of Dr. Schiller (a) that Dr. Schiller 
should be left absolutely free to choose the date, the college unanimously expressing its 
sense that it would elect Dr. Schiller on his retirement either to an Emeritus Fellowship 
under the new statutes or to an Extraordinary Fellowship under the old statutes + allow 
Dr. Schiller to retain his present rooms.  (b) that arrangements for the teaching of 
Philosophy for the next year, if necessary, be made by the Tutorial Body. 237   
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Not that all is lost.  In giving up his twenty-plus year career as a College Tutor, he retained his 
residence at Oxford under the Extraordinary Fellowship.  But other opportunities, and different 
audiences, were now open to a man freed of the rigors of a career he had, in all practical senses, 
made and decided to give up. Such fortunes lay, not in the England to which he had once 
returned, but in the America which he had once unceremoniously left. 238 
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7.0  OUT OF THE LIGHT, INTO THE CAVE 1927-1939 
The more pedestrian of philosophers wander about in them with their heads in culs de sac; 
the more dashing pursue dead issues into dead ends: in both cases because their predecessors have 
omitted to post ‘not a through street’ signs.  Hence they leave behind litter, but not literature.  
This is called the History of Philosophy.1 
 
Freed from the constraints of a tutorship, Schiller’s final years are a mix of travel and reiteration.  
Save for the last couple years, Schiller maintains a fairly stable travel schedule.  He spends his 
summer and fall in England, at his quarters in Oxford and at the family residence at Betchworth, 
and then several weeks at Pontresina in Switzerland.  His winters and springs are spent in 
America visiting friends, giving lectures, and teaching at the University of Southern California.  
It is only in 1935, after suffering a significant decline in health and taking a wife, that Schiller 
finally moves full-time to Los Angeles.  No longer healthy enough to teach, he obtains emeritus 
status at USC in 1936.  In the midst of publishing a series of articles, Schiller dies late in the 
summer of 1937. 
This travel routine has the effect of limiting his writing.  Previous years had been spent 
fretting over the lack of a systematic treatise.  But Schiller only manages one comprehensive 
statement: Logic for Use (1929), meant as the productive rather than destructive sequel to 
Formal Logic.  His other books during this period, Social Decay and Eugenical Reform (1932) 
and Must Philosophers Disagree? (1934) are collections of previously published articles.  A 
similar slowing occurs where Schiller has achieved most of his notoriety with his peers.   
Quarrels in the pages of the Journal of Philosophy and Mind diminish as he takes to writing 
smaller articles in smaller journals.  His most aggressive output—hundreds of reviews and 
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several articles—are reserved for the pages of Flewelling’s Personalist and often composed while 
in transit between America and England.  The drama of previous years, though not entirely gone, 
is surpassed by attempts at précis of his social concerns, of pragmatism’s lineage, of his career.  
His retreat from teaching at Oxford is in large degree self-imposed.  And it is an exile that grants 
some measure of comfort and closure.  But it is also a much more isolated end than Schiller felt 
he deserved. 
7.1 WANDERLUST: RECLAIMING JAMES 
Regardless the route or exact date, it is clear that Schiller arrives at Harvard in early September 
1926 to attend the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy and present two papers 
(subsequently republished in the proceedings the following year).  This return to America carries 
with it a return to the most belabored issue of Schiller’s career, alongside the more recent 
considerations of philosophy as a mechanism for social control and reform.  The first paper, 
“Fact and Value,” is presented alongside papers by Wilbur M. Urban (1873-1952) of Dartmouth 
and Leonard J. Russell of Birmingham.  The presentation seeks to destroy the very distinction of 
its title.  For, to Schiller, any fact worth considering is one that has obtained its status by means 
of valuation.  The “philosophic sciences” should, rather than seek to parse out distinctions 
between the objective fact and its subjective value, admit that the two shade into each other.  
And while Schiller holds that such a view seems “so simple and so obvious that it hardly seems 
worth while come 3000 miles to say it,”2 he is full well aware that it is likely to be met with the 
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accusation that he is wrong.  But is that not, he concludes, the very valuation of the facts in 
dispute that he claims to uphold?   
The second paper, “Communication on Philosophy and International Relations,” is 
presented alongside Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) of Cologne and G. Kuwaki of Tokyo.3  
Schiller notes that, as far back as Plato’s philosopher-king and Aristotle’s sage, philosophy has 
entertained the notion of exerting a controlling influence on society.  Whereas the first scheme 
was fantastic and the second useless, philosophy is again in a position “to look further ahead, to 
take a wider view of the circumstances of life as a whole, to perceive the trend of events, to 
prepare men’s minds betimes for what is coming, to influence them to act as reasonably as their 
nature permits.”4  And it is to America that Schiller looks.  For America, by way of film and 
finance, already wields great influence internationally.  And its philosophers, “mostly 
pragmatists, more or less,” might provide a third method of persuasion, “of mediating between 
the distracted peoples of the earth and of setting their feet firmly in the paths of peace.” 5  The 
paper makes no mention, however, of the method by which Schiller would see this solution 
achieved. 
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Nor do the records indicate exactly what transpires after these presentations in 
September.  But a general schedule can be put together.  It is likely that Schiller set off to deliver 
a lecture at USC, a lecture that was published a year later in the Personalist as “William James 
and the Making of Pragmatism.”6  The lecture itself has a rather complex life.  Both Schiller and 
Flewelling refer to it as having been delivered at the International Congress in September.  But 
the table of contents provides no listing of such a presentation.  It is likely, then, that it was 
presented extemporaneously and then drafted into publishable form for the Personalist.7  Nor was 
this to be the last use of the lecture.  It was published in the latter collection Must Philosophers 
Disagree? (1934) and is significantly modified in a lecture that he delivered at the College of the 
Pacific in that same year.  This essay is an important step in what becomes an increasingly 
insistent program to canonize James as the preeminent figure in the development of pragmatism, 
past as well as present. 
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Claiming that “Pragmatism was one of the major events in the history of thought,” 
Schiller includes it in the company of such discoveries as: (1) the Absolute, (2) Pure Spirit, (3) 
Universals, (4) Formal Logic, (5) the Self, (6) the Critical Problem of epistemology, (7) the 
Problem of Value, and (8) Darwinism.8  But, like most important discoveries, pragmatism suffers 
the insult of its novelty and the ignorance of a pedigree that stretches back to Protagoras.  Here 
Schiller is speaking of James, yet lingers on the aspects of discovery in a manner that also 
suggests himself: 
The first hundred times or so that a new idea is ventilated, it is simply disregarded, and 
treated at though it had never been; the one hundred and first time, when some forceful 
genius gets the world by the long ears and makes it listen, the learned can always show 
that it was anticipated long ago.  So they are satisfactorily confirmed in their conviction 
that there is nothing new under the sun!  Nevertheless Pragmatism was as new as 
anything could be in the fog-laden atmosphere of philosophy.9  
 
The comment is forceful, if curious.  The version of pragmatism that is most associated with 
Protagoras is Schiller’s humanism.  And it is Schiller who has operated as the “genius” that 
“anticipated long ago” this connection.  But, obviously, Schiller doesn’t mean to suggest that he 
is a mere follower.  So why this passage?  The implication is that he is trying to trace out a 
historical lineage—from Protagoras, through James, to himself—that shows the long-standing 
dismissal pragmatic-like thought has suffered at the hands of the traditionalists.   
Even within the purported pragmatist camp.  For here comes his first attempt at an 
erasure and revision.  Peirce is discounted because “the doctrine was fathered upon him” 
whereas James operates as “its real progenitor.”10  Schiller’s placement, and that of his 
contemporaries, is also subtly set forth.  Though Schiller claims no status of “disciple” as late as 
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1897, he suggests that he felt in 1899 that his friend Dickinson Miller “had seriously mistaken 
James’s meaning.”11  Others sensed the import of James as well.  Dewey, and note here the 
language, “had the perspicacity to detect the philosophy that was contained in James’s 
psychology and to derive the philosophy of his ‘instrumentalism’ independently from that 
fountain head.”12  The shifty nature of this argument is made clearer by reference to the dates 
attached to the comments about Dewey’s independent philosophy.   Dewey had “caught on” by 
1914 (when Knox published his The Philosophy of William James) even though the reference to 
James’s psychology dates it back to the publication of James’s work in 1890.  The timeline is 
muddled, it seems, for effect.  Though Dewey got it sooner, he developed an “independent” 
philosophical view.  Though Schiller got it later, he more obviously understood pragmatism’s 
history and the “real progenitor’s” meaning and was able to defend it against attack. 
What aspects were there to which Schiller had to provide aid?   Contra critics such as 
Stebbing, Schiller had to bolster the issue of what counts for verification and proof as regards the 
truth and a truth-claim.  And for him that amounts to the empirical side of James’s pragmatism.  
How, then, do Schiller, Dewey, and Peirce fit into the championing of James’s gift?  Schiller, in 
“Axioms as Postulates,” seeks to expand the will to believe and “by so universalizing it I could 
render its recognition easier and more palatable.”13  Dewey, for his part, gives the academics 
what they want: burdensome technicality respected but not understood, foisted under the unduly 
“cumberous” label “instrumentalism.”14  Peirce, poor soul, is reduced to a description offered up 
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by Alice James: “For years C. S. P. had appealed to William for help until at last he acquired the 
habit of tugging that poor derelict though troubled waters.”15  The question, one assumes, is 
rhetorical.  Would one choose a universalizing and palatable, cumbersome and technical, or 
derelict view of pragmatism? 
But Schiller again feigns modesty even while asserting his role in pushing the movement 
forward.  He “found it quite easy” to adapt to the use of the clunky term pragmatism as the 
general, and instrumentalism and humanism as the specific, term(s) for the movement. Indeed, 
he suggests that there are perhaps as many pragmatisms as there are persons who champion its 
cause.16  Not so fast.  For here Schiller perfects the merger of James into his Humanism.  James, 
like Protagoras, respects “the humanistic truth”: “every center of experience should be heard 
from, because it may yield a contribution to the common store.”17  This is the (overly) optimistic 
blending of the general and the particular, the fusion of individual views to a social process by 
which truth-claims that are verified achieve more and more axiomatic status.   How, though, the 
derelict and the technical philosophers fit into this rosy picture remains in doubt.   
This attempt to gather diverse strands underneath his humanist awning was not reserved 
for members of the pragmatist fold.  After his stay at UCLA, Schiller travels back across the 
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country to present his paper “Some Logical Aspects of Psychical Research” at a symposium held 
at Clark University, Worchester, Massachusetts, from 29 November to 11 December.  The 
symposium attracts a wide range of presenters, ranging from proponents to opponents and those 
in between.  Notable among them are author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930) and politician 
Sir Oliver Lodge (1851-1940) representing supporters, and magician Harry Houdini (1874-1926) 
as a critic.  This article can be read as a companion piece to the previous one.  It is an attempt to 
place himself amidst the historical developments of psychical research, urging again for 
humanistic novelty and against flawed traditions. 
Schiller begins by noting that his interest in psychical research, begun in 1882, has been 
conducted for 44 years “without either giving up the subject as hopeless or extracting from it any 
overbelief and turning it into a religion.”18  But his insistence on its worth as an area of inquiry is 
also an extension of his belief that the traditional training in logic and science is lacking.  In 
turning away from flawed notions of proof, his early work in the Oxford Phasmatological 
Society—which was absorbed in the Society for Psychical Research—ensured that he “never 
became enslaved to the fatuities of the traditional logic, and became more capable of conceiving 
the idea of a humanist logic that interested itself in the actual reasonings of men and their 
practical difficulties in obtaining truth.”19  Schiller’s logic, then, tests the limits of what is 
traditionally considered scientific, junking the a priori in search of that which becomes truer by 
testing.  But it accrues sanction by the very fact that science as practiced—in the downfall of 
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Euclidean geometry or the rupture in Newtonian physics—exemplifies the first canon of his 
logic: “that nothing is incredible if the evidence for it is good enough.”20 
But what becomes truer and is seen to be good enough is a matter of quantity; it is subject 
to the demands of “a logic which is willing to let empirical evidence accumulate.”21  And, on this 
count, Schiller’s interest in psychical research contains a criticism.  Lacking experimental 
control, psychical research is left to take the worst form of philosophy, the “one proves all,” and 
vainly assert it as proof of the legitimacy of its endeavors.  As Schiller explains: 
It is moreover a further consequence of this lack of experimental control over the 
phenomena that the severest and most trustworthy of all the tests of truth, the pragmatic, 
cannot as yet be supplied in Psychical Research.  We cannot as yet maintain that psychic 
phenomena “work” so obviously and so surely that their reality is practically beyond 
dispute, and that disbelief in them has become mere silly, like disbelief in telegraphy.22 
 
Such validation must be sought if it wishes to enter into discussions of legitimate science.  Here 
Schiller urges caution against surrendering too quickly to any one theory of any one sort of 
psychical phenomenon.  Why?  In the first place, these phenomena engage the mind in 
conceiving heretofore unexamined possibilities.  In the second, “the hypotheses also by which 
we seek to apprehend them are similarly ill-defined.”23  The widest possible ground should be 
covered in both seeking to find objects to study and in attempting to develop theories as to their 
occurrence.  But, in the third and in line with his view of logic, this searching out of materials to 
test and hypotheses to apply is the mark of all sciences.  A robust science like physics continues 
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to encounter data which defies its established assumptions and psychology, one of the oldest of 
sciences, still struggles to define the terms of its inquiries.  Why should psychical research 
proceed any less impeded by changing concepts and terms of art?  And here Schiller references a 
hope of seemingly Jamesian overtones:  “It seems probable enough that the facts will continue to 
seem bizarre . . . but our faith in Scientific Method should embolden us to believe that, if we go 
on, we shall find a way, even through the thickest jungle.  It is the scientific will to find a way 
which has hitherto been lacking.”24  Thus, Schiller concludes, not with a program, but with a 
“profession of faith.”  It is a belief that the road ahead may prove difficult but, in the end, supply 
materials that are useful.  
The two presentations that Schiller provided at the International Congress can be read as 
rather staid extensions of already standing arguments: the errors of abstraction and the social 
application of philosophy.  But the two lectures are different.  They rather insistently insert 
Schiller into the historical mix of pragmatism and psychical research.  It is also clear that they 
function as a form of retrospective sense-making meant to improve his place within those 
movements.  The published disparagement of Peirce, not heretofore seen, draws Schiller closer 
to James.  The comments regarding Dewey are more reminiscent of his private letters than his 
past reviews of Dewey’s works.  And by combining his historical interest in psychical matters 
with his more recent attempts to formulate a humanistic logic, Schiller seeks to further extend the 
reach of his particular version of pragmatism.  In both, he exemplifies his claim that “every age 
demands a new history of the past.”25  But to what end a past picture for a philosopher with a 
forward thinking program?  A “practical desire for guidance which inspires our interest in the 
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future, as in the past.”26  If pragmatism can be seen to move seamlessly into humanism, it 
eliminates both Peircean obscurity and Deweyian technicality.  If psychical research is aided, 
indeed informed, by humanism, it further extends the practices which he professes.  All history is 
aided by what we recall and how we articulate it.  These lectures clearly suggest that Schiller 
remembers his own place well.  The question is not how true the tales are, but whether they will 
prove useful. 
7.2 ON WHAT GROUNDS: THE HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF HUMANISM 
Whatever the actual date of the Clark University lecture, Schiller was back at Oxford by 
the start of 1927.  And correspondences he received provide tantalizing hints as to the overall 
trip.  At some point, perhaps as a result of such a taxing schedule, Schiller’s health had 
suffered.27  But it is a letter from Fawcett that is more intriguing:  
Glad you had such a rare time + steered clear of a Professorship with possibly an 
American heiress to follow ------ then the domesticities + and [sic] no Logic!  Oh!  Yes, 
Knightly + I admire your work in Logic, but should prefer even to that another 
installment of the lucubration of you + your old crony, the Sphinx.  Would the 
monadology + the pluralism hold today?  And can the white world, which you suspect to 
be on the primrose path of decadence, dispense with a metaphysics which will endorse 
meliorism? . . .28  
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The letter references a variety of interesting possibilities.  In the first place, it suggests that 
Schiller was already entertaining an offer to teach at USC.  In the second, there is the implication 
that Schiller had met a potential paramour.  It is likely that this love interest was future wife 
Louise Strang Griswold, then an assistant art professor at USC.29  And the trip was successful 
enough to prompt Flewelling to exclaim, “We miss your genial countenance in the office and 
since the mountains have been several times covered with snow we have wished that you might 
be here to enjoy their beauty. . . . You see I am trying to whet your appetite so that you will hurry 
that work which you have on hand and return to us.”30  That return will have to wait.  The work 
that occurs in between suggests both the complexities of the history Schiller is creating. 
These complexities have to do with the very practice he recently endorsed: selection of 
what will count as history.  And it is seen in Schiller’s “profession of faith” as regards the 
concept of eugenics.  The previous years have seen the publication of a significant amount of 
articles, and also books, that address what he saw as the deterioration of society.  This wing of 
his social philosophy has, as was mentioned previously, been downplayed by past writers as non-
philosophical.  And for a philosopher like Schiller, one who stressed the application, testing, and 
revision of views (even when he did not do what he preached), the interest in eugenics is no 
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more shocking than the interest in psychical research.  Rather than accepting things—be they 
social, logical, or spiritual—as is and when there is a felt problem, it is best to explore and test 
options that might craft a more productive result.  But there are difficulties. 
In the April 1927 Eugenics Review, Schiller reviews of C. P. Blacker’s Birth Control and 
the State.  He proffers an optimistic goal for eugenics: “a capacity for indefinite increase is 
inherent in all living beings.”31  How?  Following from Blacker’s suggestion: 
The medical profession should appeal to the Ministry of Health to permit instruction in 
birth-control to be given to the poor women from whom it is at present withheld.  That is 
only a small step towards the removal of a great social maladjustment, but it is a 
practicable step, and perhaps as far as it is at present possible to go.32 
 
Taken alone, this might sound progressive.  But the “all” that is being offered the solution is not 
the “all” that offers it.  Schiller, attending to the problem of overpopulation and endorsing 
Blacker’s plan, also adds that the specific problem are “the classes which at present proliferate 
like rats and rabbits.”33  This exposes another of the paradoxical aspects of his general 
philosophy: the difficulty of upholding the social context of humanism while stressing above all 
else the empirical, and personal, aspects of pragmatism.  What the individual finds lacking is not 
merely theoretical (and thus an abstraction); it is the actual practices that constitute, at least for 
Schiller, the “social maladjustment.” 
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There is need here for pause as regards the difficulties inherent in Schiller’s eugenic 
position.  The concept of eugenics, far from deserving praise, suggests the need for nuance.  And 
two caveats, which will be extended later, deserve mention here.  One of the most troubling 
aspects of eugenics is the racism that it both utilized and engendered.  As latter documents will 
show, Schiller was indeed a racist.  His suspicions regarding Africans and East Indians are 
clearly stated.  But this negative treatment of race did not extend to one of the most consistent 
arguments often raised in support, and discussion, of eugenics: the concept of “racial purity.”  As 
Schiller notes in his April 1928 review of American plant geneticist Edward Murray East’s 
Heredity and Human Affairs (1927), it helps to “put the ‘race’ fanatics in their place. . . . 
Professor East shows that crossing is conducive to variability and that this increases the 
prospects of better adaptation to a wider range of conditions.”34   
Another, equally troubling, aspect is that of class.  Schiller’s comments in the Blacker 
review clearly make a distinction between higher and lower classes.  On this point, he is more 
ambivalent.  But he also argues that higher social position in many cases was a detriment to 
eugenic goals.  As he states in his July 1928 review of William Townsend Jackson Gun’s Studies 
in Hereditary Ability (1928): “Mr. Gun’s pedigrees are highly selective, and do not tell the whole 
story, and urge that persistent prominence in ‘leadership’ may be due to inequality of 
opportunity, hereditary position and wealth, rather than any hereditary ability.”35  Neither of 
these points is meant to suggest that Schiller is freed from the positions he espouses in other 
places.  But they should help to more accurately: (1) contextualize Schiller’s eugenic positions as 
                                               
34
 F. C. S.  Schiller, review of Heredity and Human Affairs, by Edward M. East, Eugenics Review 20, no. 1 
(April 1928): 40. 
 
35
 F. C. S. Schiller, review of Studies in Hereditary Ability, by W. T. J. Gun, Eugenics Review 20, no. 2 
(July 1928): 113. 
  407 
against others current at the time, and (2) place those positions into clearer relationship with his 
other philosophical positions.  
But there is more.  This restrictive turn in his philosophy carries, abovementioned 
problems noted, the suggestions of benefits.  The individual view, that volitional and testing self, 
is not to be denied merely because the accepted social views sanction against it.   And here again 
we must turn to an area which philosophers have, for the most part, deemed outside the 
discussion of Schiller’s philosophy: psychical research.  At about the time that Schiller’s review 
of Blacker’s book came out, Clark University (Worcester, Mass.) releases The Case For and 
Against Psychical Belief, a collection of the lectures offered at their symposium along with 
several additions submitted by those not in attendance.  The response in July from England, from 
the Society for Psychical Research, is not a good one.  While Theodore Besterman congratulates 
Clark University for taking the lead in American university study of psychical research, his 
summary conclusion is clipped: “We regret, however, that more thought and care were not 
devoted to the preparation.”36  Besterman provides a laundry list of typos, and a salvo of further 
criticisms: the lack of a clear definition of the primary terms, the liberal focus on too 
contemporaneous a case study,37 and the arguments by persons who hardly qualify (Houdini) as 
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credible or whose arguments (provided by the only two female contributors) are “literary, rather 
than scientific, performances.”38  He applauds the discussions of William McDougall and Oliver 
Lodge, and notes Schiller’s application of pragmatism to psychical research.39  But the two 
authors, excepting Houdini, who are openly hostile to psychical research are chastised for 
providing, in the case of the University of Wisconsin psychologist Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944), 
not “a single word of specific criticism,” or, in the case of Stanford University psychologist John 
Edgar Coover (1872-1938), “very surprising remarks” which suggest his inability to form a 
cogent argument.40 
Besterman’s review, from inside the Society for Psychical Research, reads as though it is 
offered by one personally attacked.  Schiller’s commentary in the same month, in The Nineteenth 
Century and After, is far different.  And “The Truth About Psychical Research” is reflective of 
tendencies that complicate those found in his support of Blacker.  Human beliefs, according to 
Schiller, split into liberal and conservative sides: “There is always a liberal party, progressive 
and adventurous, willing to run risks and to speculate, and a conservative, loyal to traditions and 
tested truths.”41  The conservative bias, however, runs deeper.  But, in deference to comfort, it 
downplays novelty.  Nor do the institutions meant to shape belief work to overcome this bias.  
The university, for example, functions to ward off “too many novelties in our stock of ideas” as 
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they might prove upsetting to everyday life.42  Not that this is always and everywhere the case.  
Schiller sees the publication of the book as suggestive that the conservative bias might be 
changing.   
But the book reveals as much need for caution as it does for congratulations.  All sides in 
the matter seem to harbor views so radically disposed to dismiss their contrary that no détente 
seems likely.43   Is there not, Schiller asks in the rare role of mediator, a way to navigate toward 
more temperate waters?  Schiller believes that there is; and it should shock no one that it resides 
within the vestibule of one of his pet projects: “everything hinges upon scientific method; and 
what this is is a logical question.”44  And the answer resides in both camps disengaging their 
conservative biases in favor of more liberal ones.  Both sides “should change their logic, and 
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observe the method they actually use in knowing, rather than that which theoretical logicians 
have ascribed to them.”45  Such observations initially privilege the critics.  They are right that the 
science of psychical research does not yet “work.”   But the proponents would then be spurred on 
to actually prove the value of what they hold to be “true.”  Such motivation would then move 
psychical research into more of an accord with the scientists.46   
The complexities of Schiller’s approach should now be more apparent.  Turned to the 
social, it suggests gradations as to what constitutes value.  Turned to the individual, it suggests 
variations as to what counts as truth.  Combined, they seem to be in conflict as neither side of the 
ledger seems capable of even the slightest degree of stability.  But the answer, for Schiller, lies in 
the relation of the social to the individual.  If history is selective it is because it is individual.  If 
the individual is to be effective it is because the selection accords with the most useful social 
needs.  And those needs, as applied to eugenic reform, to psychical research, to philosophy, are 
anchored to a test that implicates both the individual and the social: control.47  Schiller’s attempts 
to push forth pragmatism and humanism now seem strangely reminiscent of his attempts to forge 
a metaphysic in 1891.  Then, the spirit struggled more and more to craft confluence in the world 
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process.  Here, individuals work to achieve tighter and tighter control over the social forces they 
seek to understand and influence.  But there is a further catch: for Schiller’s (individual) 
philosophy to gain credence it has to vie with competing (social) systems.  He claimed that 
pragmatism was big enough to admit of varying species.  He must contend, however, with those 
who see his understanding of the genus as flawed. 
Though in fact merely coincidence, the person with which he must now compete also 
echoes back to the previous decades even as he has been a subject of discussion only a few 
months past: Dickinson S. Miller.   In April, while Schiller was discussing “social 
maladjustment,” Miller was still questioning the status of James, the figure so central to 
Schiller’s history of pragmatism.  In his April 1927 Journal of Philosophy review of Julius 
Seelye Bixler’s Religion in the Philosophy of William James (1926), Miller praises James’s 
appreciation of life even as he dismisses most of his formulations about the same.48   He claims 
that James was “the most important . . . figure in American philosophy” even if most of James’s 
actual philosophy was “unsound.”49   His primary example is the “will to believe.”  Why, Miller 
asks, believe for the sake of believing, when it is far better “to know what is really there”?50  The 
problem with such a position is not, as James assumed, that one takes cold comfort in “rules of 
logic or science”; no, the harm is that a faith in something that “does not exist or is not certain” 
ends up warping “ourselves to what does and is.”51  And even James could not hold to his own 
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principle.  For there existed in his works the tension between wanting to believe and wanting to 
more accurately understand phenomena.  So it was that James traced out beautifully the general 
tendencies of his thought, but would slip into ambiguity where Miller would have wanted more 
precision. But even then, Miller admits, such detail “would probably have dimmed and enfeebled 
those perceptions which were the means of his principal service.”52 
In August, Schiller responds with “William James and the Will to Believe.”  First, 
Schiller asserts that the will to believe avoids being mere subjectivism by being tested against 
“the empirical consequences of a belief.”53  It is just this empirical testing that Miller abhors, as 
it resists a static world of facts to which man must submit.  Second, though related to the 
empirical demands of the first, Miller is “reprehensible” in questioning “the religious value of 
James’s philosophy.”54  The will to believe in matters of religion resists the deterministic 
cosmological system that Miller seems to endorse.  As do, Schiller contends, the needs of most 
people of faith.  While Miller may wish to “know” a religious system in which all has been, is, 
and ever shall be laid out in intricate order, the “faith” of the view that James’s provides is more 
in keeping with the complexities of religion.  “I would submit that [‘creation out of nothing’] and 
free-will and alternatives and miracles and novelty all belong together, and suggest far too 
coherent an interpretation of very insistent facts of experience to be dismissed without 
examination.”55  Given these points, Miller’s initial appreciation of James’s continued 
importance seems of depreciated value to Schiller. 
                                               
52
 Miller, review, 206. 
 
53
 F. C. S. Schiller, “William James and the Will to Believe,” Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 16 (4 August 
1927): 437-38. 
 
54
 Schiller, “William James,” 439. 
 
55
 Schiller, “William James,” 440. 
  413 
Logic would dictate that Miller respond.  Not surprisingly, his November 1927 reply 
chides Schiller for the same deficiency he found in James.  Miller remarks in “Dr. Schiller and 
Analysis” that Schiller’s contented “himself with a few general remarks and judgments from a 
distance instead of offering exact and conclusive refutations of what tried their best to be exact 
and conclusive analyses.”56  But he also takes aim at Schiller’s style.  Specifically, Miller 
addresses the “inexactness” to which Schiller submits language generally and metaphor 
specifically.  Miller posits that the process of error cannot be the same as that of truth, otherwise 
we persuade “ourselves that a certain road is the way to our destination because it promises the 
most agreeable hours on the journey.”57  Further, he notes that the use of terms such as ‘rigid’ 
and ‘static’ in no way comport with a realistic view of the world, and must be a metaphysical 
strategy meant to denote something other than what Miller meant.  All of these problems lead 
Miller to wish that Schiller “had given fresh aid by coming to closer quarters with his theme.”58 
In March 1928, Schiller feels the need to clarify his position in “William James and 
Empiricism.  Noting that the tension, steeped though it is in admiration, between himself and 
Miller has existed for over thirty years (enough to even make him question a will to believe in 
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pragmatism), Schiller nonetheless feels the prior essay “does not yet satisfy [his] curiosity.”59    
He notes that his response to Miller’s arguments was faulty only in that he “was not trying to 
dissect it into a series of syllogisms.”60  Schiller further argues, and this applies to many of 
Miller’s points, that a statement of fact is really only a purposeful charge of contextual belief; 
“every valuable result may be improved on and bettered, every ‘truth’ seems doomed to be 
dogged by ‘error’ on its path, and finally to suffer degradation into ‘error’ when we advance 
beyond it.”61  Simply put, Schiller is suspect of Miller’s neat and tidy use of terms (and critical 
condemnation of Schiller’s use of them).  His is a use of convenience, insofar as what is useful 
avoids “advancing metaphysical pretensions and falling foul of other useful principles.”62  He 
wishes to advance a worldview in line with James, a version of empiricism that stakes its claim 
to “experiment without fear, prejudice, hindrance, or remission.”63   
This quarrel with Miller stands in stark contrast to his discussion of psychical research.  
There he attempted to show scientists and psychical researchers the middle road.  Here he seeks 
to demonstrate that Miller is leading the reader down the wrong path.  Why the difference?  It 
again seems to be an issue of genus and species.   For Schiller, the overriding and governing 
philosophical contention is that his humanism is an outgrowth of Jamesian pragmatism.  It 
follows that the ends to which it is directed, be they eugenics or psychical research, are meant to 
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demonstrate the validity of the approach.  Already, however, we have seen that the social and 
individual components of his philosophy create an unsteady mix.  But the argument with Miller 
adds another layer to the analysis.  The individual is the philosophical in Schiller’s worldview 
and the philosophical must show adherence to pragmatic humanism.  And when Miller attacks 
the central tenet of James’s philosophy as Schiller conceives it—the empirical—the argument is 
more than merely a quibble over details.  It is an argument about what constitutes humanism, 
what warrants its intervention into areas of human activity, and what justifies Schiller’s assertion 
as to that relationship.  Recall that in 1899 Schiller said: “James’s principle was being 
misconstrued (by ignoring its demand for empirical verification) as an incitement to make-
believe, instead of as an analysis of the psychological processes of acquiring beliefs.”64  Nearly 
thirty years later, it is now Schiller that has to answer charges that his conceptualizations are 
mere fancy.  
7.3 QUESTIONS OF LORDS AND LOGIC: SOCIAL CONTROLS AND 
SYSTEMATIC STATEMENTS 
As the summer begins, Schiller’s thoughts turn to his schedule for the remainder of the year.  It 
included at least one (unpublished) lecture.  In July 1928, Schiller completed a manuscript 
entitled “The Psychology of Ghosts.”  Schiller’s notes suggest it was then delivered to the 
Clerical Club in December of the same year.   The contents, ranging over twenty-two 
handwritten pages, are suggested by the very title.  What is more interesting is the manner in 
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which he frames the discussion, both in the document itself and in a revised preface.  The script 
suggests the recent time off has done nothing to quell his distaste for the profession he has left 
behind.  But these comments can also be read as a response to the squabbles of the past months.  
He derides Oxford philosophers as “asses” so “hidebound” to convention that they scarcely look 
beyond the standard dogma.  The reason: 
Now all these are worshippers of the great idol of Respectibility + have their reward.  For 
Respectibility means camouflage + fashion + prosperity.  But it also means wearing an 
oppressive armour of conventions + traditions which enslave the spirit + ultimately crush 
it.  Thus the academic man only becomes truly free when he is pensioned off.  And by 
then he has often become so crushed + slavish that he hugs the chains that fettered him!65 
 
The independent minded, instead, find in their freedom from the strictures of respect an 
allegorical sympathy for those spirits no longer tied to the terrestrial plane.  It is clear that 
Schiller views himself as the anti-worshipper, as the pensioned off thinker freed from status and 
constraint. 
Even if such a view is more posture than fact, it did free him to consider the possibilities 
of travel abroad.  This is suggested in a letter from Knox on 27 August, itself a response to one 
from Schiller two days past.  In it, Knox humorously queries: “[L. P. Jacks] did not know 
anything about your California plans.  What are you to do there, when are you leaving, and how 
long are you going to stay?  Are you going to preach pragmatism at Los Angeles, or study the 
“stars”?66  The details of this trip are further clarified in a letter Schiller writes to Flewelling 
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three days later: “It is very good of you to offer me another chance of [sic] University of S. 
California in 1930, and I much appreciate the honour.  But, as you yourself suggest, one is 
reluctant to bind oneself at my age, so far ahead, and I should prefer to defer consideration of 
your offer until I get to Los Angeles next winter.”  He suggests an aggressive touring schedule 
upon his arrival in February 1929: staying in Los Angeles during “the second semester,” visiting 
Berkeley at the start of the Summer, with a trip to Yale in September, and a return to England by 
1 October.67  The schedule is as was said aggressive, especially so for a person whose health was 
so recently on the mend.  But it is also indicative of a new novelty in Schiller’s life: freedom.  No 
longer held in tow by a busy tutorial schedule, he is now free to choose—to travel, to lecture, to 
visit, to teach—to a degree heretofore impossible. 
Before leaving, however, Schiller drafts and publishes an article in the Eugenics 
Review.68  Appearing in January 1929, “Eugenical Reform—1. Of the House of Lords” is the 
                                                                                                                                                       
endowment for giving you much help as is my power to give; and so fail to see where the ‘throwing you over’ 
comes in!  All the same, your persistent desire to help me warms the cockles of my heart . . . Alice is very much 
better, and sends you her kindest greetings. . . . Thank you once more for all you have done for me.” 
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first in a series of articles that will eventually be continued in The Nineteenth Century and After.  
And it forms the starting point of what he sees as a widespread reform of the entire British 
system.  Schiller believes the House of Lords, as opposed to the House of Commons, is favorable 
to eugenic reform.  The House of Lords, acting as a check on the power of the Commons, could 
be made to cater to serious social needs rather than be a receptacle of special titles handed out to 
aged flunkies, “ex-directors of industry, eclipsed actors, extinct movie stars and the like.”69  
These reforms must, however, be squared with the hereditary principle by which families ascend 
to a seat based on their familial lines and also with the practice of handing out peerages to 
notable newcomers.   
Central to both is keeping the matter of ascension in the hands of families, rather than 
individuals.  If eugenical sentiment were such that a person should be given a peerage as 
recognition of their “social distinction,” so be it; conversely, if a family fails to demonstrate said 
distinction, that may be grounds for “the lapsing of a peerage.”70  In either the familial or social 
forms, the function of the peerage is to spur competition which favors the better being chosen 
and maintained in the House.  It is also possible to endow eugenical peerages “to ensure that 
their holders would always be able to support their dignity, and so should not be forced, as at 
present, to have recourse to the eugenically reprehensible, and often biologically ruinous, 
expedient of marrying heiresses.”71  Such an endowment would only further the competitive 
nature of peerage.  Families would work hard to keep the distinction of the peerage.  And it 
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would help to reverse the tendency found in those of sufficient money but no distinction: no 
motivation to demonstrate ability where social promotion is a given.  
Schiller realizes all this may sound far fetched.  But he counters that this attempt to create 
“the new eugenical nobility” is actually a historically sound one:  
For, properly regarded, the idea is merely that the hereditary ability of the community 
should be organized in hereditary clans, each privileged to depute its worthiest member to 
a senate as its contribution to the collective wisdom of the community, in order that there 
may be formed an effective and respected Second Chamber, capable of exercising an 
intelligent control over the transient impulses of the mob and of the ephemeral 
governments that emerge from the turmoil and deceptions of a General Election.72 
 
It harkens back to the ‘Conscript Fathers’ of Ancient Rome while utilizing the modern advances 
of eugenical science.  And said science accrues benefits by checking the defects of the House of 
Commons.  It would, in the first place, turn the House of Lords from a vestige of snobbish 
immorality (“drunk as a Lord”) into an example to be emulated by society at large.73  In the 
second place, it would reestablish the veneration of the family along eugenical lines.  This 
“modern scientific equivalent for ancestor-worship” would both subsume the individual within 
the ties of his clan and awaken in society a larger measure of respect for the geniuses in their 
midst.74  As a final result, it would finally set in motion a visible platform upon which to develop 
a truly eugenical society.  But more than that.  Negative eugenics is “child’s play,” it sanctions 
only elimination and not progression.75   Positive eugenics is not so easily undertaken or readily 
acknowledged.  It “is a stupendously difficult undertaking” that goes beyond the “the painless 
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extinction of bad stocks whose existence is only a curse to themselves and others.”76  It is, 
concludes Schiller, the desire to transform human lives “gradually into something higher and 
better.”77 
Shortly after the publication of this article, Schiller must have departed for America.  The 
records of Schiller’s schedule upon arriving in 1929 remain fragmentary at best.  Though several 
documents indicate that Schiller accepted a Professorship at USC upon arriving,78 it helps to 
recall that he had told Flewelling he wanted to wait to consider “another chance” at USC “in 
1930” until he had arrived.   He had added that he was putting off making a decision until he 
determined “how I like the sea journey, and can talk the matter over with you, Presidnet [sic] von 
Kleinsmidt [sic] and Carr.”79  Other records indicate that upon his arrival he “delivered . . . a 
course of ‘Special Lectures’ in the University of California at Los Angeles and at Berkeley, in 
the first part of 1929” that formed the basis for his upcoming book.80  Even without an official 
teaching position, Schiller remains busy.  In May, Schiller delivers a lecture at Scripps College, 
Claremont, CA, entitled “Pragmatism, Humanism, and Religion.”81  By June, he is again in 
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Berkeley teaching a summer course.82  In August his upcoming book is in the proof stage back in 
England.83  And, by 1 September, he has traveled—likely “East, via Canadian Pacific, for choice, 
so as to see the Canadian Rockies, and compare them with the Alps”84—to take part in the Ninth 
International Congress in Psychology at Yale.85  After the Congress, Schiller goes to Boston 
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where he was able to meet the person who had been at the center of the controversy that helped 
fuel the symposium and the book The Case for and Against Psychical Research, the medium 
Mina (referred to as “Margery”) Crandon.  By the start of November, he returns to Oxford.86    
Within weeks his new book, Logic for Use, was released.87  As was the case previously, 
Schiller apologizes, explaining that it was “delayed by that tragedy of academic organization 
which renders it impracticable for an academic teacher to publish his thoughts while he is still 
actively teaching.”88  He also cautions that this work is part of a project still in development.  As 
such, it forms but one part of what can be called no “more than an ‘introduction.’”89  But it is an 
introduction meant to usher in a new kind of philosopher: 
For it is a charter of freedom for the philosophic imagination, emancipating it from its 
long thraldom to a sterilizing intellectualism.  It gives him the right to try alternatives, to 
experiment freely . . . to win the inestimable prize of a philosophy that satisfies to the full 
the demands of his whole soul.90 
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As a consequence, it is not written for “the sort of professional who despises what he can 
understand even more than what he cannot”; rather, it is meant “to interest students . . . in the 
cognitive operations of the mind.”91   
The responses from friends are understandably positive and contain some insight into the 
circumstances surrounding the book as well.  Fawcett notes “How awfully dull the S.P.R. has got 
– I couldn’t stick it: I do trust you will be able to brighten things a bit as you do so effectively the 
[sic] discussion of logic in your delightful Logic in [sic] Use.  What I can’t understand is the 
stubborn opposition to you at Oxford.”  But Fawcett also suggests that the book has been 
presented in lecture form for some time when he goes on to note: “Of course it is awkward to 
have to rewrite lectures (though I cancelled two big books honestly; in fact all my stuff published 
before Imaginism was launched in 1916).”92  William McDougall is also thinking of Schiller’s 
alma mater when he writes from Oxford: “I have just finished reading with much enjoyment 
your Formal Logic, + am therefore in a position to congratulate you heartily upon.  It must do a 
lot of good, especially up here.”93    
Another acquaintance, George A. Briggs, provides a favorable contrast of Schiller to 
Dewey: “The book, Logic for Use, came today.  I shall dig into it at once.  It came quite 
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opportunely as I had just finished The Quest for Certainty.  That book in my opinion is much the 
biggest thing Dewey has done.  But what a relief it will be to go from his style to yours.” 94  
Read, whose work Schiller has referenced in the past, is full of praise: “Many thanks for your 
Logic for Use, which reached me about a month ago.  I have read it thro’ firstly carefully and 
warmly congratulate you on the achievement.  It is a great advance upon Formal Logic, good as 
that was.  You certainly make out an unanswerable case against the common formal logic, and I 
wonder what sort of reply its professors will make – if any. . . .” 95  Another friend thanks 
Schiller for the “splendid little book” and notes that “no less a person than Dr. T. N. Carver, the 
Harvard economist, has asked for the loan of it, but he can’t have it just yet.” 96 
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The shorter notices are not as glowing.  In the New Republic, Paul Weiss—who will go 
on to help edit a collection of Peirce’s papers—argues that Schiller’s pragmatism is already out 
of date.  While James helped to bring pragmatism to the fore, “the history of the subject since his 
time has largely been an attempt to reformulate and understand Pragmatism in terms of Peircian, 
rather than Jamesian, conceptions.”  Schiller attacks this approach.  But the attack is subject to a 
succinct dismissal: 
Schiller’s claims, though ambitious, remain questionable and unfulfilled.  His criticisms . 
. . are a mixture of abuse, ad hominem arguments and an application of the formal logic 
to which he so violently objects.  He thoroughly confounds theory with application, logic 
with psychology, activity with result and what ought to be with what is.  Wit he has, and 
some originality, deftness and industry, but they hardly suffice to make one feel that the 
acceptance of Pragmatism is imperative.97 
 
The Times Literary Supplement is more kind.  It faults Schiller for not, a la the past complaints 
of Stebbing and others, clearly delineating what counts as “true.”   But that type of 
comprehensiveness is not its virtue; “it may be in the end found that it is in its insistence on 
relevance to concrete situations, on verifiable consequences of theories and on the indefinite 
perfectibility of all human views of reality . . . that the value of Pragmatism consists.”  As such, 
this book “should be studied by philosophers and scientific researchers.”98  In the International 
Journal of Ethics, E. F. Mettrick pities that this is less than what Schiller had promised and likely 
to generate no new reactions.  It will be “pleasant reading to many,” but will merely kick up the 
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drumbeats of “old foes.”99  And Merrick wanted and expected more from Schiller; “for there is 
no living philosopher with such a grasp of the processes of thought as he, and the constructive 
third quarter of the present volume gives promise that it would have been the greatest book on 
logic for a century.”100 
The longer notices suggest a paradox.  On the one hand, Schiller’s logic could have been 
more; on the other, it can’t help but reflect the limitations of its creation.  In the April 1930 
Mind, L. J. Russell suggests that Formal Logic, the abstraction, has become something of a 
windmill for Schiller, the polemicist.  This creates two problems: (1) Schiller has become so 
endeared of the form he attacks that he can’t see it as only one made up for attack, and (2) his 
alternative, for all its talk of righting the wrongs of thousands of years, is actually “quite sober 
and respectable.”101  The resulting book struggles to reinvent logic while hampering the progress 
for which it pleas.  In his attempt to move beyond arguments in abstract, Schiller provides 
suggestions that would instead hamper progress by being too “obscurantist, reactionary, and 
conservative.”102  Russell hopes that Schiller, perhaps invigorated by “the more promising 
atmosphere of Southern California,” can finally lay out a theory of logic “more closely related to 
practice.”103  
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In the July 1930 Journal of Philosophy, Eleanor Bisbee (1893-1938) notes how Schiller’s 
“constructive” counter to his “destructive” Formal Logic is marred by the sparring tendency: 
“But the controversial habit is so strong!  It is in this new book with the same verve and wit 
which make Schiller’s criticisms so readable, although here it rather hampers the reader’s effort 
to focus on the announced exposition.”104   There are benefits, however, if readers can look past 
Schiller’s labeling of formal logic as Cloud Cuckootown.  And they mirror the suggestions of the 
Times: “the ideal of voluntarist logic is not to prove, but to improve knowledge.”105  In this 
pursuit, and with a healthy “spirit of adventure,” Schiller’s process mirrors the basic aspects of 
Dewey’s reflective thinking model, with one crucial difference: “Schiller does not identify 
thinking and final action. . . . this voluntaristic transition from thought to action is the 
judgment.”106   But she notes a lack of clear criteria in assessing this “Will to Believe,” this 
“Right to Postulate.”107  If man is the measure what is to measure man?  An appeal to Darwinism 
“offers no criterion, no absolute guide.”108  Perhaps this open-endedness is meant as a benefit, a 
willingness to test his theories by his own logic.  Or might it be that a focus on ends and 
selection shows how clearly Schiller’s logic is a reflection of the times, of an era where the 
premises for belief have been replaced with warrants for action.109  The interesting thing is that 
Schiller would likely not quibble with this assessment of a book “vigorous and rich in 
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suggestion.”110  Not with its logic being subject to the continued demands of the times, or with 
the suggestion that it is a creation of the man and the times in which he finds himself. 
The comments of friends surely did nothing to offset the criticisms of peers.  Two 
attempts at reform in the space of a year and neither likely to arouse, judging by reactions, a 
renewed calling to the cause of humanism.  But Schiller’s newfound wanderlust is perhaps a 
salve.  For, as soon as the reviews started coming, Schiller is already preparing to return to 
California.111  And it appears from the scant documentation that Schiller teaches two courses, 
one in Logic and the other in Practical Ethics, during the Spring 1930 semester.112  The first, 
judging from the introductory notes, is meant to supply a critique of Formal Logic as handed 
down from Aristotle.  As Schiller concludes, “I will confess to a [sic] I don’t be. tt any will 
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supersede Arn Log., until it can be shown tt / systm fails as an instruct. of coercn + a criterion of 
victy.  Hence to arg. for such fail. is to attack F. L. in a vital spot, + we shall see how it may be 
done.”113  The second, given what appear to be final exam questions dated May 1930, seeks the 
more traditional route of examining the moral implications of ethical theory.114    
And he caps this semester abroad off as an honored—he had recently received his 
honorary Fellowship and Doctor of Law degree—guest among new colleagues.115  At a bit past 7 
o’clock on 5 June 1930, after a full day of activities, Schiller presents the first in a series of 
presentations meant to cap the day’s events: the dedication of the Seeley Wintersmith Mudd 
Memorial Hall of Philosophy at the University of Southern California.116  But the celebration, in 
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more than one sense, is short-lived.  In a mere matter of days, Schiller is already heading back to 
Europe and his yearly sojourn in Switzerland. 117  Articles and reviews continue to come out 
while Schiller vacations.118  But his upcoming projects suggest that he is turning his attention to 
the renewed calls for social reform.  If his logic fell short, his plans for eugenics are about to gain 
significant elaboration. 
7.4 PHILOSOPHICAL JUDGMENTS: THE SOCIETAL AND THE SYMBOLIC 
After the less than celebratory reaction his Logic for Use received, it is perhaps understandable 
that Schiller attends to another of his projects.   And while Schiller by no means gives up on 
discussions of logic, it is clear that he is now more interested in mapping out what society would 
look like should it adapt to the cause of eugenics.  The first of these articles, the 30 August 
“Eugenical Reform—The Plutocracy,” in The Nineteenth Century and After, is meant to segue 
out of the argument started in the Eugenics Review in January of the previous year.   What he 
asserted then was that the House was essentially in a state of disrepair, that it functioned only as 
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a “stronghold for the plutocracy, and little more than a clubhouse for the rich.”119  But, reasons 
Schiller, all forms of government that claim the mantle of capitalism exhibit plutocratic 
tendencies.  And it is plutocracy, in all its forms, that provides the greatest challenge to the 
endorsement of eugenics in society.  For it lies partially hidden, like “an iceberg,” in some 
countries; in others, it spreads its powers “like a fungus”; and still yet, “like a termite,” it bores 
into and corrupts all political mechanisms it touches.120  To win the public battle, eugenics must 
transform the plutocracy into an organ of its reforms. 
But the conversion will be difficult.  Unlike the plutocrats of the past, tied to familial 
obligations and mores, the modern plutocrat is free to exert his influence outside government so 
as to then wield that influence in manipulating governments.  In European democracies, he is 
likely to buy a title so to rise in the ranks of “nobility.”  In America, the case is different.  There 
the plutocrat will buy legislation.121  And both engender a curious weakness born of their wealth.  
The energy expended gaining influence is replaced upon receiving it, replaced with a lethargic 
regard for their secured station.  Robbed of any need to work, the rich man is “condemned to be 
a drone, and a vicious drone at that.”122   Sitting, isolated by his very wealth, he sees no reason to 
propagate.  Having no skill other than spending money, he is given no job.  Thus, through a 
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process which initially demonstrates the spirit and determination necessary to succeed, all those 
of ability rise to the top and thereupon wither.   
What is the solution?  Simply, education.  More specifically, a eugenical education of the 
young generally and of those of inherited influence specifically:  
For unlike tribal training, eugenics is essentially an affair of the future.  It looks to the 
future to redeem the past.  It is full of promise.  It is an adventure.  It is pervasive of all 
the activities of life.  It demands an all-round training of all our powers.  It connects up 
directly and intimately with the most pressing problems in the lives of the young.  It must 
moreover evoke personal pride and the spirit of emulation; yet its ideal is social and not 
selfish.  Its appeal is to anyone who feels he is good for anything.  What can be better 
calculated to appeal to the psychology of youth?123 
 
But the “anyone” above must come with conditions.  It must be a selective process in which the 
elite are competitively trained in the high ideals of eugenics, in all its physical, intellectual, and 
moral facets.  At the same time, “the appeal of eugenics education will be universal: that is, it 
will reach all the classes which generate ability.”124  Finally, it will be a progressive affair.  It 
will adapt as it goes and increase in prestige as it attracts to its fold the talented who can turn 
plutocracy into aristocracy fitted to the “progress of humanity.”125 
If the plutocrat wields warped influence from without, the bureaucrat works to corrupt 
democracy from within.  In the September 1930 “Eugenical Reform.  II. The Democracy,” 
Schiller argues that, in the employment of bureaucracy, modern democracies align themselves 
with “as potent and insidious an enemy to the freedom and equality of ideal democracy as 
plutocracy itself.”126  Touted as “expert government,” it works behind the scenes to become 
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“masters in the art of guiding, and hoodwinking, the rules for whom they are supposed to take 
their orders.”127  The victims in all this are: (1) the leaders, who are reduced to puppets of the 
pencil-pushers, and (2) the people, who are pushed this way and that by the rigged elections and 
behind the scenes deal-making that leads up to them.  The need, then, is to examine the areas 
where the public will most likely see the dysgenic effects of democracy at work.  Once exposed, 
it is more likely that the public will clamor for eugenic reforms.128  
The first problem is “that civilized societies are doing practically nothing to prevent the 
deterioration of their germ plasm by the free breeding of the most undesirable sections of their 
population.”129   In the name of charity and benevolence, society continues to foist large sums of 
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money on “the breeding and supporting of lunatics and ‘morons.’”130  The second problem is the 
growing threat of over-population.  No country is exempt from this threat, though one is perhaps 
equipped to turn it into an advantage.  America used cheap immigrant labor to build up its 
economy.   And that increased global standing might engender another benefit.  If America 
continues to prosper financially and decides to restrict unchecked immigration, she may have the 
resources to entice the talented from Europe, turning the continent “more and more into a 
pleasure resort.”131  Both problems could be resolved by means of negative and then positive 
eugenics.   By the elimination of the unfit in both the higher and lower classes, the worker pool 
could be reduced and hence refined. 
There is, however, a third problem which reclaims the aristocratic impulse of the 
previous articles and promotes positive eugenic reforms: “the competition between European and 
coloured labor.”132   For, although “the European work is, pretty obviously, the better man,” his 
market position is being undermined by “the short-sighted and unscrupulous capitalists” who are 
spurring on globalization.133  The need for massive amount of cheap labour has several effects: 
(1) the grueling work for low pay is unbecoming the white worker and so he readily gives it over 
to his coloured inferior; but, in so doing, he ushers in (2) population shifts concomitant with the 
influx of the cheap labour.   So what is to be done?  The idea of force is obvious, but as short-
sighted as the causes of the problem.   
The temptation to exploit and enslave the coloured labour, rather than to exterminate it, 
would prove irresistibly attractive to a large and potent faction of the whites; the result 
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would be class wars among the whites, to be followed later by successful slave revolts.  
These would doubtless be fomented and supported by states not ruled by whites—at 
present China and Japan—and likely to be more numerous and powerful in the future.134 
 
The more prudent policy, then, is to increase the worth of the white labourer through eugenic 
reform.  “Let them breed better men, and thereby both preserve their position at the head of the 
human race and set a good example of true—that is, eugenical—progressiveness to the whole 
world.”135 
Schiller realizes that his proposals suffer from a promotional problem.  As much as the 
overall goal is the productive increase in humanity, much of the program is based on negative 
measures.  So he seeks out, in the 30 October “Eugenical Reform.  III. The Intelligentsia,” those 
who might aid the eugenic cause.  The intelligentsia are “the people who are interested in ideas,” 
and their chief occupation is journalism.136   But they seem ill-suited to the cause.  Journalists are 
often hard to prod in new directions.  Instead, they adopt an indignant posture.  The journalist 
“usually finds it the path of least resistance to ridicule a new idea in an airy, irresponsible but 
ignorant way, rather than to take the time and trouble to expound it seriously, or even to report it 
fairly.”137  
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So where would Schiller turn for the support that the intelligentsia is unlikely to provide?  
Politicians are ‘yes’ men to such a variety of interests that support from them would be support 
for nothing.  “Considered as a class he is not, in modern democracies, a leader of public opinion, 
but a follower, even when he is popularly hailed as a leader.”138   The clergy, though showing 
more potential historically for advocacy, are now outdated and obsolete; “it is precisely in 
matters of faith and morals that we can no longer look for guidance to the clerical 
professions.”139  Their dogmas seem quaint, their style of life seems too cloistered, and their 
views of current social problems reflect the detached manner in which they view modern life.  
Doctors fare better, but only to the degree that their specialized knowledge does not hamper their 
support.  On the plus side, they are “extensively aware of the evils which result from the 
dysgenical practices of our present civilization”; on the other hand, “they are inclined to lay a 
somewhat exclusive and one-sided stress on the physical items in the eugenical programme.”140   
Schiller is led to the conclusion that educators are the best vehicle for fostering eugenical 
support.  They work directly with the young.  They are most intimately connected with the full 
development of the young.    As supporters of eugenics, “they could impress on their pupils the 
unitary nature of education as a harmonizing of all faculties, a realizing of all possibilities, a 
training for all-round fitness.”141  In the end then, the intelligentsia will provide “nothing more 
than partial and half-hearted support.”142  The politicians, clergy, and doctors are limited by the 
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focus of their occupations.  Better to turn to those professionals who might shape the mind, as 
well as the body, in pursuit of eugenic ideals.   
No more systematic discussion of Schiller’s eugenics views exists.   In four articles, he 
lays out what is essentially a plan for social reform.  If logic is the theory which Schiller finds 
lacking, eugenics is the practice which demands to be tested.  They form two essential 
components of Schiller’s pragmatic humanism.  The best minds would be turned to an 
appreciation of logic built on use, in a society structured to best use its varied, valuated, 
individuals.  But it is, for all its optimism, an endlessly qualified plan.  It is, to steal a page from 
the Times of India, a call to action divorced from “the realities of life.”  Government will work 
better, if the House of Lords is reformed. The leaders of society will guide judiciously, if they are 
made to see the errors of their ways.  Democracies will remain leaders, if their precarious grasp 
of economics, politics, and colonies is tightened.  And, time and again, it is left to the educators, 
the philosopher kings, to work from within to craft a eugenic society without these deficits.  
Schiller’s willingness to believe here now seems like a mere dream. 
But duties proper rouse him to something of a clarification.  In the first week of 
September, Schiller attends the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy at Oxford.  Giving 
his recent preoccupation with eugenics, and his startling suggestions as regards “coloured labor,” 
it is important to note the focus of the short paper he presents: “Is the Distinction between Moral 
Rightness and Wrongness Ultimate?”   Schiller notes that the terms “right” and “wrong,” and to 
a lesser degree “morality,” exist in a relatively few languages, and that the use of functional 
equivalents in other languages causes a large degree of variance.  This, however, does not lead 
Schiller to suggest they should be abandoned.  On the contrary, and in context, they should be 
used:  
  438 
I can see no objection to recognizing the distinction wherever we can find it, and using it 
pragmatically for all it is worth.  If it works well and helps to control human propensities 
to any appreciative extent, we shall regard it as valuable or even invaluable.  If it works 
ill and gives its conscientious sanction to atrocities and obstinately thwarts the 
progressive re-adjustment of former ‘duties’ to changing conditions of life, we shall 
regard it as a nuisance, and undertake the education and enlightenment of errant and 
backward consciences.  If it does both, in different persons, we shall discriminate, and 
insist that the value of a ‘conscience’ depends on the moral value of the possessor. 143 
 
Here, then, amidst an etymological and philosophical discussion, we find a possible warrant for 
Schiller’s views as regards eugenic reform.  Like truth, the value of individuals is variable.  As 
such, they are subject to very tests by which we judge the value of any other concept, be it 
formal logic, psychical research, or otherwise.  This striking comment shows the extent to which 
humanism is willing to extend its “right to postulate,” to turn itself towards adjustments of a 
coarsely human sort.  But Schiller, the educator, now directs his attention to details involving a 
more mundane issue of courses. 
Three days after the Congress, he queries Flewelling: “[can] you send me a copy of the 
School of Philosophy announcement, together with any (secret?) information you might have 
about the date of the second semester.”144  Flewelling informs Schiller that USC has “a larger 
registration in philosophy than we have had before in recent years.”145  Flewelling urges Schiller 
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to report for teaching on Monday, 2 February 1931: “if you are here at that time, you will 
probably have better classes than if you come in a few days late.  I have difficulty getting my 
Englishmen to understand the desirability of being on hand, though of course I do not remember 
that I have had any trouble with you on that score.”146  It is likely that Schiller made Flewelling’s 
deadline.  On 2 January 1931, Schiller notes that he “starts for Antwerp this evening . . .  as 
today is the first good day for an age, it looks as though we should have a good passage.”147   
What occurs once Schiller arrives in Los Angeles remains unclear based on the 
documents extant.148  It is possible that he teaches a course on Plato’s Republic.  But, in 
consequence, all that is clear is that Schiller returns to England, and to Betchworth, by the start 
of June.149  Shortly thereafter he embarks on his annual summer vacation at Pontresina.  While 
there, Schiller’s health again suffered.150  But his health was good enough to complete another 
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essay, “The Sacrifice of Barbara.”151  And, in October 1931, Flewelling notes that he sent 
Schiller the typescript for approval.  He hopes, lacking a response from Schiller, “that the article 
was free from ringworms and other bacteria.”152  Regardless its condition, it is published in that 
month’s Personalist.  And what it suggests about Schiller’s philosophical views is revealing.  
Simply put, it betrays the extent to which Schiller’s creative output was growing soft around the 
edges, lacking both the incisiveness of his wit and the directness of his previous disputations.  
Schiller’s travel schedule, his health, his recent focus on eugenics, may all have been 
contributing factors.  But Schiller’s choice to have this article published is not in question.  Nor 
is its focus on one of the newer developments regarding a topic he had long entertained: logic.  
Specifically, the new Symbolic as against the old and despised Formal. 
Judging from Schiller’s past arguments against formal logic, it would seem plausible that 
he would welcome any attempt to move beyond it.  The response is a bit more complicated.  It 
recalls Schiller’s 1923 tussle with Bertrand Russell regarding psychology and self-analysis.  On 
the one hand, Schiller continues to abuse formal logic as “a pretty harmless and moderately 
entertaining word game”; on the other, though, he claims the new logic as a “fanatic Formalism” 
bent on subjecting students “to suffer untold agonies.”153  Why such a posture as regards a logic 
that, in Schiller’s own words, is dedicated to destroying that which he has long disparaged?  The 
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simple answer is that he sees the new logic as merely “a more perfectly formal form of Formal 
Logic.”154  As such, it is only a further distortion of actual thinking.  But there are other 
considerations lurking in this article.  One of those he references as a representative of the new 
logic is Stebbing, the critic who in years past accused Schiller of reducing pragmatism to “all 
that is useful is true.”  That a personality should cloud Schiller’s judgment of new developments 
in logic might, at first glance, seem enough to dismiss his purple protestations.155  That dismissal, 
however, is couched in a further consideration:  
I notice that Miss Stebbing makes constant and effective use of conceptions like 
relevance, selection, purpose, context . . . . Now in itself it is no matter for regret when 
the practice of philosophers is better than their theory.  But in what are professedly 
theories of Symbolic Logic some little apology would seem to be needed for the intrusion 
of these strange and extraneous notions.156 
 
Stebbing, proponent of symbolic logic and critic of pragmatism, is trying to import pragmatic 
principles into a logic resistant to them.   
Schiller’s argument can thus be read as speaking in two voices: as an objection to 
continued abstraction and, it would seem, as a protest to the use of concepts over which he 
assumes ownership.   It was a protest that Schiller hoped would provoke a response.  But it 
didn’t.   So Schiller sent a copy of the article to Stebbing.157  Still no reply.   And in December 
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Flewelling thinks it unlikely she ever will.  Why would she, he reasons, “you could scarcely 
expect any one who has already felt the tip of your lance to pose for another stroke of 
lightning—if you allow me to swap metaphors in the middle of stream!”158  Flewelling’s 
response to Schiller’s attempts to drum up a debate is courteous, if not entirely convincing.  The 
more likely reason that Stebbing did not respond is that she didn’t feel it necessary. 
But Schiller was busy enough with other matters as the year drew to a close.  Back at 
Oxford, he was readying for his trip to Los Angeles.  And he was preparing for the courses he 
was to teach.  As late as Christmas Day, Schiller writes to Flewelling about the course 
(Philosophy 100) he is planning to teach in the Spring 1932 semester: “re the introductory course 
I hope I’m right in supposing that it is really one for people who have not had any philosophy 
before (virgin souls in fact), and not a continuation of your course in the previous semester: for it 
I am wrong it is too late to remedy it.”159  And he was putting the finishing touches on the 
introduction to his newest collection of essays.     
The release of Social Decay and Eugenical Reform coincides with Schiller’s return to 
America near the start of 1932.    It is a slim volume of little more than one hundred and fifty 
pages.  It consists almost exclusively of the articles he has released in recent years in the 
Eugenics Review and The Nineteenth Century and After.   In the introduction he penned the 
previous December, Schiller argues that it a tome born of “deepest depression”; but it is inspired 
by the desire “to progressively affect the human race in such a way as to improve its intrinsic 
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qualities and render it more and more capable of improving its conditions of life.”160  He frames 
the book “as a continuation of my Eugenics and Politics, which supplies its historical and 
sociological background, and of Tantalus; or, The Future of Man.”161  The reviews, few though 
they are, are appreciative of the continued effort.  The London Observer opines, “the grim truth 
that our civilization is ‘breeding downwards’ and saddling its own capacity with a growing 
burden of subsidized unfitness, is driven home with merciless force in Professor F. C. S. 
Schiller’s ‘Social Decay and Eugenical Reform.’”162   Another review suggests that this program 
is offered with “literary charm . . . rare grace and intellectual power.”163  At odds with previous 
negative reviews on similar subjects, and in contrast to the aforementioned blind spots in his 
social program, portions of the popular press seem to prefer Schiller’s dream to their reality.  
Schiller’s peers respond in kind.  In March several friends, including the British 
pragmatist Murray and author Upton Sinclair (1878-1968), write to acknowledge receipt of the 
book.164  Others have already had a chance to read it.  Darwin appreciates Schiller’s continued 
interest in championing the cause in the face of critics: “. . . great men seem to delight in 
throwing cool water on Eugenics, or in giving such equivocal support as to be harmful.  I am so 
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glad to see you keep on fighting.”165  Hastings Berkeley also comments on the uphill battle 
Schiller is fighting: “I fear that the advent of positive Eugenics is yet a long way off: our 
grandchildren may perhaps see the dawn of this very difficult but very necessary job.”166 
Clarence Gordon Campbell, a member of the American Eugenics Society and President of the 
American Eugenics Research Association, is effusive in his praise: “I have read it with much 
pleasure.  There is not a dull phrase in it and many a chuckle.  In the general Excellence of all the 
chapters, the one on the Intelligentsia breaks the newer ground and is both incisive and true in its 
analysis.”167   
Schiller’s close friend Thaw, reflecting on her experience as a eugenics supporter, also 
provides a positive assessment: “I find that I am bound to say that we ought to be far from 
discouraged.  Here in the US as to ‘negative’ eugenics and as to the average, quite moderately 
well to do family, there has been, it seems to me, as much progress as could possibly be 
expected.”168  Thaw’s response helps to contextualize the bind of Schiller’s reception.  In matters 
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social and philosophical, those closest to him continue to praise his acute insights and critical 
daring.   But the reaction of the larger public is decidedly mixed.  His most recent attempt at 
picking a philosophical battle goes unheeded.   A call for the comprehensive, eugenical, overhaul 
of society is met with some measure of popular praise.  But it receives nothing in the way of 
philosophical consideration.  Schiller’s reaction, judging from what comes next, is to double 
back.  He now attends to the larger picture, to the humanistic frame upon which he has hung all 
these other endeavors.  
7.5 PARSING OUT PRAGMATISM: HISTORY AND HUMANISM, PEIRCE AND 
JAMES 
Unlike the previous year, Schiller’s schedule is fairly clear throughout 1932-1934.  While in 
America, he teaches several courses.169  He gives lectures at USC and also the College of the 
Pacific.  Upon returning to Europe, he splits his time between England and Switzerland.  He also 
dedicates time to an increasing number of reviews in the pages of the Personalist and to several 
articles published in a variety of journals, several of which blossomed into debates.170 And, in 
                                                                                                                                                       
as amused to know some of the actual facts and conditions as to both the past and the present.  One extraordinary 
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1934, he releases his final collection of essays.  This is a rather mundane survey of the facts at 
hand.  For, mixed into this schedule, is a renewed preoccupation with the themes he had been 
developing in 1926-1927; specifically, with laying out the historical importance of humanism 
and pragmatism.  And the lacuna is understandable.  For several years previous, he had been 
occupied with setting up his last systematic treatise, Logic for Use, and laying out his eugenical 
reform proposals.  Now, freed of those obligations, he continues his project of reiteration.  And it 
is a project that gains renewed momentum in light of several challenges.  On the one hand, a six 
volume collection of Peirce’s papers was being released.  On the other, Perry put out a collection 
of James’s letters.  Both, to varying degrees, called into question the history Schiller was telling.  
And both more easily aligned themselves with the three preeminent strains of pragmatism 
currently in vogue: (1) the social/instrumental form referred to as the Chicago School and led in 
reputation if not always fact by John Dewey, and (2) the New Realism as advanced by scholars 
such as Perry that reconceptualizes James, and (3) the logical wing just under construction by 
scholars such as Hartshorne and Weiss that ties back to Peirce. 
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The exact dates of Schiller’s Forum Lectures are not clear but, given his correspondence, 
they had been in the works since the previous summer and were delivered during the Spring 
term.  And, in a nod to the historical project he was undertaking, Schiller suggests that they gave 
him “occasion to develop further the argument begun long ago on Darwin and Design.”171  Set in 
light of that early article, with its sanction of science but respect for an “intelligent design,” they 
indicate that Schiller is again attempting to articulate a worldview open to the fluidity he had 
found so engaging in the works of James.  But they also suggest, in the ends to which they lead, 
the effect that the long shadow of years had cast upon that youthful project. 
The first lecture, “The Metaphysics of Change,” makes clear that there is a metaphysical 
underpinning to his arguments.  But it is, as he has already noted, an individualized and 
subjective one: “strictly speaking, there must be as many metaphysics as there are philosophers, 
and none of them can be valid for all types of personality, and conclusive, whether as coercive or 
as satisfactory, for any but their authors.”172  And Schiller hopes to, in the course of these four 
lectures, “first establish their principles and proceed to their application.”173   A central feature of 
his argument is the view that change, rather than being a mediating state of what is and what will 
be, is in fact the most plausible state of being.  In contrast with the clunky and dichotomous 
apparatus of learned philosophies, common sense show that we “directly experience it in our 
own persons.”174 
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What is obtained with this self-based, variable theory of change?  First, no law is 
“necessarily eternal or immutable.”175  Absent that restriction, nothing is perforce impossible; 
novelties can and do exist.  But they throw into doubt “the confidence of our predictions.”176  
Causality, the barren building block of worried logicians, will not lock into place according to 
pre-ordained sequences.  That only suggests that, as much as the potential for ruin surrounds us, 
“the possibility of novelty and indetermination entitles us also to determine their frequency and 
extent empirically.”177  But, second, given that it is human novelty we are talking about, Schiller 
would be loathe to suggest “that individual behavior is completely determinate.”178  Things will 
happen that cannot be predicted and that will escape our grasp.  But that does not “stop us from 
using determinism as before, wherever we can, as a principle of method.”179  Finally, change and 
time, it would seem, move forward.  We should study our history for clews to our present, just as 
we should delight in “the anticipations of the wildest mythologies and to the fancies of the 
bizarrest philosophies.”180  The mixed and conflicting theories—it is constant, or decreasing, or 
increasing, or variable—as to the nature of the universe in physics give rise to a final validation 
of Schiller’s views.  The old, unchanging laws are being warped within the changing approaches 
to change itself. 
This view of change is informed by Darwinism, but not enslaved to overly deterministic 
versions of the same.  In “The Meaning of Biological History,” Schiller celebrates the fact that, 
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through the combination of “Heredity, Variation, and Natural Selection . . . Darwinism 
undertakes to derive all the varieties of organic life.”181  It accounts for why the fitter survive 
(they “leave more descendants than the unfit, and transmit to them their superior qualities”) and 
why novelties (“the principle and source of innovation” which “produce the one-way course of 
the real”) occur.  But that does not rule out Design and the reasons are readily apparent.  First, 
natural selection cannot be made to account for those traits which are selected; “a living 
organism must always be presumed to be endowed with sufficient organs to live, before any 
question of its surviving better can arise.”182  Secondly, adaptation cannot account for the fact 
that interaction also influences the selection process; “the survival of one species will not depend 
only on its own efforts, but also on those of others.”183  These points would lead one to conclude, 
thirdly, that natural selection is “the mechanism whereby an already existing adaptation is 
automatically adjusted to the changing conditions of life.”184  But, by being automatic, it cannot 
be imbued with some sort of teleological function as well. 
The mistake is based in a rhetorical, and largely effective, move on the part of science.  
By choosing the master word “evolution”—as opposed to “epigenesis,” or the development of 
new characters out of an undifferentiated base—scientists were able to induce a view of 
biological process that was mechanical, denying both novelty and progress.185  In spite of this 
mechanical view, progress was seen to occur on the heels of novelty.  So science had to shift its 
argument by: (1) keeping the term it chose and inserting the meaning of the term it discarded, 
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and (2) operating from the assumption that that development was a progressive (meaning: 
positive) “law” that had “culminated in man.”186  Yet there were still problems.  That which was 
observed as progressive was not a law at all.  It was a result.  And that which occurred was not, 
in fact, always positive.  The biological process was left wanting in support for its claim of 
defeating, or taking over from, theological explanations of teleology.   
This is where the philosopher should enter into the fray, not braying about the death of 
God or bemoaning a mechanical universe.  Rather, philosophy should entertain the human 
implications of accepting the scientific and/or teleological viewpoints.  But any implication is 
always shaded “according to our purposes in dealing with it.”187  And is it not more in keeping 
with our interests, our purpose, in the universe that Evolution should not exclude teleological 
action?  Schiller’s solution is meant also to suggest a moral basis of any historical study.  The 
Historical Method is not merely a matter of laying out all the details in a chronological row.  For 
facts never simply are and are never simply enough: 
When it discovers facts it is always in a rich historical setting, and its history is always 
more than a mere sequences of uncomprehended events.  A historical study must be 
singularly dull and uninspired if it yields no inkling of the causes that were operative in 
bringing about the historical process, and if it suggests no guidance for the future.188 
 
What Darwinism was for Darwin is not what it is for Schiller.  Past assumptions, even those 
novel enough to upset long standing tradition, are not grand standing idols before which we 
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should cower.  They should be tested against the potential new uses to which they can now be 
directed. 
Schiller realizes that the possibility of Design does not exclude the potential for random 
occurrences.  As he suggested, the view one takes is largely a matter of the value one finds in 
taking it.   So, in “The Development of Man,” he wants to examine the value of those variations 
which “participate in the uniqueness of all historical events,” those “novelties” which “start new 
departures.”189  The most basic novelty is life itself.  But there is a large gap between a living 
single-cell organism and the higher levels of species.  The latter exhibit consciousness.190  And 
this self-awareness is profound.  For consciousness, whatever its source, not only implies 
variation, it entails it; “that is, a conscious being cannot be trusted to exhibit completely uniform 
reactions.”191  Consciousness, in short, gave to life what in man has come to be known as reason, 
“a power of adjusting action the particular and peculiar circumstances of each vital situation.”192   
But novelties do not guarantee that the departures they engender will be positive.   
Take, as an example, the development upon which “any enduring social structure” 
depends: “the mutual adjustment of the behavior of its individual members.”193  It has been seen 
in various familial forms—the nomadic tribe, the hunting party, the patriarchal family—
throughout history.  But even as that development has been extended to include international 
relations, there has been no decrease in the possibility that tension will rend apart the structure of 
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society.  That is because societies have not found a way to eliminate the novelty of the individual 
acting against the good of the society.  In that regard, we are no better than even “social insects.”  
For even bees and ants “are apt . . . to nourish and cherish social parasites that are destructive of 
the community.194  There may, however, be one possible “psychological variation” suited to 
curbing such destruction: the ability to formulate value judgments.    
In “Man’s Future on the Earth” Schiller admits to his bias.  He acknowledges that, as 
much as he argued against an absolute argument for Design, he still cannot shake “the suspicion 
that the variations which have mediated progress were not really accidental.”195  How, then, to 
explain the admixture of the good and the bad, the social and the anti-social, in the previous 
discussion of novelty?  Simply, “the factors making for degeneration are always found to co-
exist with those making for progress, and the facts nearly always permit themselves to be 
interpreted as incidents in either process.”196  Novelties, as pivot points, assure no clear outcome.  
Perhaps that is why the human hand must guide novelties towards more desired, though by no 
means secure, conclusions.  “It may mean that we are not forced into progress against our will, 
though we can progress if we will.  In other words, to effect progress our assent is really 
needed.”197 
To Schiller, the current state of affairs suggests such a need.  For the economic, political, 
and moral foundations which have for so long bolstered democracy are on the wane.  If the 
democratic experiment, in Europe and American, goes by the boards, what will chance to replace 
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it?  “It is fashionable and easy to answer: some form of government that will practice social 
planning instead of leaving men to find the ways to their ends by cut-throat competition.”198  
And these forms already exist, albeit in incipient states.  Communism seems ready to reduce man 
to a form of “social insect”; and while this could certainly “arrest man’s deterioration” it would 
also “put an end to any significant history of man.”199 What alternative is there to this solely 
negative form of eugenics? 
There is, however, conceivable a second and more intelligent mode of planning, of which 
Italian Fascism may be the harbinger.  It does not fly in the face of natural selection, and 
try to reduce all to the same lowly level; it is selective, that is, aristocratic, in method, and 
aims at raising man above his present level.  Thus it is essentially an attempt by human 
society to direct its own development, to supersede mere survival-values by ethical 
values of equal or greater survival value and substituting for natural selection a selection 
of what is judged to be the best to grow a super-man.200 
 
But the requirements for its successful execution are monumental.  There would have to be the 
implementation of eugenical policies which would “arrest the contra-selection at present going 
on in the whole civilized world.”201  The elimination of the practices which give rise to “morons 
and lunatics” would have to be coupled with the study of practices which would aid in the “self-
repair” of the “competent and intelligent.”202 
But Schiller doubts that humans are capable of enacting such schemes unless they 
counter that doubt with a leap of faith.  Faith, not sought in a world found to be lacking, but in 
the novelty that lies beyond immediate experience, in “worlds upon worlds of dream, 
imagination, and aspiration, which supplement, transmute, and transcend the physical 
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universe.”203  This leads Schiller to what he calls “the threshold of religion.”  But it is inspired by 
a belief that has been implied throughout these lectures; “namely, that everything will be what it 
turns out to be in virtue of what it has been through!”204 Schiller suggested that novelty carries 
risks, and implies consequences, for mankind.  To succeed is to progress; to fail is to despair.  
Even in articulating the limits of imagination, Schiller is not willing to forsake our capacity to 
try. 
Schiller finds other developments more trying.  Towards the end of the Spring semester, 
Schiller starts to notice that some are revising the history he has been telling.  The first of these 
challenges comes by way of someone new and someone old.  The former is Charles Hartshorne 
(1897-2000), the professor of religion and philosophy then at the University of Chicago.  The 
second is Paul Weiss, philosophy professor at Bryn Mawr and the man who provided the 
scathing review of Schiller’s Logic for Use in 1930.  Together, they edit the Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. I: Principles of Philosophy (1931).  And Schiller uses his latest 
publishing home, the Personalist, as a forum in which to challenge this and subsequent volumes.  
The challenge is both personal and public, as it sets Jamesian “tough-minded” pragmatism 
against a person Schiller now feels is being tendered unfair credit.  The first salvo, in April 1932, 
is relatively tame.  As Schiller sees it, James was a giving friend willing to oblige Peirce with 
honors not always becoming him.  He notes that the contents of this volume are meant to 
“represent Peirce as a system-making philosopher.  They prove, I think, that system-building was 
not his forte, though they evince on every page the working of an independent mind that could 
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not be coerced to flock in herds.” 205  Moreover, they do not furnish enough evidence to decide 
the question of “how far Peirce had gone beyond enunciating the pragmatic principle.”206  For 
every decidedly pragmatic notion, there exists “other passages which are unpragmatic, and show 
how hard it is, even for an innovator, to emancipate himself from a tradition.”207  This is not the 
last comment he will have for Peirce, but it will have to do for now.  The summer is quickly 
approaching and Schiller must again set off for Europe. 
Judging from the documents, it is a summer largely spent preparing for his return to 
America.208   Upon returning in January, Schiller delivers the [George Holmes] Howison 
Lecture, “Theory and Practice,” at the University of California, Berkeley.209   In February, 
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Schiller teaches his Pragmatism course for the first time.   But, during the semester, he also 
ventures to the College of the Pacific, in Stockton, CA, to deliver a lecture entitled “Must 
Philosophers Disagree?” on 8 March 1933.  This is not a specific complaint about any one 
philosopher.  Nor is it written as an explicit defense of humanism.  But it is a rather clear 
indication that, in front of a receptive audience, Schiller is at pains to paint himself as a promoter 
of that to which philosophy should aspire.  Here he champions the divergence of opinions, a 
divergence which he has often courted, as a chief benefit of philosophy.  By virtue of “its 
toleration of differences and disagreements” philosophy “completes and transcends science, and 
aims at a higher ideal.”210  How does philosophy aim at this ideal which subsumes science?  
Simply put, by embracing the all encompassing influence of personality.  While science will aim 
for an objective approach to phenomena, it removes from view the idiosyncrasies which guide it 
practices and admits of its discoveries. In doing so, science declines the view that “actual 
experience is always grouped around a personal self” and obscures the fact that its laws are tied 
to those actual experiences.211  For those experiences form particular cases which, when applied 
generally as “laws,” are “judged by their success in predicting the flow of events.”212  A 
personality-driven and particularized philosophy has thus the right to call itself “the study of all 
the data.”213 
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Not that philosophy always shows itself equal to Schiller’s definition.  No, for philosophy 
to subsume science, it must: 1) admit of no abstractions, 2) acknowledge the role of personality 
in the development of philosophies historically.  Living people give rise to as many rich as well 
as bankrupt philosophies.   It is as foolhardy “to depict the kaleidoscopic succession of 
philosophies as steps in a logical development” as it is foolish to not question philosophers until 
they are dead.214  The first takes convenience at the expense of historical accuracy; the second 
ensures the convenience will seem more accurate.  The consequences of this revised view of 
philosophy will not be hard and fast.  Philosophy will have to admit of a flexible history written 
with different philosophies in mind.  And it is ultimately minds, not abstractions, which matter 
most to Schiller.  For the personalities of philosophers point to the philosophies that they will 
profess and protect.  Anguished over in seclusion, adorned in “a technical language of their 
own,” is it any wonder that philosophers will disagree about philosophy?215  
What is, therefore, most sorely needed in Philosophy is the institution of thorough and 
systematic discussion of the great questions in dispute between the different sorts (not 
schools!) of philosophers.  The protagonists in these discussions should be selected, not 
so much for their age, infirmities and reputation, but for their open-mindedness, honesty 
and good temper.216  
 
Dead philosophers should tell no tales and old ones seem unlikely to change theirs.  In Schiller’s 
final analysis, the hope for a more useful philosophy is with the young.  
If this is the case, why is Schiller attempting to sell this view of philosophy?  Because, by 
his logic, his is a living philosophy.  His disagreements are active protests against those who 
would violate the two rules he sets forth, who would deny the progress of the world by: (1) the 
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abstraction of philosophy, and/or (2) the reduction of its important developments to mere 
historical curios.  It is on these two counts that his April 1933 review of the second Peirce 
volume, Elements of Logic (1932), should be read as a continuation of the first.217  For Peirce is 
now being configured as an unclear historical artifact, as “the mystery man of modern 
pragmatism.”  And he is being reduced to the role of providing cumbersome abstractions:  
For on the whole Peirce belonged to the school of logicians who attach importance to the 
archaeology of their subject, and think that a science already overburdened with an 
untamed multitude of technical terms can be enriched by multiplying their number and 
changing their formulations.218 
 
Burdened by its focus, the contents of this newest volume reveal “little trace of pragmatism or its 
influence.”219  The language is telling.  Read one way, it supposes the absence of the source in 
the supposed source materials.  Read another, it suggests the absence of pragmatism in the place 
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where it mattered most to Schiller: logic.  For a living philosopher preaching an applied art, the 
manipulations of Peircean logic seem too obtuse.   
And it is worth noting the developments that occur in the upcoming months for this living 
philosopher.   Early in the summer, while in Oxford, Corpus Christi extends a courtesy to their 
former tutor:  “Dr. Schiller was unanimously re-elected to an Extraordinary Fellowship under 
clause 22 (ii) d of the Statutes of 1882 from October 1st 1933 to September 30th 1940.”220   In 
July 1933, Schiller comments to Flewelling about his recently renewed fellowship: “I have been 
re-elected . . . for seven years, which is longer than I’m likely to require!”221  This is Schiller 
aware, and seemingly humorously so, of his own mortality.  On that count, his protests of the 
past several years suggest urgency on his part.  But there are other issues which are again 
troubling him.  In August 1933, after detailing his worries about Russia and Italy, Schiller reports 
to USC colleague Louis J. Hopkins: 
Meanwhile the rest of the world is getting crazier and crazier; everywhere economic 
nationalism is strangling more trade and appealing more strongly to mass stupidity.  But I 
was cheered a little. . . the sterilization programs of the German Nazis may do good, as 
may their campaign against some forms of pseudo-scientific literature and book-burning.  
One can never feel quite sure whether there [sic] Dictators are as crazy as they profess to 
be or are only playing down to the silliness of their supporters.222  
 
This, then, is the world in which Schiller lives.  The humble and the horrific mix uncomfortably 
therein.  Aware of his precarious health, Schiller works to get out statements that obtain some 
measure of respect for him and his work.  Germany, already in the grips of National Socialism, is 
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codifying a policy whereby undesirable classes are stunted.   But that, for Schiller, is merely a 
current political development.  As such, Schiller hopes that those potential saviors of the world 
in which he lives comport with the worldview which he preaches.  It is a world, in short, where 
his social and philosophical views continue to make demands of him. But it is also a world that 
provides a routine inspiring to some normalcy.  He returns again to California at the start of 1934 
to teach the second Pragmatism course.  And a world still offering an indication of heretofore 
unspoken novelty: romance.  Upon his return to California at the start of 1934, one finds Schiller 
penning a rather flush letter to Louise Griswold.  Given its date of 2 February, it must have been 
a romance in development for some time.  He explains to her that, due to the necessity of 
meeting with Hopkins and others, “I shall not be able to come out at all tomorrow + nor to see 
you for 2 long days!  Terrible!  I’ll come out early on Sunday though!”  The letter is signed “In 
greate haste but ever thine, Canning.”223  At the bottom there are three O’s enclosing three X’s. 
The reason for his anguish over the delay is understandable.  For only five days after the 
note was sent, Schiller had to be in Stockton to deliver his latest College of the Pacific lecture.  
That lecture, “William James, the Maker of Pragmatism,” is really an extension of the one that 
appeared in 1927.  In this way, it serves as a bridge between his previous and present efforts to 
tell pragmatism’s and humanism’s tale according to his views, as against those being proffered 
by Weiss and others.  And there are clear indications that the discussion is being updated to fit 
the new climate.  It is here that he starts to refer, ambiguously now but specifically later, to 
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James’s sympathy for “cranks.”224  It is also the place where he contrasts James’s style of 
philosophy with that of other American philosophers: “I believe that his way of writing was part 
of a fully considered policy, part of a deliberate protest against the paralyzing Germanism which 
he saw creeping into American academic life, together with German scholarship and ideals of 
research, desiccating the professor and alienating him from the people.”225  And it is here where 
he protests against claiming pragmatism as an American philosophy.  While he gives full 
measure to the discovery of James, Schiller finds it “to be very unsound and dangerous doctrine 
to argue from the character of a people to that of a philosopher belonging to that people.”226  No, 
pragmatism is larger and older than America; “actual human life and actual knowing are 
everywhere pragmatic.”227  Pragmatism, like all great discoveries, is far older than the latest 
person who brings it to the people.  The last one to lay claim to making that discovery is William 
James.228 
But, in April 1934, the one being claimed as its founder is still Peirce.  And the title of the 
third volume, Exact Logic, provides an indication of his first complaint: Peirce praises exactness 
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 Only several weeks after this lecture, Schiller receives a note from Knox.  The implication is that 
Schiller has been discussing the struggles of recent months.  Regaining a touch of whimsy after the loss of his wife, 
Knox comments:  “Here is a motto for the pragmatist that has just occurred to me:- You might use it in a lecture 
entitled ‘Auditory Ambiguities, vulgarly called Puns’ – 
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(Howard Vincenté Knox, Oxford, to F. C. S. Schiller, 20 February 1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller 
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in logic without ever being exact in explaining it.229  As Schiller explains, “Peirce . . . always 
delighted to pepper his pages with weird symbols, before which he knew that the ordinary 
philosopher would simply stand aghast and grovel.”230  As with his logic meant to supplement 
traditional approaches, so too with his mathematical acumen.  If, Schiller reasons, a 
mathematical symbol is taken in pure form as exact, then it can never be altered and is thus 
useless.  If taken in the applied sense, it is clear that it must be subject to revision and thus not 
exact at all.  So what, then, are persons to make of Peirce’s logic?  Bluntly put, that it suffers the 
oddities of an author who “has a tantalizing habit of introducing some obscure and often 
irrelevant technicality and riding off on it . . .”231  More simply stated, Peirce is a victim of his 
time, trading in outdated notions (such as contradiction meaning “false” and not “meaningless”) 
that it took a person such as A. Sidgwick to show as lacking.232  But Peirce gets it right in one 
regard.  He anticipated Schiller’s own conclusion that Formal Logic was a meaningless science. 
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 Schiller makes sure that such an interested party like Sidgwick would be kept aware of his latest work.  
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“As to Analysis, I fear that is devoted to Stebbingism . . .  Those people are determined to keep pragmatism 
misunderstood, + so to escape all fear of conversion to it.”  It is a discussion which continues into late 1934.  In the 
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As with previous years, no sooner does this review come out then Schiller is again 
returning to Europe with, it seems, Louise in tow.233  This summer, however, is different.  His 
precarious health is discussed in a medical report from July 1934.  It notes that Schiller leads “a 
moderately quiet routine of life at present; travels extensively; not much active exercise apart 
from a little walking; appetite and digestion good; sleeps somewhat irregularly . . .tobacco and 
alcohol nil.”  But idle as he is, his health is in decline.  His present symptoms include “attacks of 
breathlessness at nights during the past three years—condition rather more troublesome 
recently.”  The diagnosis is “hypertensive heart disease; myocardial insufficiency, bundle branch 
blook [sic]; chronic nephritis.”   As a result of his “considerably enlarged” heart and “deficient 
                                                                                                                                                       
October issue of Mind Schiller challenges the arguments of Lewis Samuel Feuer (1912-2002) in a short discussion 
notice, a notice which is an extension to a discussion that began in the previous year.  The argument is in keeping 
with his previous comments: Symbolic logic, rather than be a corrective, is an unnecessary extension of Formal 
logic.  Schiller’s conclusion aptly summarizes his opinion: “I agree that philosophers are not to be blamed for the 
complexities of the world, though I deplore that so many have introduced unpardonable complexities into their own 
systems” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Unity of the Universe Again,” Mind 43, no. 172 [October 1934]: 471).  Feuer was 
to receive his doctorate, with a dissertation entitled The Philosophical Analysis of Space and Time, from Harvard 
University in the upcoming year, and his later works show an interest in ideological and social movements.  He 
taught at Vassar and Berkeley among others. 
Sidgwick, for his part, is more interested in discussing the stranglehold of one of Schiller’s more recent 
nemeses: Stebbing.  Responding to Schiller at the start of the same month, Sidgwick explains: “. . . The October 
Mind hasn’t yet reached me, but there ought to be an article in it which I hope you will like.  There should also be a 
short paper in ‘Analysis’ but I rather suspect they will reject it as conflicting too much with Miss Stebbing’s habits 
of thought” (Alfred Sidgwick, Ambleside, to F. C. S. Schiller, 7 October 1934, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. 
Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University 
of California, Los Angeles).   We do not have Schiller’s response, but Sidgwick’s next letter suggests the tone of the 
discussion: “. . . I agree with all you say about the symbolic people.  I sent one short contribution to their Journal 
‘Analysis’ + they put it in.  Then I sent another on ‘Interests + Purposes’ + they have silently avoided printing it, 
though it was perfectly non-contentious + civil.  Miss Stebbing appears not to welcome any difference of opinion – 
perhaps afraid of losing some of her disciples.  They do seem rather a puzzling crowd” (Alfred Sidgwick, 
Ambleside, to F. C. S. Schiller, 11 October 1934, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 
191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los 
Angeles). 
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circulatory reserve,” his doctor recommends that Schiller should “as far as possible . . . avoid 
physical strain in any form.”234   
Schiller does make some changes to his schedule as a result.  As he notes in an August 
letter to Hopkins: “Contrary to expectations we are exploring Norway this year, instead of 
returning to our old Swiss haunts, the reason being that the Doctor would not let me go so high 
(heart).”235  He then travels to Prague to attend the Eighth International Congress of Philosophy, 
during the first week of September.  While there he presents, alongside Flewelling, a paper 
entitled “How is ‘Exactness’ Possible.”236  And it is shortly thereafter that Schiller sees the 
publication of his last book, Must Philosophers Disagree?   As per usual, Schiller receives notes 
of thanks from friends regarding the publication.237   
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 Hopkins comments: “‘Must Philosophers Disagree’ came yesterday.  I have already read the chapters on 
‘Herbert Spencer as a Moralist’ ‘William James’ and ‘William James and the Making of Pragmatism’ and I am 
especially glad to have chapters 18-19-20 + 21 in book form as I had kept the numbers of the Personalist that had 
them and can now throw them away.  Thank you for having it sent to me” (Louis Hopkins, Pasadena, to F. C. S. 
Schiller, 8 October 1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of 
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).  Cyril Edwin 
Mitchinson Joad provides a longer reply and a shading of Jamesian reflection: “With regard to the disagreement of 
philosophers, it does seem to me that you are saying they need not disagree anything like as much as they do, and 
that ultimately there may come a time, if they think straight enough and take enough pains to express themselves 
clearly, when on many matters they need not disagree at all.  All of which is, I submit, a way of saying that your 
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The critical notices the book receives are varied in their focus.  In the December 1934 
Journal of Philosophy, A. E. Moore notes that this “somewhat miscellaneous collection” comes 
well equipped with Schiller’s expected “controversial wit” and “‘humanistic’ approach” to 
philosophical topics.238  The essays “are lively, suggestive, though sometimes repetitious 
variations on familiar ‘humanistic’ themes, well calculated to enlist the attention and sympathy 
of that ‘wider public’ with which the author is mainly concerned, though hardly likely to 
convince those ‘academic recluses.’”239  In the May 1935 Journal of the Society for Psychical 
Research, G. N. M. T. praises how Schiller unites the disparate materials “by a deliberate 
avoidance of technicality of style, which so often reduces, as he observes, the writing of 
philosophers to ‘verbalism and not literature’.  These readable essays, written in Dr. Schiller’s 
delightful style, are certainly the latter.”240  And he notes that it is to be expected that Schiller 
answers the title in the affirmative.  For Schiller, “each philosophy is . . . the product of an 
individual personality, stamped by that personality’s history and character, and intelligible in 
light of that alone.”241   
                                                                                                                                                       
answer to the question “Must philosophers disagree?” is in the negative.  As to the justice of your censure, I am 
entirely on your side as against the great mass of contemporary philosophers, who consider you to be wicked 
because you are so rude to them” (Cyril Edwin Mitchinson Joad, Hampstead, to F. C. S. Schiller, 27 November 
1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, 
Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).  Joad (1891-1953) was a British 
philosopher who at the time chaired the Philosophy Department at Birbeck College, University of London.  A realist 
of the stripe of B. Russell, he later experienced a conversion to Christianity, a topic which occupied the main of his 
later works. 
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In the October 1935 Mind, John Leofric Stocks (1882-1937), then a philosophy professor 
at the University of Manchester, provides the most searching of these short reviews.  And he 
focuses on the third, Speculative, section.  While Schiller jokes that he has “lived down the 
indiscretions” of attempting a metaphysic in Riddles of the Sphinx, Stocks wonders if the overall 
content of this section suggests “Dr. Schiller is in fact returning to metaphysics.”242 And he 
hopes that this book, at least in its third part, is a sign of things to come: “Now that retirement (or 
shall we say semi-retirement) from teaching has given Dr. Schiller increased leisure we may 
hope that he will find an opportunity of working out his metaphysical views more fully. His pen 
has evidently lost nothing in freshness and vigor.”243  
But leisure is not the order of the day, or the world.  As Schiller prepares for his journey 
back to California, there are other things on his mind.  The situation in the Europe that he is 
preparing to leave is a tenous one at best.  In August Hitler’s status as Fuehrer is made “official” 
by a plebiscite.  At the same time, Hitler continues to make demands as regards Germany’s right 
to arm itself and to disputed territories in the Saar Region [land bordering both Germany and 
France].  At the start of October, both King Alexander I and Foreign Minister Louis Barthou of 
France were assassinated at Marseilles by a Croatian revolutionary.  In this climate European 
countries are attempting a variety of tactics to avert any conflict.  One such country is Austria, 
which, wracked by unrest, has adopted a Fascist government structure friendly to Italy and 
signed an alliance with Hungary and Fascist Italy.  Schiller provides his take on these 
developments in a letter to Hopkins in November: 
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As for our air force increase, it seems to me more probable that we are really trying to 
equal the French, who are admittedly twice as strong, than to guard against the Germans, 
who are only half as strong!  Austria is still a danger spot.  I fear the government there is 
turning out 1) Jews and 2) Nazis from their professorships and filling their places with 
priests! 244 
 
The juxtaposition of Jews and Nazis is jarring to a contemporary reader.  But works that Schiller 
has been preparing during his time in Europe will soon make the references clearer. 
7.6 PERRY AND THRUST: FINAL COMMENTS 
Schiller arrives in the United States in February 1935.245  The records suggest that Schiller 
teaches no more courses at USC.  But, for a man recovering from an illness and a long voyage, it 
had already been a busy year.   He had completed two pieces in January 1935—an article and a 
Library Lecture (eventually delivered on the radio)—that suggest the events of the past months 
had a profound impact on him.  Set against his latest reviews of the Peirce papers, in January and 
April, they help to demonstrate just how closely bound the philosophical and social, the theory 
and practice, of Schiller’s humanism have become.   Freed of full-time teaching Schiller is not 
taking the route hoped for by Stocks.  But he is filling in the details of his system, even as he 
hopes to advance against those that are seeking to erase him from the pragmatic metaphysics 
they are creating. 
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Schiller publishes “Ant-Men or Super-Men?” in the January 1935 The Nineteenth 
Century and After.  He continues to articulate the ideas he was developing in the previous 
summer (he had mentioned in his letter to Hopkins in November that he was finally able to 
complete this piece).  And the issue Schiller raises is a basic one: given that man is a social 
creature, the question arises as “to what sort of society his social nature can, or should, give 
rise.”246  The most relevant part of his answer deals with the political situation in Europe, which 
he frames as the struggle to balance a Conservative deference to tradition and a Liberal belief in 
“the policy of reaching social agreement by reasonable discussion or debate rather than by 
authority and force.”247   The lessons as of recent history show routine winning out over an equal 
measure of originality.  And it has been a deceptive rhetorical campaign.  Under the banner of 
Liberalism, the forces of Conservativism waged a punitive (first world) war against Germany 
and her allies.  The results are a circus mirror version of tradition, rife with distortions: 
Everywhere a narrow and bigoted conception of nationality broke up not only the 
political but also the economic aggregates that were essential to human civilization and 
prosperity, and forced mankind back into barbarism, follies and superstitions that it had 
seemed to have outgrown long ago.  It was a signal example of the bitter irony of history 
that a war which had been ostensibly fought to render the world safe for democracy 
should lead not only to a widespread abandonment of democratic institutions, but also to 
a state of affairs in which there was no safety for life, property, or justice, and to a 
recrudescence of personal rule in its most ruthless and tyrannical forms.248  
 
The results were to be expected.  The public, to whom the forces of Liberalism and Conservatism 
preached, turned their backs in disgust at the machinations of politics.   Absent said support, 
governments collapsed into a motley pile of authoritarian governments: (1) Bolshevised Russia 
                                               
246
 F. C. S. Schiller, “Ant-Men or Super-Men?” The Nineteenth Century and After 117, no. 695 (January 
1935): 89. 
 
247
 Schiller, “Ant-Men,” 93. 
 
248
 Schiller, “Ant-Men,” 94. 
 
  469 
with its rule “by open force and secret police”; (2) Fascist Italy with “the dramatic sense of the 
people” that is developing into “a political theory of sorts”; and (3) Nazi Germany, “the maddest 
of all the dictatorships, based on the pseudo-science of fantastic race theories and the barbarism 
of anti-Semitic Judenhetzen.”249  These governments responded to the vacuum created by the 
leaders of the democratic nations.  They stepped into the chaos and offered citizens “a more 
rational and planned order” by which the dictator can shape his citizens into a reflection of the 
nation.250  And note that this amounts to something like an inverted Conservativism.  The 
rationale is an individual that reflects rational society, not a society that reflects its rational 
citizens.   
And it is, ultimately, the citizen who absorbs the impact of these new experiments in 
government.  For each form of rule calls for a specific sort of citizen; it must, in short, “breed, or 
somehow mould, the sort of man it wants, the man who would be fit for its purposes, would 
believe in its ideals, could enjoy life in it, or could at least endure it.”251  The Communist 
government desires an Antman, he who is “infinitely laborious, self-sacrificing, and submissive 
to his social order.”252  But, absorbed into the colony, this is a man without thought for anything 
but the colony.  “For dealing with novelties he will not be equipped, and so his unintelligence 
will make him unprogressive.”253  The Nazi government desires a Superman: 
Already one of the new dictatorships, the German, has declared in favour of eugenics, 
alike in its negative or sanitary form, which aims at purifying the stock, and, in its 
positive and more ambitious form, which aims at creating a real aristocracy and a better 
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type of man.  No doubt many centuries may elapse between this declaration and the 
realization of its programme, but it is none the less significant that the ideal of eugenics 
should now have been officially adopted and proclaimed in a great modern State.254  
 
For this to work, however, the appropriate steps must be taken.  A eugenical State, to inspire the 
masses in its direction, “will have to be elevated into some sort of biological religion and 
equipped with appropriate rituals and myths.”255   And it will have to, as in the case of Hitler, 
commit itself “to the policy of developing leadership, a quality which the democracies are more 
and more failing to do.”256  Rather than “grind down individuals” as in the case of Communism, 
Fascism promises to “utilize the progressive possibilities latent in human individuality and to 
cherish the individuals from whom it will derive the impetus to progress.”257  This “New 
Liberalism” gives rise to hope.  But, should we fail to learn from our mistakes, “the avenging 
Furies of our past misdeeds may turn us back again into the beasts we were.”258 
The January 1935 Library Lecture, “Goethe and the Faustian Way of Salvation,” also 
speaks specifically to the issues Schiller raised in his letter to Hopkins.  And it helps to temper 
what, initially, sounded like a contradictory endorsement of Nazism.  He notes that Germany and 
Austria are attempting, along with the purge of various intellectuals (the list again includes both 
Nazis and Jews), to craft a new form of philosopher king, one who instructs as well as leads by 
example.  But he cautions: “It is much too early to say of course what the results of this 
experiment will be.  It has been initiated with much brutality and ruthlessness; and at present it 
looks quite probable that it will succeed only in ruining the German universities as seats of 
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learning.”  And he adds:  “Much the same may be said at present of a still more grandiose 
scheme, the German legislation on eugenics.”259  The comments of the summer past are now 
easier to understand.  Schiller counts as intellectuals both Nazis and Jews.  And he sees the 
experiment in Germany as just that, an applied test of possible solutions that is as yet unfinished.  
That these policies are eugenical binds him to support them in spirit.  That they have already 
suggested negative underpinnings leads him to critique their specifics.  
In January, Schiller also continues to entertain questions regarding the past.  Schiller 
wastes even less time dispensing judgment regarding the fourth volume of the Peirce papers: 
calling this volume “The Simplest Mathematics must, in view of it contents, be regarded as a 
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somewhat cruel jest.”260  For Peirce, the son of a mathematician is so enamored of math that it 
becomes a limitation rather than a strength.  “It did not avail to induce him to cultivate exactness 
of expression, and it very much encouraged his tendency to take refuge in needless technicality 
and to meet all demands for lucid explanation with an arrogant impatience.”261  Shackled to a 
dichotomous manner of thinking—as per traditional logic, things must be either true or false—
Schiller even goes so far as to pay a small compliment at the end of a rather brusque dismissal: 
“Hence Peirce’s subservience to mathematics fully accounts for the sterility of his logic and for 
his inability to contribute to the pragmatic theory of knowledge towards which he had taken the 
first step.”262 
In April 1935, Schiller turns to the fifth edition of the Peirce papers.  Its focus is 
pragmatism and here Schiller’s critiques cuts closer and he digs deeper into his personal 
experience as one of its advocates.  If the previous reviews were curt, then this one is most clear 
in its dismissal of Peirce as the founder of pragmatism.  And the tactics Schiller uses are worth 
noting.  He relies on James’s description of Peirce’s Harvard lectures—“flashes of brilliant light 
relieved against Cimmerian darkness”—as the entry point into a discussion of Peirce’s own 
ruminations on the Metaphysical Club.  Given the impressive collection of thinkers who made up 
this group, Schiller is led to say:  
This account bids to settle the vexed question of the genesis of Pragmatism; for under 
these conditions the whole credit for its origination can hardly be assigned to any single 
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member, and James’s generosity in attributing so much to Peirce appears in its true 
light.263  
 
Then Schiller feigns modesty by suggesting that Peirce’s role cannot be accurately assessed even 
now.  But he is willing to tender a few observations.  If not for James’s willingness to take the 
few strands that Peirce had offered and mold them into a more comprehensive philosophy, 
pragmatism would have died before it even started.  That Peirce should quarrel with James for 
this, after James had been kind enough to attribute to him the status of an originator, “seems 
decidedly ungracious and ungrateful.”264  When it comes to Peirce’s views of Schiller, gone is 
even the slight courtesy of letters from decades past.265  After “excessive laudation” Peirce 
senses that Schiller too is moving beyond his fragments; so he “changes tone” and even engages 
in “false references” to suggest his views are being highjacked.266  Not that it would be easy, 
given Peirce’s “lengthy and tortuous lucumbrations,” to make off with his personal views of 
Pragmatism and Pragmaticism.267  For Schiller is not sure that even Peirce was clear as to what 
he meant.  It is only “under Providence and with William James as his interpreter” that 
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pragmatism truly flourished.268  Trading in views that are by turns untenable and naïve, Peirce 
seems to Schiller the luckiest man to have never explained himself clearly.   Clearly, Schiller is 
hoping to fare better by comparison.  As the semester draws to a close, Schiller delivers a library 
lecture entitled “The Humanistic View of Life.”  He ends the lecture by saying: “I have said 
nothing about myself.  That is a great oversight; but some [sic] else will have to make it good.  
Do not despair however; for so far as I know the part of my biographer is not yet filled!”269  Nor, 
as yet, is his goal of setting his story, and history, straight. 
But first there is his last trip to Europe.   And it is a trip where he is accompanied by a 
wife.  Schiller and Louise, the friend who he thanked in Must Philosophers Disagree?, married 
sometime during this semester.  And as they ready for the trip in May, Schiller writes ahead to 
Washington to schedule a visit with his close friend Thaw.270  On 20 June, Schiller and Louise 
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S. Schiller, Los Angeles, to Florence Thaw, 18 May 1935, Correspondence, Box Two, F. C. S. Schiller Papers 
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added responsibility of trying to safe-guard that precious + precarious spark of life.  Tho’ he will not have told you, 
he has been none to well recently, - and I endeavor to assure him of rest and quiet to equip him for his university 
obligations.  It is a comfort to my heart, which loves him so, to be able to do little things to relieve some of the 
strains on him.  You as a woman can understand this, I know.  We have been close companions for many years in 
work and play, and have grown to care for each other very deeply.” 
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set sail for Europe.271  The joy of a wife by his side is countered by what proves to be five 
difficult months. In July, Schiller writes to Flewelling about a recent decline in health.  He notes 
that doctor’s orders crimp any further teaching plans: “You will realize that under these 
circumstances I cannot be very definite about undertaking work for the second semester.”272    In 
August, while recuperating at the Grand Hotel on the Jersey Shore, he suggests that he is only 
capable of committing to some Forum Lectures.273  But his health doesn’t seem to improve and 
his doctors indicate that he should avoid the use of stairs permanently and undergo a period of 
bed rest.  These problems result in a sad decision: he decides to sell off his belongings at Oxford 
and make the move to California permanent.   They stay briefly at Betchworth before arriving at 
Oxford in September.  The strain of clearing out his room only exacerbates his condition. 274  In 
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191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los 
Angeles). 
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October, after having cleared out his dwelling, he and Louise spend some time in London 
relaxing before returning to Betchworth to arrange passage.   He reacts with surprise when he 
receives word that he is scheduled for a regular course to teach.  He finds it “hopelessly 
optimistic.”275  Schiller protests that he does feel better.  But his doctor bars him from any sort of 
teaching; “so it seems to be sick leave or emeritus, either of which I should greatly 
appreciate.”276   
Not finding any direct route to New York with a doctor on board, Schiller explains that 
they will try to book a ship through the Panama Canal so as to leave England before the cold 
season starts.277  The search must have been successful, as they arrive in California by mid-
November.278  And it must have proved recuperative.  For the next year is marked less by his 
health than by his choice to engage in two final debates.  Both are with the beacons of 
pragmatism’s present (Morris of Chicago, Weiss of Bryn Mawr and Perry of Harvard) over the 
contested founders from pragmatism’s past.   The jousting was started prior to Schiller’s 
departure for America by an October 1934 review in the Personalist of Must Philosophers 
Disagree?279   
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 At that time, Schiller comments to Flewelling: “Morris’s review of my book I found disappointing 
because it only repeats Chicago clichés, without giving any reasons.  So I am writing a short article . . . entitled 
“Must Pragmatists Disagree?” (Schiller, London, to Flewelling, 4 October 1935).  Schiller’s expression of 
displeasure is based, perhaps, in the fact that he had come to view Morris as an ally.  In September 1934, while still 
in Prague after having attended the International Congress of Philosophy, Schiller wrote to Hopkins: “I came first in 
Section A . . . and was followed by an excellent paper by C.W. Morris of Chicago, which compared Pragmatism 
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The reviewer is Charles William Morris (1901-1979), a student of Mead at Chicago prior 
to taking a post there himself.  Morris notes the magnitude of Schiller’s debt to James.  But that 
is not meant as a compliment: “Candor requires me to say that I do not believe that Professor 
Schiller has in any substantial way advanced the status of the ideas he defends beyond what 
James had done.”280  What’s more, Schiller isolates himself by his “animosity to mathematics 
and formal logic.”281  Rather than take these as areas for productive reconstruction, he seeks to 
defame and destroy them.  The results are unfortunate and, again, of Jamesian influence: 
As logicians and mathematicians like [German-born Logical Positivist Rudolf] Carnap 
[1891-1970] and [Austrian set theorist Hans] Hahn [1879-1934] are beginning to show, 
one can assimilate the formal sciences within an empirical and even pragmatic view, but 
one cannot push them out of existence by the quixotic lance, Personal Meaning.  Schiller 
has both exaggerated the claims and underestimated the significance of the new logic.  
Like James, he is too afraid of desiccation.  The phobia of the formal is the reverse side 
of the obsession with the personal.282  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
with the ‘Logical Positivism’ of [Mortiz] Schlick [1882-1936] and [Rudolph] Carnap [1891-1970] and Co. . . . I 
made friends not only with Morris but with Carnap, and hope to see both of them in Oxford in the next month or so” 
(F. C. S. Schiller, Prague, to Louis Hopkins, 7 September 1934, Correspondence, Box One, F. C. S. Schiller Papers 
[Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, 
Los Angeles).  Not that his previously stated opinion was all that favorable.  Less than a year prior, Schiller had 
reviewed Morris’s Six Theories of Mind, a work dedicated to Dewey and George Herbert Mead.  Initially, he 
compliments it as “a competent, well-documented, and valuable work.”  But he also attempts to correct Morris on 
several points.  First, he suggests that Morris’s deference to the “new realism” leads him to forget that “pragmatism 
is essentially a method, not a metaphysic, the method of taking all conceptions and all doctrines functionally, and 
working them for all they are worth.”  Second, and relatedly, Morris’s should remember that the whole basis for his 
study—Mind—is only an abstraction as useful as use has shown it to be.  And, as based upon an abstraction, 
Morris’s work might be made “more intelligible if it were recognized that minds all belong to persons” (F. C. S. 
Schiller, review of Six Theories of Mind, by Charles W. Morris, The Personalist 14, no. 3 [July 1933]: 215-7).  
Morris went on to publish a collection of Mead’s lectures entitled Mind, Self, and Society (1934).  He later helped, 
based in part on the works of Peirce, to usher in the study of semiotics. 
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Morris admits that “James and Schiller are a . . . valid part of the pragmatist-humanist-empiricist 
tradition.”283  But he also fears that they are likely to become mere curios.  If that tradition is not 
mindful of recent developments, if will become “of historical interest only, or merely an 
intellectual gymnasium where athletes of the mind attempt to reinvigorate timid and tired 
persons.”284  The comment is shocking.  Two years before his death and several decades later, 
Schiller is accused of becoming the Bradley he attacked. 
Schiller had been drafting a response since the review came out.  In the January 1936 
Personalist he publishes “Must Pragmatists Disagree?”  The anger of his rebuttal belies the 
decrease in his health.  He questions why it is that, while Jamesian pragmatists “gulp down every 
extension or new application of pragmatic principles made by Professor Dewey, with relish and 
without a qualm,” those of the Chicago School attack them, “rehearsing a few rather obvious 
platitudes and ancient clichés, the application of which to the objects of their criticism is never 
specified.”285  But Schiller does question Morris’s specific complaints.  Where, Schiller wonders, 
is the basis for an argument that either he or James ignored the “social aspect” of meaning or that 
Schiller reduced meaning to “a wholly private affair”?286  Morris is simply “naïve” to assert that 
suggesting the difficulty of conveying meaning is the same as arguing it is wholly private.  
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Where does Schiller show animus to math?  It seems entirely disingenuous to claim this as 
Schiller, being a pragmatist, has hoped to engender “the philosophic appreciation of scientific 
method.”287  The only thing Schiller agrees with is his disrespect for symbolic and formal logics.  
But it is based on his well-documented arguments that: (1) “formal validity is untenable,” (2) 
“the basic unit of all the formal and symbolic logics, the proposition appears to be non-existent,” 
and (3) “the fundamental fact about Formal Logic is that it rests on an abstraction from real (i.e. 
personal) meaning.”288  
Schiller faults these attacks as the result of misdirected respect.  Morris “still seems to 
regard Peirce as the exemplar and standard to whom pragmatism should conform.”289  Perhaps 
he will revise his view in light of the printed record: 
In the first place Peirce himself reveals that James had exaggerated his (Pierce’s [sic]) 
share in the founding of pragmatism, and that many other members of the Harvard 
Metaphysical Club besides Peirce and James deserve part of the credit.  It appears 
moreover that Peirce himself had greatly changed his interests in the twenty years that 
elapsed between 1877 and 1899: he did not exactly withdraw what he had said, but he 
became very unwilling to sanction any further extension or application of his own 
principle.  Particularly, he had fallen completely under the spell of the old elusive ideal of 
mathematics, that of “exactness,” and reprobated any attempt to carry pragmatism 
beyond the points he had himself formerly reached.290 
 
This makes it all the more strange that followers of Dewey, who urged the “constant 
reconstruction of beliefs,” would claim lineage in the works of Peirce, who lapsed back into 
formalism and was himself not fan of Dewey.291  Regardless, Schiller puts out the challenge that 
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Morris meet his arguments.  Then, perhaps, the question that is this essay’s title will be answered 
in the negative.292   
In the July 1936 Personalist, Morris argues that Schiller’s “position is often wrong, and 
misleading or one-sided when not positively wrong.”293  While he does agree that the social 
aspect of knowing is almost a truism, he argues that the ways in which that meaning is 
understood vary widely.  To compare “the psychology of [Auguste] Comte, Dewey, and Mead” 
to “the psychology of James or of English empiricism (including Schiller)” is to gloss over 
substantial differences.294  In particular, Schiller’s understanding of the social is severely limited 
by his privileging the personal.   In that regard, Morris suggests that the goal “is not to express an 
exclusive devotion to either personal meaning or social meaning in isolation, but to investigate 
the place each plays within the knowledge process.”295  
 He also questions Schiller’s understanding of the sciences.  Math functions as a 
“linguistic aid” in understanding “the propositional consequences which follow from the 
                                                                                                                                                       
he shares with Schiller.  And, given Schiller’s recent attempts to substantiate the social wing of his humanism, it 
must have struck him as a rude oversight.  In that work, Dewey comments: “As long as ends are not thought of as 
individualized according to specific needs and opportunities, the mind will be content with abstractions. . . . But 
when attention is concentrated upon the diversified concretes, recourse to all intellectual materials needed to clear up 
the special cases will be imperative.  At the same time that morals are made to focus in intelligence, things 
intellectual are moralized.  The vexatious and wasteful conflict between naturalism and humanism is terminated” 
(italics mine; John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy [New York: Henry Holt, 1920; reprint, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1957], 174). 
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acceptance of a certain initial proposition.”296  It does not need a social application or use to be 
valuable.  A “point” in geometry does not need an object to which it points.  Nor should formal 
logic be expanded beyond its limits.  It should be regarded as “the study of the formal 
dimensions of linguistic meaning: it does not study non-linguistic objects nor psychological 
events.” 297  Thus it is unreasonable to argue that features within a given formal system should 
extend beyond that system; a formal system “carries no warrant for the applicability of what is 
demonstrated to existence beyond the system.”298   If pragmatism is to be anything beyond a 
quaint curio, it must incorporate these new developments “in logic and the philosophy of 
science.”299 
In the same issue of the Personalist, Schiller is “greatly pleased to find how numerous 
and important the points of agreement” are between the two of them.300   So pleased, in fact, that 
he is willing from the start to grant that the relation of the personal to the social, and the relation 
of pragmatism to new ideas in logic, are important. But Schiller’s concern is the interaction 
between the personal and social, and reducing the potential for actual misuse in actual 
interactions. 301 “What we want to know is not whether under specially favorable circumstances 
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 Schiller explains his view of these social interactions by asking a question: how does person A 
undertake to communicate with person B?  That question raises what is primarily a psychological problem for A, the 
problem of “how to effect contact between two minds, so that they may share their meanings.”  Should A succeed, B 
will attempt the same and, should both be successful, their interaction may rise to the level of “social meaning”; 
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meaning can be conveyed by a set of symbols, but whether we have succeeded in conveying our 
meaning in the various emergencies of life.”302  Granted, such emergencies occur in a social 
setting.  But, again, any social meaning is the result of the interactions of individuals.  Any 
review of the machinations of propaganda during the war or as a consequence of the rise in 
dictatorships suggests as much, suggests that “discoveries are made by individuals (set no doubt 
in a social context which more often hinders than helps them), and that society can exploit or 
suppress them only after they have been made.”303  
This complex relationship carries implications for both pragmatism and the sciences.  
And, for Schiller, those implications emphasize the particular.  If, as Morris suggests, 
pragmatism is to develop a deeper rapport with math and logic so as to craft a more useful 
science, it has to be “cognizant of particular cases, and so of personal differences between 
them.”304   But this respect for the sciences should not devolve into a slavish devotion to their 
theories.  It should instead proceed according to the best of their methods, testing their worth and 
revising their value according to their usefulness.   This approach lays the ground work for a 
theory of meaning; but it is also the first step in what should become a more robust theory of 
truth:  
No doubt it is meaningless to discuss the truth of an assertion until its meaning has been 
ascertained; yet, once assured of this, we always desire to know also its value, i.e. 
whether it is ‘true’ or ‘false.’  For meaning does not spring up in vacuo; it arises in a 
                                                                                                                                                       
meaning, in short, that could be repeated by persons not A and B.  But, and this is Schiller’s main objection, “that is 
no guarantee against future alteration and misuse.”  And the potential for such problems suggests, at least for him, 
why Morris is wrong.  “What we want to know is not whether under specially favorable circumstances meaning can 
be conveyed by a set of symbols, but whether we have succeeded in conveying our meaning in the various 
emergencies of life” (Schiller, “Comments,” 301). 
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context and as an incident in a train of thought; it has a purpose, it claims value, it points 
forwards to a use.  Thus the same psychological background exists both for meaning and 
for truth.305  
 
Here Schiller hopes he reads Morris right in suggesting there can be a “science of personality.”  
For if science is understood “as a technique for calculating the course of events, there can be a 
science of the individual and the personal—and indeed nothing else, because all events exhibit 
individuality and dependence on personality.”306  It is not, as Morris contends, that Schiller 
privileges the individual over the social.  It is that the social Morris so clearly appreciates is 
subject to the particulars, good or otherwise, of those that compose it. 
Three months prior, in the April 1936 Personalist, Schiller chose to engage in the defense 
of another individual, James.  In the same breath, he continued his attack on Peirce.  The review 
of Perry’s two volume The Thought and Character of William James starts favorably enough.  
Schiller is “congratulating” Perry on the publication of the work, noting how likely this venture 
is to be a “literary success” and “an invaluable addition to American philosophic literature.”307 
Then, almost without warning, an enormous qualification: “. . . I do not feel sure that he has 
made the right selections and so distributed his lights and shades and emphases as to produce a 
portrait which is a good likeness.  It looks a little like an unconscious confession of a failure to 
achieve a final synthesis of James’s personality that in his concluding chapter he is impelled to 
recognize no less than four William Jameses.”308  Schiller sees these—a “neur-asthenic” and 
“radiant” James, a third which is the “enriched” melding of the previous two, and finally “the 
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James of experience and discipline”—as the idiosyncrasies that mark James a genius.  Perry’s 
description(s), however, “may be read as though he thought James was rather lucky not to end up 
in a lunatic asylum.”309  Surely, this wasn’t Perry’s intention.  A solid writer, though one not 
always in accord with James’s view, Perry must have simply failed to “penetrate the central core 
from which James’s multiple personalities could be seen to spring, and this again, perhaps, 
betokens merely a defect of sympathy.”310 
Schiller localizes the cause of this defect: a misguided appreciation for the accepted 
history.  And that history tells a tale that leads back to Peirce:  
Many had suspected also that Peirce was at bottom a crank, though no doubt the greatest 
of those James delighted to pet. . . . He bore Peirce’s querulous lecturing angelically, and 
made desperate attempts to get him appointed to Harvard. . . . I venture to suggest that 
James, the supreme psychologist that he was, understood what was valuable in Peirce 
better than Peirce himself, and treated him both generously and discriminatingly.311 
 
Schiller’s Peirce, a heady brew of supposition and factual detail, turning away from pragmatism 
and bogged down in symbolic logic, becomes “a peg” on which James charitably hung his own 
doctrine.  The matter, for Schiller, is obvious; “it is pretty clear that Peirce can not have been 
more than [pragmatism’s] putative parent.”312   
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Schiller next turns to the sixth and final volume of the Peirce papers.  Schiller finds his 
views of metaphysics, taken from fragments and occasionally divorced from their original 
context, “pretty vague and almost contradictory.”313  Peirce has become, in the eyes of Schiller, 
the “Humpty Dumpty” the editors (and, one assumes, Morris) wish they could be put back 
together.  But it is, and will continue to be, tough going and questionably motivated.  Schiller 
even uses Perry’s work to critique Hartshorne’s and Weiss’s, noting James’s reference to Peirce 
as a “crank” and “failure.”  He then uses the words of James’s as a means to dismiss this latest 
volume:  
Now in my own dealings with cranks I have found that perhaps the most reliable mark of 
the genus crank is a constitutional inability to give a straight answer to a straightforward 
question.  The crank will always stray from the point into some favorite hobby of his 
own.  Judged by this test, James’s judgment is amply justified in this volume.314  
 
And Schiller’s summary conclusion is a condescending jab at James’s square peg: “Is it not 
tragic that so professorial a mind should never have been summoned to adorn a 
professorship?”315  It is not likely that Schiller was trying to hand out compliments. 
Nor is Perry ready in the October 1936 Personalist to fold to Schiller’s “misstatements.”  
In a short summary, Perry points out what stands in need of correction: (1) he has never “plainly” 
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expressed disapproval of James’s style; (2) nor expressed “condemnation” of James merger of 
psychology and philosophy; and (3) James, as much as he expressed an “incapacity” for exact 
thought and a disregard for formal logic, nonetheless demonstrates a “very considerable amount 
of exact thinking.”316  Verifiable by reference to his text, Perry hopes these points will clarify his 
position.   Schiller replies in the same issue.  He grants Perry point one, noting: “[that] I did not 
refer to any specific passage in Professor Perry’s book shows that my feeling was only an 
impression, and I am only too glad to learn that I was mistaken.”317  But on points two and three 
he will not budge.  He did provide documentation and it still suggests exactly what he said it did.  
To suggest, as Perry did, that James’s had “metaphysical infidelities” does imply that he failed to 
make a distinction between psychology and philosophy; “otherwise, it rather loses its point.”318  
To suggest, as Perry also did, that James’s showed—even if only by his own incapacity—a 
“pathological repugnance to the processes of exact thought” is “harsh, and probably 
mistaken.”319  Schiller takes this last comment as an insult. He doubts James would be “flattered” 
by Perry’s claim that he occasionally achieved “exact thought.”  
This defense of his friend and mentor’s reputation or, more accurately, the James that 
Schiller knew, is the last of Schiller’s articles for 1936.  Indeed, it signals the end of his 
academic debates in the pages of philosophy journals.  The remainder of the year compasses rest 
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and recuperation, but also reflection and preparation.  He and his wife suffer bouts of ill health, 
with Louise requiring a brief hospital stay.320  They are forced to convalesce at home in Los 
Angeles through most of the Spring and Summer.  And it is likely that a trip to Canada to secure 
an extension on Schiller’s visa never materialized.321  But Schiller maintains his interest in the 
increasingly conflicted realm of international affairs,322 to the point that he is drafting a book on 
the Europe situation and working on a revised version of Cassandra.323  He is also working on 
papers for the upcoming International Congress of Philosophy, to be held in Paris in 1937.    As 
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much as Schiller is aware of the frailty of his health, he remains optimistic that he is as yet not 
done telling his tale. 
7.7 DEPARTING SHOTS: SUMMARY AND APPRECIATION 
The year starts with an indication that Schiller has not yet declined his role as pragmatism’s 
“literary” provocateur.  In a continuation of the queries as regards philosophers, pragmatists, and 
their disagreements, Schiller now asks: “Must Philosophy Be Dull?” in the January 1937 
Personalist.  His answer is to be expected: “I do not recognize the duty of dullness, and I am 
even skeptical of the dullness of duty.”324  But Schiller realizes this will not stand without further 
clarification.  The real question, as he sees it, is whether there are: (1) “logical” reasons that it 
must, and/or (2) “moral” reasons that it ought to be dull.  The answers to both questions are tied 
up in how one conceives philosophy and its relationship to the sciences.  Rather than isolate 
itself or rush too quickly to embrace science, Schiller sees it as a matter of compliments: “I 
should prefer to assign to philosophy a useful and important function and an independent 
standpoint of its own, which enables it both to benefit by the work of the sciences and to benefit 
them.”325  Philosophy seeks to obtain the “full” picture while science, with her specialized 
niches, full well supplies “partial” glimpses of the larger whole.  Philosophy, thus considered, is 
justified in its threefold quest of: (1) “abstracting from the details, the dull details, of the special 
sciences”; (2) exploring “the field of metaphysical poetry, that is of philosophical poetry”; and 
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(3) “taking into account those parts or aspects of reality which the sciences exclude for 
methodological reasons.”326 
None of this is to disparage science her role.  It is simply a recognition that the scientific 
search for the objective and the disinterested is a fiction.  That being said, it is a fiction that 
works within its limits.  Scientists seek to craft more accurate predictions.  But that search is 
conditioned by interests that render each case “infinitely particular, individual and unique.”327  
So all attempts to translate a particular case into a universal law are bound to falter.  It is at this 
point that philosophy should come to the aid of science, should explore the role that personality 
plays in shaping scientific discoveries.  Instead, philosophy trades in the same abstractions that 
both should work to remove.  “Academic philosophy” is riddled with “bombastic technicality 
and impenetrable obscurity.”328  Settled into its place in the Tower, it repeats as if by incantation 
the historical fictions of a disinterested past.   These are protective, not progressive, rites meant 
to ward off any semblance of real world application.  
The results are not merely dull; they are depressing.  Worn into the grooves of routine 
and safety, each philosopher is left alone to develop their historical tale to suit their speculative 
whims.  When surprised by a fellow traveler their personal isolation makes discussion nearly 
impossible.    When discussion does occur, philosophers seek the safety of academic small talk.  
“Philosophers shrink from their big and thrilling problems, and confine themselves to a number 
of technical questions about which they can discourse, harmlessly and endlessly, with a show of 
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erudition.”329  But all it is is a show.  Such questions—“What is thought—without a thinker? 
What is mind—without consciousness?”—can’t be answered and, suggests Schiller, aren’t meant 
to be answered as protectively posed.330  The compunction to be dull is merely a social and 
psychological, not logical, one.  If philosophers must act this way, they ought to realize they will 
not “be benefiting themselves, hurting their foes, or performing a single service to humanity.”331  
The upcoming months are marked by a decided drop in what has already become a 
slower pace.  Schiller continues to craft reviews from his home in Los Angeles,332 and finishes 
writing “How Far does Science need Determinism?” for the International Congress of 
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Philosophy.333  But he does not attend the Congress, to be held 1-6 August in Paris, and the 
reason is clear.  After a brief period of good health, Schiller suffers a precipitous decline in 
health in April.334  As his brother, Ferdinand Nassau (1866-1938), explains in a letter to Louise 
at the start of May: 
It seems to me judging by the account of the last illness that Canning has had pneumonia 
– all the symptoms you mention are those of pneumonia – and if this is the truth, and that 
he was in no danger when you wrote, it sounds almost miraculous that he should have 
come through it.  Naturally, we are feeling as anxious as possible and the state of 
suspense must remain for some considerable time yet.  Apart from that it is also [an] 
ordeal that the physical strain of nursing him must make the greatest demand on your 
strength, and the situation then is about as full of anxiety as it can be.  Unfortunately 
there is nothing that can be done in pneumonia except efficient nursing, and in that 
respect there is no better than you.  I can’t tell you how sorry I am for you – Give him my 
love + take that which [sic] part which is yours.335 
 
It is not, given his already frail health, an illness from which he recovers.  Exactly three months 
after the letter was written, on 6 August 1937, Schiller dies at the age of seventy-three.   
Not that it stopped someone so known for his insistence.  In what would likely have 
raised a smile, commentators past and present give him three more days.336   And they gave him 
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yet more.  On 28 November 1937, Dewey reads a brief statement at the New School for Scoial 
Research.  He praises “the work which he did both in Great Britain and this country in loosening 
the strait jacket in which Aristotelian logic had confined scientific method.”337  Though some 
may quibble with his “dominantly psychological” view of philosophy, they still “owe him a great 
debt.”338  The British social anthropologist Robert R. Marett (1866-1943), a co-contributor to 
Personal Idealism, recalls the singular nature of Schiller’s focus: “Apart from his interest in a 
few side-issues . . . he concentrated wholeheartedly on a single problem—how the logical 
process of truth-seeking is influenced by its psychological conditions.”339   And Marett is well 
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aware that this approach has been criticized for applauding as useful a test of truth that is 
nowhere found completely stated.  But he augurs this as being perhaps even more of a statement 
of Schiller’s convictions.  To assume you have found the test is to give up the search.  “We make 
truth, Schiller would say, just as we make beauty or moral goodness, by striving to realize it 
more and more.”340  
The Oxford philosopher James Ivor McKie notes the novelty of his views.  Schiller, 
whose ideas were already forming prior to meeting James, was not simply a disciple of Jamesian 
pragmatism.  Indeed, it is James who has suggested that Schiller “opened his eyes to the 
philosophical importance of those ideas, and had known how to develop that side of them.”341  
He also notes that, in person, Schiller’s conversations were positively striking “in the ingenious 
turns he would give his thought, in its unfailing combination of subtlety and boldness, and in a 
certain flavor of the Citizen of the World.”342  The man who lured him to California, Flewelling, 
also praises the novelty of Schiller’s approach.  With his mix of the critical and comical he 
brought pragmatism to the shores of Britain.  Pragmatism, like his attack on the logic of the 
times, was a bracing reproach to the “insularity of British philosophy.”343   But it became more; 
it also signaled him as, in the development of Humanism, “the foremost advocate of a consistent 
pragmatism.”344  
Hopkins, his colleague at USC, argues that Schiller’s prescience was combined with a 
surprising sense of modesty.  When Schiller first remarked that the nature of scientific discovery 
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was tentative and subject to modification, scientists insisted that the atom could not be divided 
and that energy in the universe was fixed.  Both, in keeping with Schiller’s foresight, were 
revised within his lifetime.  Such a gap between what he supposed and what was soon accepted, 
Hopkins offers, is a measure of the man: 
In this instance as in others many of Dr. Schiller’s friends felt that he was never given the 
credit that he was entitled to for his pioneering work in clarifying the concepts of science; 
but so far as I could see Schiller, himself, was never very much interested about the credit 
for any of his ideas.  He was always more interested in reaching a correct conclusion than 
in any thought of who should have the credit for it.  Even when he felt that a conclusion 
was true, he never showed any great elation over it for he realized, as few have, that our 
most cherished truths change with changing conditions.345  
 
When a colleague from England said, upon hearing of Schiller’s death, that “the world has thus 
lost a great man, while philosophy in all its branches has lost a pre-eminent master,” Hopkins 
extends the compliment further; he opines, “We have lost a great friend.”346 
Lost, yes; but not yet gone.  Amidst these tidings of farewell, Flewelling posthumously 
publishes the series of articles Schiller penned on the personalistic implications of humanism. 
These four essays in the Personalist are his final attempt to summarize the relation of his 
humanism to philosophy in general and to the world.   The first of these, the October 1937 
“Humanisms and Humanism,” suggests the expansive range that Schiller gave to his philosophy.  
It is a range best framed by philosophy’s relation to science.  If the latter provides the particular, 
it is the former which seek to obtain some measure of the universal.  The world is awash in 
“ambiguous phenomena” where the disputed claims of differing sciences may all, in part, be 
true.347   Here philosophy can help “to interpret the conflicting deliverances of the various 
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sciences into a coherent and intelligible picture which it is possible to accept and believe.”348  
This “combing and interpreting function of philosophy” Schiller deems to be humanism.349  It 
seeks to make sense out of the various slices of human experience that science provides.   
In providing this wider perspective, Schiller’s humanism is not novel.  There are many 
other attempts under the awning of “humanism” to understand human experience.350  But 
Schiller’s philosophical humanism, a variation on the dictum of Protagoras, asserts “the human 
value of philosophy, and systematic antagonism” to Absolutism and Naturalism.351   It “regards 
as its central concern the problems of human life and experience and of the real world with 
which we believe ourselves in contact.”352  It is neither radically nor moderately skeptical; for it 
views doubt as “the chief stimulus to inquiry, to research, and so to discovery.”353  But Schiller 
adds that said doubt is: (1) limited only by that which we investigate, and (2) not meant “to 
diminish our confidence in the truths we accept or take for granted.”354  If all knowing is 
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conditioned by man, Schiller concludes, no conception of knowing can escape the nature of that 
condition.355   
The second piece, the January 1938 “Logic: A Game, or An Agent of Value,” is a parting 
shot at the hazards of formal logic, plied as “a sort of intellectual game with weird symbols.”356  
What is shocking is that such antiquated ideas resisted revision for so long.   Schiller again pleas 
for a logic which responds to the actual conditions of everyday life.  For does not actual life 
confound the esotericism of intellectualism at every turn? 
For in point of fact, our thinking is volitional through and through.  It is set going by 
desires and purposes; it is drive onwards by the urgency of problems.  It pursues ends 
which appear to it as goods, and is pervaded and steered by values of all kinds.  Truth 
itself moves us, not because it is distant and unattainable, disinterested and dispassionate, 
but because it is near and dear to our heart: it is felt to be a value and worth achieving, 
even at the sacrifice of nobler aims and lesser values.357  
 
Actual knowing is guided and blinded by selection and choice. A new logic must be made on 
those accounts and not in deference to ancient tomes.  Formal logic, that “aged and toothless 
hag,” that “pernicious witch,” must be “left to mumble in obscurity and to die in peace”; for “so 
long as Formal Logic is not eradicated root and branch, we can have no logic that is more than a 
trivial play with words.”358  And, by being more responsive to the reality of our knowing, a new 
logic is less certain of itself, less boastful of its powers.  But this new, humanistic, logic is more 
conducive to a progressive and advancing view of knowledge.  In place of the safety of 
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absolutes, it takes as its maxim that, “though every truth has its day, sufficient for the day will 
ever be the truth thereof.”359 
The third essay, the April 1938 “Ethics, Casuistry and Life,” is a rumination on the 
concept of ethics.  For Schiller, the study of ethics is the study of human nature as a whole.  It is 
a study of how all the supposed seats of ethical action—“instincts, impulses, desires, volitions, 
thoughts, cognitions, etc.”—work to serve functional ends.  For his point of view, then, a 
“Humanist ethics will take pains, and pleasure, in tracing out how in fact these entities enter in to 
human actions and determine man’s behavior.”360  It comes as no surprise that Schiller sees this 
as the exception to the traditional outlook, an approach worn into grooves that ignore their 
exceptions.  Such a view of ethics is an attempt to set, in advance, a template upon conditions not 
yet in evidence based on opinions already calcified.  To codify moral conduct is, in essence, to 
disavow the need for reflection prior to action in the form of pre-made rules.   
The alternative, then, is to apply as per Aristotle the particular case so as to advance the 
moral action: 
Just as scientific laws are formulas drawn from events in order to predict events, so moral 
laws are formulas extracted from right actions to facilitate more moral actions.  Thus a 
principle formulated ahead of its application to a case is only tentative.  It is not certain a 
priori that it will apply to the next case upon which it is tried.  It is always capable of 
further growth, and should never be allowed to grow rigid.  We should always remember 
that circumstances alter cases, and that cases elicit and develop principles.361  
 
Thus the humanist approach would be to combine scientific flexibility with legal acuity.  It is to 
transform the instances of “past experience” into a body of moral “case-law” to be reviewed, that 
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is, reflected upon, by experts.  From the principles of past cases judges can extract which 
precedents have a bearing on the current case.   While this is not fool-proof, it is subject to 
further revisions in future cases.  And it stands, in Schiller’s estimation, as infinitely better than 
creating new laws “made by blundering, harassed, and frequently corrupt, politicians.”362   While 
not without its problems, and needing more elaboration, this at least advances a suggestion of 
“how the problem of right action may be handled in the concrete, and rescued from stupid 
rigorism and empty formalism.”363 
The fourth and final piece, “The Relativity of Metaphysics,” is published in July 1938.  It 
returns Schiller to the place where his publications started in 1891: metaphysics.  And it is as 
much his view that he discusses as it is a caution to all who struggle to come to terms with this, 
“the loftiest and most arduous region of the philosophic field.”364  For in all metaphysics, the 
grand and the small, there remains one constant: the individual.  And to take on, or be taken in 
by, another’s metaphysic is to settle for something always too lose or too snug.  “We should be 
aware, therefore, of a philosopher who retails in absolute and universal truth, good for all, and 
for all purposes: he is a vendor of panaceas, and, most probably, a fool or a fraud.”365  But in 
taking view of another metaphysic we may gain, personally, a view which can be made to 
comport with our views and ends.  And that is all, in the end, the humanist would urge of 
philosophers; that is, “to drop some hints concerning the ways in which metaphysics may be 
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constructed, so that every one who chooses may be able to construct his own, to suit his case, 
and to suit himself.”366 
But this final piece is novel in a way not heretofore seen: Schiller extends his hand to the 
Idealists he has so long dogged.   Schiller begs them to consider the distinction between our 
waking and dreaming lives.  In the latter, we find things that “have a great family resemblance to 
the world of waking life.”367  But we also find in them that we have different powers, see 
different people, and are capable of experiencing—not just envisioning—heretofore 
unexperienced events.  Normally, and in the main course of our lives, we take these things at 
face value; that is to say, we “wake up” and slough off that other part of our life as “only a 
dream.”  But not always.  In rare cases, dreams have been regarded “as valuable revelations and 
visions of higher realities” and found themselves integrated “into the fabric of all the great 
religions.”368  What of these, empirical, cases?  On what grounds do we take some dreams to be 
divine and other to be vulgar slumber?  Dreams demonstrate that Idealism may be true in three 
ways: (1) we can create, out of mind, a reality independent of what we normally take to be 
reality; (2) what we take to be reality may in fact be part of a larger course of events to which we 
have yet gained an appreciative view; (3) we may be privy to an extension into the future of what 
we normally take to be our lives’ terminus.369  In so ably tipping his hat to what was so often 
taken as an foe, Schiller believes he has shown the merits of a humanist approach to 
metaphysics.  Its relativity and optimism condone all attempts and only asks that they be judged 
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according to what benefits they might bring . . . to those that create them and consider them 
worthy of pursuit. 
In 1939, the last tribute to Schiller’s life is offered up by his wife Louise.  Our Human 
Truths is a posthumous collection of already published essays and lectures delivered late in his 
career.  But the documents show that she labors over its publication intensely.370  From questions 
as to the title,371 to issues of formatting,372 to even issues of attribution,373 Louise attends to 
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specifics in letters back and forth to the editors.374  The shorter notices are respectful of the 
effort.  Paul Clark suggests that the collection demonstrates Louise’s “reflective insight and 
appreciation of her distinguished husband.”375  The Ocean Beach News recommends this book, 
brimming with “sparkling wit and vivid and picturesque language,” to all who “enjoy intellectual 
stimulation.”376  The Garrett Tower calls these essays “a plea for breadth of interest, lucidity of 
thought, a delightful humor, and most of all for the relating of all thinking to the human 
enterprise.”377  Albion King admits that a review of this sort of book is hardly ever “objectively 
critical.  One takes up the last book of a revered teacher, recently deceased, with reverence, 
knowing what to expect and finding no disappointment on any page.”  That being said, Schiller 
takes on a variety of subjects “with urbane humor and a finely polished literary style.”378 
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One longer notice also attends to the book in a respectful manner.  But it also suggests 
that the criticism and praise that Schiller invoked were of the same source.  As such, it provides a 
useful segue into the evaluation of Schiller that will form the final chapter.  Max Carl Otto 
(1876-1968), a philosopher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison who taught alongside 
Kallen, reviews the book in November 1940 Journal of Philosophy.  He begins by noting he had 
the misfortune of never having met Schiller personally.  He then goes on to provide this 
description of Schiller and his posthumous collection of essays: 
For he strides in its pages as he did in life, talking, gesticulating, laughing at you, kicking 
intellectual rubbish, as it seemed to him, out of the way, brushing traditional difficulties 
aside, and going directly to the business at hand.  Aside from the living, sparkling quality 
of its style, the book is a good medium through which to get to the heart of the author’s 
philosophy.379 
 
Otto notes that Schiller’s philosophical position is thoroughly humanistic both in its emphasis on 
the human facet in all forms of knowing and in its personalized take on Protagoras’s maxim.  On 
this last point, and in the face of some critics, Schiller “probably finds more in the dictum than its 
originator thought of putting into it.”380  This liberal borrowing has both a positive and negative 
aspect.   As the first, it signals “the vital, dramatic, often exciting character of his thinking”; as 
the second, it betrays “a philosophic bias” which has “a self-perpetuating tendency which, unless 
scrupulously watched, will render its champion peculiarly susceptible to judging everything from 
a restricted point of view.”381  Simply put, what is rousing about Schiller’s insistence on man as 
the measure is also what leads to a telescoping view as to all forms of assessment.   
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But Otto is careful to note that Schiller’s views, as much as they simplify the problems of 
philosophy, also suggest the merits of his case.  His is not a call for complete skepticism, the 
charge of which Otto finds “nothing short of weird.”382  Nor is his ransacking of Absolutism 
without merit if we grant, as Otto suggests, that the abstractions of that philosophical camp “may 
have been a reasonable theory in a pre-scientific epoch.”383  Yet in answering to the most 
consistent charge against pragmatism, that it is just a “happy-go-lucky” theory which takes what 
it wants and does whatever it will, Schiller’s arguments start to deal in tricks of light.  While Otto 
notes that Schiller’s pragmatism is not the stuff of pure subjectivity, it is less clear to what extent 
it traffics in some form of objectivity.384  And it is here where Schiller’s measure is also his blind 
spot: “he used up so much energy in vanquishing absolutes and in defending relativity that he 
had little of it left for the indispensable task of indicating by what specific means the desired 
objectivity is to be gained.”385   
This is not, to Otto, an oversight or an error.  The focus on the personal “was his 
besetting idiosyncrasy.  It was the heart and soul of his method.”386  The human inside the man 
was the key to understanding all problems, philosophical or otherwise, in Schiller’s worldview.  
It led him to espouse eugenics and to suppose authoritarian governments might help to release 
what till now remained locked up in our human stock.  This led Schiller to ignore, opines Otto, 
the powerful conditioning force of our environment.  The man who could parse out philosophical 
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distinctions regarding terms of art failed to see those distinctions in his terms of life.  The reasons 
are not hard to find. 
Perhaps this is natural when those of us who appraise social affairs do so from a 
privileged station of detachment.  We are not obliged to make the suggested program 
work practically, or to use available, imperfect means.  We need only look to the 
perfection of our conceptual blueprint, and see to it that we have provided theoretically 
for what we happen to value.  In other words, Mr. Schiller’s social philosophy seems to 
me academic in the bad sense of the term.387  
 
And Otto mourns that judgment.  For it was Schiller who insisted that philosopher’s look up 
from their speculations to address the practical sides of life.  And it was Schiller who infused into 
the banal halls of philosophy a sense that all was not said and done.  Yet there remains a sense 
that he retained the measure of what should be done by, to, and with others, regardless their 
status or station.  This infused his work with “philosophic genius”; but it also instilled it with “a 
haughty humor, with more bite than fun.”388  In taking the risks that genius takes, Otto supposes 
that Schiller made as much as he missed.  And he will always be sought out by those willing to 
“look reality in the eye, feeling, deep down . . . that reality is made to be remade by those who 
have the faith, the insight, and the courage to meet the test.”389   
F.C.S.S. August 6-1937 
Into the cold white dark of death he went 
Silent, upon whose lips no malice lay . . . . 
(Wisdom and laughter had their mingled way) . . . 
Only a sigh to mark the breath which spent 
His little strength. Yet to that sigh was lent 
The weary benizen [sic] of every day, 
And all the words he nevermore would say, 
And the still moment of a sacrament. 
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The quiet giving of his gentle hands 
For all distress, took nothing for his own; 
The pen, which to the measure of the world had grown, 
Fell, and the fingers empty lay.  Now stands 
His spirit clear and free and high, 
And naught of all he did can ever die, 
Deathless—and nevermore to die.390 
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in England.  In 1939 she wrote: 
F.C.S.S. 
The winding road along the sea, With flowers on the sand! 
As on we passed he took my hand---The road that brought my love to me. 
 
His eyes were blue as is the sea, Wind deeds his flower of life; 
As on we passed he said “my wife”---The road that brought my love to me. 
 
There in the village by the sea, Within the cool-arched hall, 
“Till death us part” he said to me; And as we passed he kept my hand, 
Along the road beside the sea, With flowers on the sand. 
 
And now death has my all. 
(Louise Schiller, “F.C.S.S.,” 1939, Poetry and Prose, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of Louise 
Luqueer [Strang] Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, 
Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles).   Flewelling had also noted, and 
Schiller had expressed delight regarding, the garden that the Schillers had at their home in Los Angeles.  Schiller 
had even brought back some of the varieties of plants he found in California to grow at the nursery at Corpus 
Christi.  In 1939 Louise also wrote this poem: 
F.C.S.S. Revenant. 
The flowers you loved so much are opening now 
Here in your windy garden on the hill; 
In careless clusters all the wild things fill 
The air with colour much as trumpets blow 
A golden triumph.  Scarlets brilliant glow, 
And tossing sprays of lilac lupin bloom, 
Blue penstemon from distant peaks, and broom, 
Romero, sage and ceanothus grow. 
 
Over these flash the humming-birds; here play 
The slower wings of butterflies; and sweet 
The blended songs of lark and finch, and gay 
Tip-tilting mocking-bird, can freely meet. 
Here, my beloved, must thy tender spirit dwell, 
Smiling at every flower and wing it loved so much. 
(Louise Schiller, “F.C.S.S. Revenant,” 1939, Poetry and Prose, Box Eighteen, Register of the Personal Papers of 
Louise Luqueer [Strang] Schiller in the F. C. S. Schiller Papers [Collection 191], Department of Special Collections, 
Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles). 
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8.0  CONCLUSION: THE PRAGMATISM OF APPEARANCES 
It is human to err but logical to be infallle 
 
Althg always anxious to hear some new Φs 
in Oxf. any old Φs will do! . . . 
 
T. 1st + most important ?n abt every Φy is 
to ascertain whether its author had a sense of humour. (F.C.S.S.) 
Φy will never be purged of absurdy until Φrs acquire 
a sense of humor . . .1 
 
The epigrams above are a purposeful segue into the conclusion of this admittedly lengthy 
discussion.  To a philosopher so enamored of his, and his fellow humans’, ability to craft a world 
always in the making, these provide pointed emphasis to what are the most essential complaints 
in his philosophy: the relentless pursuit of those who claimed that arguments could be set apart 
from context, set against the backdrop of an education that privileged such a view and 
promulgated it in arid tomes brimming with abstract language.   These must be added, of course, 
to the foundation from which they derived their power: Schiller himself.    For his philosophy 
was at its base his philosophy.  And the evidence amply demonstrates that, as much as his critics 
accused Schiller of neglecting the objective side of reality, the reality was that they objected all 
the more to the subjective shadings he brought to pragmatism and humanism.   
Moreover, these epigrams begin to suggest answers to the challenges put forth at the start 
of this study: (1) why was Schiller so vigorously discussed in his time; (2) why is he now so 
obviously not discussed; and (3) how do the previous two questions interact, and how might they 
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relate to and enrich the study of pragmatism as a historical movement and a philosophical 
concept.  Such questions warrant further elaboration.  This explanation will develop out of the 
concerns raised in the introductory chapter.   Those concerns amounted to the claim that 
Schiller’s arguments with other intellectuals provided the basis for a rhetorical biography.2  
Those concerns can now be scrutinized via the issues illuminated in the subsequent chapters, 
through an actual examination of the arguments that Schiller used to advance the cause of 
pragmatic humanism.   
Specifically, the conclusion will call attention to three issues.  The first issue to be 
discussed is the mystery that underlies this entire project: the relatively brisk erasure of Schiller 
from pragmatism’s record.   The introduction suggested that the trend to remove him has 
continued almost unabated up to the current renaissance in pragmatic thought.  But it is just that, 
a trend.  As such, it is important to look to the histories which fuse the pragmatism of Schiller’s 
time with the pragmatism of our times.  These histories provide indications as to why the 
appearance of pragmatism came to mean an exclusion of Schiller.   But these are not the only 
causes at play.  Thus the second section will focus on how detailed assessments of Schiller’s 
work have, even when positive, undercut any resurgence in scholarship related to Schiller.  As a 
result, an alternative approach to Schiller will be put forth.   This revised interpretation attends to 
both the contents of this study, Schiller’s interactions with other philosophers, and the method by 
which it has developed, rhetorical biography.  Schiller’s style of pragmatism, read far larger and 
more continuously than previous commentators sought to allow, implicates his removal in 
subsequent histories of pragmatism.  The final issue is the summation of this study.  It is an 
                                               
2
 “Rhetorical hermeneutics avoids epistemological debates . . . . But it does not try to avoid ‘irreconcilable 
disputes’[;] . . . rather, it attempts to take such historical disputes as a rhetorical focus of study” (Steven Mailloux, 
“Interpretation and Rhetorical Hermeneutics,” Reception Histories: Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American Cultural 
Studies [London: Cornell University Press, 1998], 63). 
  508 
attempt to provide answers to the three research questions mindful of all that has transpired. 
Central to this section is the argument that Schiller’s use of repetition, while initially proving 
invaluable to pragmatism’s cause came to cloy upon its continuation. 
8.1 ALL THAT IT MUST BE: CLEARING THE WAY FOR AN AMERICAN 
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
The construction of a pragmatic canon began prior to Schiller’s death.  His squabbles with Perry 
and Morris, with Weiss and Hartshorne, signal that an argument was being created which sought 
to divide pragmatism into individual (referred to elsewhere as psychological) and social camps at 
the exclusion of the former.   It is true that the outbreak of World War II initiated a rupture in 
philosophy from which pragmatism struggled to recover.  But it is also the case that interested 
parties kept working to finalize the doctrines which form the basis for present day pragmatist 
discussions.3  These disputes, by and large, signal what is important in an increasingly varied 
debate.  To what extent is pragmatism American?  In what ways is it democratic?  Is it inclusive 
of other approaches?   Is it even a specific method or philosophy proper?  And the debates over 
these questions are carried on with an almost conscious disregard for the part that Schiller could 
play in them, should he so be allowed. 
                                               
3
 As was suggested in Chapter One, the literature surrounding pragmatism encompasses a variety of 
different interpretative frames: Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989); Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy (Madison, Wis.: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989); Tom Cohen, “The ‘Genealogies’ of Pragmatism,” in Rhetoric, Sophistry, and Pragmatism, 
ed. Steven Mailloux (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 94-108; John Patrick Diggins, The Promise of 
Pragmatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Morris Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux, 2001); and Peter Simonson, “Varieties of Pragmatism and Communication: Visions and Revisions from 
Peirce to Peters,” in American Pragmatism and Communication Research, ed. David K. Perry (Mahwah, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001), 1-26. 
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Not that it was always the case that Schiller’s name would have to be begged into the 
record.  As early as 1912, pragmatism was considered a multi-faceted movement involving a 
variety of players.4  David Leslie Murray explains that “it is a collective name for the most 
modern solution of puzzles which have impeded philosophical progress from time immemorial, 
and it has arisen naturally in the course of philosophical reflection.”5  His biography 
encompasses James, Schiller, and Dewey, but also names such as Knox, Sidgwick, and Sturt.  As 
late as 1925, Joad describes the situation similarly: 
Pragmatism is the name given to a number of different, though allied, tendencies in 
modern thought.  These tendencies originated chiefly in America, the name Pragmatism 
being first applied to them in 1878 by a writer named C. S. Peirce.  The works of William 
James are pragmatic in character . . . [and] the Pragmatic method has been further 
elaborated by Professor Dewey in the United States and by Dr. Schiller in Great Britain.6 
 
Now, granted, both of these authors are British.  And Murray’s book was introduced with a brief 
preface by Schiller.  But a fellow Brit, Widgery, goes even further in 1927 to suggest the 
                                               
4
 It pays to recall that twelve years earlier the drift of pragmatism was seen as even more fluid than any of 
the most recent histories would suggest.  For a review of these discussions, see Chapter Three and specifically: 
William Caldwell, “Pragmatism,” Mind 9, no. 36 (October 1900): 433-56.  For a less integrative and more critical 
reading of what pragmatism meant during this time, see Chapter Four and specifically: Arthur O. Lovejoy, “The 
Thirteen Pragmatisms.  II,” Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (January 1908): 29-39. 
 
5
 D. L. Murray, Pragmatism (New York: Dodge Publishing, 1912), 2. 
 
6
 C. E. M. Joad, Introduction to Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 67.  It should also be 
noted that Kallen’s The Philosophy of William James first appeared in this year.  It provides a bevy of historical 
details as regards James’s emerging philosophy.  As sympathetic as it is to James, it cuts short any who might follow 
upon the trail he cut.  In Kallen’s estimation, the legacy of James’s philosophy is that what it accomplished so 
radically changed the conditions upon which it operated: “The generation which was the generation of William 
James is gone.  The world they lived in is gone, and gone because they lived in it.  The days of the pioneer are over.”  
The argument here is seemingly conflicted.  It supplies in the same breadth a corrective and a supplement to the 
rugged American tale of pragmatism, even at such an early date as 1925.  It is the first in that it suggests that the 
American myth is a romantic claim now made nostalgic.  But it is the latter in that Kallen asserts the romance of 
James’s notions are a potential salve to the the-current world of standardization: “the folkways of a society 
regimented by scientific generalization and machine-made uniformities in its work, its play, its arts, its religion, are 
upon us” (Horace Kallen, introduction to The Philosophy of William James [New York: Modern Library, 1955], 48; 
53).  Taken together, James’s philosophy is an antiquated elixir made potent by its potential to remedy new 
problems.  The question, though, is to what extent the philosophy of a man now over a decade passed has been 
amended to deal with these present realities.  Begging pardon, dead men tell no tales and provide no directions; 
those who take up their cause remain their best, if still limited, reference points. 
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expansiveness of pragmatism.  Widgery is no wide-eyed advocate of this trend in philosophy, 
averring even at that date that “the controversies it aroused and the interest it evoked are almost 
forgotten.”7   Yet he grants that pragmatism’s creation was the result of “a variety of 
circumstance,” involving J. Ward, G. F. Stout, and Schiller in Europe, James in America, and 
extending to entertain strains of thought found in the works of the French metaphysician Bergson 
and Italian Idealist Benedetto Croce (1866-1952).8  
The situation is far different in the years after Schiller’s death.  As close as a year after 
his passing and as much as thirty years thereafter, the parentage of pragmatism is being 
developed in books dedicated to specific founders, pragmatism proper, and philosophy in 
general.  In Joseph Ratner’s John Dewey’s Philosophy (1938), neither Schiller nor pragmatism 
finds reference in the index.   But one of the three indexed references to James is illuminating in 
the shifting, indeed sifting, tide.  Read against the ‘variety of circumstances’ mentioned in the 
decades previous, it is striking.  Ratner casts a fairly wide net when he comments that Idealists 
and English Realists, following in the line of thinking initiated by British empiricist George 
Berkeley (1685-1753), reduce all qualities to dependent perceptions of mind.  The curative to 
this “vicious” manner of thinking?  Ratner opines: 
The attack on Berkeley’s method and so on all modern philosophy that led into it and all 
that developed out of it was initiated by C. S. Peirce—the logical father of pragmatism.  
The new method of philosophy, both as a critical and constructive instrument, was 
developed to some extent by William James and was carried out practically to its full 
critical and constructive methodological limits by Dewey  This method is a new 
                                               
7
 Alban Widgery, “Pragmatist Humanism,” in Contemporary Thought of Great Britian (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1927), 120.  As the title of both the chapter and book suggest, Widgery emphasizes the British 
development of pragmatism in the works of Schiller. 
 
8
 Widgery, “Pragmatic,” 121. 
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contribution to philosophy, and, we may well be proud, a distinctively, even exclusively, 
American contribution.9 
 
While one might be appreciative of the glowing praise, the historical tale being told here 
emphasizes the American end of the grand experiment of pragmatism.10  
Two years later, Justus Buchler (1916-1991) published The Philosophy of Peirce: 
Selected Writings (1940).  Contra Ratner, Buchler attends to Schiller.  And the person deserving 
the methodological credit isn’t Dewey.  What does he make of pragmatism after Peirce?  “In the 
versions of James and Schiller, a huge pragmatist offspring flourished early in this century.  But 
the seeds of confusion and superficiality caused it to die as suddenly as it had been born.”  
Peirce’s pragmaticism is being reclaimed as the true pragmatism, replacing popular pragmatism.  
And what is popular pragmatism?  Not something Buchler wishes to indulge in: “an anti-
intellectualistic revolt, an embrace of the ‘will to believe’ pathetic in its methodological 
feebleness . . . an interesting manifestation of the general empirical temper.”11 
                                               
9
 Joseph Ratner, introduction to John Dewey’s Philosophy (New York: Modern Library, 1938), 44; f. *. 
Ratner (1901-1979) received his doctorate from Columbia University in 1930 and went on to teach there and at the 
City College of New York. 
 
10
 An interesting anomaly, born perhaps of proximity, is published first in 1938 and in revised form in 
1945.  Benjamin Apthorp Gould Fuller (1870-1956), a student at Oxford in 1902-5 and later a colleague of 
Schiller’s at USC, released A History of Philosophy.  While making reference to the by now standard origin of term 
in Peirce, he ranges far wider to suggest that James’s philosophy was influenced also by the German sociologist 
Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-1875), physicist Mach, and English statistician Karl Pearson (1857-1936).  Moreover, 
Fuller devotes subsequent sections covering pragmatism to first Schiller and then Dewey.  Of the former, he opines: 
“With many of James’s conclusions F. C. S. Schiller . . . was in agreement.  Some of them he developed 
independently, in others James’s influence may be seen” (B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy, revised ed. 
[New York: Henry Holt, 1945], 468-9; references to Fuller’s friendship with Schiller, started while at Oxford, are 
found in: Allan Shields, ‘Some Impressions of F. C. S. Schiller,” Personalist 55 [1974]: 290-97). 
 
11
 Justus Buchler, introduction to The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings (New York: Routledge, 
1940); reprint, Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), xi.  The breathless claims 
for the virility of true, Peircean, pragmat[ic]ism read interestingly against the old claims of flaccidity that Schiller 
vaulted at Bradley.  Especially so, when one notes the list of different novelties that Buchler provides to Peirce: 
supporting a view of evolution “in which the concepts of chance and habit play a major rôle,” championing of 
“philosophy on a scientific basis,” rejection of the self-evident a priori “in which cognition is a fetish” (Buchler, 
introduction, ix-x).  I have no reason to take these aspects away from Peirce’s philosophy; I do question how novel 
they are when set against other philosophers who argued for the same or similar causes. Buchler received his 
doctorate from Columbia University in 1939 and was a professor there and then at SUNY, Stony Brook. 
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Little more than a decade later, in 1949, Philip Paul Wiener (1905-1992) published 
Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism.12  Though its title is general, the interior is clearly 
meant to be in keeping with the American nature of the movement described.   In that regard, it 
is also more penetrating.  It provides separate chapters discussing the Metaphysical Club, 
Chauncey Wright (1830-1875),13 Nicholas St. John Green (1830-1876), and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes (1841-1935) decades before Menand’s unified treatment.  It even recognizes Schiller in 
three instances as part of a far larger story with which a “history of pragmatism in the twentieth 
century would have to do justice.”14  But one cannot escape the implication that Schiller is 
excluded from being a founder on account of his not being American.  Nor will one of those 
founders complain.  Dewey, in his foreword, comments on Wiener’s contribution:  
He has not merely contributed to the understanding of a significant distinctively 
American philosophical movement, but he has also provided a formation and 
exemplification of an enlightened and liberal method for dealing with the philosophical 
activity of any historical period.15   
 
                                               
12
 Wiener stands out as the one historian of pragmatism who might have had actual contact with Schiller as 
a student.  He received his doctorate from USC in 1931 and went on to be a professor at the City College of New 
York and then at Temple University. 
 
13
 Wright, and his paltry coverage, is worthy of a sidebar.  Edward H. Madden notes, again years ahead of 
Menand, that “Wright is a pivotal figure in American philosophy—with him began the ‘golden age’ of Peirce, 
James, Dewey, Royce, and Santayana” (Edward H. Madden, Chauncey Wright and the Foundations of Pragmatism 
[Seattle: University of Washington, 1963], v).  Madden suggests that Wright’s “contributions to philosophy of 
science, religion, ethics, and metaphysics” have led to a renewed interest by “historians of American philosophy.”  
Thankfully, he references the opinion of one of them.  That historian?  None other than Madden himself.  The 
collection in which his words appear is an important one, self-promotion notwithstanding.  It includes a nice survey 
of Wright’s works and a reprint of William James’s 1875 Nation article, “Chauncey Wright” (Edward H. Madden, 
ed., The Philosophical Writings of Chauncey Wright, The American Heritage Series [New York: Liberal Arts Press, 
1958]).  For whatever reason, Madden’s groundwork is not mentioned by Menand in The Metaphysical Club.  
Madden, for his part, thanks Perry and Wiener for their input in the preface to the 1963 work. 
 
14
 Philip P. Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1949; 
reprint, New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 279, f. 4.  The other two references are to rather more cosmopolitan 
collections of pragmatists suggested by Perry and James. 
 
15
 John Dewey, foreword to Wiener, Evolution, xii. 
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The digging is thus deeper but it is also narrower.  It admits of a larger historical range, but 
adheres to an already sanctioned foundation.   
Will Durant’s 1953 edition of The Story of Philosophy is not a discussion of pragmatism 
proper.  It is meant to be a far-ranging, popular, and admittedly partial account of the major 
personalities in philosophy from ancient to modern times.  As such, the quibble here is slightly 
different than the ones that came previously.  There is no issue with his choices as regards 
contemporary European—Bergson, Croce, and Russell—and American—Santayana, James, and 
Dewey—philosophers.  What one finds, however, is that the discussion specific to the rise of 
pragmatism references persons in an intriguing fashion.  Durant directs interested readers to 
James’s Pragmatism.  But who does he reference for further details?  “Flournoy has a good 
volume of exposition, and Albert Schinz’s Anti-Pragmatism is a vigorous criticism.”16  The issue 
is thus one of selection.  Durant points to James and not Peirce.  But, in furthering the Jamesian 
line alongside the Deweyian one, he references two persons even more on the margins than 
Schiller.  But, by their reference, Durant comes so close to issues which tie Schiller to James that 
                                               
16
 Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 382, f. 49.  To be clear, 
my argument here is rather specific.  Durant is referring here to University of Geneva psychologist Theodore 
Flournoy (1854-1920), whose interest—alongside James and Schiller—in the work of Frederic Myers’s psychical 
theorizing was briefly recounted in Chapter Two.  Durant is also referring to Schinz’s book Anti-Pragmatism: An 
Examination into the Respective Rights of Intellectual Aristocracy and Social Democracy (1909).  But he also 
references James’s son Henry’s collection of his father’s papers.  Those volumes, as well as those by Perry, clearly 
lay out the extensive and humorous lambasting that Schinz (1870-?) received at the hands of James and Schiller.  
Their personal letters traded in caricatures—both in crude captions attached to pictures of African natives and in 
actual discussions of “Schinzy”—that go beyond the overwhelmingly negative published reviews of persons such as 
Dewey, Schiller, A. W. Moore, and others.  If, then, Durant’s reference to all this “delightful gossip” were to be 
contextually clear, it would include, even in passing, a reference to Schiller. 
Durant (1885-1981), whose full name is ironically William James Durant, led a rather varied existence.  
After considering a life as a Jesuit, Durant was a reporter and a librarian.  He received his doctorate, and briefly 
taught at, Columbia University in 1917.  But for the vast majority of his life, based largely on the popularity of The 
Story of Philosophy (originally published in 1926), Durant was free to work in New York and then California as an 
independent scholar writing the multi-volume The Story of Civilization.  Those interested in the sad case of Schinz, 
then a professor of modern languages at Bryn Mawr, are directed to Peter Manicas, introduction to Anti-Pragmatism 
(1909): An Examination into the Respective Rights of Intellectual Aristocracy and Social Democracy, Early Critics 
of Pragmatism Series, ed. John R. Shook, vol. 2 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), vi-xvi.  This introduction, like the 
rest of those in the series, is followed by the full text of Schinz’s book as well as a useful selection of reviews that 
includes two by Schiller. 
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the former’s absence is startling.  And, as if to add insult to omission, Durant concludes that “the 
most eloquent and subtle of our living thinkers belongs almost wholly to the cultural traditions of 
Europe.”17  
The first volume of William Barrett and Henry David Aiken’s Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century (1962) provides an interesting accounting of philosophy, both in America and 
in Europe.18  Philosophy at the turn of the century in England is a stage-change from the 
obstinate idealist Bradley to the gradually awakening Russell.  The former, a tinge of sarcasm 
worthy of Schiller seems present in the description, deals in an outdated realm where “no fact is 
left unredeemed and where the Absolute Reality remains blessedly secure beyond the ravages of 
time and change and history”; the latter, shocked by the ravages of the first war, found it no 
longer possible “to go on living in a world of abstraction.”19  But a sage from the frontier need 
not experience such calamities to see the light: 
Of course it did not require wars and concentration camps to make some philosophers 
feel that their sheer sense of fact was violated by the beautiful structure of Idealism. . . . 
James too found that Idealism stuck in his gorge, it simply did not resemble the world of 
                                               
17
 Durant, The Story, 396.  Not that this is to suggest that Durant is praising this distillation.  Raising, again, 
the claim to an American view of philosophy, he suggests that James and Dewey, whatever their attachments to the 
European tradition, are part of the process by which Americans have “selected for survival and imitation among 
ourselves, rather the initiative individualist and the acquisitive pioneer than the meditative and artistic souls.”  That 
one could compass both individual and artistic forms of thought seems not to have occurred to Durant. 
 
18
 The chronology between volumes is also curious.  While this volume suggests as its focus “The Fate of 
Philosophy in the Twentieth-Century,” the overall historical emphasis seems to be reversed: the first volume covers 
“Pragmatism and America’s Philosophical Coming of Age” while the second details “The Rise of Analytical 
Philosophy in England.”  This is an inversion insofar as the first—going from Peirce, to James, to Dewey, to 
Santayana—comes prior to a discussion in the second that includes as its entry point a detailed elaboration of 
Bradley. 
 
19
 William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1 (New York: Random 
House, 1962), 21; Russell, qtd. in Barret and Aiken, 22.  Barrett (1913-1992) received his doctorate from Columbia 
and then taught at the University of California and New York University.  Aiken (1912-1982).received his doctorate 
from Harvard and went on to teach there and then Brandeis. 
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fact in which we live. . . . the philosophy of the twentieth century, we have seen, takes 
shape as a revolt against Idealism.20 
 
Where is Schiller in all this?  Surely, the erasure is only a temporary one, as the first volume then 
moves into a discussion more specific to the history of pragmatism.  No.  In the thirty plus page 
introduction to “Pragmatism and America’s Philosophical Coming of Age” there is a laundry list 
of persons both European and American—Kant and Darwin, Morris and Perry, Royce and 
Santayana—but not a single reference to Schiller.  The “great pragmatic triumvirate” of Barrett 
and Aiken tenders not even a passing dismissal to a person implicated in the passing of Idealism 
and the coming of pragmatism.21 
Joseph Leon Blau’s William James: Pragmatism and Other Essays, published in 1963, 
continues Schiller’s erasure even as it extends his deference to James at the expense of Peirce.  It 
is also clear that the reference points from which it draws have been those groomed by the 
previous discussions of the subject.  In the brief “Works About William James” there are 
references to Blau, to Perry, and even to Otto.  But there are no references to Schiller or Knox.  
And who is the James that Blau sees?  Surprisingly, one betraying no small similarity, save in 
explicit reference, to Schiller.  James was derided in his early writings for his style, for making 
complex philosophic issues seem within reach of everyone.  But why, reasons Blau, is it 
“necessary for a good book to be dull.”  And in those books James demonstrated that a person’s 
philosophy is as much a guide to that person.  So who was this man?  Simply: 
He was a man whose training in the hard-headedness of science never completely 
subdued his soft-hearted belief that men are not merely automata, strictly determined in a 
mechanical world, but are, to some degree, the makers and shapers of their world. . . . he 
                                               
20
 Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy, 1, 71.  The triumvirate even inspires cringe-worthy analogies: Peirce is 
Socrates, James is Plato, and Dewey is Aristotle (Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy, I, 49).  With no room for 
Protagoras in the triadic schema, Schiller is surely left out on account of space. 
 
21
 Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy, 1, 71. 
 
  516 
was a man who was eternally ready to lend a sympathetic ear to the wildest of theories 
because he could not be convinced that all wisdom was of the academy or that there was 
only one clearly marked road to truth.22 
 
With minor emendation this is a James who, five decades deceased, retains all the components of 
a peer no longer discussed for seemingly the same reasons. 
Reasons which, it would seem, continue to implicate him in a discussion of pragmatism, 
American or otherwise.  And, finally, that is the case.  In 1968, Horace Standish Thayer 
publishes Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism.  It is a wide-ranging book, 
covering in detail both American and European strands of pragmatism.  But it is in this work, the 
most detailed treatment of Schiller to this point, that one of his epigrams comes back to haunt 
humanism’s ghost.  Thayer begins promisingly.  Schiller was “the most famous pragmatist 
outside the United States,” was regarded at the start of the century as “the equal of James,” and 
garnered with James more attention in Europe than “any other pragmatists.”23  But then the 
compliments stop.  Thayer grants that Schiller’s view were in development prior to meeting 
James.  But that means that Schiller was not a founder of pragmatism.  Schiller tried to convince 
James of the soundness of the term humanism.  He is, in sum, a close pal and ally of James but 
not, on Thayer’s account, a pragmatist.24 
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 Joseph Blau, introduction to William James: Pragmatism and Other Essays (New York: Washington 
Square Press, 1963), x; xv. Blau (1909-1986) received his doctorate from Columbia University in 1944 and went on 
to teach philosophy and religion there. 
 
23
 H. Standish Thayer, Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1968; reprint, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1981), 273.  Thayer (1923- ) received his doctorate from Columbia 
University in 1949 and went on to teach there, Barnard College, and the CUNY. 
 
24
 There is a rather novel rhetorical tactic that occurs within a few lines of this comment by Thayer.  While 
Schiller is cast out as a founder for deriving view in advance of meeting James, he is also dismissed for co-opting 
the ideas of Royce and James in “Axioms as Postulates” . . . after admitting to his inspiration in the works of James.  
What then is to be made by this comment regarding that essay: “While a significant contribution to the literature of 
pragmatism , it can scarcely be judged as an original and fundamental philosophic influence on the history of 
pragmatism” (Thayer, Meaning, 274).  Such a confluence of value assessments—issuing from a respected 
personality in the history of pragmatism—must surely be an objective judgment not informed by any subjective 
influence. 
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If not, then what?  He compliments Schiller’s Riddles; it is “highly original, containing 
many fresh insights and novel bits of scholarship, and is gracefully written.”25  Thayer spends 
precious time providing the details of British Idealism, lucidly drawing in figures such as Lotze 
and Hegel, Bradley and A. E. Taylor.  He provides specifics as regards Schiller’s views on 
psychology, logic, and philosophy.  And Thayer even reaches conclusions with which the present 
author can find no qualm: Schiller took criticism personally, pursued logic past the point of 
necessity, and was, in light of these things, largely ignored in his last years.  All this for a non-
pragmatist.  But Thayer’s own subjectivity is laid bare in a startling question: “What conclusions 
are suggested in a final stock-taking of this lively but no longer living philosophy of 
humanism?”26  By virtue of the framing, Thayer confirms that for his critics, Schiller was his 
philosophy.  And he and it were, in Thayer’s estimation, a bad joke: 
For one always suspects a lurking mockery in Schiller’s discourse and a trap readied to 
be sprung in those portions of his philosophizing that most tempt criticism.  The trap one 
fears is that of being taken in, innocently and soberly made the prey of a jest and parody 
of philosophic seriousness.  However, if this uneasy feeling is at all justified, nothing so 
thoroughly condemns a philosophy as the suspicion that it is not intended to be taken 
seriously.27 
 
But Thayer doesn’t like the punning.  The majesty of his solemn pragmatism—innocent and 
sober, fearful and suspicious—cannot suffer fools lightly.   So, in a role reversal, he and it will 
purge Schiller as an absurdity. 
In 1970, the joke is still on Schiller.  Thayer won’t even feign to include him in the 
“classic” writings.  The book doesn’t suggest that it is American-specific, but the index and the 
introductory justification do.   It contains no reference to Europe or pragmatism’s supporters 
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 Thayer, Meaning, 276, n. 10. 
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 Thayer, Meaning, 301. 
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 Thayer, Meaning, 301. 
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there.  This exclusion from the references is coupled with the implication that Schiller doesn’t 
fall under the “classic” label.  Thayer describes this criterion: “the original and formative 
expressions of this philosophy articulated by its most eminent spokesmen.”  Though there is 
“considerable literature” on other European and American “pragmatists and sympathizers . . . 
[they] could not be included here.”28  And while it is clear that all the persons listed—Peirce, 
Dewey, James, Mead, and Lewis29—count as pragmatists, the extent to which all of them 
provide classic, original, and formative expressions of pragmatism is reasonably open to 
question. 
Also in 1970 Morris, one of Schiller’s final combatants, publishes The Pragmatism 
Movement in American Philosophy.   Given its title, there is no reason to quarrel with Schiller 
receiving no mention in the index.  Morris is dealing, to be fair, with the American exemplars 
Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead.  But, given Morris’s firsthand knowledge of the history he is 
telling, the omission is clearly revisionist.  Recall that he claimed Schiller as part of the 
empiricist tradition of James.  Recall also that he criticized both James and Schiller for being too 
afraid of the formal in philosophy.  What, then, to make of Morris’s first chapter, “The Occasion 
for American Pragmatism”?  Specifically, how is one to construe the four factors that underlie its 
arrival: “1) the prestige which science and the scientific method enjoyed during the mid-
nineteenth century; 2) the corresponding strength of empiricism in the then-current philosophy; 
3) the acceptance of biological evolution; 4) the acceptance of the ideals of American 
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 Horace Standish Thayer, preface to Pragmatism: The Classic Writings (New York: New American 
Library, 1970), vii. 
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 “Lewis” is Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964) who received his doctorate from Harvard in 1910 and 
then taught at the University of California before returning to teach at Harvard.  He is known for promoting what he 
termed “conceptual pragmatism.” 
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democracy.”30  This is as much an alteration as it is a synthesis; for Morris is tilling the same 
well-kept field as Wiener did before him.  He is working to smooth the edges of pragmatism’s 
history even as it stands in America.  Here empiricism traces back directly to the British, to 
Hume and Mill, and then leaps forward to James and his “extreme emphasis on the category of 
experience.”31   Was it not this strain of pragmatism which Morris saw, in 1935, as threatening to 
relegate pragmatism to a mere curio?  Here there is no such risk or threat.  The American 
pragmatists only “differ somewhat” in helping to craft “one of the major philosophical 
achievements of the last hundred years.”32  But Morris laments that pragmatism, as an expression 
of “American culture,” has waned in influence in recent years.  He hopes his then is a partial 
corrective.  And, in an unintentionally suggestive finale, he hopes to have shown that “American 
pragmatism is much more than the voice of its historic occasion.”33  Much more than he and 
many more capable have been willing to entertain. 
That last line, a jab really, regarding the history of Schiller’s erasure might seem facile if 
not for the cumulative evidence.  But there is another side to this historical tale.  It is one that 
qualifies Buchler’s dismissal even as it grants the germ of his thesis.  The simple fact is that the 
                                               
30
 Charles William Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York: George 
Braziller, 1970), 5. 
 
31
 Morris, The Pragmatic, 7.  Twenty years earlier, John W. Yolton argues that Schiller is a central player in 
pragmatism’s relation to empiricism.  Schiller, alongside the Personal Idealists such as Sturt and pragmatists such as 
James and Dewey, sought to amend the classic tenets of empiricism so as to combat Idealism and naturalism.  At the 
same time, Schiller imported traces of the Idealism that he sought to refute.  While Yolton faults Schiller for not 
fully appreciating the distinction between that which “is given” and the act of  “knowing,” Yolton suggests 
Schiller’s “Kantian modifications of empiricism . . . even where they are fallacious . . . serve to reveal the extent of 
the empirical and idealistic elements in many forms of present-day pragmatism” (John K. Yolton, “F. C. S. Schiller's 
Pragmatism and British Empiricism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 11, no. 1 [September 1950]: 44). 
 
32
 Morris, The Pragmatic, 141.  But it is again a history which ranges so close to Schiller as to cast his 
reflection upon the discussion.  Pragmatism’s quibbles with Bradley are here referenced, but the counterpoints 
offered are only Addison Webster Moore and John Dewey. 
 
33
 Morris, The Pragmatic, 152. 
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vast majority of those who argued for, or showed even passing interest in, the psychological 
emphasis in pragmatism were dead or had moved on to other topics by the time of Morris’s 1970 
celebration of America’s philosophy.  Schiller’s early ally, the personal idealist Henry Sturt, had 
died in 1946.  Of the English pragmatists, those most explicitly tied to the writings of James and 
Schiller, Knox was dead by 1960 and Murray by 1962.   The Swiss psychologist and psychical 
researcher Flournoy, to whom James expressed a debt of gratitude alongside Schiller, died in 
1920.  Even sympathetic American philosophers, such as there were, did not live to see fit to 
challenge these perspectives.  Flewelling, the American personalist who had befriended Schiller 
and gotten him to travel to California in 1926, died in 1960.   
Other countries had, admittedly, only provided limited endorsement.  The Italian 
pragmatists—so robust in the creation of the journal Leonardo that they drew both Schiller’s and 
James’s attention—veered towards Fascism and then turned to religion in their later works; 
Papini died in 1956 and Giuseppe Prezzolini in 1982.34  In France, sympathy for pragmatism was 
never very high.  But those who had showed an interest in pragmatism, such as sociologist Émile 
Durkheim and Marxist philosopher Georges Sorel, died in 1917 and 1922 respectively.  Others, 
such as philosopher Maurice Blondel and mathematician Édouard Le Roy turned, like their 
Italian counterparts, toward religion in the later years of their lives.  The former died in 1949 and 
the latter in 1954.35  In Germany, pragmatism was met with marked disdain.  Until the 1960s, 
                                               
34
 For a general account of the pragmatist movement in Italy, one which preferences the more Deweyian 
sort of “logical pragmatism” that was undertaken by mathematician trained Giovanni Vailati (1863-1909) and law 
student Mario Calderoni (d. 1914) as well, readers are directed to Giovanni Gullace, “The Pragmatist Movement in 
Italy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 23, no. 1 (January-March 1962): 91-105.  For an account which more 
exclusively focuses on Vailati—his distance theoretically from Papini and James and closeness to Peirce in 
developing a logical theory of meaning—readers are directed to C. P. Zanoni, “Developments of Logical 
Pragmatism in Italy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 40, no. 4 (October-December 1976): 603-619. 
 
35
 Interested readers are directed to Neil Gross’s contextual assessment of the French reaction to 
pragmatism, focusing particularly on Durkheim’s “Pragmatism Lectures” of 1913-4 but also on other French 
intellectuals such as LeRoy and Blondel.  His central thesis is that the relationship between pragmatism and the 
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with the arrival of Jürgen Habermas (1929- ) and Karl-Otto Apel (1922- ), the majority of 
thinkers argued that it was a watered down version of their brand of Idealism.36  And here, most 
of all, the social situation can only be described as increasingly grim.  Thankfully, none of the 
three philosophers praised by James and Schiller were around to witness the destruction of the 
1930s and 40s.  The Austrian Wilhelm Jerusalem, who had translated James’s Pragmatism in 
1908, died in 1923.   Rudolph Eisler, the philosopher and sociologist who had published 
selections from Schiller’s Humanism and Studies in Humanism as Humanismus: Beifräge zu 
einer pragmafischen Philosophie (1911), died in 1926.  Julius Goldstein, the man who James in 
his last letter to Schiller also “left the cause to,” died in 1929.   
Any theory, philosophical or otherwise, is bound up in the persons who craft its 
trajectory.  And the lineage of pragmatism’s Jamesian line was cut short by a variety of factors 
                                                                                                                                                       
somewhat different French la pragmatisme can only be properly understood in reference to religious currents at play 
during that time (Neil Gross, “Durkheim’s Pragmatism Lectures: A Contextual Approach,” Sociological Theory 15, 
no. 2 [July 1997]: 126-49).  Another approach to Durkheim’s lectures, one that places specific emphasis on how he 
disagreed with the “psychological pragmatism of the sort associated with William James,” is found in Robert Prus, 
“Emile Durkheim Engages the Pragmatic Divide: Reconceptualizing the Sociological Tradition in Pragmatism and 
Sociology,” Paper presented at the American Sociological Association Meeting, Philadelphia, 13-6 August 2005. 
There is at least one instance where a scholar traces the connection of pragmatism and French philosophy back to an 
even earlier date.  In The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain, Oberlin Professor of Theology Walter Marshall Horton 
(1895-1966) suggests: “the left-wing Pragmatism of Peirce and Dewey was indeed the legitimate offspring of 
nineteenth century empiricism, utilitarianism, and positivism; but the right-wing Pragmatism of James, Schiller, and 
other religious thinkers owed its origin to a more complex union of tendencies . . . if we are to understand the 
relation of Pragmatism to preceding philosophies we must study the vitalistic and voluntaristic tendencies of 
German Idealism, and not confine our attention to the Anglo-Saxon side of the family tree.  If, then, it is permissible 
to cite such men as Kant, Schopenhauer, Lotze, Maine [Marie François Pierre Gonthier] de Biran [volitional 
philosopher, 1766-1824], [Jean Gaspard Felix] Ravaisson[-Mollien, archeologist and philosopher of “consciousness 
and will,” 1813-1900] and [Charles Bernard] Renouvier [pluralist philosopher who influenced James in the 1870s, 
1815-1903] when making a list of the forerunners of pragmatism, it is equally permissible to cite the name of 
Bautain” (Walter Marshall Horton, The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain [New York: University Press, 1926], ix).  
Louis Eugène Marie Bautain (1796-1867) was a French philosopher who explored, occasionally at peril to his 
standing as a professor, the connection of faith to reason.  He taught at Strasburg and the Sorbonne and received his 
Holy Orders in 1828. 
 
36
 Interested readers are directed to an exceedingly rich treatment, one that extends consideration to other 
figures central to the German reaction to pragmatism: Hans Joas, “American Pragmatism and German Thought,” in 
Pragmatism and Social Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).  Though Schiller is not mentioned, the 
chapter contains a compelling discussion of pragmatism’s fortunes in Germany and America in the years after 
WWII. 
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not solely the domain of the American historians of pragmatism.37  It is conjecture to suggest that 
                                               
37
 Another area, developing alongside the histories of pragmatism thus covered, that held potential for 
taking up Schiller’s cause was the field of American sociology.  In 1938, Robert K. Merton published Science, 
Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England.   In the preface to the 1970 edition, he explains that the 
book was meant to fill a gap in the sociology of the times; specifically, the “study of the behavior patterns of 
scientists and of science as an evolving social institution” (Robert K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in 
Seventeenth-Century England [1938; New York: Harper and Row, 1970], vii).  The book is worthy of review on its 
own merits.  What is of interest here is the slim pragmatic thread Merton picks up in 1938, only a year after 
Schiller’s death: “Whatever the faults of pragmatic analysis, it has amply justified its contentions by forcing us to 
realize that every ‘fact’ in a naturalistic system is a selection from the unorganized whole of implicit or avowed 
human criteria” (Merton, Science, 229).   The footnote for this claim references—not Peirce, James, or Dewey—but 
Schiller and his 1907 Studies in Humanism.  In the Appendix to the 1990 collection of Merton’s works, Puritanism 
and the Rise of Modern Science: The Merton Thesis, K. E. Duffin and Stuart W. Strickland provide an abbreviated 
outline of the 1938 work.  Though Schiller is removed from their discussion of the page where he was referenced, 
his imprint is not: “In science, these [utilitarian] values expressed themselves in a neglect of the unique and variable, 
an interest in things for what they made possible rather than for what they were in themselves, and a reduction of 
phenomena to common manageable units” (K. E. Duffin and Stuart W. Strickland, “Appendix: The Principal Theses 
of Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England: An Analytical Synopsis,” in Puritanism and 
the Rise of Modern Science: The Merton Thesis ed. I. Bernard Cohen, [New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1990], 388).  Another work—one that Merton had reviewed and commented on in manuscript form—came out a 
year earlier: Talcott Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action.  Though its touches on a broader range of sociological 
issues than Merton’s work, and contains no reference to Schiller, the comments as regards scientific theory would be 
amenable to a discussion of Schiller (no less Dewey): “True scientific theory is never the product of idle 
‘speculation,’ of spinning out the logical implications of assumptions, but of observation, reasoning and verification, 
starting with the facts and continually returning to the facts. . . . Only by treating theory in this close interrelation 
with empirical problems and facts is any kind of an adequate understanding either of how the theory came to 
develop, or of its significance to science, possible” (Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action [New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1937; reprint, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949], vi). 
Merton’s interests never led him back to that comment or to Schiller.  Parsons never discovered him.  But 
another sociologist provided a brief reference.  C. Wright Mills’ 1942 University of Wisconsin dissertation, A 
Sociological Account of Pragmatism (published in 1964 under the title Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher 
Learning in America), provides only one reference to Schiller; humorously, it is to the letter James wrote describing 
Peirce as “a hopeless crank” (C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America, ed. 
Irving Louis Horowitz [New York: Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1964], 135).  But, in a postscript where Mills 
reflected on his dissertation, he makes a comment worth noting: “It is perhaps not indispensable, but it would 
certainly be interesting and in all probability revealing, to examine the non-American refractions and criticisms of 
pragmatism.  In Italy, especially, as well as in England, France, and Germany, there has developed, since the time of 
William James, a literature on this topic” (Mills, Sociology, 466). Whether by training, interest, or both, his 
comments are suggestive of at least two inferences.  (1) In Italy, especially and as was discussed previously, there 
flourished a “logical” form of pragmatism under the auspices of Calderoni and Vailati.  The emphasis is surely not 
on Papini, and would not lead in consequence to Schiller.  (2) As with Thayer, Schiller is relegated by terms of art to 
a refraction, and not originator, of pragmatism. 
There is, however, a further supposition which stands to be considered: Mills found the Jamesian style 
pragmatism, in a word, un-American.  In a 1938 letter to Ernest Manheim, Mills makes this claim:  
Here, through Mr. Mumford, the ‘genteel tradition’ speaks. It is my belief that Mr. Mumford has not gotten 
hold of the vital intellectual core and animus of pragmatism. He has missed the intellectual challenge which 
it undoubtably presents. By pragmatism I do not mean the doctrines of W[illia]m James.  James is no 
genuine pragmatist. The tradition runs from C[harles] S[anders] Peirce to [John] Dewey and [George 
Herbert] Mead. These are the carriers of that pragmatism which is larger than a specific philosophic 
doctrine. Peirce, and later Dewey, ‘denounced’ James’ doctrine. He is not in the middle of the living 
stream. . . . That traditional interpretation of pragmatism which locates James as the center of diffusion for 
the doctrine is, I believe, mistaken and intellectually unfortunate. 
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the situation in Europe, the situation which gave rise to Schiller’s increased interest in eugenics, 
also contributed to the decline of the individual/psychological view of pragmatism.  But the 
decades immediately proceeding Schiller’s death provide institutional details too apparent to 
discount.  Pragmatism’s history was being written almost exclusively by the professional 
American philosophers who rose through the ranks, first as students and then often as professors, 
at Columbia and Harvard.38  The exceptions—Abel at the New School, Winetrout at American 
Institutional College, Searles at USC, and Sheilds at the University of Northern Iowa—did not 
                                                                                                                                                       
(C. Wright Mills, Austin, to Ernest Manheim, 4 September 1938, Signatur 31/1, Archiv für die Geschichte der 
Soziologie in Österreich, Graz, Nachlass Ernest Manheim).  Lewis Mumford (1895-1990) was a polymath without a 
college degree, though he studied at Columbia University and the New School.  A historian, urban planner, and 
sociologist, Mumford was a co-founder of the Regional Planning Association of America (1923) and professor at 
Stanford University in the early 1940s.  The reference to pragmatism to which Mills refers occurs in Mumford’s The 
Golden Day: A Study in American Experience and Culture (1926). 
 
38
 There is a variation on this argument that has already been raised.  In Chapter Four, there is reference to 
Slosson’s comment that, “if Mr. Schiller had remained in America he would now be lecturing to one or two hundred 
students at the time, largely teachers who had come from all parts of the country expressly to hear his ideas and who 
would in turn transmit them to their students” (Edwin E. Slosson, Six Major Prophets [Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1917], 196).  White has also suggested, albeit to a different end, that the educational environment at 
Oxford—lacking the graduate students and scientific laboratories of the sort found in America—had an impact on 
the propagation of his philosophy (Stephen Solomon White, “A Comparison of the Philosophies of F. C. S. Schiller 
and John Dewey,”Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1940, 72-3).  Herbert Searles avers: “It had always been a 
mystery to me that Schiller did not receive the attention given to the other three leaders in the general area of 
pragmatic thought; but that mystery is lessed by the fact that most of his productive life was spent at Oxford, which 
was unfriendly to his viewpoint, and in the later period spent in the U.S.A., he proposed nothing new” (in Shields, 
“Some Impressions,” 293). 
There can be no doubt that Slosson, White, and Searles are all correct, to a degree.  Lacking the students, 
the facilities, and the support, Schiller’s philosophy stood at a distinct disadvantage as compared to persons such as 
Dewey and Perry, at institutions such as Harvard, Chicago, and Columbia.  But this argument is subject to 
qualification on two ends.  From the American side, there were an ample assortment of graduate student trained by 
James, not the least of which is Perry, who went on to both write Schiller out of the equation and to reconfigure 
James’s philosophy so as to exclude its more individualistic components.  From the British side, the situation is 
somewhat different.  First of all, Schiller did influence philosophers—in Germany, Italy, and England—but a myriad 
of other mitigating factors (already discussed at some length) seem more plausibly significant than simply a lack of 
graduate students or facilities for doing psychological experimentation.  Secondly, and to the point of the next 
section, Schiller’s interest in psychology, dating as far back to his interactions with Titchener at Cornell in the 
1890s, rarely, if ever, extended beyond the psychology of James save in matters of emphasis (see Chapter Two).  
That said interest could have been a contributing factor is more to the point of the overall complaint: 
individual/psychological pragmatism of the sort promoted by James and Schiller was offset by the histories being 
written. 
None of which is to suggest that the American system of “building philosophy” was not a magnificent 
example of “professionalizing” the way in which the love of wisdom was conducted, providing the grooves and 
active participants in crafting pragmatism’s history.  A particularly acute discussion of that system, specifically as it 
applies to Harvard, is found in: Bruce Kuklick, “Building a Graduate School, 1890-1912,” in The Rise of American 
Philosophy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 233-58. 
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have: (1) careers of the same trajectory, or (2) interests that ranged to encompass the history of 
pragmatism proper.  As a consequence or a coincidence or a measure of both, the results are 
clear.  Whether written or read, there were less and less counterpoints from those trained in the 
views Schiller had fought to defend.  And those few counterpoints that were offered, whether in 
blame or partial praise, suffered from the dynamics of their production. 
8.2 ALL THAT IT ONCE WAS: THE STYLE OF PRAGMATIC HUMANISM  
Schiller’s entry into the philosophical fray was, as with the previously surveyed histories of 
philosophy and pragmatism, context specific.  And, aside from the deep friendship he formed 
with James and later Flewelling and Hopkins, Schiller’s context was an overwhelmingly 
European one.  Whereas earlier chapters stressed his distance from the emergence of pragmatism 
in America, they also implicated that remove as a perspective-setting one.  The groundwork 
Schiller did in articulating first pragmatism, and then humanism, in Europe ran up against the 
tendencies that had started there and then been adopted in America.  In that regard, he was 
attempting to undercut Bradley’s First Principles while James adopted a posture of genial 
annoyance with the variations found in persons such as Royce.  And in such a way, he was closer 
to the historical and philosophical currents that pragmatism sought to remove.  But such 
proximity, as much as it fueled his attacks on Idealists in his midst, also engendered a myopic 
regard for the battles to be fought and the causes to be championed.   The paradox is that 
Schiller, as much as he struck closer at the perceived sources of philosophy’s ills, was farther 
from the currents that would eventually prevail as useful. 
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The problem that has developed, however, is one of coverage, the ways in which Schiller 
has been portrayed in previous detailed examinations of his philosophy.  To wit, none have 
undertaken a biography of Schiller until the present.   What have been presented are thematic 
treatments where specific parts of his philosophy are highlighted.  Some of these are 
exceptionally nuanced.39  They explore aspects of Schiller’s philosophy, by reference to more 
traditional versions at play during a given time or in comparison to more recognized pragmatists.  
They note specifics such as his battles with Bradley, or the turn in his later writings to argue 
against symbolic logic.  But even with these strengths they are occupationally blindered.  As has 
been suggested previously, commentators interpret Schiller’s philosophy narrowly.  They ignore 
aspects of his philosophy that answer the challenges they put forth.   They argue for the novelty 
of his philosophy while undercutting it with traditional examples.  They reframe his philosophy 
in a manner that only engenders further arguments against its resurgence.  The remainder of this 
section will examine these varied treatments and end with an analysis that goes beyond the 
arguments put forward thus far. 
The first sort of occupational hazard occurs when a writer, obviously an expert in a 
certain sort of thinking, takes on a thinker of another sort of thinking.  Sometimes the clash is 
                                               
39
 I should pause to note that I am taking previous examinations, even those with which I disagree, as 
honest attempts to explore Schiller’s philosophy.  The problems that develop relate to comments by Medhurst 
regarding the necessity of primary documents (see Chapter One: Martin J. Medhurst, “The Contemporary Study of 
Public Address: Renewal, Recovery, and Reconfiguration,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (2001): 495-511).  
The advances in technology since the time some of these treatments were written have made research and access to 
archival materials easier.  And, in at least one important instance, some of the materials related to Schiller weren’t 
even available to researchers prior to 1949.  While a doctoral student at USC, Allan Shields undertook to research 
Schiller.  When he contacted Brooke Whiting of the Department of Special Collections Library at UCLA to inquire 
about any holdings relating to Schiller it might have, Shields was initially told that there were no such materials.  
Weeks later, however, Whiting called Shields back.  As Shields explains: “they had discovered three trunksful of 
Schiller effects and literary remains located under a stairwell (storage) and that the materials had been waiting for 
accession at a later, less busy time.  No records of receipt had been made” (Allen Shields, “Building the 
Bibliography of F. C. S. Schiller,” 25 September 2003).  Records of these materials were only made available in 
finding aid form in July 1968 by Julia Jones of the Department of Special Collections.  These materials were 
referenced in Shields dissertation (written at USC) in 1951, and given wider exposure in the 1968 bibliography he 
co-authored with Herbert Searles. 
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dramatic, the force of the confrontation culminating in ideas or issues that neither thinker would 
have brought to the table without the other.  My cautious estimation is that George Stack’s 1982 
“Nietzsche's Influence on Pragmatic Humanism” is not that sort of interaction.  Stack, an 
emeritus professor of philosophy at the State University College of New York at Brockport, is a 
Nietzsche scholar.  His essay deserves, first, praise and, second, a healthy degree of doubt.  As to 
the first, and given that I am no Nietzsche scholar, I can't quibble with Stack’s assessment that 
Schiller’s work demonstrates marked similarities to, and does owe a debt to, Nietzsche.  In fact, I 
freely acknowledge him two points: (1) Schiller utilized Nietzsche in his writing, and (2) 
Schiller's later works cover a varied list of topics.  In both instances, Stack does justice to 
Schiller’s texts and shows sensitivity to what his texts say and to what they, admittedly, lack. 
 Now as to the doubt.  First, Schiller acknowledges the import of Nietzsche and does so 
more candidly than Stack seems to recognize.40  Second, Stack displays ample talent at 
‘arguments by quotation’ which, in certain cases, are patently incorrect or curiously 
misattributed.41  Third, Stack argues persuasively, if occasionally from oversight or error.  Stack 
                                               
40
 See Schiller’s: “On Nietzsche Translations,” Nation, 26 April 1906, 343; “Nietzsche, Friedrich 
Wilhelm,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed. (1910); “The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche,” Quarterly Review 
434 (January 1913): 148-67 (a revised version of which, along with a reference in the preface to Nietzsche, appeared 
as: “Nietzsche,” in Must Philosophers Disagree? [London: Macmillan, 1934], 106-28); review of Un Romantisme 
Utilitaire: Etude sur le Mouvement Pragmatiste.  Le Pragmatisme chez Nietzsche et chez Poincare, by Rene 
Berthelot, Mind 82 (April 1912): 250-2; review of Nietzsche, the Thinker: A Study, by William Mackintire Salter, 
Mind 109 (January 1919): 107-8. 
 
41
 Stack references Quarterly Review articles from January 1913 and January 1915.  But the two references 
are actually both from the 1913 article referenced in the previous footnote.  How is this possible?  Simply put, Stack 
bases his arguments here on a typo made by Salter.  The more damning suggestion would be that he bases his 
argument here only on Salter’s book’s discussion of Schiller.   When one looks to the actual articles from the 
Quarterly Review in 1915, there is indeed an article on Nietzsche.  But it is: (1) written in July, not January; (2) 
deals with Nietzsche’s relation to German education, not to translations of him; and (3) is written by A. W. G. 
Randall, not Schiller.  If one looks to page 157 in the bounded collection, the discussion is of “war, wounds, and 
disease.”  
Not only does Stack take Salter at his word, he takes Salter’s words and makes them into Schiller’s.  He 
attributes to Schiller a comment made by Salter only to further the argument that Schiller was hiding his debt to 
Nietzsche (George J. Stack, “Nietzsche's Influence on Pragmatic Humanism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
20, no. 4 [October 1982]: 402, n. 113; 405).  Schiller’s comments in 1913, as used by Salter and commented on by 
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ignores Schiller's Must Philosopher's Disagree? revision of the Quarterly Review article—the 
1913 one that exists, not the 1915 one that does not.  Stack also mangles dates to interesting 
effect where he speaks of "being convinced" of Schiller's cribbing “useful fictions” from 
Nietzsche.42  The edition of Riddles of the Sphinx that Stack refers to can only be either the 1891 
or 1894 edition, not the "second edition" he claims as 1910.  And, in both of those, the appendix 
“Free Will and Necessity” appears (he is unknowingly referring to one of the two additional 
appendices that were added to the 1910 third edition of the text).  These points are telling, in that 
they derail Stack's argument regarding Nietzsche’s Will to Power (1896), though it does mean 
that Schiller most likely read Beyond Good and Evil (1886) at least five years before the first 
edition of Riddles of the Sphinx came out.43  All of which is rather funny given Stack's insistence 
on the date 1910 . . . the very same year Schiller's entry on Nietzsche came out in the 
Encyclopedia Britannica!   
Finally, while taking Schiller to task for ‘copying’ Nietzsche, Stack also engages in 
another odd tactical approach: the similarities in Schiller's arguments suggest that he “cannot be 
said to have misunderstood him entirely” or, alternatively, Schiller “retained only the surface 
insights and left many details behind.”44  But, if we grant that he noted the strengths and 
weaknesses of Nietzsche's arguments far more candidly than Stack asserts, this simply means 
                                                                                                                                                       
Schiller in his review of the same, can be found in: William Mackintire Salter, Nietzsche, the Thinker: A Study 
(New York: Henry Holt, 1917), 513, n. g; 514, n. i. 
 
42
 Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 381 [see first full paragraph]. 
 
43
 Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 380. 
 
44
 Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 396; 395.  Being the Nietzsche scholar, and already having (mis-)referenced Salter, 
Stack is surely aware that his questions regarding the similarities between Nietzsche and pragmatism are not novel.  
As far back as 1912 the issue was being debated in journals such as the Philosophical Review and the Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie (for reference to these discussions—which are the basis for Stack’s claim that Schiller 
“excuses” himself—see again Salter, Nietzsche, 496, n. 1). 
 
  528 
that Schiller was willing to go—either wrongly or rightly, which is not the point of this 
analysis—beyond Nietzsche where he felt it his prerogative.  Stack rightfully questions the 
extent to which Schiller used, even attributed his ideas to, Nietzsche.  And he is to be thanked for 
pointing out where these similarities lie.  But Stack seems more interested in flogging a dead 
horse only to revive the one he is riding, forgetting to saddle his interests and bridle his facts.  No 
one will ever claim that Schiller inspires the debate that Nietzsche does; though that is not to say 
that the Taylorian Scholar of German should be dismissed because he doesn’t hold to Stack’s 
scholarship of Nietzsche. 
The second sort of blind spot is one that Schiller warned about.  It should be familiar to 
anyone who works within a specialized field of study.  Well skilled in the tools of a given 
professional trade, it is easy to hold to demarcations even as one studies ideas that seek to revise, 
overcome, or remove them.45   This sort of oversight is engendered by the two men principally 
responsible for keeping Schiller’s name alive in the years after his death: Abel and Shields.46  
                                               
45
 There is, of course, a wonderfully academic phrase for this problem: trained incapacity.  Thorstein Bunde 
Veblen (1857-1929), the Norwegian born sociologist and economist, is to be thanked for developing this concept.  
But it is Kenneth Duva Burke (1897-1993), the literary critic, who provides the explanation of this “state of affairs 
whereby one’s very abilities can function as blindness.”  As Burke notes, there is a narrow margin dividing the 
ability to discriminate and the inability to comprehend: “We thus have orientation discussible as either training or 
incapacity, depending upon its outcome in correct or faulty means-selecting.  And our own judgments as to the 
adequacy of the means selected in any given instance might depend upon our particular sense of the appropriate” 
(Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, 3d ed. [Berkeley: University of California, 1984], 7; 10). 
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 Another example of this approach is found in White’s 1941 University of Chicago dissertation.  This 
work—in which White thanks Morris, Hartshorne, Dewey, and Louise Schiller—is worth attention for its attempt to 
draw out comparisons between these two pragmatists.  White is clearly conversant with the works of Schiller, 
Dewey, and other writers on pragmatism.  But he stumbles, in my estimation, in holding too closely to distinctions 
between what constitutes philosophical and non-philosophical interests.   This dichotomy is made most clear in his 
concluding chapter.  Therein, White asserts three contrasts between the two philosophers: (1) Dewey upheld a 
scientific whereas Schiller provided a metaphysical theory of truth; (2) Dewey’s was a logical approach whereas 
Schiller’s was a psychological approach; and (3) Dewey’s test was social while Schiller’s was individual.   The first 
clearly misconstrues what Schiller meant by both terms, blurring the distinction between a personalized worldview 
and a willingness to construct the social experiments necessary to test it.  The second is accurate to the extent that it 
holds to a division which Schiller sought to destroy, with the reconstructed result being that a logical end was 
always conditioned by some psychological (hence personal) valuation.   The third is the long-standing objection 
Schiller faced (even from James, though it pays to recall that James himself stated that they started at opposite ends 
yet arrived at the same middle point: that the nature of truth was relative to the interests of those that fashioned it).  
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And it would be surprising if not for a very simple fact: both men were, by training, 
philosophers.  As such, their thematic calls for a renewed appreciation of Schiller are qualified 
by the contours of what that training provided.  While it has already been discussed how both 
men chose to view Schiller’s forays into eugenics and psychical research as either minor 
diversions or non-philosophical interests, the focus here will be on how they interpret arguments 
that are decidedly philosophical. 
Abel’s 1955 The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller is the first comprehensive 
thematic statement of its kind.  It is also the first attempt to provide a bibliographic resource of 
Schiller’s and his commentators’ writings.  In it, Abel ranges over the entirety of Schiller’s 
philosophy—his logic, his views of science, metaphysics, religion, and his interest in psychical 
research and eugenics—to reach a two page summary of his credit to philosophy, put thusly: 
“The core of Schiller’s permanent contribution to philosophy is his emphasis on the creativity of 
human beings.”47  Readers will not be surprised to find this author in agreement with that 
                                                                                                                                                       
The actual disagreement, and it is one that extends to a discussion of James as well as Dewey, is to what extent there 
is an objective and subjective side to reality.   But it is in discussing this last distinction that White most clearly 
shows a bias to the established attitude regarding “philosophical” interests.  In a move that privileges Dewey while 
surprisingly relying on a psychological distinction between the introvert and extrovert types of personalities, White 
comments on “the great variety and multiplicity of Dewey’s writings and interests as over against Schiller’s fewer 
interests and writings” (White, “A Comparison,” 71; Winetrout makes critical note of this psychological explanation 
in Kenneth Winetrout, F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism [Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1967], 60-1).  That he references none of Schiller’s minor or major works on eugenics, nor his works on psychical 
research, goes to suggests that “variety” is taken in a restricted form. 
This analysis is not meant to suggest that White’s dissertation is not worthy of review.  This dissertation 
seems, though, to be an anomaly in his overall career.  White (1890-?), who also held a Bachelor of Divinity from 
Drew Theological Seminary (N.J.) and a Doctorate of Divinity from Olivet Nazarene College (Ill.), spent the 
remainder of his life on working in and publishing for the Church of the Nazarene, in 1945 becoming a professor of 
theology at the Nazarene Theological Seminary (MS.). 
 
47
 Reuben Abel, The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. S. Schiller (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1955), 
148.  It should be noted that, in the course of the book, Abel took exception to his own estimation.  Earlier on, he is 
found to exclaim that “Schiller’s treatment of logic is no doubt his most significant achievement” (Abel, The 
Pragmatic, 75).  Another first was his 1966 Humanistic Pragmatism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller, to this date 
the only English-language compilation of Schiller’s essays (from Mind!, Humanism, Studies in Humanism).  The 
general introductions, to the book and the sections, break little ground in Abel’s estimations of Schiller.  Though, 
again, he chooses to reframe the fundamental importance of Schiller’s philosophy: “The distinctive aspect of 
Schiller’s world view is his statement that ‘reality’ is plastic, incomplete, and piecemeal” (Reuben Abel, Humanistic 
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assessment.  But the road to that appreciative estimation is one that keeps to the tended path.  
Abel’s assessments of Schiller’s logic are the most detailed.  But Abel tends to equivocate over 
several chapters as to how he should frame his arguments about the same.  The clearest instance 
of this sort of hedge is found in Abel’s estimation that Schiller did not understand the difference 
between analytic and synthetic statements.  As an example of the first he offers the simple 
mathematic equation “two plus two equals four”; of the second he offers “man is a featherless 
biped.” 48  My response is blunt: Schiller did not misunderstand these distinctions.  Rather, he 
failed to see the utility of any statement that was not subject to the test of experience.  So when 
Abel goes on to suggest that “Schiller failed to realize that pure probability propositions are 
susceptible of formal statement, and can be demonstrated as thoroughly as any other proposition 
in pure mathematics,”49 an interesting form of conversion is occurring.  Schiller’s argument 
against pure/a priori/formal statements is turned into a failure to recognize the same.50 
                                                                                                                                                       
Pragmatism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller [New York: Free Press, 1966], 37).  It should be noted, however, 
when Abel quotes Dewey, in a letter to James, as feeling that he was closer to Schiller—“in his later writings”—as 
regards a theory of truth, that: (1) the actual letter is from 1907, and (2) the full text of the letter is more indicative of 
the uncertainty that Dewey felt regarding the variations of pragmatism at play at that time (Abel, Humanistic, 152; 
see the full letter in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, vol. 2 [Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1935], 528-9).  The slightest of changes can be seen, though, in Abel’s estimation of 
psychical research.  In the first he makes the argument that it is unfortunate that Schiller “did not take any interest” 
in psychoanalysis, though the truth is that his few comments regarding it were critical and dismissive (Abel, The 
Pragmatic, 141).  In the second he is instead inclined to suggest that “it is in the realm of religious philosophy that 
Pragmatism probably scores its greatest success” (Abel, Humanistic, 255).  In both he thankfully acknowledges that, 
though always on the outskirts of accepted study, Schiller could count as allies in said study a slew of respected 
thinkers. 
 
48
 In keeping with my promise to tread cautiously, I am going to keep to Abel’s definitions and put aside 
the issue of whether or not he, or Schiller, provides the “right” conception of terms.  The issue at hand is how well 
Abel holds to a discussion of what he understands Schiller to mean.  For Abel, a synthetic statement “has meaning 
only in terms of matter of fact”; an analytic statement is one that “has meaning independently of matter of fact” 
(Abel, The Pragmatic, 77). 
 
49
 Abel, The Pragmatic, 88. 
 
50
 The interesting thing is that Abel actually states a version of my complaint as against Schiller only pages 
earlier regarding mathematics: “He believes that it originates in the same type of need, functions for the same type 
of purpose, and is subject to the same type of verification by experience” (Abel, The Pragmatic, 79).  Further 
clarification of my position comes from two essays that Abel did not reference in his evaluation of Schiller’s logic.  
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Another version of disciplinary mypoia occurs in Allan Edwin Shields’s unpublished 
1951 USC dissertation, “An Exposition and Critique of Humanistic Voluntarism: The 
Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937).”  Though ranging over a variety of components of 
Schiller’s philosophy, by far the most space is dedicated to a discussion of Schiller’s logic as it 
was put forth in numerous essays (many of which have already been discussed) and his books 
Formal Logic and Logic for Use.  And it is on the basis of these writings that Shields grounds 
many, though not all, of his conclusions.51  His assessment as to “whether or not Humanistic 
                                                                                                                                                       
These essays are justified for inclusion in that they directly relate to other components of Abel’s analysis: (1) Kant, 
and (2) symbolic logic.  In offering his definition of an analytic statement, Abel makes a curious statement: “Kant, 
of course, thought that ‘7+5=12’ was a synthetic rather than analytic statement.  However, Schiller refers explicitly 
to this view of Kant’s only casually (in Logic for Use, p. 433) and does not realize that the human operation of 
counting logically presupposes the number system” (Abel, The Pragmatic, 162, n. 10).  But Schiller had commented 
that Kant’s categories were an attempt to logically prove relations that Hume had already taken as impossible, to 
show “that subjective additions to the given were not confined to the causal postulate.” But this, claims Schiller, is 
the most damning component of Kant’s plan, a sort of etymological alchemy: 
To all this epistemological machinery he gave a perverse, obscure, misleading and ambiguous name, ‘the a 
priori.’  Until Kant an a priori argument had meant one that argued from cause to effect, and the apparently 
non-empirical factor in knowledge had been credited to the ‘innate idea.’  True, there had been some 
confusion as to how such ideas were inborn; but this confusion was only aggravated by Kant.  The a priori 
became the central mystery of his system.  It claimed to be logical, not chronological; but the 
Transcendental Aesthetic is full of passages which make no sense unless ‘priority’ is understood as 
temporal. 
So, wonders Schiller, which is it?  Is the a priori the new “innate idea” or is it a logical conception “severed from all 
reference to the temporal order of events” (F. C. S. Schiller, “The Ultra-Gothic Kant,” Personalist 17, no. 4 [October 
1936]: 388-9)? 
In another place, he argues that Schiller “failed to realize . . . that he agreed with much that symbolic logic 
has done” as well as with the work of logical positivists and analytic philosophers (Abel, The Pragmatic, 86-7).  The 
previous chapter, particularly in the discussion of Stebbling, dovetails with the spirit of that assessment.  But my 
agreement is tempered by the fact that Schiller, even in later writings, was still questioning some of the very 
distinctions Abel wishes to honor.  In a response to Russell’s critique of empiricism, Schiller argues that he does not 
recognize “that for a ‘proposition’ to acquire any actual meaning it must be given relevance to some actual problem, 
and that until this has been done, it has neither truth nor falsity, simply because the question of meaning takes 
precedence over that of cognitive value” (F. C. S. Schiller, “Must Empiricism Be Limited?” Mind 45, no. 3 [July 
1936]: 304).  Both arguments support the argument that Schiller disagreed with, rather than misunderstood, the 
issues Abel raises. 
 
51
  It is important to note that Shields full well recognizes, though does not draw the implications from it 
that I do, the narrow range of his critical assessment.  In introducing his evaluation, Shields suggests: “There are, it 
seems, at least three standards that can be used for criticism of Humanistic Voluntarism; 1) Schiller’s, 2) some other 
philosophy’s, or 3) a combination of the two.”  He then adds that his evaluation will focus “only on those concepts 
which are of central importance” so as “to show the internal weakness of a philosophy” (Allan Shields, “An 
Exposition and Critique of Humanistic Voluntarism: The Philosophy of F. C. S. Schiller [1864-1937],” [Ph.D. diss., 
University of Southern California, June 1951], 225).  As will become apparent, this admission provides both for the 
benefits of his work and the limits of its conclusions. 
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Voluntarism was concealing an important logical theory, method, and approach to philosophy, or 
epistemology” is succinct: “that 1) Schiller’s criticism of formal logic missed the mark, 2) that 
his logic is not a logic, and 3) that there are other serious defects in his logical theory in 
particular and his philosophy in general.”52   
In this section we will entertain the first two, and return to the third a bit later.  Evidence 
for the first claim is found “in the fact that no formal logician (including Bradley) admitted to the 
relevancy of the criticism to his logic.”53  This contains a germ of truth that should by now be 
apparent to even the idlest reader.  Schiller’s polemic was often harsh, occasionally wrong, and 
at times seemingly clouded by personal disagreements.  Even so, that a person criticized chose 
not to grant the criticism seems wholly prejudicial to the one making the critique.54  But it leads 
into Shield’s explanation of his second point.  The crux of which is that a logic cannot be based 
in psychology because logic “is a formal body of principles which can be used but whose 
validity or sources is not dependent on such use, or the fact that we adopt the propositions of 
logic as premises in our reasoning.  Logic provides formulae.”55  One need not look far to see 
that Schiller explicitly dismisses this standard as the method by which to judge his logic.  In 
Schiller’s Logic for Use he asserts from the beginning “that Logic should be a theory of actual 
reasoning, and that a logic theory which cannot conceivably be applied to life and used in 
                                               
52
 Shields, “An Exposition,” 227-8. 
 
53
 Shields, “An Exposition,” 229. 
 
54
 The case of John E. Russell, and his discussions with James and Schiller in 1906 and 1907, seems to be a 
partial exception to Shields’s criteria (see Chapter Three).  There also remains the specter of Bradley.  Though he 
never claimed to have changed his positions per se, the debates detailed in Chapters Three and Four suggest 
otherwise.  While it would be wrong to attribute all of this change to Schiller, it is clear that the general onslaught of 
criticism was directed by pragmatists, like Schiller and James, and their allied contemporaries, such as Sturt, 
Sidgwick, and Knox. 
 
55
 Shields, “An Exposition,” 233. 
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scientific inquiry cannot be possibly right.”56  This, then, is an instance of Shields engaging in 
the same approach used by Abel: taking disagreement with the excepted protocols as an 
indication of misunderstanding them.   
The third sort of thematic inconsistency, like the previous ones, issues from an honest 
desire to assess a philosophical figure.  In contrast, however, it seeks to align a past position with 
a more recent one.  The strategy is familiar to anyone with an acquaintance of argumentation 
theory: in instances where a topic is unfamiliar, arguments from a known topic are advanced so 
as to provide a warrant by analogy.  But it should also be clear that this tactic works best when: 
(1) the unknown is viewed by the audience as relatively similar to the known quantity, and (2) 
the audience has a favorable perception of that quantity.  If not the first, then the audience will 
suspect the proponent of forcing the issue. If the first but not the second, the unknown will only 
taken on the negative perceptions engendered by the known. 
Winetrout, a professor of the philosophy of education, is primarily a popularizer.  He 
dedicated himself to writing variations of the same basic plaint in several journal essays in the 
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 F. C. S. Schiller, Logic for Use: An Introduction to the Voluntarist Theory of Knowledge (London: G. 
Bell and Sons, 1929), vi.   This, to be quite clear, exempts from register: (1) the relation of Schiller’s—not to 
mention Sidgwick’s, Knox’s, and Sturt’s—work to the development of what is now termed “informal” logic (for a 
reference to the work that Sidgwick and Schiller did in this regard, readers are directed to John Passmore, “Some 
Critics of Formal Logic,” in A Hundred Years of Philosophy, revised ed. [New York: Basic Books, 1966], 158-74), 
(2) a multiplicity of other pragmatist conceptions, such as the “reflective thinking method” as espoused by John 
Dewey in How We Think (1910).  It also sidesteps the fact that in Chapter Two, “The Definition of Logic,” Schiller 
specifically disagrees with Shields conception: “a Logic which repudiates psychology repudiates meaning, and 
lapses into nonsense” (Schiller, Logic, 23).  As before, my goal is not to champion Schiller or Shields over as 
against the others in matters of logic theory; rather, it is to show that the frame of references assumes, rather than 
proves, the warrant for each argument being made. 
Shields also refers to one of Schiller’s last essays on logic, “Multi-Valued Logics–and Others.”  The 
content of Schiller’s complaints is as clear here as it was six years previous. A useful logic substitutes “judgments 
for propositions as the subjects of logical discourse, frankly seeks the co-operation of psychology and is willing to 
be a handmaid to the sciences.”  It asserts that accepted truths, prized by the logics of antiquity and Idealism, are no 
more than conditional valuation.  And, in a sign of humorous indignity at the continued advance of symbolic logic, 
Schiller suggests that even our most basic needs can’t be reduced to mathematic symbols: “If we take the certainty 
that ‘eggs are eggs’ as an a priori warrant of the quality of our breakfast eggs, we court disappointment” (F. C. S. 
Schiller, “Multi-Valued Logics–and Others,” Mind 44, no. 4 [October 1935]: 471; 482). 
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1950s and 1960s: Schiller deserves to be read more often.57  Whether analyzing Schiller’s open-
ended conception of truth, or suggesting the similarities found between him, Dewey, and 
James,58 Winetrout’s journal essays suggest a fascination with Schiller’s disappearance given his 
seminal role in promoting pragmatism.  In his 1966 book F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of 
Pragmatism, Winetrout also engages in a thematic analysis, though one that relies on a 
comparative study of Schiller’s and other pragmatists’ philosophical views.  This book continues 
his plea for a renewed appreciation.  But this appeal is subject to several odd instances of 
oversight.  Some are rather trivial.59  But others suggest that Winetrout’s celebration of Schiller 
comes at the expense of Schiller’s actual role in promoting pragmatism.  In successive 
arguments, Winetrout shifts Schiller from attacking Idealism in Europe to being aligned with 
                                               
57
 The general reason that Winetrout offers for a renewed appreciation of Schiller seems a back-handed 
complaint about the then-current state of philosophy: “. . . we might turn to F. C. S. Schiller to help us in our time to 
develop ‘a philosophy which remains in touch with life, and strenuously participate in the solution of its problems” 
(Kenneth Winetrout, “F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937): Some Centennial Thoughts,” Personalist 45 [July 1964]: 314). 
 
58
 Even in these instances, Winetrout seems captivated—almost to the point of not recognizing that his keen 
interests are perhaps cause for other people’s irritation—by the way Schiller expresses his views.  While discussing 
Schiller’s conception of truth, there are a number of digressions such as: “Schiller’s pen is not a dry pen, a dull pen.  
There is fun in his books.  One source of delight is his comments on his fellow philosophers” (Kenneth Winetrout, 
“Aspects of F. C. S. Schiller’s Concept of Truth,” Educational Theory 6 [April 1956]: 106).  In discussing the 
relevance of Dewey, he concludes by saying: “this year’s Dewey centennial observations would have been a little 
more exciting, have more outsiders in attendance, if Schiller had not been so completely rejected by some now dead 
and some still living pragmatists. . . . He reads better and faster than Dewey—indeed, faster and better than almost 
anyone who bears the title of philosopher. . . . But it is not just his style.  Here also one can find the real meat of 
humanism, of pragmatism” (Kenneth Winetrout, “Must Pragmatists Disagree?  Dewey and Schiller,” Educational 
Theory 10 [January 1960]: 63).  It is only in discussing Schiller’s relationship to James that Winetrout seems to 
reach a qualified conclusion relating to Schiller’s fate: “it is not quite clear if his being more or less at odds with the 
philosophical fashion put him into eclipse, or if his state of near-oblivion is to be explained as the result of a 
deliberate boycott on the part of the Dewey segment of pragmatism” (Kenneth Winetrout, “William James and F. C. 
S. Schiller: An Essay in Honor of Schiller’s Centennial Year 1964,” Educational Theory 14 [July 1964]: 138). 
 
59
 For a person so willing to extend a frank admission of Schiller’s interest in eugenics, it is somewhat 
incredible that Winetrout would state: “Schiller had many ideas of reform that ranged from running eugenical baby 
shows to subsidizing members of parliament so they could propagate superior minds and bodies” (Winetrout, F. C. 
S., 45).  Readers to this point will recognize the latter statement as accurate.  But the former comment seems to be 
based on merely reading the title of Schiller’s 1917 “The Eugenics of ‘Baby Week’” correspondence in the Eugenics 
Review. 
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existentialism in America.60  The results are clear: by moving Schiller from his base of operation, 
Winetrout removes the distinctive nature of his place in pragmatism.  And, given that he is 
writing at a time when existentialism was eclipsed in mainstream Anglo-American circles by the 
social and analytical wings of philosophy, Winetrout incurs unfortunate, if unintended, results: 
robbed of that which made Schiller distinct, and placed within an American wing of philosophy 
suffering decline alongside pragmatism,61 Schiller is “twice removed” from any semblance of a 
place in a history which has already forgotten him.62 
In each of the four previous instances, Schiller’s work is framed in a thematic manner.  
Stack picks out Nietzschean nuances, Abel and Shields tend to focus on the logical components, 
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 This is particularly clear in his discussion of James and Schiller.  In the space of several pages, Winetrout 
shifts Schiller’s role quite explicitly.  First, he notes “Schiller was recognized by Peirce and especially by James as a 
progenitor and protector of pragmatism.”  Then, while signaling the individual/psychological dimensions of Schiller 
and James, Winetrout inserts this comment: “This existentialist dimension in pragmatic philosophy has been rather 
thoroughly buried.”  He furthers the blurring of social varieties of philosophy when he argues that his “point is that 
the existentialist, the personalist, and the individualist emphasis in early pragmatism gets buried beneath a persistent 
and comprehensive social consideration.”  The shift from pragmatism to existentialism is finalized: “the basic 
quality in existentialist philosophy is its holding that the particular is more significant than the universal.”  This after 
commenting only one paragraph prior: “Writing history is an all too open invitation to insert into the past that from 
the present which one would like to find there” (Winetrout, F. C. S., 22-5). 
 
61
 This shifting—from pragmatism to existentialism and back—reduces the ability to actually “place” 
Schiller within pragmatic history.   Winetrout returns to signaling the pluralistic tendencies of Schiller as extensions 
of James—aggressively so in passages on pages 85 and 94—and the subjectivist emphasis as against Dewey—in the 
whole of “Schiller’s Philosophy as Subjectivism”—but he then collapses Schiller back into the pragmatic fold as if 
unaware of the disjunction, as a matter of mere placement or actual chronology, that results: “. . . the ready 
willingness in James, Dewey, Mead, Schiller and sometimes in Pierce, to treat big, thrilling problems that gave early 
pragmatism both a warmth and a vigor that is all too often missing in philosophy” (Winetrout, F. C. S.,145).  What 
is striking is that Winetrout then engages in a switchback that actually suggests the problem he is exacerbating.  He 
remains surprised that “Schiller’s niche in the 1960’s is scarcely more than an urn holding forgotten ceremonial 
ashes” (Winetrout, F. C. S., 146).  If so, and here I full well agree, how likely is this sort of encomium to change 
things when he follows this up by suggesting, and note the final merger that occurs, this: “The hard core of 
existentialism (or to use a term more correct historically in the present context, personalism) in James and Schiller 
was buried beneath indifference to personalism by those who thought themselves followers of John Dewey 
(Winetrout, F. C. S., 159). 
 
62
 Oddly enough, the only response I can find to this book paradoxically supports the types of philosophy 
that Winetrout dismisses and my own suspicions as to its effectiveness.  Foster McMurray notes that Winetrout 
argues that “philosophy tends to be either of two different kinds of interest or content, such that a choice of one 
means having little or no commerce with the other” (Foster McMurray, review of F. C. S. Schiller and the 
Dimensions of Pragmatism, by Kenneth Winetrout, Studies in Philosophy and Education 7, no. 4 [Fall 1972]: 370).  
Winetrout’s by turns funny and candid reply directly follows: “Reply to Foster McMurray,” Studies in Philosophy 
and Education 7, no. 4 (Fall 1972): 379-82. 
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and Winetrout highlights the relevance of individualistic/subjective aspects of Schiller’s work.  
The former takes a largely critical view based on specific aspects of Schiller’s philosophy; the 
latter three reach more positive assessments.  What is missing in each of these is the wider scope 
of Schiller’s philosophy.   This scope is hinted at by way of the introductory epigrams, all of 
which were sketched prior to 1900.  There is only passing recognition that all of Schiller’s major 
scholarly pursuits were in place early in his career: his interest in psychical research dates back 
to the early 1880s, he began writing on eugenics in the 1890s, and the fundamental complaints 
against formal logic were in view by the early 1900s.63   They developed alongside, and 
interacted with, each other.  His interest in psychical research can be seen as a fringe 
preoccupation; but Schiller took it to provide a potential rapprochement between religion and 
science.  His interest in eugenics may be viewed as non-philosophical; but Schiller urged it as an 
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 For psychical research, see Chapter Two: F. C. S. Schiller, “Record of a Séance,” 20 June 1884, 
Notebook #12, n.p., 1882-1896, Diary, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), Department of Special 
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; “New Members and 
Associates,” Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 1 (December 1884): 117; “Oxford Branch of the Society 
for Psychical Research,” Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 1 (May 1885): 375.  This interest in 
psychical research is tied to Schiller views of religion.  And that interrelation seems to have occupied Schiller’s 
thinking from early in life.  In 1900, a questionnaire was prepared by the British and American Societies for 
Psychical Research entitled “Human Sentiment with Regard to a Future Life.”  Schiller’s 1901 personal response to 
the questionnaire is informative: “[I have] always [felt] (i.e. from the age of 8 or so) there must be a fut. Life (reason 
IIc) if the universe was to be rational – though of course I cd not always have expressed it so clearly.”  IIc refers to 
his previous answer that it must exist because of “the cruelty + futility of the struggle if there is no future life.”  He 
explains that those feelings “are now, + have been from childhood, very much moulded by my philosophic 
opinions.”  Later, in the addendum relating to questions V. and VI., Schiller further elaborates: “I have doubted long 
+ intensely (15-30 roughly) whether the world was rational.  Nevertheless I have never seriously doubted the 
doctrine of immortality as far as I myself was concerned, having from the first (7 or 8) a deep seated feeling that my 
earthly existence was neither the beginning nor the end of my career. . . . The agonizing question therefore was 
never ‘Is there a fut. Life?’ but ‘Of what sort is it?’  ‘Is it better better worth living than the present?’  Hence I shd 
long have preferred extinction, if I could have believed it possible, + I shd like to know + intend to try to find out” 
(F. C. S. Schiller, “Personal response to the questionnaire of the Society for Psychical Research on human sentiment 
regarding a future life,” n.p., 1901, Manuscripts and Proofs of Misc. Items, Box Seven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers 
(Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, 
Los Angeles). 
For eugenics, one must rely on Schiller’s dating of his involvement.  In his note regarding the essay “Plato 
and Eugenics,” Schiller states: “It was written in the Long Vacation of 1899 . . .” (F. C. S. Schiller, Eugenics and 
Politics [London: Constable; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1926], 128).  For logic, see Chapter Three: F. C. S. Schiller, 
“Axioms as Postulates,” in Personal Idealism, ed. Henry Sturt (London: Macmillan and Co., 1902).  An argument 
can also be made that the fundamental components of his general philosophical position are found in Chapter Two: 
Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1891); “Lotze’s 
Monism,” Philosophical Review 5, no. 3 (May 1896): 225-245. 
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applied test of his philosophy.  His suspicion that a logic for use was psychological at base can 
be viewed as an irrational fear of the formal; but Schiller understood the form of a statement to 
be predicated on valuations.   
These sorts of interpretations are downplayed in the previous discussions for a variety of 
reasons.  Chief among them is the nature of their design.  Thematic treatments, especially those 
issuing from field-specific interests, tend to obscure the larger picture.  In that way they helped to 
subtly advance the history told by the philosophers in the first section.  An adversarial expose 
from outside the pragmatic fold is as good as a caustic dismissal from within.  A sympathetic 
treatment that is based on the conventions that were being questioned is less likely to question 
those conventions.  A revisionist picture meant to restore one’s place in the canon may actually 
do further damage to that figure’s position in history.  This is not to suggest that each of their 
arguments don’t merit consideration or that this rhetorical biography does not run, in being less 
field specific, similar risks.  Rather, it is to suggest that their observations can’t be taken as the 
sole or even primary reason that Schiller fell so quickly from the scene.  There is, however, one 
aspect common to all their observations which gives way to the revised assessment that is about 
to be offered: Schiller’s style.   
In the introduction it was suggested that style was being conceived of as both a process of 
constructing discourse and as a recognition of how discourse is accepted once constructed.64   In 
this section the focus is on how the former implicates the latter.  Clearly the pragmatic histories 
in the previous section suggest the erasure of Schiller.  But even here, in four specific attempts to 
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 The two components again suggest that style operates as “an analytical category for understanding a 
social reality” (Robert Hariman, Political Style: The Artistry of Power [Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995], 9).  
But that understanding is predicated on how the social reality is constructed.  This conception of style operates, then, 
as a matter of both ethos and pathos.  In crafting an argument one wishes an audience to view the world and the 
rhetor in a certain way.  How that message is received implicates how an audience views the world and the rhetor. 
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reinsert Schiller into the philosophical discussion, it is obvious that the construction of his 
arguments has been emphasized in attempting to interpret his philosophy.  Whether promoting 
cobbled together Nietzsche, or misinterpreting logic, or being aligned with fading existentialism, 
all four augur that his manner of philosophizing: (1) brings Schiller to the attention of his peers, 
(2) leads to their interest in his work, and (3) demands the consideration of others.65  Could it be 
the case that his philosophical persona is the more salient fact in his rise and then fall?66   That it 
is not any one component of his philosophy, but the manner in which they were held together?  
Recall that I suggested we would return to the third conclusion that Shields reached: that 
there are serious defects in Schiller’s logic and his philosophy in general.    In explaining this 
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 I wager that some readers will view my assertion as more in keeping with those (Abel, Winetrout, and to 
a lesser extent Shields) who wish to promote renewed interest in Schiller.  But Stack, who clearly wishes to defame 
Schiller as a plagiarizer of Nietzsche, also fits my thesis.  Stack provides this assessment of Schiller’s reception 
while in at Oxford:  “His vitriolic attacks on Bradley, as well as his undiplomatic manner and attitude, made him an 
object of dislike at Oxford.  Before the pragmatic movement gave sanction to his thought, and before he became part 
of it, Schiller was not taken too seriously and was considered as a clever literary gadfly.  However his flair for 
philosophical polemic earned him a reputation as an enfant terrible” (Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 370).    But, at least as 
Stack tells it, Schiller began importing Nietzsche into his works as early as Riddles of the Sphinx (1891): “To be 
sure, he had modified Nietzschean themes, has couched Nietzsche’s assertions in his own rhetorical style . . .” 
(Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 399).  He suggests that all this was for naught, as Schiller was “overshadowed by James and 
Dewey and relegated to a minor role in the drama of pragmatism” (Stack, “Nietzsche’s,” 372).  If all three of these 
are the case, why then this concluding observation: “Much of what Peirce, James, and Dewey found stimulating, 
provocative, insightful, and challenging in Schiller’s writings was derived from the thought of Nietzsche.  If my 
analysis . . . is valid, then the history of the pragmatic movement in philosophy must be rethought or revised” (Stack, 
“Nietzsche’s,” 406).  The portrait is a confused one: 
(1) Schiller is a clever literary gadfly who, prior to finding pragmatism, was 
(2) providing a rhetorically stylized and plagiarized version of Nietzsche that was 
(3) overshadowed by his peers, even though 
(4) it was sufficiently integrated into their arguments to demand a rethinking of pragmatism. 
My minor point is that this thematic treatment clearly exposes problems that can be resolved in a chronological one.  
Many of Stack’s contentions—which were previously discussed in some detail—devolve under the scrutiny that a 
thorough-going historical treatment can offer.  My major point is that, for all his inconsistency, Stack focuses on 
Schiller’s reception as demonstrated by his style of presentation.  Critical as he is of Schiller’s arguments, his focus 
remains largely on the rhetorical forms they take. 
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 Searles, who co-authored Schiller’s bibliography with Shields, also reaches similar conclusions in two 
articles he published in the 1950s.  In the first, he opines: “Just as James had been misunderstood because of his 
brilliant, concrete and dynamic vocabulary . . . Schiller had to contend with his critic’s misunderstandings of his 
volitionally toned vocabulary” (Herbert L. Searles, “Pragmatism Today,” Personalist 32 [1951]: 148).  In the 
second, he concludes in Schiller’s favor in one specific way as regards history’s judgment: “As a writer of 
philosophical prose, I think it has already been decided in his favor” (Herbert L. Searles, “The Philosophy of F. C. S. 
Schiller,” Personalist 35 [1954]: 24). 
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position, Shields goes on to point to the “subjectivist” components of Schiller’s philosophy as a 
key factor in this assessment.  Then he inserts this comment: “Schiller’s essential method of 
procedure is persuasion and not conviction.”67  That a method focused on “definite formulae” 
would find this off-putting is understandable.  That it begs consideration when the focus is on the 
rhetorical, and stylistic, aspects of Schiller’s philosophy is also clear.  But Shields supplies more.  
Only pages earlier Shields had noted Schiller’s most important contributions to pragmatism and 
philosophy: 
Schiller’s primary contributions lay not so much in the positive effect his logical theory 
had, as in the negative effect of his criticism of the idealists of formal logic, and of the 
generally stuffy atmosphere which was prevalent at the turn of century in England and on 
the continent.  His was a yeoman’s labor in controversy with some of the top 
philosophers who were, so to speak, held over from the previous era . . . More than this, 
Schiller was widely read as a popular philosopher.  No doubt this was largely due to his 
literary style, rather than his Humanist philosophy.  But perhaps most important, it was in 
no small measure due to Schiller’s propaganda that William James, and hence, 
Pragmatism, became, for a period of over ten years, one of the most discussed 
philosophies in both England and America. 68  
 
There is much to consider in the transition between assessments.  On the one hand, Schiller is 
faulted for adopting an approach that stressed winning converts to pragmatism’s fold.  On the 
other, he is credited for both combating Idealism and bringing pragmatism to the attention of 
America and Europe.  His larger impact, his “popular” side, was due to his style more than his 
philosophy.  
This stylized, individualistic, approach sought to lay low the older forms to make way for 
the new theories.  And it developed, as was put forth at the start of this section, in the context of 
his European surroundings.  John Passmore notes the adversarial nature of this style: 
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 Shields, “An Exposition,” 236.  As evidence of this contention, Shields points to a surprising source: 
Schiller’s debates with J. Russell!  The fact that this person was eventually moved to the pragmatist side seems, 
though a small victory, counter-intuitive as support for defect. 
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 Shields, “An Exposition,” 226-7. 
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Schiller’s main work . . . was his lively defence of the pragmatic theory of truth.  Himself 
an Oxford man, he was in revolt against the smugness and rigidity which, to his 
apprehension, Oxford encouraged and even extolled.  His very style was a protest, the 
flippancy of his manner and the violence of his polemics induced even James to advise 
him to pay more attention to the academic proprieties.69 
 
Such a reactive style is not likely to engender lukewarm reactions.  On the positive side, 
Flewelling comments that such polemics ruptured the “insularity of British philosophy.”70  
Schiller is thus “an iconoclast who took pleasure in the smashing of some very respectable 
fetishes, but he was more than that.  He had the power so seldom possessed by idol-smashers, of 
putting something better in the place of the idol.”71  On the negative side, Schiller’s pleasure is 
turned into a perversity.  McKie suggests that Schiller betrayed “a certain obstinacy in 
discussion, which an ungenerous critic might ascribe to a willful, even if only partial, blindness 
to the other fellow’s point of view.”  This defect was coupled with a “perversity of style, not 
fairly describable, perhaps, either as a love of paradox or as a disregard for precise expression, 
but capable of looking like both.”72  In both cases, the assessments are not a matter of specific 
theories nor arguments; the evaluations are directed to the elements of Schiller’s style.  What 
remains to be seen is the degree to which style factors into Schiller’s placement in the history of 
pragmatism.   
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 Passmore, “Pragmatism and its European Analogues,” in A Hundred, 115.  Wilbur Long’s comments 
regarding Schiller form an effective supplement to Passmore.  He notes that Schiller claimed his polemic attacks 
were the result of “the climate of the time.”  He also notes that Schiller was “better as a polemical critic than as a 
constructive and systematic mind.”  And he implies that those stylistic traits, harnessed to the context of the time, 
were at play in reducing Schiller’s importance: “I considered Schiller a brilliant mind, amazingly informed and keen 
in debate, whose merits have been unusually discounted by posterity. . . . Much of what he fought for has become 
the common belief in our age, but he has received no credit for it” (in Shields, “Some Impressions,” 292-3). 
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 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, “F. C. S. Schiller: An Appreciation,” Personalist 19, no. 1 (January 1938): 6. 
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 Flewelling, “F. C. S.,” 8. 
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 J. I. McKie, “Dr. F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937),” Mind 47, no. 185 (January 1938): 137. 
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8.3 ALL THAT IT CAN BE: REPETITION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN 
PRAGMATIST HISTORY 
The answers to the three research questions are made easier by reference to the above 
discussion of style.  The focus throughout has been on Schiller’s reception during his life.  It is 
only in the conclusion that we have turned to his reception thereafter.  But in both, in his 
squabbles with idealists and obfuscation at the hands of pragmatists, the style of Schiller’s 
pragmatic humanism has remained paramount: the development of his ideas, the venues in which 
they were discussed, and the reactions they engendered.  Such details go a long way in validating 
this project.  But a biography is only rhetorical in so far as it helps to establish “what is not 
already articulated in our current thinking.”73  That is to say, this project is predicated on 
persuading interested readers that Schiller remains relevant; it is not aimed at convincing critics 
that he was always right.74  The final portion of this study is, then, both a presentation of results 
and a suggestion of their consequences.   
8.3.1 Why was Schiller so vigorously discussed in his time?   
Schiller was such a central figure during the foundational years of pragmatism for both positive 
and negative reasons.  Both relate to a species of style referenced in the introduction: repetition.  
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 Edward Schiappa, “Isocrates’ Philosophia and Contemporary Pragmatism,” in Rhetoric, Sophistry, and 
Pragmatism, ed. Steven Mailloux (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 32. 
 
74
 The thrust of this point is made clear by reference to Kloppenberg’s comments at the close of Chapter 
One: “Just as people in the past selected parts of their experience to record and preserve in the records that they left 
us, we select parts of the past to examine and we choose how to tell our stories.  But to admit that interpretation is 
important is not to claim that everything is interpretation.  It is crucial that we historians be able to distinguish what 
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propositions in the widest range of public forums” (James T. Kloppenberg, “An Old Name for New Thinking?” in 
The Revival of Pragmatism, ed. Morris Dickstein [Durham: Duke University Press, 1998], 116). 
 
  542 
Recall that repetition, like style, is traditionally conceived of from within the parameters of a set 
speech or text.75  Here, however, the assumed domain has been far larger: the entirety of 
Schiller’s philosophical career.  This expansion has been warranted on several grounds.  First, 
the stylistic elements of Schiller’s arguments have been in place since his time at Cornell.  From 
the jottings in his notebooks which mocked the Broad Church Idealists,76 to the indignation 
expressed to Alfred Godley regarding a negative review of his contribution to Erdmann’s History 
of Philosophy,77 to his squabble with W. J. Wright about Lotze’s Monism,78 Schiller was already 
establishing the polemic which he then turned to a defense of pragmatism and humanism.  
Second, it has also been noted that his chief interests were also in place around this time.  Third, 
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 This is certainly the case in the classical treatments.  As Cicero states:  “For there is sometimes force and 
in other cases charm in iteration of words, in slightly changing and altering a word, and in sometimes repeating the 
same word several times at the beginning of clauses and sometimes repeating the same word several times at their 
end” (Cicero De Oratore III, Loeb Classical Library, p. 165).  George Campbell takes this further in suggesting the 
connection of this force to persuasion: “Passion naturally dwells on its object: the impassioned speaker always 
attempts to rise in expression; but when that is impracticable, he recurs to repetition and synonymy, and thereby in 
some measure produces the same effect.  The hearer perceiving him, as it were, overpowered by his subject, and at a 
loss to find words adequate to the strength of his feelings, is by sympathy carried away with him, and enters into all 
his sentiments” (George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, book III [Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1963], 340). 
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and as yet not noted, the two taken together saw little substantial retreat throughout the 
remainder of his career.  Thus Schiller provides a perfect case study of how both style and 
repetition are merged in the construction and reception of discourse. 
The positive aspects of Schiller’s stylistic repetition should be obvious.  As was noted in 
the introduction, repetition (repetitio) is used to: (1) clarify positions, (2) emphasize their 
importance, and (3) to arouse an emotional response.  When turned to the causes of pragmatism 
and humanism, “dwelling on the point” (commoratio) of the challenge to the established tenets 
of Absolute Idealism was not only useful, it was necessary if pragmatists hoped to gain adherents 
(1 and 2).  At the same time, Schiller saw the need to extend pragmatism’s and humanism’s 
range.  So he turned to psychical research, eugenics, and logic.  This “working out” (exergasia) 
of the applications of the new philosophy was meant also to broaden its appeal (3).79   This is in 
part the “popular” side of his philosophy that Shields referenced.  And it is attested to in many 
reviews that his books received in the non-philosophical press.  While not always glowing, there 
are numerous notices that praise Schiller, as a philosopher, for seeking to interact with a larger 
public.80  Simply put, in the formative years of pragmatism, its promotion—whether 
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 Taking a cue from the singular instances referenced in the classical texts, repetition serves to 
motivate/persuade audiences that a concept is worth considering and acting upon.  But, by way of amplification, 
repetition also serves to increase the sense that the concept is large enough to engender those changes in thought and 
action: “Repetition may be resorted to . . . when the object is to deepen the impression, and the magnitude of the 
theme will justify it.”  By what route?  The goal is “to seize upon the most prominent thought and hold attention 
upon it a long time” (E. O. Haven, Rhetoric: A Textbook [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1873], 210-11). 
This “working out” is also what initially drew other European philosophers to pragmatism, where 
pragmatism was understood, aside from the variation being developed in France, as the creation of James and 
Schiller more than Peirce and James.  The Italian Papini, acknowledging Schiller’s debt to James, was lead to say: 
“In the sleepy world of modern philosophy F. C. S. Schiller stands for an idea which is very simple, and has for that 
very reason been long forgotten: the idea that theories should lead to practical results” (Giovanni Papini, “F. C. S. 
Schiller,” in Four and Twenty Minds, trans. by Ernest Hatch Wilkins [New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell, 1922], 62). 
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1904, Newspaper and Magazine Clippings, 1904, Box Fourteen, F. C. S. Schiller Papers (Collection 191), 
Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles; 
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psychological or social—was crucial to its survival as a legitimate counter to the Idealist strains 
of philosophy found in both England and America. 
So, too, should the negative aspects of this repetition be visible.  The very aspects of 
repetition that gained Schiller an initial measure of acclaim, came to grate on his reputation.    
Once James had died, the psychological wing of pragmatism was stunted.  The social and logical 
wings of pragmatism experienced continued growth in the works of Dewey and Mead, and then 
figures such as Perry and Morris.  Aside from a few supporters, such as Knox and Murray, 
Schiller was left to defend his conception of the Jamesian line of pragmatism in the form of 
humanism.  Schiller was still discussed because he continued to discuss, to debate, and to defend 
his claim to the pragmatic pedigree.  But the repetition, like his stature, underwent a 
transformation.  Claims once found to be novel challenges now took on an aspect of tedium 
(“like speech”; homiologia), the refreshing tonic against logic began to seem tiresome (“the same 
saying”; tautologia).   The very tendency which earned Schiller a measure of success as a 
popularizer gained him an equal dose of disdain from those who would determine his place in 
pragmatism’s history; that is to say, his intellectual public, other philosophers.  Recall that 
Waterlow lambasted Schiller’s “self-conscious swagger,” his use of language that “is uniformly 
flabby and pretentious, and constantly disfigured by cheap flowers of sentimental rhetoric.”81   
The amplification of a “will to believe” and a “right to postulate” came to be seen, like the 
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commonplace disparagement of style, as mere repetition (“upon, to remain”; epimone).82  And 
later attempts to seek some degree of reconciliation—a willingness to again consider 
metaphysics, an attempt to provide a suggestion of Idealism’s worth83—looked like a stumbling 
retreat. 
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 Recall again that Morris all but stated that Schiller had become outdated.  He claimed that Schiller’s 
Jamesian wing of pragmatism was in danger of becoming “of historical interest only, or merely an intellectual 
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83
 The four part posthumous series in the Personalist is ample demonstration of this point.  Read against a 
later essay offered by Bradley, they provide startling similar—in tone not theory—examples of two philosophical 
greats both reasserting and retreating.  See F. C. S. Schiller, “The Personalistic Implications of Humanism.  I. 
Humanisms and Humanism,” Personalist 18, no. 4 (October 1937): 352-68; F. C. S. Schiller, “The Personalistic 
Implications of Humanism.  II. Logic: A Game, or an Agent of Value,” Personalist 19, no. 1 (January 1938): 16-31; 
F. C. S. Schiller, “The Personalistic Implications of Humanism.  III. Ethics, Casuistry and Life,” Personalist 19, no. 
2 (April 1938): 164-78; F. C. S. Schiller, “The Personalistic Implications of Humanism.  IV. The Relativity of 
Metaphysics,” Personalist 19, no. 3 (July 1938): 241-54.  For a reference to the Bradley essay demonstrating 
comparative aspects, see F. H. Bradley, “On Appearance, Error, and Contradiction,” Mind 19, no. 74 (April 1910): 
153-85. 
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8.3.2 Why is he now so obviously not discussed?  
In the introduction, I put forth a hypothesis central to this answer.  It was that Schiller being alive 
constituted the single most important reason he is now neglected, that he was able to manage and 
massage his message.  The facts of this project amend that estimation.  In 1906, Sturt made this 
comment: 
There is an extreme form of Voluntarism which is not content that man should bear part 
in moulding in his world, but would have him create it altogether.  This Fitchean line of 
thought we find implied, I believe in Mr. Canning Schiller.  If it be so, my comment once 
more must be that a good tendency has overreached itself.  The power of man, at least, 
has always the limitation that it cannot create something out of nothing.84 
 
Sturt’s comments are suggestive of a theme that reoccurs in Schiller’s writings: personality.  
Taken narrowly, the concept implicates Schiller’s deeply held belief—bolstered by the 
philosophical and psychological suggestions of James—in the volitional power of humans to 
bend the world to their will.  This is a conceptualization from which Schiller did not sway even 
as it was considered antiquated prior to his passing.  But, considered more expansively, it also 
implicates the issues of reception brought forth in answering the previous question.  In involves, 
on the one hand, the actual personalities entrusted to write pragmatism’s history after Schiller’s 
death.  Given the social realities of the time, with pragmatism considered naïve and analytic 
philosophy on the rise, a “will to believe” lacked the requisite objectivity and rigor of method.  
On the other hand, it relates to Schiller’s style and how he, as a persona, was construed once he 
could no longer respond.85  Bluntly stated, to polemically accuse the new generation of 
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philosophers of being slavish sheep and/or fanciers of a new formalism is unlikely to be repaid 
with kind mention once the body has cooled.  
As has been amply pointed out, Schiller spent the latter portion of his career doing two 
things: (1) defending his conception of Jamesian pragmatism, and (2) reiterating the components 
of his humanism.86  The second is inextricably linked to the first.  This fact is pointed out in 
Dewey’s tribute to Schiller three months after his death. While Dewey praised Schiller for his 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hegelian (see Chapter Two: James Ellis McTaggart, “The Changes of Method in Hegel’s Dialectic,” Mind 1, no. 1 
(January 1892): 56-71; James Ellis McTaggart, “Time and the Hegelian Dialectic. (I.),” Mind 2, no. 8 (October 
1893): 490-504; James Ellis McTaggart, “Time and the Hegelian Dialectic. (II.),” Mind 3, no. 10 (April 1894): 190-
207; F. C. S.  Schiller, “The Metaphysics of the Time-Process,” Mind 4, no. 13 (January 1895): 36-46.  One of his 
last reviews focuses on McTaggart’s career.  What is interesting is the way in which Schiller frames McTaggart’s 
personality, the way in which it can be read as a mirror of Schiller’s career: the former an idealist and the latter a 
pragmatist; the one dedicated to the speculative, the other to the practical; the first an atheist, the latter a believer in 
immortality.  But note Schiller’s speculations.  While at school, “[McTaggart’s] most public and essential function 
was that of school atheist . . . the spiritual function of the school atheist was that of being kicked.”  So strong was 
that function, that he carried it with him into his professional career, that attitude of outsider even within his 
varied—idealist, Hegelian, monist, partial personalist—circle of peers.  But then, buried amidst what is largely an 
encomium, Schiller offers this comment: without the great a priori truths to believe in, McTaggart’s “conclusions 
usually antedated his premises.”  The resulting philosophy thus held to the whims of his personal interests, 
regardless the larger currents in philosophy (F. C. S. Schiller, review of Philosophical Studies, by J. M. E. 
McTaggart; Die Philosophischen Stroemungen Der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien, vol. 1, by Rudolph Metz; and 
Value and Reality in Bradley’s Philosophy, by Torgny Segerstedt, Personalist 16, no. 3 [July 1935]: 273; 274).  
Though it is only conjecture, I assert that Schiller’s grudging respect for this family friend centers on similarities 
even he perhaps failed to note. 
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Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine, 2d ed. [New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1898], 66-7; for a 
more detailed discussion of Riddles and James’s psychological theories readers are directed to Chapter Two; as 
regards radical empiricism one is directed to Chapter Three). 
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assault on the teaching of logic in Britain, he also provided an argument as to why Schiller was 
to be cleaved from the canon.  He notes Schiller’s attraction to James.  But Dewey then goes on 
to put forth an argument that implicates Schiller’s dismissal, a la Morris.  He comments that 
Schiller claimed that a work should gladly suffer its own provisionality by proving itself out of 
existence.  Dewey grants that point as regards Schiller’s “dominantly psychological” approach to 
philosophy and an approach to logic stamped with “mentalism and subjectivism.”87  The tribute 
is an interesting one: Schiller’s assault on logic proved largely correct but that which sprung up 
in its place was not to his liking.  
Nor was the James that developed after Schiller’s death likely to have met with his 
approval.   The primary instigator of this revised James was Perry.88  Others have commented on 
the fact that Perry’s James was tailored to be a version that led fluidly into Perry’s New 
Realism.89  What has been ignored is how subtly the specter of Schiller was dissipated.  Indeed, 
it is easy to miss what Perry leaves out.  Consider his introduction the 1947 edition of Essays in 
Radical Empiricism; A Pluralistic Universe.  In the preface he makes note of the changes 
undertaken: “Four essays which appeared in the earlier edition of Essays in Radical Empiricism 
are here omitted—IX, X, and XI because they are primarily controversial in nature, and XII 
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viii). 
 
89
 “[Perry’s] writing on James suffered because they tried to show that James was a metaphysical realist.  
The reason for this misinterpretation was that, for Perry, parts of James’s greatness lay in his ‘anticipation’ of Perry 
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Absolute Idealism” (Kuklick, The Rise, 340).  One can find no clearer reference to the challenge Perry faced in 
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because it dates from earlier years before the doctrine of Radical Empiricism had been 
matured.”90  But consider the titles of the first two or the last one: “Is Radical Empiricism 
Solipsistic?,” Humanism and the Truth Once More,” and “Absolutism and Empiricism.”  Each of 
these essays correspond to ones that Schiller wrote around the same time regarding the same 
topics.91   Brothers-in-arms are, in Perry’s masterful hands, held at arm’s length.   
Consider also his introduction to a new 1948 edition of Psychology.   He praises the work 
thusly:  “Like the physiologist who refuses to reduce the living organism to the terms of 
chemistry, James refused to reduce the peculiar functions and capacities of conscious mind to a 
mental chemistry.”92  Here the organizing spiritual component of consciousness, the one that 
tended towards discussions of psychical research and immortality, is erased.  In its place is the 
analogy to the scientist, to a search within the objective realm for factors which do not render the 
human purely mechanical.   The shift is away from controversy and towards synthesis, a retreat 
from the subjective towards the objective end of psychology.   It recalls the discussions of 
Shields and Abel, wherein the psychological and personalistic are not construed as another way, 
but as the wrong way. 
Wrong, also, according to the needs of the time.  Morton White and Winetrout may 
indeed be right that the 1930s were a time when the rise of formalism eclipsed the practical 
nature of pragmatism.  The next three decades were a time when pragmatism needed to be 
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distilled into a heady brew rising to meet the challenges brought on by the Cold War and the turn 
to analytic philosophy. The social histories worked hard to make American philosophy just that, 
American.  The resulting shift then tends to skew towards those that can be framed as American 
(recall the “existential” struggle of Winetrout) or reframed as an acceptable precursor (the 
traditional canon of British empiricism which James modified to suit his groundbreaking 
Psychology).   The good tale told well proved both useful and persuasive; contemporary 
accounts that recover the history of pragmatism retell the narrative put in place at this time.93 
Here again, though, we confront Schiller’s personality and style.  For, even supposing 
that the crafting of American pragmatism was (1) consciously done in response to (2) the 
realities of the time, Schiller is in no small measure to blame for his removal.    That which kept 
him in play while alive certainly contributed to the silence when he was dead.  Schiller’s writings 
are littered with breaches, humorous though they may be, of decorum.  And the consistency of 
his interests suggests that he disregarded the limitations of the “opportune moment” (kairos).94 
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In an odd twist, Schiller’s personality-driven humanism could not sustain itself once that 
personality was gone.  By the time of his death, Schiller was no longer the announcer of a new 
philosophy, but an annoyance to those carrying it forward.  Schiller—the idealist tinged dabbler 
in eugenics and psychical research—was as much a hard sell as a tough fit in this era where 
pragmatism struggled under the dismissive labels of optimistic and popular (as regards vulgar 
taste, not philosophical reception).  
8.3.3  How do the previous two questions interact; how might they relate to and enrich 
the study of pragmatism as a historical movement and a philosophical concept? 
To this point, his contemporary relevance has been only been posited enthymematically; that is 
to say, the object has been to understand Schiller in context of his arguments, not by the 
imposition of current issues.  But what he can offer to the current discussion of pragmatism is 
manifold.  On the most basic level, Schiller helps to more completely fill in the origin tale by 
virtue of the role he played.  After Peirce and before Dewey, Schiller served as one of the two 
primary linchpins of pragmatism.   His were the most consistent, and insistent, arguments against 
the formalism and abstraction prevalent in both British and American philosophy.  As against 
critics such as Lovejoy who desired for uniformity,95 Schiller championed a plurality of methods 
that might prove useful and, as such, pragmatic.  As against foes such as Bradley who would 
render the world mere appearance, Schiller urged for a world that waited merely for our 
                                                                                                                                                       
initial ground-clearing had been done to establish pragmatism (and humanism) as a proper object of consideration, 
many of his even potentially valid arguments were discounted.  When he challenged the depictions of James and 
Peirce being bandied about towards the end of his career, he often employed the tactic of referencing his firsthand 
knowledge of James’s philosophy (“again, to put in mind,” anamnesis).  But it backfired.  He was instead seen as 
trying to argue for his position, vainly repeating old arguments (battologia) rather than advancing new ones. 
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intercession on its behalf.  If not for such arguments, often biting and occasionally off-putting, 
the attention then displayed and scrutiny now paid to pragmatism might be far different.  Not that 
reading Schiller back in takes much effort when one considers where our interests and his meet.    
 At the intersection of both Philosophy and Rhetoric, Schiller’s exemplar Protagoras 
greets a renewed interest in the interaction between rhetoric and sophistry, the classical tension 
between the Actual and the Ideal as regards conceptions of truth.   Such interest can force a 
rather hard dichotomy: textual rigor versus imaginative interpretation.  A colorful example of 
this sort of debate occurs between Edward Schiappa and John Poulakos.   In the 1990 Philosophy 
and Rhetoric article “Neo-Sophistical Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of 
Sophistic Doctrines?,” Schiappa urges for a “historical reconstruction of sophistic doctrines.”96  
He does so by reference to an admittedly difficult sticking point: the term rhetoric does not 
appear in the works of the Sophists.  As such, Schiappa posits that the reconstruction proceed by 
examining the “incipient ‘rhetorical theories’” that were developed in individual Sophist’s extant 
texts.97  In the same issue, Poulakos points to a more interpretative view in “Interpreting 
Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa.”  He argues that a close-text approach locks the 
Sophists in amber of a suspect sort; he sees Schiappa’s approach as a celebration of the Sophists 
“after mummifying them by academically sanctioned methods.”98   But is this not the same sort 
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of quarrel into which Schiller stridently placed himself when he held up his imaginative 
Protagoras to the glare of the Greek scholar Burnet?99    
And the process of contesting and reclaiming the Sophists continues to the present day, 
and is furthered by references to pragmatism.  A more recent discussion of a specific Sophist, 
Gorgias, takes exception to the methods of both Schiappa and Poulakos.   In Gorgias: Sophist 
and Artist (2001), Scott Consigny takes an alternative view from a person not unfamiliar to 
current pragmatists, Stanley Fish.  He uses Fish’s “interpretative community” as the basis for 
establishing “the criteria for assessing any reading.”100  And Mailloux, in Reception Histories: 
Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and American Cultural Studies (1998), places, albeit incidentally, each of 
the above debates within the grooves of this very project when he comments: “As notable as the 
return of sophistic rhetoric, there has also been a significant renewal of American 
pragmatism.”101  Schiller, to my mind, stands as a provocative source of further discussion as 
scholars continue to parse out the relationship between Plato, Aristotle, those that came before, 
and those that came after.   
In the area of science, his work on the tentativeness of scientific discoveries aligns with 
work being done in the Rhetoric of Science/Inquiry, the Philosophy of Science, and the History 
of the Philosophy of Science.102  Rorty, for instance, bases many of his pragmatic arguments on 
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eliminating the dichotomy between the objective and subjective.  In his contribution to The 
Rhetoric of the Human Sciences (1987), “Science as Solidarity,” Rorty avers: “We need a way of 
explaining why the scientists are, and deserve to be, moral exemplars which does not depend on 
a distinction between objective fact and something softer, squishier, and more dubious.”103   In 
the same collection, Charles W. Anderson contributes “Human Sciences and the Liberal Polity in 
Rhetorical Relationship.”  He readily aligns pragmatism with liberal and democratic themes 
thought to adhere in conceptions of science and politics.  And, with Rorty, he bases his extensive 
analysis on refuting those who would “see the task of science and scholarship as putting an end 
to argument through the discovery rationally unassailable principles or empirically validated 
truths about the nature and destiny of man.”104  Schiller would likely add substance to Rorty’s 
call to remove the objective veil.   And, complicating matters, Schiller supplies a far earlier 
attack on ideas that, given Anderson’s concerns, have yet to be answered.105 
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  555 
There are also elements of Schiller’s arguments in support of eugenics that are still being 
considered.  I realize it may at first seem odious to suggest we revisit eugenics.  The history of 
intolerance promoted under than awning inspires well-deserved revulsion.  But such loathing can 
also inspire a rather hasty examination of the historical ledger.  In Chapter Five, Hasian’s The 
Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought (1996) and Condit’s The Meaning of the Gene 
(1999) were discussed as regards the discrepancy between popular support and numerical 
membership in various eugenics ventures.  Here, again, their work proves invaluable.  Hasian, in 
discussing the controversial issues raised by Human Genome Project, sounds a pessimistic 
alarm: “what we will have to deal with is a return visit by a revised form of eugenics that is just 
beginning to be critiqued.”106  Less ominously, though no less critically, Condit offers this 
observation as regards gene therapy: “Good bets can be placed on our eventually overcoming 
what appear now to be insurmountable obstacles to gene therapy.  However, the good bet also 
holds that they will not be overcome with a single magic bullet, but rather in fits and starts with 
techniques adapted to particular conditions and organs.”107   Schiller’s defense of eugenics was 
racist, sexist, classist, and based in flawed science.  But these and other contemporary and 
contentious debates on issues ranging from stem cell research to genetic engineering hold to 
variations on themes advanced by Schiller and others.108  Schiller may remain a historical 
                                                                                                                                                       
Times Book Review, 1 January 2006; Lawrence M. Krauss and Leonard Suskind, “In Praise of Physics,” letter to 
the editor, New York Times Book Review, 22 January 2006. 
 
106
 Marouf A. Hasian, “The Return of Eugenics: Ideographic Fragments and the Mythology of the Human 
Genome Project,” in The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1996), 157. 
 
107
 Celeste Michelle Condit, The Meaning of the Gene (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 
243. 
 
108
 Other smaller issues are now also discussed, albeit without the label of eugenics, as commonsensical.  In 
1930 Schiller suggested that the children of the wealthy need to be taught to value that wealth; as recently as 2005 
that very same issue, using similar arguments, was addressed in a local newspaper: F. C. S. Schiller, “Eugenical 
  556 
footnote; but his involvement in the discussions that lead to these contested scientific advances 
can add another important historical element: context.   
In the area of religion, Schiller’s belief in immortality, in a future life, may strike some as 
quaint holdovers of a Victorian sort.  But his willingness to explore what is taken on faith by a 
variety of religions suggests a wider view than his conservative Anglican upbringing would 
support.  What’s more, the connection of pragmatism to religion is a strong and varied one.  One 
need only look to a contemporary collection that explores the connections between pragmatism 
and religion to see its variety, but also Schiller’s potential for input.  In Pragmatism: From 
Progressivism to Postmodernism (1995), editors Robert Hollinger and David Depew hug to the 
well told narrative.109  Two essays, however, stand out as regards the connection between 
pragmatism and religion.  The first, Casey Nelson Blake’s “The Perils of Personality: Lewis 
Mumford and Politics after Liberalism,” provides for a comparative instance of exclusion.  
Mumford, it pays to recall, is the one dismissed by Mills for his understanding of pragmatism.  
Blake argues that Mumford, taking Herman Melville as his exemplar, confronted the emptiness 
of American liberalism and tried to find a way out of the resulting “inescapable sense of loss.”  
His answer was religion; but it was “a religion of culture . . . conceived as [an] inherently 
dynamic, self-critical, and self-limiting form of human endeavor.”110  An earlier scholar, dealing 
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with a different sort of loss, also turned to towards the spiritual when confronting the riddles of 
the world.    
The second essay draws us even closer to a discussion of Schiller.  Konstantin Kolenda’s 
“American Pragmatism and the Humanist Tradition,” like the works of Mailloux, can’t resist the 
pull of the American nameplate.  Kolenda provides a passing reference to Schiller, noting that he 
demonstrated “the capacity of philosophy to produce intellectual delight.”  What is 
unintentionally, I assume, illuminating is what occurs after this reference.  The very next section 
is entitled “The Humanism of Pragmatism.”  But the delightful Schiller is nowhere to be found.  
Kolenda, in discussing the open religious systems of pragmatism a few pages later, transforms 
the nameplate into the familiar template utilized in many discussions of religion and pragmatism: 
Peirce, James and Dewey.111   Blake and Kolenda remind us that the places where Schiller’s 
thoughts might inspire contemporary resonance are at once easy to see, yet hard to find.   
In both religion and science, working Schiller into the dialogue—and enriching the 
same—is not difficult given the currency of his interests.  It would be interesting to imagine 
Schiller’s response to two claims made by Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989): 
(1) “the underlying strategy of James’s utilitarian/pragmatist philosophy of religion is to 
privatize religion”; (2) “But since religion has aims other than gratification of our need to predict 
and control it is not clear that there need be a quarrel between religion and orthodox, atoms-and-
void science.”112  The first, as others have elsewhere noted about Rorty’s pragmatism generally, 
seems in keeping with his project to, ahem, privatize pragmatism.  The second, however, raises 
                                               
111
 Konstantin Kolenda, “American Pragmatism and the Humanist Tradition,” in Pragmatism, 239-44. 
 
112
 Rorty, Contingency, 149-50. 
 
  558 
an issue which Schiller would complicate: to what extent do religion and science work together 
to create a subjective/predictive appraisal of how to control society?   
Humorously, a person who takes umbrage at Rorty’s views of science and religion is 
none other than Schiller’s old foe, Hartshorne.  In Rorty & Pragmatism (1995), he calls Rorty’s 
views “vaguely generalized metaphysical agnosticism.”  And then, sounding partly like the aging 
Schiller, Hartshorne explains his views in context of a world awash in threats of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical destruction: “My ethics, which has a metaphysical aspect, tells me that . 
. . we are obligated to do the best we can with a situation one would not have chosen to be in, but 
which has been brought about by freedom, the source of both good and evil.”113  Though 
Schiller’s was a thoroughly personalized metaphysic, it was no less an attempt to navigate a 
tenuous world than Hartshorne’s.  Schiller offers a window into far more optimistic debates 
about the limits of faith and reason.114   He affords us a compelling historical instance of trying 
to reconcile what are now, more and unfortunately more, seen as divided by an ideological 
chasm.   
                                               
113
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objective correspondence in reality for his taste (Richard Rorty, “Response to Hartshorne,” in Rorty, 33). 
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Schiller also point historians of pragmatism to the numerous other actors whose roles 
have been obscured.  No historical treatment, rhetorical or otherwise, should or likely can deal in 
all the details, discuss all the personalities.  But realizing the centrality of Schiller’s involvement 
in pragmatism necessarily extends the possible inquiry into others who have been forgotten.  
Within pragmatism proper, the likes of Goldstein, Knox, and Papini admit of other stories worth 
considering, other aspects of pragmatism in need of retelling.  Outside of pragmatism, Personal 
Idealists such as Sturt, logicians such as Sidgwick, and psychologists such as Myers provided 
instances of productive interaction, and at times conflict, which have been downplayed.  The 
contemporaneous history of pragmatism admits of an ever expanding diversity of players.  By 
being so generous in adopting, it seems fair that it should be the same in rediscovering.    
With the research questions answered and potential areas of future research addressed, 
we can turn to a final consideration of rhetorical biography.  The introduction argued that this 
was a species of a much larger genus, rhetorical criticism.  It was further noted that both are 
under-utilized as critical tools for examining historical artifacts, debates, and personalities in 
what has come to be known as the study of “the history of ideas.”  The goal, then, has been to 
highlight the utility of these critical methods by way of contemporary revisions.  Those revisions 
have been twofold: (1) the expansion of the traditional canon of style, specifically the figure of 
repetition, to encompass more than the set speech or text, and (2) the use of reception studies to 
buttress the analysis of the arguments undertaken by, and about, Schiller.   While Schiller’s 
style—with its emphasis on polemic and the reiteration of key topics—played an important role 
in the origins of pragmatism, it was those very same tendencies that resulted in a shift away from 
him once he died.   And it is by reference to the arguments themselves—public and private, 
altered and unaltered, assuredly trivial and surprisingly topical—that we obtain a greater measure 
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of certainty as regards the importance of those rhetorical strategies.  The result, I argue, is a more 
thorough understanding of the importance rhetorical choices make in crafting persuasive 
arguments. 
These observations are all as much subjective appraisals as they are renderings of the 
objective details.  And no assessment, particularly one that lays claim to pragmatism, can 
obscure the valuation inherent in this endeavor.  After all is written, Fish can still argue that 
pragmatism implies nothing and Kloppenberg is free to press the democratic connections.  
Because pragmatism—as a historical movement, as a philosophical method, as a contemporary 
object of inquiry—is not predicated on any one argument.  Rather, pragmatism is a concept that 
will continue to be rhetorically negotiated by the participants and their arguments.   Thus the aim 
of this project may seem paradoxically meager and grand.  As much as this is the study of one 
man, it is also a plea for a wider view than currently held as regards pragmatism.  And this 
appeal runs up against an obvious obstacle.  Welcoming back into the fold a person who so 
notably banished others requires a degree of tolerance.   But such tolerance, insofar as it remains 
cognizant of the costs and benefits of defending Schiller’s pragmatic humanism, is useful.    For 
a revised history of pragmatism is meant to expand, not restrict, the options of those who find 
merit in its claims.   
 
The Agnostic 
The man, who knows, he cannot know 
Knows all, he knows, + all, he knows, not too 
Oh wondrous knowledge let him go, 
He knows too much, I know, for me or you.115 
 
 
                                               
115
 F. C. S. Schiller, Notebook #1, n.p., n.d., Holograph Notebooks, Box Eleven, F. C. S. Schiller Papers 
(Collection 191), Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, University of California, 
Los Angeles. 
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